U.S. Department of State

Africa and the Middle East

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I. Summary

Angola does not have a significant drug production, trafficking, or use problem. Cannabis is cultivated in limited amounts and consumed locally; it is not exported to the U.S. Transit for illegal drugs through Angola appears to be increasing, particularly cocaine from Brazil to South Africa. Seizures of cocaine rose from 16 kilograms in 1999 to 124.5 kilograms this year. Angola is the only Southern African Development Community (SADC) member that has not signed the SADC counternarcotics protocol.

II. Status of Country

Angola is not a major center of drug production, trafficking, money laundering, or production of precursor chemicals, and is not likely to become one. Angola lacks the industrial base to produce chemicals, and remains underdeveloped and unstable, politically, discouraging money laundering for lack of investment potential. Despite resource challenges, the Angolan National Police increased dramatically the amount of cocaine seized in 2000. The police attribute this to the greater emphasis placed on narcotics trafficking and greater awareness of Angola as a transshipment point for cocaine. Nigerian traffickers control the smuggling of cocaine from Brazil through Angola to South Africa.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2000

Angola is not a signatory to the SADC Counternarcotics Protocol. Money laundering is not an issue in Angola, given the country's poorly developed financial and banking sector. There are no laws dedicated exclusively to money laundering, although money laundering is defined as a crime in the counternarcotics laws. There have been no cases prosecuted involving public corruption connected to narcotics trafficking. In December 2000, Angola signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.

The authorities made 710 drug-related arrests during the first nine months of 2000. In the first nine months of 2000, the authorities opened 619 new cases relating to drugs.

Although Angola has legislation mandating treatment for those convicted of narcotics consumption, there are no public treatment centers. Angola does cooperate with South Africa in fighting the flow of cocaine from Angola to South Africa, and South Africa has offered training and equipment to the Angolan police. Angola also cooperates on a regional basis via the SADC and recently signed a law enforcement cooperation agreement with Brazil, the shipment point in South America for much of the cocaine transiting Angola. The Angolan National Police have expressed strong interest in participating in U.S. training opportunities.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

The Angolan National Police will be receiving U.S. counternarcotics training in FY 2001 for the first time. This program stems, in part, from agreements reached during Bilateral Consultative Commission meetings with the U.S., in which Angola expressed strong interest in receiving law enforcement training. Over the longer term, Angola should benefit, as should the whole southern African region, from the U.S.-funded International Law Enforcement Training Academy (ILEA) under construction in Gabarone, Botswana.


I. Summary

The Government of Benin (GOB) continues to make progress in the fight against illegal narcotics trafficking and has taken steps to implement a national drug strategy. Benin is not a major narcotics producing country. Benin remains a transit route for illegal narcotics transiting West Africa. Illegal drug trafficking and GOB drug seizures have increased throughout the year. The GOB has developed a national antidrug policy and is struggling to implement its national action plan and coordinate drug enforcement operations through a newly established central office (OCERTID). Inadequate resources, interagency rivalry and reports of mishandling of evidence or possible corruption have impeded law enforcement efforts.

II. Status of Country

Benin is not, and is not likely to become, a significant producer of drugs or a source of precursor chemicals. Benin produces a limited amount of cannabis for local consumption. Benin remains a West African transit point for regional traffickers rather than a production site.

Benin's porous borders permit African drug traffickers, primarily Nigerian nationals, freely to transit the country and/or access its ports. This ease of access has made Benin a transshipment point in the regional and sub-regional narcotics trade of heroine, cocaine, and cannabis.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2000

Policy Initiatives. The Ministry of Interior, with EU financial support, completed a comprehensive national antidrug policy and a detailed national action plan this year. In December 2000, Benin's leading antinarcotics enforcement officials and government leaders discussed priorities at a roundtable discussion on ways to finance, support, and implement GOB antidrug policy.

GOB has not established the infrastructure or legal apparatus to enforce the comprehensive antinarcotics law enacted in 1997. The law is based on the UNDCP model designed to bring countries into compliance with the 1988 UN Drug Convention. It criminalizes money laundering and provides for stronger sentences, asset forfeiture, and inter-agency cooperation.

Prompted by the steady increase of drug abuse and drug traffic along the West African coast, the GOB decided to take action in 1999. The Ministry of Justice, Legislation and Human Rights, together with the Ministry of Health, suggested a national policy to fight drug abuse and illegal narcotics trafficking. The government called for a national master plan to report on the drug abuse situation and define strategies to combat this problem. The GOB began drafting a plan in 1999 and the national policy was published in July 2000. The GOB is now struggling to implement the good intentions set out in their policy, but as in any other areas they must confront the problem of limited resources.

Accomplishments. The GOB newly developed national action plan identifies ten antidrug strategies to be implemented over the next six years. It has three major objectives:

  • Improve the strategies to combat the use of illegal drugs;

  • Reinforce current programs to fight against illegal drug production and trafficking; and

  • Develop strategies to prevent drug abuse and provide for the treatment and rehabilitation of ex-drug abusers.

The national antidrug policy identifies six priorities and four complementary programs. The six priorities are as follows:

  • Coordinate the national effort against illegal narcotics;

  • Provide additional resources to the national drug lab;

  • Provide additional resources to law enforcement agencies, increasing their drug intervention capabilities;

  • Reinforce smuggling controls at Cotonou's major shipping port;

  • Develop programs for the prevention of drug use and treatment of drug abusers;

  • Create a national health center for drug abusers.

Complementary projects focus on illegal drug production, prescription drug abusers/traffickers, prevention programs for single families, and the creation of a canine brigade.

Law Enforcement Efforts. The law enforcement agency with primary responsibility for combating narcotics smuggling and drug abuse is the newly created central office against illegal drug trafficking (OCERTID). The OCERTID is subordinate to the director general of the national police, and works with customs, the gendarmes and national police drug units.

Law enforcement agencies have had sporadic success in combating the various elements of the drug trade. The biggest problem facing the government is a lack of equipment and training. The GOB has not been able to supply much in the way of increased resources to law enforcement agencies that are responsible for drug enforcement. This lack of resources undermines such organizational changes as the new central drug policy coordinating body (OCERTID). Adequate resources are still not available or devoted to drug interdiction efforts. Agencies continue to focus their efforts on arresting and prosecuting small-scale couriers and users. Despite the establishment of a central drug office, efforts have been hampered by inter-agency rivalry and a lack of cooperation among law enforcement agencies.

There have also been allegations of improper disposition or destruction of drug evidence. A recent example involved the seizure of 21 kilograms of cocaine at the Cotonou airport in November. This success, the largest seizure of the year, was overshadowed by press reports of disappearing drug evidence and problems in OCERTID. Seizures generally increased in 2000 from last year's figures. Specifically, in 2000, GOB officials seized 368.247 kilograms of cannabis, an increase from seizures of 24.977 kilograms of cannabis in 1999. Authorities seized 21.494 kilograms of cocaine in 2000, an increase from seizures of 18.26 kilograms of cocaine in 1999. Seizures of heroin in 2000 fell to 7.572 kilograms in 2000, down from 16 kilograms in 1999

Corruption. Press reports have alleged corruption in the government and hinted at problems with the disposition of drug evidence, but the exact extent of corruption and its impact on law enforcement and antidrug operations is unknown. This is a difficult area to discern and resistance to oversight reform still persists within the government.

Agreements and Treaties. Benin is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. In December 2000, Benin signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the protocol on trafficking in persons. A drug enforcement cooperation agreement between the French and Beninese governments is still in force, and continues to aid Benin's antidrug efforts. There is no bilateral extradition or mutual legal assistance treaty between the U.S. and Benin.

Cultivation and Production. Cannabis is the only narcotic cultivated or produced in any sizable quantity in Benin. No figures on the exact extent of production are available at this time. The cannabis grown in Benin is used for domestic consumption.

Drug Flow/Transit. Benin is an important transit/staging point for Southeast Asian heroin being smuggled to Nigeria for onward transport to Europe and the United States, and for South American cocaine being transported to Nigeria en route to Europe. There is no evidence that the heroin that enters the U.S. from Benin is in an amount sufficient to have a significant effect on the U.S. Marijuana from Nigeria transits Benin on its way to other African countries. Nigerian traffickers control drug trafficking activities in Nigeria. In addition to transiting the county overland, drugs depart the country via Cotonou's international airport and seaport.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

U.S. Goals and Objectives. The primary objective of the U.S. Government is to combat the transit of drugs to the U.S. or Europe. The goal is to build on successful antinarcotics cooperation efforts, focusing on prevention, interdiction, prosecution, and treatment.

Bilateral Cooperation. The U.S. and Benin signed a Letter of Agreement in 1995 under which the U.S. agreed to provide communications equipment and drug testing kits to GOB narcotics units. This assistance was provided in 1998. The authorities in Benin point to many areas which would benefit from additional assistance. Such help is under consideration, but Benin must compete with other problem narcotics countries in the region.

The Road Ahead. Benin is beginning to seriously address the drug problem in the region by implementing coordinated antidrug measures. This is obviously the first step down a long road. The U.S. Government must continue to engage Benin on the complex issues of counternarcotics enforcement, asset forfeiture, and money laundering while providing assistance whenever possible. Border and port control measures are two obvious priority areas, as is increased training of enforcement personnel. The GOB must strengthen and effectively use the asset forfeiture and narcotics-related money laundering laws that are currently in place.


I. Summary

Botswana is not a major producer of drugs and is not a significant drug transit country. Isolated pockets of marijuana cultivation occur, but eradication efforts keep production levels low. In 2000, drug control officials seized sizable amounts of cannabis, as well as small amounts of cocaine, heroin, and one seizure of phenobarbitane. Exact seizure and crop destruction figures are not available. Based on a slight decrease in the number of drug-related arrests in Botswana, drug control officials see less reason to fear an increase in drug use in Botswana. Nevertheless, cannabis remains a popular drug here, due to its low price. Botswana is a transit point for Mandrax being smuggled from India to South Africa. Individuals caught with drugs in Botswana can expect fines and prison sentences.

II. Status of Country

Botswana is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. In 1998, Botswana created a National Drug Control Coordination Council, chaired by the Office of the President. In addition, the Government of Botswana has strict legislation against the production, trafficking, and money laundering associated with the drug trade. There was concern that Botswana's status as an offshore financial center might lead to money laundering, so the banking system and regulations surrounding Botswana's International Financial Services Center (IFSC) have been carefully drafted and closely monitored. Botswana courts rigorously sentence drug related offenses, with mandatory sentences of one to five years' imprisonment for possession of fewer than 60 grams of cannabis, and five to ten years for more than 60 grams. In 2000, the authorities made 237 arrests relating to cannabis use. The Botswana National Police Service looks forward to training opportunities provided by donors, such as its 1999 participation in a regional drug enforcement seminar in South Africa sponsored by the U.S. DEA.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs

There has been a reduction in the number of seizures of drugs transiting and entering the country. Police seized 718 kilograms of cannabis during 2000, mostly from Zambia and Mozambique. In 2000, police seized three shipments of cocaine; the first one originated in Brazil and transited Frankfurt and South Africa en route to Botswana. The second and third cocaine shipments were seized from Nigerian dealers crossing the border into Botswana. Police seized one kilogram and 696 grams in the three shipments. The Botswana Police report good cooperation on narcotics control with their regional partners, especially South Africa and Zimbabwe. The UNDCP has provided drug detection dogs to Botswana for use in drug searches. There are no indications of senior government officials being involved in drug related offenses.

IV. Policy Initiatives and Programs

The U.S. Government did not conduct any counternarcotics policy initiatives in Botswana during the reporting year. Police officials anticipate more cooperation with USG officials upon the opening of the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Gaborone, anticipated in late 2001.


I. Summary

Cameroon remains a transit point for drug trafficking. Nigerian nationals, residing in Cameroon, traffic heroin to Europe and to some extent also to the United States. There is no available evidence that the heroin that enters the U.S. from Cameroon has a significant effect on the U.S. Marijuana from Nigeria is smuggled through Cameroon to Europe. Most types of drugs are available in Cameroon, but cannabis is the only drug produced locally in significant quantities. Cannabis is also the most widely consumed drug. There have been only minor drug seizures in 2000. Cameroon is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Cameroon is also a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 Protocol, as well as to the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Cameroon signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Crime and its protocols in December 2000.

II. Status of Country

Cameroon produces few illegal drugs and is not known to be heavily involved in trafficking. However, the trafficking situation in Cameroon is difficult to assess because interdiction is sporadic and few records are kept. According to Cameroonian police, interdictions in 2000 were down from the low levels reported in 1999. The police attributed the drop to improved smuggling tactics in the face of customs and police services that are poorly equipped, poorly trained and often indifferent.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2000

The Government of Cameroon (GRC) initiated no new counternarcotics initiatives in 2000. The National Committee for the Fight against Drugs (CNLD), created in 1992 under the auspices of the Ministry of Health, remained inactive. There were no specific legal or law enforcement measures taken to prevent and punish narcotics-related public corruption. Only limited resources and training are available to customs and police officials. Counternarcotics law enforcement activities in 2000 were limited to a few minor drug seizures.

Marijuana is widely available in Cameroon. Cannabis is grown nationwide but is concentrated in the East, Center, Littoral and Northwest provinces. According to the local press, it is the drug most widely used among Cameroonians.

The government of Cameroon does not maintain accurate statistics on drug production or seizures. However, the government did report the following seizures for the period January through November 2000: 2,467.8 kilograms of cannabis, as well as 211 packets not weighed; 2 kilograms of heroin; 53 packets (not weighed) of cocaine; and 125 kilograms of psychotropic drugs. The GRC also reported that 17 hectares and nine other cannabis farms (surface area not reported) were destroyed, and 287 persons were detained for possession, consumption and/or trafficking.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

DEA instructors conducted a two week West African Regional Drug Enforcement Seminar in Accra, Ghana, paid for by State Department assistance funds. Six Cameroonian law enforcement officers attended this conference in April 2000. Training was provided in traditional and specialized investigative techniques as related to narcotics investigations. Given the low starting point of GRC capabilities, a small investment in the training of police and customs officials could markedly increase their ability to combat drug trafficking.

Cote D'ivoire

I. Summary

With two of the largest ports in Africa and an extensive and developed infrastructure, C�te d'Ivoire has been a transit point for narcotics from Asia and Latin America to Europe and, to a lesser extent, North America for the past several years. Although domestic narcotic drug production is negligible, and limited to cannabis, consumption of hard drugs is increasing. Heroin and cocaine use are rising in Abidjan. As a consequence of the coup, the United States suspended law enforcement training. C�te d'Ivoire is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances.

II. Status of Country

Abidjan is a major West African financial center and a regional hub for international airline travel and ocean freight. Following USG civil aviation visits under the "Safe Skies" program, security at Abidjan's International Airport has been tightened somewhat. Nevertheless, drugs and money continue to pass through Ivoirian ports and across porous borders, along with other smuggled goods, including light arms and stolen vehicles. As the middle class grows, there is also a slowly growing domestic trade and use of heroin and cocaine. Police seizures of narcotics are usually small.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2000

Policy Initiatives. During the first six months of 2000, the Ivoirian Government implemented a number of recommendations made by foreign countries interested in improved narcotics law enforcement and incorporated them into a National Antidrug Plan adopted in May 2000. Among other things, the plan identifies drug-abuser rehabilitation and effective enforcement as key priorities for the next year and accordingly defines areas of responsibility between government agencies, non-governmental organizations, and international donors.

Accomplishments. Following the December 1999 coup d'etat, the U.S. Government suspended most bilateral assistance under section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act. C�te d'Ivoire continues, however, to cooperate with the U.S. Government and the European Union's (EU) African Antidrug Program to identify training needs for drug abuse prevention, law enforcement, and addict treatment and rehabilitation. A regional narcotics training center in Grand Bassam still offers classes underwritten by the EU.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Foreign antidrug assistance to the Inter-Ministerial Committee (CILAD) and the Regional Training Center for the Battle Against Drugs have contributed significantly to improved law enforcement efforts. During the first half of 2000, Ivoirian police reported making 230 seizures of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and other illegal narcotics. These included cocaine seizures totaling 3.442 kilograms, heroin seizures totaling 1.234 kilograms with the arrest of 20 people, and over 200 marijuana seizures totaling 118.7 kilograms with the arrest of 287 people. The majority of seizures took place at the Port of Abidjan, Abidjan's Felix Houphouet-Boigny International Airport, and post offices. In addition, authorities apprehended eight children being used as "mules" to transport illicit drugs.

Corruption. Corruption continues to hamper efforts to enforce counternarcotics laws effectively. In addition narcotics law enforcement took a low priority during the ten-month-long military regime. Despite highly publicized anticorruption initiatives during the first half of 2000, corruption, ironically, appeared to worsen. While corruption goes largely unpunished, C�te d'Ivoire does not encourage or facilitate illicit narcotics production or distribution of drugs or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions as a matter of state policy. With the primary agencies for narcotics enforcement seeing several leadership changes in ten months, implementation of policy suffered.

Agreements and Treaties. The Government of C�te d'Ivoire is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, 1961 UN Single Convention and its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. The Ivoirian Government is also a party to several regional counternarcotics cooperation agreements negotiated among members of the West African States' Regional Economic Organization (ECOWAS). C�te d'Ivoire signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime in December 2000.

Cultivation/Production. Cannabis is grown in limited quantities in remoter parts of southern Cote d'Ivoire. Most is consumed domestically as marijuana. Crops are frequently concealed among cocoa plantings and then transported overland to Abidjan and other distribution centers. The National Police continue to destroy any cannabis they may find, but they do not keep itemized records of crop seized and quantities destroyed, and there are no good estimates of production.

Drug Flow/Transit. Abidjan is a major transit point for Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin en route to Europe and to a lesser degree the U.S., and South American cocaine destined for Europe. Cote d'Ivoire's major seaports in Abidjan and San Pedro reportedly serve as important transit points too. Drugs and other goods cross borders by boat and vehicle, unnoticed or abetted by bribed border officials. There are no reliable statistics on the movement of narcotics.

Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction). Public drug-abuse awareness programs still remain in the planning stages but are making some progress. Following the installation of the new civilian government, several antidrug groups, in collaboration with the Ministries of Interior and of Youth, have met to discuss rejuvenating antidrug efforts. Several government agencies participated in workshops sponsored by the EU's African Antidrug Program to identify core drug education priorities. The resulting broad training effort focuses on drug awareness and demand reduction, as well as on law enforcement, treatment, and rehabilitation of former addicts.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

U.S. Policy Initiatives. U.S. policy goals remain focused on reducing use of C�te d'Ivoire as a transit point for narcotics trafficking.

Bilateral Cooperation. With the suspension of aid following the December 1999 coup, U.S. Government assistance at most levels has been frozen. In late 1999, the U.S. Government did purchase a computer and a fax machine for the CILAD, but has not presented them, pending a resolution of C�te d'Ivoire's political crisis and a resumption of U.S. aid.

The Road Ahead. As in previous years, the principle U.S. counternarcotics interest will be drugs entering from Latin America and transiting towards Europe, and possibly the U.S. Training for police, Gendarmerie, customs, and judicial authorities remains the key prerequisite for broader U.S.-Ivoirian engagement in counternarcotics efforts. With a democratically elected government now in power, a resumption of assistance is under review.


I. Summary

The Republic of Egypt is not a major producer, supplier, or consumer of narcotics or precursor chemicals, and it does not have a serious money laundering problem. Heroin and cannabis are transported through Egypt, though the level of traffic has decreased in 2000. The Antinarcotics General Administration (ANGA) is the main drug-fighting organization in Egypt. Egypt is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

Opium and cannabis are grown in Egypt, but Egypt is not a significant producer or consumer of narcotics or precursor chemicals. It is also not a money laundering center. Narcotics destined for Western Europe and the United States continue to be shipped through Egypt, though this phenomenon has diminished in 2000 and there is no evidence that significant amounts of narcotics are reaching the U.S. in this manner. The transshipment of Southwest Asian heroin is made easier by Egypt's long uninhabited borders and by the high level of shipping which passes through the Suez Canal. Narcotics also pass through Cairo International Airport. The substances most commonly abused in Egypt are cannabis and legitimate pharmaceuticals.

ANGA, which has jurisdiction for investigating all criminal matters relating to narcotics, maintains offices in all major cities and airports. By providing equipment and training, the U.S. DEA's country office assists ANGA in certain smuggling interdiction operations in the Canal Zone and at Cairo Airport, and in crop eradication operations in the Sinai Peninsula and Upper Egypt.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2000

Policy Initiatives. The Government of Egypt (GOE) continues to develop the comprehensive drug control strategy which it formally adopted in 1994. ANGA, the Egyptian Coast Guard, Customs Service, Ministry of Interior, and selected military units cooperate in task forces to interdict narcotics shipments. The ministries of health and education and several religious organizations run drug awareness programs designed to curb demand. All these initiatives are hindered by a lack of money and equipment. Parliament continues to review a draft law which would criminalize money laundering.

Accomplishments. In 2000, parliament passed a law which will allow ANGA to keep for its operational use a portion of the assets seized from narcotics traffickers.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Egyptian law enforcement efforts are largely directed toward combating terrorism; nonetheless, ANGA runs an effective program of arresting low level drug traffickers and users, intercepting narcotics shipments, and eradicating illegal crops. Cultivation of illicit narcotics continues to drop each year. Large scale seizures and arrests are rare, since drug abuse is not a serious problem in Egypt. ANGA runs a drug awareness campaign and a crop substitution program in the Sinai that has not proven successful. ANGA's eradication unit runs monthly operations against cannabis and opium crops in the Sinai. A 1971 law penalizes those who make money through illegal activity. Using this law, prosecutors may impound for up to five years the money and property belonging to a convicted criminal and his family. The Court of Ethics, Egypt's highest criminal court, is then responsible for determining whether the seized assets were obtained as a result of the illegal activity, and therefore forfeit. Up until relatively recently seized assets went directly to the Egyptian Treasury, however a law passed in 2000 provides that a portion of the assets seized in narcotics cases now goes to ANGA.

Corruption. There does not appear to be serious narcotics related corruption in Egypt. However, low level local police officials have been identified and arrested on corruption charges. The GOE has strict laws and harsh penalties for government officials convicted of involvement in narcotics trafficking or related areas.

Agreements and Treaties. Egypt and the U.S. have had an extradition treaty in place since the late 1800s. Egypt is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1971 UN Convention, and the 1961 UN Single Convention and its 1972 Protocol. The Senate granted its advice and consent to ratification of the U.S.-Egypt Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty on October 18, 2000, but the Treaty has not yet entered into force. Egypt signed the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime in December 2000.

Cultivation and Production. Cannabis is grown year round in the northern and southern Sinai and in Upper Egypt, and opium poppy is grown in southern Sinai for part of the year. The UNDCP reports that opium production is declining in Egypt, but cannabis production is increasing. The rough terrain dictates that plots be of irregular shape, so ANGA estimates crop sizes by visual inspection. After identifying illegal plots through aerial observation and confidential informants, ANGA conducts daylight eradication operations, cutting and burning the plants. ANGA has not yet implemented its planned herbicide eradication program. No heroin processing plants have been discovered in Egypt for over ten years. There is no evidence that either Egyptian-grown opiates or marijuana reach the U.S. in quantities sufficient to have a significant impact on the U.S.

Drug Flow/Transit. ANGA judges that drug shipments through Egypt have decreased in recent years, and attributes this to improved border surveillance and interdiction, as well as to the creation of new smuggling routes from South Asia through the Commonwealth of Independent States. However, ANGA does intercept illicit shipments of hashish and heroin en route to Western Europe and North America from Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction). The ministries of health and interior sponsor a national narcotics campaign and several public awareness campaigns. These programs are aimed at school-aged children and rely on the mass media. DEA's office in Cairo also assists the GOE with a national drug awareness campaign. Most treatment for the small group of drug abusers is carried out by private doctors.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

U.S. counternarcotics policy in Egypt remains to engage in a bilateral program to further reduce transit of narcotics and to decrease opium and cannabis cultivation. This policy has the following specific objectives: increase training; target eradication efforts; improve interdiction methodology; and improve intelligence collection and analysis.

In FY 2001, the U.S. Government plans to provide the GOE with training in police science, anticorruption measures, and border control operations. The DEA country office will continue to work closely with ANGA to improve interdiction and eradication techniques, and to develop additional sources of information on production and trafficking.


I. Summary

Ethiopia does not play a major role in money laundering, precursor chemical production associated with the drug trade, or in the production of narcotic drugs. Ethiopia is strategically located along a major narcotics transit route between Southwest Asian heroin production and European markets and West African trafficking networks. Cannabis is grown in Ethiopia, but most is consumed in rural areas of Ethiopia itself. More heroin is transiting Ethiopia for markets in West Africa, Europe, and the U.S. Nigerian traffickers are active in Ethiopia. Ethiopia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. The Ethiopian Counternarcotics Unit (ECNU) maintains an interdiction team at Bole International Airport, which is where its two drug sniffer dogs primarily are employed. The interdiction unit routinely screens passengers, luggage, and cargo on flights arriving from "high risk" origins, i.e., Bangkok, New Delhi, Mumbai, and Islamabad. The sniffer dogs are employed examining cargo, and checking luggage. These inspections are conducted routinely with a degree of randomness.

II. Status of Country

Ethiopia is not now, and not likely to become, significant in the production of narcotic drugs or precursor chemicals or in money laundering. Cannabis is being produced for export primarily to neighboring countries.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 2000

Ethiopia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and continues to strive to fulfill its goals and objectives. The use of heroin and other hard drugs remains quite low, due primarily to the high street price for poor Ethiopians and limited availability. To the extent these hard drugs are available, it is in large part due to the "spillover" effect from the transiting of drug couriers through Bole International Airport. Bole is a major air hub for flight connections between Southeast and Southwest Asia and Africa, and much of the heroin entering and/or transiting Ethiopia comes from Asia. Many of the flights require up to two-day layovers in Addis, permitting the introduction of these drugs into the local populace. In December 2000, Ethiopia signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.

Law Enforcement Efforts. The ECNU has been severely hampered due to a lack of leadership at the federal level. At the unit level, the ECNU also suffers from managerial/leadership problems. The ECNU commander lacks a commitment to attacking the international drug problem, and the agency remains focused on domestic issues. The interdiction team at Bole has been largely ineffective. While the number of officers assigned has increased, only two have had any real training and they are the only two who can speak a language other than Amharic. The interdiction unit has improved its ability to identify male Nigerian/Tanzanian drug "mules" who traditionally swallow drugs to smuggle them. Arrests at Bole more than tripled from last year's figures.

Policy Initiatives. The Ethiopian Ministry of Justice is in the process of updating the penal code. Currently the maximum sentence for trafficking is two to three years, which does not serve as an effective deterrent to using Ethiopia as a transit country. Additionally, Ethiopia lacks a central coordination body to coordinate systematically antidrug activities of the Ministries of Education, Health, and Justice. Senior Ethiopian government officials are attempting to refocus attention on the drug problem and to re-commit Ethiopia to countering narcotraffickers.

(Money laundering is not considered a problem.) Asset seizure, extradition, and mutual legal assistance, as in past years, were of little significance. The United States does not have an extradition treaty with Ethiopia.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives

There were no major policy initiatives undertaken in 2000. The focus has remained on the law enforcement side, specifically the ECNU. Ethiopia has limited resources and must rely on assistance from external sources. Overall, the ECNU needs more training, better facilities, and improved access to resources. The persistent weakness of the ECNU's current leadership, however, makes any immediate improvement quite difficult.


I. Summary

Ghana takes an active stance against drug abuse and illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Ghana has active enforcement, treatment and rehabilitation programs. Ghana is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

Ghana is a transit point for Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin being smuggled to Europe and the U.S., and South American cocaine being smuggled to Europe. Increasing amounts of heroin are destined for the U.S. Some of the cocaine might also be smuggled to South Africa. Trafficking occurs at Accra's Kotoka International Airport as well as at the ports of Tema and Sekondi. Overland trafficking occurs at the land borders with Togo (Aflao) and Cote d'Ivoire (Elubo). As Nigeria improves its interdiction efforts, Nigerian traffickers are strengthening their presence in Ghana. Ghana-U.S. law enforcement coordination continues to grow in strength and effectiveness. The trafficking problem has fueled an increase in domestic consumption. Marijuana use is a problem in Ghana, although the extent of local cultivation is uncertain because of its clandestine nature. Through public education programs, citizens assist in combating drug trafficking and abuse. Money laundering occurs, but this is not a major problem. Precursor chemicals are also not a major problem.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2000

Policy Initiatives. The Narcotics Control Board (NCB) coordinates the efforts of, and cooperates with, all organizations involved in counternarcotics activities. The NCB's 2000 activities encompassed numerous areas of counternarcotics, including enforcement and control, education, prevention, treatment, rehabilitation, and social re-integration. In 1999 the NCB completed its counternarcotics master plan, the "National Plan of Action 1999-2003." The European Commission, through its African Antidrug Program (AADP) for West Africa, provided financial and technical support. This plan is still waiting for government approval.

In 1999, reacting to difficulties with the current narcotics law, the NCB submitted proposals to the Ghanaian government to amend the 1990 narcotics law in order to increase penalties for drug offenses; raise the fine for narcotics-related violations due to depreciation of the Cedi; allow the NCB to manage and administer any property forfeited under the narcotics laws; and allow prosecution for possession or control of anyone who employs a courier "mule," agent or servant. These proposals are still pending government approval.

Accomplishments. The NCB and other law enforcement agencies enjoyed greater and more successful cooperation with U.S. law enforcement agencies. Most notably, this resulted in the arrests of a number of Ghanaian drug traffickers, two of whom have been convicted. The NCB increased its national drug education efforts to include district assemblies, which resulted in increased law enforcement/civilian cooperation in combating drug cultivators and traffickers.

Ghana attended the 43rd session of the Commission on Narcotics Drugs in Vienna in March 2000. Ghana also attended the Fourth Inter-Ministerial Drug Control Meeting in Dakar, Senegal, in October 2000.

Law Enforcement Efforts. The police's Criminal Investigative Division's (CID) narcotics unit based in Accra undertakes interdiction exercises, surveillance, raids, arrests, seizures and prosecutions alone or in joint operations with officials of the NCB. NCB narcotics squads are located at known drug-prone areas—Kumasi (Ashanti Region), Koforidua (Eastern Region), Ho (Volta Region), and Tema (Greater Accra Region)—which conduct similar operations. The Customs Excise and Preventative Service (CEPS) Headquarters also has a counternarcotics unit, as well as antidrug squads at some of Ghana's borders (at Aflao, on the border with Togo, and at Elubo, on the border with Cote d'Ivoire), and at Kotoka International Airport in Accra.

Figures show an increase in cocaine-related arrests but a decrease in cocaine seizures. The decrease in seizures may be due to the January and February 2000 arrests of major Nigerian drug traffickers who were primary suppliers of cocaine to Ghana. A gram of cocaine, depending on its purity, sells at Cedis 100,000-120,000 (approx. $15-$18). Heavily diluted cocaine sells at Cedis 60,000-80,000 per gram (approx. $9-$12).

Figures also show an increase in heroin-related arrests, but a decrease in heroin seizures. This may be due to the deterrent effect of increased law enforcement vigilance at the borders. A gram of heroin, depending on its purity, sells at Cedis 80,000-100,000 (approx. $12-$15). Heavily diluted heroin sells at Cedis 50,000-60,000 per gram (approx. $7-$9).

There was a large increase in marijuana-related arrests, but a decrease in marijuana seizures in 2000. The amount of marijuana seized may have increased drastically in December 2000 (figures not yet available), because the NCB often seizes more marijuana after the marijuana crop is harvested in September-October. The NCB has also received more information on drug cultivators and dealers from the public after increased public education on the harmful effect of drugs on the individual and the society. A kilogram of marijuana sells at Cedis 12,000 (approx. $1.80). A wrap or joint sells at approx. Cedis 5000-6000 (approx. $.70-$.90).

Drug dealers, using matchsticks as measures, retail cocaine or heroin at prices between Cedis 2,000-6,000 (approx. $.30-.90), depending on purity. The matchstick is dipped in cocaine or heroin powder and what collects on the head of the match is sold. A drug addict might need eight to twelve of these matchsticks per day.

The police narcotics unit and the NCB have worked closely with the Accra INS sub-office. INS Accra shares information about drug activities between the U.S. and Ghana with the Ghanaian police and NCB, who corroborate the information and ultimately work the case. This free exchange of information has resulted in the arrest of several drug dealers, including the arrest of an individual in Ghana, who is now the subject of a U.S. pending extradition request.

In April 2000, a Ghanaian drug smuggling syndicate based in the U.K. and Holland was apprehended by British and Dutch security personnel. Three Holland-based Ghanaians were arrested in Amsterdam, preparing to smuggle cocaine to the U.K. from Suriname. Four other U.K.-based Ghanaians have also been arrested and convicted. They received from four to 20 years in prison.

A combined team of the NCB's rapid deployment unit and the police narcotics unit continued to investigate the production and distribution of narcotics and to destroy cultivated cannabis farms and plants in 2000.

The NCB has succeeded in working with DHL and Federal Express to intercept packages containing narcotics that were destined for the U.S., Ghana or London. The NCB has also apprehended members of a drug ring in the Brong-Ahafo Region who were colluding with transport drivers to smuggle drugs through the country.

Corruption. In 2000, there were no narcotics-related public corruption cases reported. In two 1998 cases involving the Bureau of National Intelligence and the Judicial Service, the four officers involved in the case were dismissed from service.

Agreements and Treaties. U.S.-Ghana extradition relations are governed by the 1931 U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, to which Ghana acceded. Ghana has extradited four narcotics offenders to the U.S. under this treaty (one in 1992 and two in 1994), and one in January 2001 to New Jersey. Additionally, Ghana is a party to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Protocol Agreement, which includes an extradition provision. Ghana is also a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1971 UN Convention of Psychotropic Substances, and the 1961 UN Single Convention and its 1972 Protocol.

Cultivation and Production. Marijuana or cannabis grows in Ghana, so it is easily available and widely abused. The cannabis comes from the rural areas, where it is cultivated illicitly, to the urban areas, where there is a ready market for it. Some cannabis is trafficked to neighboring and European countries. Cannabis is usually harvested in September and October, and knowing this, law enforcement teams increase surveillance and investigation during this time. As a result, a large amount of arrests for cannabis cultivation are made in the latter part of the year.

Drug Flow/Transit. Cocaine and heroin are the main drugs that transit Ghana. Marijuana is smuggled from Ghana to other African countries and to Europe. Narcotics entering Ghana are sometimes repackaged for reshipment to the United States and Europe through various concealment methods, such as: hidden in false compartments in briefcases, bags, and cartons; deposited into unaccompanied baggage; hidden in exported foodstuffs (yams, pineapples, palm oil, fish, kola nuts, etc.); or placed in condoms or cellophane and swallowed by individuals. According to DEA, there has been a notable increase in the number of intercepted packages of narcotics destined for Accra. There is no evidence that drugs transiting Ghana have a significant effect on the U.S.

According to the NCB, citizens of neighboring West African countries increasingly use Ghanaian passports to travel because it raises less suspicion than other countries' (e.g., Nigeria). In addition, drug smugglers often purchase their tickets in Ghana because the exchange rate favors their currencies. The NCB reports that after a series of unpublicized orientation courses for law enforcement officers this year, security agents were able to increase greatly arrests of drug smugglers. No illegal drug labs were detected in Ghana in the year 2000.

Demand Reduction. The NCB works with the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development to encourage members of Ghana's 110 district assemblies to include narcotics prevention in their education programs. To date, the NCB has conducted drug education programs in 98 of the district assemblies. The NCB also works with the Ministries of Health and Education through the ministries' representatives on the Board. Drug prevention education programs, such as the program the NCB held on the International Day Against Drug Abuse on June 26, target the general public as well as the ministries themselves.

The NCB has received cooperation from Ghanaian newspapers in publishing names and pictures of arrested drug offenders, which the NCB hopes will increase awareness of the repercussions of drug activities.

In September 2000, the NCB, in collaboration with the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) Regional Office for West and Central Africa, organized a national workshop on drug abuse in Ghana. In October and November 2000, the NCB organized workshops to educate media on narcotics issues, and to coordinate with NGOs on a drug prevention education action plan.

With school authorities, the NCB has helped establish drug-free clubs in all secondary schools to apply peer pressure in drug prevention education. In 1999 the Ministry of Education, in cooperation with the NCB, placed drug prevention education in the curriculum of all secondary schools and teacher training colleges. The NCB distributes literature, broadcasts antidrug information on the radio, and delivers talks at schools nationwide.

The School Health Education Program (SHEP) handles all drug prevention education in Ghanaian schools. In addition, in 1999 the NCB and the Ghana Education Service formed a committee with SHEP, school guidance counseling units, and the welfare unit, to oversee drug prevention education. Treatment programs have lagged behind preventative education and enforcement due to lack of funding.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

U.S. Goals/Objectives. U.S. goals are: to strengthen Ghanaian law enforcement capacity; to strengthen the Ghanaian government's ability to identify, investigate, and prosecute narcotics-related crime; and to reduce Ghana's role as a transit point for narcotics.

Bilateral Cooperation (Accomplishments). U.S. Customs participated in a counter narcotics survey with DEA in April 2000. Ghana and DEA co-sponsored a regional antinarcotics course for law enforcement officers in March. INS Accra joined DEA in conducting the training. Law enforcement officers from Ghana, Togo, Benin and Cameroon attended. In September the U.S. and Ghana signed a Letter of Agreement renewing their narcotics cooperation and calling for the U.S. to provide $82,000 in equipment to support the NCB in its efforts to combat narcotics in Ghana.

In November 2000, Ghana's Police Criminal Investigative Division, working with U.S. Customs and DEA, apprehended the Ghanaian leader of an East Coast narcotics ring. The alleged drug smuggler is the subject of an extradition request.

Ghana has also received technical equipment from the German government and the UNDCP to aid the NCB's counternarcotics activities.

The Road Ahead. The U.S. wants to continue its productive relationship with the Government of Ghana to improve Ghana's narcotics interdiction and investigative capabilities.


I. Summary

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a major transit route for opiates smuggled from Afghanistan and through Pakistan to the Persian Gulf, Turkey, Russia and Europe. There is no evidence that narcotics that transit Iran are in an amount sufficient to have a significant effect on the U.S. at this time. Iran is no longer a major drug-producing country. An extensive 1998 U.S. survey concluded that the amount of opium poppy cultivation in Iran is negligible, down from an estimated 3,500 hectares in 1993. A follow-up survey in 1999 reached the same conclusion. However, as the President's November 2000 notification to the U.S. Congress of the list of major drug producing and transit countries stated, Iran is a country of concern. As with all former producing countries, the USG continues to watch closely for evidence of renewed poppy cultivation or evidence that drugs transiting Iran reach the U.S. in significant quantities. The Government of Iran (GOI) has informed the United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) that Iran has a growing drug addiction problem and lacks the resources to counter it.

The GOI has demonstrated a sustained political commitment to combat narcotics. Iran has been in the forefront of efforts by the international community to combat the Afghan drug trade, leads all other countries in the region in drug seizures by a wide margin, and has lost 3,000 law enforcement personnel in clashes with drug traffickers. No other country has taken the fight to the Afghan drug trade to this extent. The UNDCP opened a country office in Tehran in June 1999, and inaugurated a $12.7 million drug control project with Iran. Iran has received assistance from the United Kingdom and Germany and has bilateral counternarcotics cooperation agreements with 11 other countries.

Iran has ratified the 1988 UN Drug Convention, but its laws do not bring it completely into conformity with the Convention. The UNDCP is working with Iran to modify Iran's laws, train the judiciary, and improve the court system.

II. Status of Country

Land routes across Iran constitute the single largest conduit for Southwest Asian opiates en route to European markets. Entering from Afghanistan and Pakistan into eastern Iran, heroin, opium, and morphine are smuggled overland, usually to Turkey but also to Turkmenistan, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Drugs are also smuggled by sea across the Persian Gulf.

Iran is no longer a major drug-producing country. An extensive 1998 U.S. survey and a 1999 follow-up survey both concluded that the amount of opium poppy cultivation was negligible, down from an estimated 3,500 hectares in 1993. According to the UNDCP, there are no reports indicating illicit narcotics cultivation in Iran.

Drug addiction in Iran is a growing problem. In 2000, Iran estimated that the number of drug addicts was approximately 1.2 million, with an additional 600,000 drug abusers. Observers ascribe the GOI's more aggressive antidrug policies, at least in part, to concern over burgeoning drug addiction and related crime problems in major Iranian urban centers. Although the most common drugs of abuse are opium and hashish, the UNDCP reports that the use of heroin, including by injection, is increasing in Iran.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs

Policy Initiatives. The UNDCP opened a country office in Tehran in June 1999. The UNDCP and the GOI signed an agreement for a four-year project called "NOROUZ" ("New Year" in Farsi). The project is budgeted at $12,701,200 by UNDCP, and supported by Iran at the level of $120 million per year. The project has four parts: interdiction, demand reduction, legal assistance and reform, and community awareness. Since 1995, the GOI has better recognized the magnitude of its domestic drug abuse problem and has given counternarcotics efforts more resources and higher-level attention.

In January 2000, Iran hosted the first International Conference of Drug Liaison Officers, which was attended by representatives of regional and European countries, as well as Canada and Australia. The conference agreed to establish a regional drug control information center in Tehran.

Iran has asked the UNDCP and its member nations to support Iran's counternarcotics efforts because Iran's efforts reduce the flow of drugs to Europe. In response, the United Kingdom has provided nearly $2 million for counternarcotics assistance.

Law Enforcement Efforts. The Antinarcotics Headquarters coordinates the drug-related activities of the police, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the Ministries of Intelligence and Security, Health, and Islamic Guidance and Education. Iran claims to spend up to $400 million annually against drugs.

Iran pursues an aggressive border interdiction effort. A senior Iranian official told UNDCP that Iran has invested as much as $800 million in a system of berms, channels, concrete dams, sentry points, and observation towers, as well as a road along the entire eastern border. According to press reports, the Iranian government also intends to build a fence along its border with Afghanistan. There are enormous on-going costs associated with these projects. Thirty thousand law enforcement personnel are regularly deployed along the border, and Iran reports that more 3,000 law enforcement officials have been killed in clashes with heavily-armed smugglers during the last two decades. Interdiction efforts by the police and the Revolutionary Guards resulted in numerous drug seizures. According to the UNDCP, Iranian officials seized 253,275 kilograms of illicit drugs in 1999 and 116,475 kilograms of illicit drugs in the first six months of 2000, dismantling a total of 2,310 trafficking groups in 1999 and 2000. In addition, after two years of bumper crops in Afghanistan, opium stocks are likely to be at record levels, making it unlikely that drugs will stop flowing into Iran in large amounts.

Drug offenses are under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts. Punishment for narcotics offenses is severe, with death sentences possible for possession of more than 30 grams of heroin or five kilograms of opium. Those convicted of lesser offenses may be punished with imprisonment, fines, or lashes, although lashing is said to have been used less in the last year or two. Offenders between the ages of 16 and 18 are afforded some leniency. Iran has executed more than 10,000 narcotics traffickers in the last decade. According to the UNDCP, Iranian officials made 228,413 drug-related arrests (including on charges of drug abuse) in 1999, while the number of prisoners convicted on drug-related charges was 85,301, approximately 60 percent of Iran's total prison population. Some human rights groups allege that the government has been known to charge its political opponents with drug offenses falsely as a means of neutralizing their political activities.

Corruption. Although there is no indication that high government officials aid or abet narcotics traffickers, there are periodic reports of corruption among lower-level law enforcement, which is consistent with the transit of multiple-ton drug shipments across Iran. Punishment of corruption appears to be harsh.

Agreements and Treaties. Iran is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Its legislation does not bring it completely into conformity with the Convention, particularly in the areas of money laundering and controlled deliveries. The UNDCP is working with Iran through the NOROUZ Program to modify its laws, train the judiciary, and improve the court system. Iran is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention, and has signed bilateral counternarcotics agreements with Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, India, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Turkey, and Turkmenistan. Iran has shown an increasing desire to cooperate with the international community on counternarcotics matters and recently signed separate quadripartite MOUs on money laundering and drug control with Armenia, Georgia, and UNDCP as well as Azerbaijan, Georgia, and UNDCP. In January 2000, according to press reports, Iranian airport officials visited Cyprus to look into ways to control drug trafficking from Iran to Cyprus. Iran participates with the UNDCP and Pakistan on a reasonably successful project to bolster drug interdiction efforts on the Iran-Pakistan border. Iran is a member of the ten-nation Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), which established a counternarcotics center as part of its secretariat. In March, the Iranian permanent envoy to the UN's Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) was elected by a large majority to chair the Commission for a one-year term. Under his able chairmanship, the Commission developed a reporting and evaluation program to follow up on commitments made at the 1998 UNGA Special Session on Drugs. Iran has been active participant on counternarcotics issues through the UN's "Six Plus Two" process on Afghanistan, and signed the Six Plus Two Regional Action Plan in September. Iran signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime in December, 2000.

Cultivation and Production. A 1998 U.S. survey of opium poppy cultivation in Iran and a detailed multi-agency assessment concluded that the amount of poppy being grown in Iran is negligible. The survey looked at more than 1.25 million acres in Iran's traditional poppy-growing areas, and found no poppy crops growing there, although the survey could not rule out the possibility of some cultivation in remote areas. A follow-up survey in 1999 reached the same conclusion. This evidence that no poppies are being grown is consistent with Iranian claims and evidence from other concerned countries and the UNDCP.

U.S. opium crop estimates were a major factor in placing Iran on the Majors List in previous years. In 1993, a previous survey showed 3,500 hectares under cultivation. Iran was removed from the Majors List in 1998, following the survey.

Drug Flow/Transit. Shipments of opiates enter Iran overland from Pakistan and Afghanistan by camel, donkey or truck caravans, often organized and protected by heavily-armed ethnic Baluch tribesmen from either side of the frontier. Once inside Iran, large shipments are either concealed within ordinary commercial truck cargoes or broken down into smaller sub-shipments. Foreign embassy observers report that Iranian interdiction efforts have disrupted smuggling convoys sufficiently to force smugglers to change tactics and emphasize concealment. The use of human mules reportedly is on the rise.

Most of the opiates smuggled into Iran are smuggled to neighboring countries for further processing and transportation to Europe. Turkey is the main processing destination for these opiates, most of which are bound for consumption in Russia and Europe. Established trade and smuggling routes from Iran through Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Armenia provide alternative routes to Russia and Europe that bypass Turkish interdiction efforts. Additionally, despite the risk of severe punishment, marine transport is used through the Persian Gulf to the nations of the Arabian Peninsula, taking advantage of modern transportation and communication facilities and a laissez faire commercial attitude in that area. A significant, but unknown, quantity of opiates smuggled into Iran remain there for domestic consumption by an estimated 1.8 million users.

Demand Reduction. The Government of Iran estimates the number of drug addicts at over 1.2 million, with an additional 600,000 drug abusers. However, a physician and member of the national committee against AIDS estimated that there are 3.3 million addicts. UNDCP estimates that 1.5 to two percent of a population of 63 million has a serious drug problem. Ninety-three percent of these are male, with a mean age of 33.4 years (plus or minus 10.5 years), and 1.4 percent are HIV positive. In the past, the Islamic Republic attacked illegal alcohol use with more fervor than drug abuse, and was reluctant to discuss drug problems openly. Since 1995, public awareness campaigns and attention by two successive Iranian Presidents as well as cabinet ministers and the parliament have given demand reduction a significant boost. Under the NOROUZ plan, the Government of Iran spent more than $68 million dollars in the first year for demand reduction and community awareness. The Prevention Department of Iran's Social Welfare Association runs 12 treatment and rehabilitation centers, as well as 39 out-patient treatment programs in all major cities. Some 30,000 people are treated per year, and some programs have three-month waiting lists. Narcotics Anonymous and other self-help programs can be found in almost all districts as well and several nongovernmental organizations focus on drug demand reduction. There are no methadone treatment or HIV prevention programs, although HIV infection in the prison population is a serious concern.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

In the absence of diplomatic relations with Iran, the United States of America has no narcotics initiatives in Iran. The United States Government continues to encourage regional cooperation against narcotics trafficking. Iran and the U.S. have expressed similar viewpoints on illicit drugs and the regional impact of the Afghan drug trade. In the context of multilateral settings such as the UN's Six Plus Two group, the U.S. and Iran worked together productively. Iran nominated the U.S. to be coordinator of the Six Plus Two counternarcotics initiative.

The Road Ahead. The GOI has demonstrated sustained national political will and taken strong measures against illicit narcotics, including cooperation with the international community. Iran's actions support the global effort against international drug trafficking. Iran's effort to work more closely with its neighbors to counter the Afghan drug trade is another promising development.


I. Summary

Israel is not a significant trafficker or producer of drugs, however the expanding supply of drugs in Israel is a significant problem. Israel works closely with U.S. agencies in combating drug trafficking. On August 8, 2000, Israel passed legislation that criminalizes money laundering, creates procedures for criminal and civil forfeiture of the proceeds of money laundering, introduces reporting of the transfers of currency into and out of Israel, and authorizes the issuance of regulations requiring the reporting of irregular transactions by Israel financial institutions. Israel is now in the process of implementing regulations to implement this new law. Israel plans to become a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention in the near future.

II. Status of Country

Israel is not a significant trafficker or producer of drugs or precursor chemicals. Internally, the drug market is experiencing a growing demand among nearly all sectors of the population and an expanding supply of a wide variety of drugs.

In June 2000 Israel was included in the announcement of non-cooperative countries, published by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), primarily because Israel at that time did not have a comprehensive legal mechanism for fighting money laundering. However Israel in August passed money laundering legislation, and is now in the process of formalizing regulations to implement the new law.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2000

Policy Initiatives. The Antidrug Authority (ADA) sets Israeli drug policy, and has focused its initiatives on children and youth at high risk for the past several years. Its budget has remained approximately $9.5 million during this time. The ADA continues to coordinate the activities of the ministries responsible for various antidrug initiatives (Education, Health, Labor and Social Affairs, Interior, Justice/Internal Security), and reports directly to the Prime Minister. The ADA remains concerned about the expanding supply of drugs, including marijuana, amphetamines and their derivatives, as well as heroin, cocaine and LSD.

Israel continues to work closely with the U.S. DEA and U.S. Customs officials. This year the Israeli Customs Authority expanded its responsibility over narcotics-related enforcement activities, and initiated new training for its officers on conducting drug searches.

Accomplishments. Israel's passing of money laundering legislation was a key accomplishment in 2000. As of December 2000, Israel police have formalized regulations regarding reporting mechanisms, and we expect banking regulations to be finalized in coming weeks. Israel is also in the process of setting up a Money Laundering Authority (to include a Financial Intelligence Unit), which will coordinate information and activities with Israeli police, customs, banks and all other relevant entities.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Some 19,066 drug-related files were opened by the Israeli police during the first ten months of 2000, a more than 16 percent rise over the same period the previous year. The number of drug-related arrests during the first ten months of 2000 rose six percent over the same period last year to 3,923. Since the mid-1990s drug files have accounted for about four percent of all criminal files. In the last decade the number of files involving drug crimes increased 143 percent from some 8,000 files in 1989 to nearly 19,500 files in 1999. The Israeli police report that most drug criminals are males between the ages of 22 to 35; some 30 percent are non-Jews and the remaining ten percent are women.

This year Israel seized some 260,000 ecstasy tablets, down from last year's 464,651, but more than double the number of tablets seized in 1998. Seizures of cannabis were up to 8,557.6 kilograms during the first ten months of 2000, compared to 3,470 during the first ten months of 1999. Seizures of cocaine in Israel this year dropped to about 9.8 kilograms as compared to 28 kilograms in 1999. (More than 50 kilograms of cocaine were seized in other countries en route to Israel, according to Israeli police.) Some 7,681 blotters of LSD were seized this year, similar to the 7,301 seized last year. The authorities seized 65.8 kilograms of heroin during the first ten months of 2000, compared to 112.5 kilograms in the first ten months of 1999.

Corruption. Israel has no cases of government corruption in narcotics issues, nor is there any explicit or implicit official support for narcotics-related activities. Israel does not have legislation for public corruption relating to narcotics per se, but punishes corruption in all government matters when proven.

Agreements and Treaties. In 1991 Israel and the U.S. signed a Memorandum of Understanding calling for bilateral cooperation to combat illicit narcotics trafficking and abuse. A Dual Taxation Treaty entered into force between the U.S. and Israel in 1994, which grants U.S. tax authorities limited access to bank account information. A customs mutual assistance agreement and a mutual legal assistance treaty are also in force between Israel and the U.S. On December 12, 2000, Israel signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime in Palermo, Italy. Israel has acceded to the European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters and is a party to the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotics and its 1972 Protocols. Israel is one of 36 parties to the European Treaty on Extradition and has separate extradition treaties with several other countries, including the U.S. Under a 1999 law, an Israeli citizen who is deemed a "resident" of Israel at the time of the extradition request may be extradited for trial abroad only if the state seeking extradition promises in advance to return the person to Israel to serve any sentence imposed. Israel is party to a number of other bilateral and multilateral agreements that through unrelated issues allow for extradition and asset seizure. Israel cooperates with UNDCP. Israel has signed but has not ratified the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Israel now has legislation in place for each of the 11 principal elements of the Convention.

Cultivation/Production. Israeli police report that marijuana is cultivated locally in Israel and drugs are produced in clandestine laboratories in limited quantities. The amount cultivated or produced locally has only a marginal impact on the local drug market, and no proven impact on the U.S.

Drug Flow/Transit. Most of the drugs that are imported to Israel are consumed in Israel. Three tons of marijuana, which had transited Israel from South Africa to Romania, were seized in 2000. The Israeli police have no additional information to indicate Israel has acted as a drug transit point this year. The main countries that provide illicit narcotics to Israel include Jordan (heroin, ecstasy, cocaine), Lebanon (heroin, cannabis), Egypt (marijuana), India and Turkey. Source and transit countries also include Asia, Europe, South America and the United States. Israeli police indicate that Israelis play a major role in international drug trafficking networks in source, transit and distribution countries.

Amphetamines and their derivatives, originating primarily from the Netherlands, are the most prevalent drugs in Israel. The most widely used derivative is MDMA (ecstasy), which is generally marketed in the form of a capsule or tablet bearing various imprints (or occasionally in the form of powder). The drug is widely used at "acid parties" which have become popular among Israeli youths. The availability of amphetamines on the Israeli market is estimated to be in the millions of tablets; the price of an ecstasy tablet ranges from $12-$25.

The supply of marijuana (primarily from Egypt) has increased in Israel, and is measured by tens of tons. The price of 4-5 grams of marijuana is $12-$20, and it is $175-$500 per kilogram. Hashish use has steadily decreased. Israeli police say this is probably the result of reduction in hashish cultivation in Lebanon due to international pressure to destroy the crops. The hashish market in Israel is measured in hundreds of kilograms.

Heroin is widely available in Israel (mostly transiting from Jordan, also from Lebanon and Egypt), although there has been a decrease in the quantities seized thus far this year (65.8 kilograms as compared to 112.5 kilograms in 1999). The heroin market is measured in tons, and prices range from $12-$25 for a dose, $25-$50 for a gram, and $22,500-$30,000 for a kilogram. Israeli police indicate that Jordan has become an important transit country for heroin trafficked from Lebanon and Turkey via Syria, but this heroin goes to Europe. There is no evidence that significant amounts of heroin trafficked through Israel reach the U.S.

Cocaine is widely available on the Israeli market (measured in tons), and is imported from source countries in South America (Peru, Bolivia and Colombia) and from transit countries in South and Central America (Mexico, Chile, Brazil, Venezuela, and Paraguay) as well as from Europe and the U.S. The price of a gram ranges from $38-$112 and a kilogram costs $50,000-$55,000.

LSD has become more popular in Israel over the past decade, and is measured in tens of thousands of LSD squares. The price of LSD is $12-$25 per blotter, or $15 for a micro-tablet. An expensive drug used by a small sector of the population, the opium market is measured in tens of kilograms.

Domestic Consumption of Illicit Drugs. The Israeli police estimate that the Israeli drug market is valued at billions of dollars per year. In 2000, the police estimated the size of the Israeli drug market for 2000 as 50 tons of marijuana, five tons of heroin, two to three tons of cocaine, millions of amphetamine tablets and tens of thousands of LSD blotters.

Domestic Programs. The Israel Antidrug Authority (ADA) works in the areas of prevention, education, public awareness, treatment and rehabilitation, law enforcement, community development, research and information, personnel training, and encouragement of NGOs. The ADA focuses on youth and soldiers, through the Ministry of Education, local authorities, the media and parents. Youth groups considered at highest risk are new immigrants from the former Soviet Union, Ethiopia and the Arab sector, according to the ADA. "Rave culture" is gaining strength in Israel.

The ADA's main prevention methods are creating awareness of the risks of drug use and providing programs to help "at risk" youth through peer counseling, sports, travel and other programs. The ADA has modified its programs to meet specific cultural and educational needs of minorities and new immigrants. It focuses on youths both in the official educational system and in Israel's many youth movements, centers, and sports clubs, as well as the Army. The ADA also coordinates drug-related programs of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Labor/Social Affairs, as well as throughout the NGO community.

According to the ADA, there are 250,000 drug users (from casual to hard core addicts for all types of drugs) in Israel. Of those, an estimated 20,000 are heroin addicts.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. The U.S. continues to aim to assist Israel in building a self-sustaining drug interdiction force and foster regional cooperation with Israel's neighbors on antidrug issues.

Bilateral Cooperation. There is excellent ongoing cooperation between the USG and Israel on the exchange of records in connection with narcotics investigations and proceedings. U.S. DEA officials in Cyprus report that their Israeli counterparts keep good records on narcotics-related issues and always share them with the USG. U.S. Customs officials in Rome concur that Israeli authorities are fully cooperative with Customs investigations.

The Road Ahead. As Israel has passed money laundering legislation this year, it has cleared the last impediment preventing it from ratifying the 1988 UN Drug Convention, which it plans to do in the near future. Israel's Antidrug Authority will continue to focus on prevention within the youth segment of the population. Israeli Customs authorities plan to expand the number of drug-sniffing dogs in 2001 as part of the country's overall effort to improve drug interdiction on its borders and within its ports of entry.


I. Summary

Jordan's domestic drug abuse problem remains small due principally to the active enforcement of existing laws, and the cultural and religious norms which help limit the use of illegal drugs. Jordan remains, however, a transit country owing to its pivotal location between drug producing countries to the north, and drug consuming countries to the south and west.

Cooperation between neighboring countries, particularly Lebanon and Syria is ongoing and strong. Cooperation with Israel continues, but Jordan hopes for a more comprehensive and cooperative agreement. Hashish abuse remains on the decline due largely to eradication efforts and tough enforcement from Lebanon, where the drug reportedly originates. Jordanian officials announced a three-year national strategy to combat drugs of abuse in December 1999. Jordan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and looks forward to increased support from the European Union and the United States to improve its enforcement capabilities.

II. Status of Country

No obvious indicators suggest that Jordan's status will change from a narcotics transit country to a narcotics producing country in the foreseeable future. Seizure statistics and reported drug use appear to support this assessment.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2000

Policy Initiatives. In December 1999, Jordanian officials announced "The National Plan To Combat Drugs And Psychotropic Substances," a government-wide project scheduled to run through 2001. The estimated budget of the project is U.S. $22.4 million. Activities during the past year consisted mainly of meetings to discuss demand reduction and law enforcement/drug transit cooperation. The plan has three main objectives: prevention, enforcement, and treatment.

Law Enforcement Efforts. As a member of Jordan's Ministry of Interior, Jordan's Public Security Directorate maintains an active Antinarcotics and Counterfeiting Bureau. The bureau sought and received training from France during the reporting period. France trained Jordanian enforcement officers in raid and self defense techniques during narcotic investigations. Jordan continues to seek training assistance from the U.S. and other European nations.

Cannabis and heroin seizures rose in 2000 to 127 kilograms from 41 kilograms the previous year; cannabis seizures at 297 kilograms were also up sharply from a year ago (46 kilograms). The largest heroin seizure ever occurred in 2000, when police and antinarcotics officers seized 107 kilograms of heroin being smuggled into Jordan by way of the Syrian border. The heroin was valued at about U.S. $4 million. Seizures of synthetic drugs in tablet form also increased dramatically during 2000. The tablets are a combination of amphetamines, colloquially called "captagon." Enforcement officials attribute this increase to the flow of drugs from Turkey, making their way to and through Jordan. Jordanian officials hope to further enhance the already existing antinarcotics cooperation with Turkish enforcement officials and improve efforts to combat this increase.

Corruption. Jordanian officials report no narcotic-related corruption or investigations into narcotics-related corruption for the reporting period. There is currently no evidence to suggest that senior level officials are involved in narcotics trafficking.

Agreements and Treaties. Jordan remains committed to existing bilateral agreements with Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, and Hungary, which have established some form of counternarcotics cooperation. Jordan and the U.S. concluded an extradition treaty in 1995. To date, no drug-related extraditions have taken place.

Cultivation or Production. Authorities vigorously enforce existing laws that prohibit the cultivation or production of narcotics in Jordan.

Drug Flow/Transit. Jordan is a transit country for illicit drugs moving from producing countries to consuming countries. Enforcement officials directly ascribe this drug flow problem to the long, desert borders with Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the West Bank.

Domestic Programs and Demand Reduction. The Ministries of Interior and Health offer treatment and rehabilitation as an alternative to incarceration. Enforcement officials and prosecutors work side-by-side to identify potential candidates for treatment. The Ministry of Education and Health makes presentations on drug abuse to school age youths, conducts awareness briefings, and produces lecture materials on prevention, awareness, and addiction. Health and social development officials expect the number of treatment beds to rise in the coming years. Taking advantage of Jordan's widespread adherence to Islam to advance drug abuse prevention, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Holy Places also directs religious speeches, lessons, and lectures on awareness of drugs and their effects.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. While no training was scheduled in 2000, Jordan's training needs are under regular review, and efforts will be made in the future to include Jordan in available drug enforcement training.

Bilateral Cooperation. Jordan's Antinarcotics Bureau has a close working relationship with the DEA through the DEA country attach� in Cyprus. The U.S. does not have a bilateral narcotics agreement with Jordan.

The Road Ahead. U.S. Embassy officials expect continued cooperation with Jordanian enforcement and policy officials on antinarcotics matters, and look forward to Jordan's initiatives and efforts to implement vigorously Jordan's three-year national strategy to combat drugs of abuse.


I. Summary

Kenya is a transit country for heroin and hashish, mostly bound from Southwest Asia for Europe and North America. Heroin transiting Kenya has increased in quality in recent years and is destined increasingly for North America. Although it is difficult to determine the exact impact that heroin transiting Kenya is having on the U.S., it is not yet believed to be significant. Multi-ton hashish shipments also continue to be interdicted in Kenya. Cannabis/marijuana is grown commercially and imported from neighboring countries for the illegal domestic market. There is a small local heroin market. Air passenger profiling and other techniques have helped reduce airborne heroin shipments. Interdiction of narcotics shipments by sea has been less successful, but a program for profiling shipping containers is in effect and has resulted in some seizures. Police broke up a major heroin and hashish smuggling operation in 2000, but the leader of the ring escaped arrest and was subsequently murdered in the Netherlands. Other members of the ring are now being prosecuted. Police also uncovered two cases of heroin smuggling by airline personnel. The Kenyan government has not finalized a long-awaited National Drug Control Master Plan. The Antinarcotics Unit (ANU) of the Kenyan police continues to cooperate well with international and regional antinarcotics officials. Although government officials profess strong support for antinarcotics efforts, the overall program suffers from a lack of resources. In 2000, Kenya ratified the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Kenya is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and has enacted full implementing legislation.

II. Status of Country

Kenya is a significant transit country for narcotics moving to Europe and a minor producer of narcotics. Heroin and hashish transiting Kenya are having an increasing impact on the United States. Cannabis or marijuana is produced in commercial quantities for the domestic market, while small quantities of cocaine and other drugs originating outside Africa transit Kenya for consumers in southern Africa.

Kenya's sea and air transportation infrastructure, and the network of commercial and family ties that link some Kenyans to Southwest Asia, make Kenya an important transit country for Southwest Asian heroin. In 2000, officials noted a dramatic shift from low-purity brown heroin to higher-purity white heroin, and believe that the higher-purity product is destined principally for the United States. Officials now believe that the United States is at least as important as Europe as a destination for heroin transiting Kenya. It is difficult to estimate the quantities of heroin reaching the United States through Kenya and other points in East Africa, and the impact of this heroin on the U.S. market is therefore also difficult to estimate precisely - although it is not yet believed to be significant. Kenya is also an important transit point for Southwest Asian cannabis resin (hashish), and police have made several multi-ton hashish seizures in recent years. After a hiatus of two years, police seized four kilograms of cocaine in 2000 which was believed to be destined for sale in southern Africa. Although Nairobi serves as a regional financial center, there is no direct evidence that Kenya is a major money-laundering country. Kenya does not produce significant quantities of precursor chemicals.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2000

Policy Initiatives. Kenya has drafted, but not yet adopted or implemented, a national drug control master plan. Assurances from the relevant minister that the plan would be presented to the cabinet in 2000 were not fulfilled. Regional cooperation, however, improved during 2000 with regular meetings and sharing of information between narcotics officials in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Rwanda. Kenyan authorities also improved internal information sharing and operational coordination between various government agencies, airlines and other entities. ANU officers also began a program of outreach to judges and magistrates, educating them on antinarcotics law and the seriousness of narcotics issues. ANU continued to publicize its message effectively through local media. Kenya has no crop substitution or alternative development initiatives for progressive elimination of the cultivation of narcotics.

The ANU remains the focus of Kenyan antinarcotics efforts. The ANU received slightly more resources from the central government in 2000, and continues to expand the number of antinarcotics officers. A key element of the proposed master plan is the identification of a senior civil servant to liaise with donors and coordinate a broad antinarcotics effort, including a much-expanded preventative education campaign. The ANU would then be freer to concentrate on its interdiction mandate.

Accomplishments. The ANU continued its professionalization efforts in 2000. Many ANU officers have undergone training, much of it through the UNDCP and bilateral programs sponsored by the U.S., German, British, Japanese, and other governments. The ANU and the Kenyan Customs Service now have a cadre of officers proficient in profiling and searching suspected drug couriers and containers at airports and seaports. There have been some good results with profiling at airports, although generally for couriers and not major traffickers. Results at seaports have been more modest. The ANU deploys drug-sniffing dogs and took action in 2000 to improve the dog teams' effectiveness. The ANU is building its surveillance capabilities and is able to carry out increasingly sophisticated operations. Inadequate resources, a problem throughout the Kenyan police force, significantly reduce the ANU's operational effectiveness.

The ANU cooperates fully with the United States and other nations on antinarcotics investigations and other operations. Police broke up a major heroin and hashish smuggling operation in 2000, but the leader of the ring escaped arrest and was murdered in the Netherlands while Dutch officials were considering a Kenyan request for assistance in arresting and extraditing the suspect. Other members of the ring are now being prosecuted in Kenya. The ANU also cooperates with other agencies in controlled delivery operations.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Kenya seized 27 kilograms of heroin in 2000 and arrested 65 people on heroin-related charges. This represented the fourth straight year of increase in the amount of heroin seized, and a substantial increase over the 17.5 kilograms seized in 1999. Officials report a sharp shift from lower-quality brown heroin to higher-quality white heroin, and report that much of the white heroin transiting Kenya is destined for the Untied States and not Europe, and that quantities are still believed to be too small to have a significant effect on the U.S. Most couriers arrested in Kenya conceal heroin by swallowing it. The ANU concentrates its antiheroin operations at Kenya's two international airports, but has also begun targeting street users of heroin, particularly in Mombasa.

Kenyan authorities seized 4,715 kilograms of hashish in Mombasa in 2000 in a single raid. The hashish was being processed for shipment to Europe or North America. The incident was the latest in a series of multi-ton hashish seizures on the Kenyan coast. In addition, officials made several smaller seizures. Officials believe Kenyan coastal waters and ports are important transit points for the shipment of hashish from Pakistan or Afghanistan to Europe and North America.

Cocaine seizures in Kenya have fluctuated widely in recent years. Police made four arrests and seized 4.17 kilograms of cocaine in 2000. Police also arrested one person for possession of a prohibited psychotropic drug (Diazepam). Kenyan authorities destroyed 11 acres of cannabis in 2000 and arrested 2895 persons on cannabis-related charges. In 17 cases, the amounts of marijuana seized exceeded 25 kilograms. The ANU continued a program of roadblock operations begun in 1999 in cannabis-producing areas, resulting in the second straight year of significant increase in seizures of cannabis and its derivatives. Officials report increased importation of cannabis from Uganda and Tanzania where the quality is said to be better than Kenya's domestic product. Both domestic and international traffickers in cannabis have begun to process the product before transporting to reduce bulk and eliminate parts of the plant which are not consumed by users.

Kenyan authorities also identified significant drug smuggling by airline personnel who used their preferential access at Nairobi's International Airport to facilitate the transport of Southwest Asian heroin to Europe and/or North America. Police made arrests and are pursuing prosecutions in two cases involving airline personnel. The ANU continued to operate roadblocks for domestic drug trafficking interdiction and is pursuing a variety of policy initiatives for more effective coordination with other government agencies. The ANU has launched an outreach effort to persuade judges and magistrates of the seriousness of antinarcotics offenses and identify ways cases can be handled more effectively. The ANU also disseminates its antinarcotics messages effectively through local media.

Corruption. Corruption remains a significant barrier to effective narcotics enforcement. Despite Kenya's strict narcotics law, which encompasses most forms of narcotics-related corruption, there are continued but unconfirmed reports of public officials being involved in narcotics trafficking. There were no prosecutions of public officials for narcotics-related corruption in 2000. In at least one case, however, police proceeded with a prosecution despite intervention by senior political officials on behalf of the accused. Police frequently complain that the courts are ineffective in handling antinarcotics cases, although it is not clear whether this is a result of corruption, misunderstanding of the law, or simple judicial backlog. The ANU points out, for instance, that 20 foreign suspects charged with heroin offenses have skipped bail in Kenya since 1995. The ANU has urged the courts to tighten up on bail procedures in these cases. More broadly, anticorruption efforts are an integral part of an economic recovery program negotiated with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These efforts led to significant prosecutions during 2000, but the future of the anticorruption program was not clear at year's end.

Agreements and Treaties. Kenya is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, which it implemented in 1994 with the enactment of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Control Act. Kenya is also a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention and its 1972 Protocol. Kenya's National Assembly ratified the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances in 2000. The 1931 U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty remains in force between the United States and Kenya through a 1965 exchange of notes. Under a 1991 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), amended in 1996, the U.S. donated surveillance and computer equipment to the ANU in 1997. The MOU also provides for sharing of narcotics-related information. The United States and Kenya signed another MOU in 2000 to cover the donation of motorcycles, computers and related equipment to the ANU. The three nations of the East African Cooperation (EAC) group (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) continue to consider a draft protocol to enhance regional antinarcotics cooperation.

Cultivation and Production. A significant number of Kenyan farmers illegally grow cannabis or marijuana on a commercial basis for the domestic market. Fairly large-scale cannabis cultivation occurs in the Lake Victoria basin, in the central highlands around Mt. Kenya and along the coast. Foreign tourists export small amounts of Kenyan marijuana. Kenyan officials eradicated about 450 acres of cannabis in 1999, but eradicated only a small amount (11 acres) in 2000. Officials continue to conduct aerial surveys to identify significant cannabis-producing areas. Officials from the ANU are attempting to develop an innovative program of cooperation with the Kenya Wildlife Service to eradicate cannabis grown in the remote and environmentally sensitive Mt. Kenya region. The Kenyan government has no estimates of the size or yield of the cannabis crops.

Drug Flow/Transit. Kenya is strategically located along a major transit route between Southwest Asian producers of heroin and markets in Europe and North America. In 2000, the amount of heroin seized in Kenya and the number of people arrested increased for the fourth straight year. Heroin normally transits Kenya by air, carried by individual couriers. These couriers were once primarily West Africans. More recently, however, couriers are more commonly South Asian (Indian, Pakistani) or East African (Tanzanian, Ugandan). Once in Kenya, heroin is typically delivered to agents of West African crime syndicates, mainly Nigerian. Kenyan police also discovered two significant cases of airline personnel involved in international heroin trafficking in 2000. Prosecutions are continuing in both cases.

The most significant change in heroin trafficking patterns noted by police in 2000 was a dramatic shift from low-purity brown heroin to high-purity white heroin. Over the last five years, heroin seized in Kenya has shifted from almost 100 percent brown to approximately 80 percent white. Officials attribute the increasing amount of white heroin to increased processing capabilities in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Officials also say that the shift from brown to white heroin has been accompanied by a shift from the European to the North American market. According to these officials and other knowledgeable sources, at least half the heroin transiting Kenya is now destined for the United States.

Local, regional and international antinarcotics officials are also paying closer attention to maritime transport of heroin and hashish from Southwest Asia to Kenya and points in East Africa. Maritime shipments through Kenya have long been utilized for multi-ton deliveries of hashish, and police in Mombasa seized 4,715 kilograms in a single raid in 2000. Official reports and anecdotal evidence confirm that small boats often meet with larger vessels anchored off the Kenyan coast and transport drugs and other clandestine material to small landings away from major ports. Customs officials in Pakistan intercepted a maritime shipment of 27 kilograms of heroin to Kenya in 2000. There is also evidence that poor policing along the East African coast makes this region attractive to maritime smugglers. Kenya's near neighbor Somalia has a long coastline and no functioning government. Kenya also has very few maritime interdiction resources. Kenya's police force has a single boat at its disposal, which is not serviceable at present. Two other boats donated to Kenya specifically for narcotics interdiction are also not serviceable, although officials are attempting to have one repaired. Postal and commercial courier services are also used for narcotics shipments through Kenya. In the past, Kenya has been a transit country for methaqualone en route from India to South Africa, mainly entering at the port of Mombassa. There have been no methaqualone (Mandrax) seizures in Kenya, however, for the last three years. Officials have never identified any clandestine airstrips in Kenya used for drug deliveries and believe that no such airstrips exist.

Domestic Programs. Kenya has made little progress in demand reduction, although government officials express increasing concern. In addition to alcohol, illegal cannabis and legal khat are the domestic drugs of choice. Over 200 people died in 2000 as a result of consumption of illegally-brewed alcohol. Heroin abuse is limited generally to members of the economic elite and a slightly broader range of users on the coast. Solvent abuse is widespread (and highly visible) among street children in Nairobi and other urban centers. There are no reliable statistics on domestic consumption of illicit narcotics. Demand reduction efforts are largely limited to publicity campaigns sponsored by private donors and a UNDCP project to bring antidrug education into the schools. Kenyan officials have expressed interest in demand reduction and rehabilitation, but there are no government programs other than occasional speeches to schools and community groups by members of the ANU. There are no special government rehabilitation or drug abuse treatment facilities, but some churches and non-governmental organizations provide limited rehabilitation and treatment programs for solvent-addicted street children.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

The principal U.S. counternarcotics objective in Kenya is to interdict the flow of narcotics to the United States. The U.S. seeks to accomplish this objective through law enforcement cooperation, the encouragement of a strong Kenyan government commitment to narcotics interdiction and strengthening Kenyan counternarcotics capabilities.

Bilateral Cooperation and Accomplishments. There was a modest expansion of USG bilateral cooperation with Kenya and surrounding countries on counternarcotics matters in 2000. Operational collaboration with the DEA and other USG enforcement agencies remained excellent. The DEA conducted a basic drug interdiction course in Nairobi in 2000 for 35 counternarcotics officers from six different African countries, including Kenya. The U.S. Department of Defense provided a two-person team of drug-detection dog handlers for a one-month program of assistance to Kenyan authorities at international airports and seaports. Both these programs were successful.

Road Ahead. The U.S. will continue to take advantage of its good relations with Kenyan law enforcement to build professionalism, operational capacity and information sharing. The U.S. will encourage progress on adoption of a national drug control master plan and provide suggestions, where appropriate. Nairobi is also an efficient point for conducting regional training and other regional initiatives and the U.S. will actively seek ways to maximize antinarcotics efforts both in Kenya and throughout East Africa. Perhaps most significantly, the U.S. will work with local, regional and international partners to better understand and combat the flow of international narcotics, particularly heroin, through Kenya to the United States. The United States participates in the Mini-Dublin Group, which has responsibility for coordinating counternarcotics assistance from several Western donors.


I. Summary

Lebanon is not a major illicit drug producing or drug-transit country, although it remains a country of concern to the U.S. The Government of Lebanon (GOL) has been successful in destroying illegal crops that have come to its attention but has yet to find a suitable crop to replace the lost revenues and sustain the livelihoods of local farmers. As a result, there have been isolated incidents of individual farmers cultivating opium and hashish to supplement their incomes. Local cannabis production is insignificant, and there is practically no laboratory processing. Drug trafficking across the Lebanese-Syrian border has diminished substantially as a result of Lebanese and Syrian efforts to deter illicit cultivation and smuggling activity. Lebanon is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

Although the GOL has continued to combat illegal crop cultivation, the GOL has noted that the deteriorating economic situation in the country—especially within the agricultural sector—has resulted in isolated incidents of individual farmers cultivating illicit crops, including hashish and opium. With this illicit cultivation has come a slight increase in the level of violence in the drug producing areas. Although the government has gained control over these areas, occasionally producers of illicit crops have shot at strangers who were perceived to be threatening. One such incident occurred in September when unknown assailants fired a burst of machine-gun fire at a European diplomat driving on a secondary roadway near Hirmil.

In 2000, the Internal Security Forces (ISF)—the law enforcement agency tasked with counternarcotics responsibilities—destroyed opium cultivation in several areas of the Beqa' Valley. However, some plots in remote areas of the valley likely escaped detection. The ISF estimates that approximately 50,000 square meters of land are used for hashish production, and 39,000 square meters are dedicated to poppy production.

Four types of drugs are available in Lebanon—hashish, heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine and other synthetics (ecstasy) although hashish and heroin are no longer available in large quantities. Small quantities continue to be available for local consumption.

Lebanon is not a major transit country and most trafficking is done by amateurs, rather than major drug networks. Marijuana and opium derivatives are trafficked to a modest extent in the region but there is no evidence that illicit narcotics that transit Lebanon reach the U.S. in sufficient amounts to have a significant effect on the U.S. South American cocaine is smuggled into Lebanon primarily via air and sea routes from Europe, Jordan and Syria. Lebanese nationals living in South America in concert with resident Lebanese traffickers often finance these operations. Synthetics are smuggled into Lebanon for use by a wealthy group, which frequents clubs.

There is no significant laboratory processing activity; such activity has practically disappeared due to vigilance of the Syrian and Lebanese governments. Small amounts of precursor chemicals, however, shipped from Lebanon to Turkey via Syria, likely escape detection. Legislation passed in 1998 authorized seizure of assets if a drug trafficking nexus is established in court proceedings. Despite Lebanon's tight banking secrecy laws, authorities seized $260,000 in narcofunds on behalf of INTERPOL's office in Copenhagen, Denmark.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 2000

Policy Initiatives. Although there have been no new policy initiatives regarding illicit narcotics over the past year, the GOL continues to support antinarcotics initiatives both unilaterally and in coordination with international organizations and other countries through training and program participation.

Accomplishments. The Lebanese government, in cooperation with Syrian authorities, continues to suppress the illicit cultivation of opium and cannabis in the Beqa' Valley. The ISF remains dedicated to countering the drug trade. In April, ISF Director General Abdel Karim Ibrahim stressed the need to "combat the plague of drugs and root it out." In pursuit of these ends, the ISF continues to carry out its own crop substitution program.

In addition to its unilateral efforts, the GOL works closely with the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) to provide substitute crops for local farmers. Over the past six years, the UNDCP has provided about one third of the funds (an estimated $4.7 million) used in Lebanon's alternative development program. One of the organization's largest programs targets the Baalbak-Hirmil area, where the UNDCP operates six healthcare centers and provides loans and vocational training for farmers. This program is currently operating under temporary emergency funding which will run out after the first quarter of 2001. Farmers in the Beqa' Valley are dissatisfied with crop substitution projects. Given the current agricultural crisis in the country, as development funds fail to appear, more and more impoverished farmers will consider resumption of cultivation of illicit crops as a source of income.

Law Enforcement and Transit Cooperation. Lebanese security services coordinate with their international counterparts and in April 2000, the ISF and the UN Drug Control Program inaugurated a two-week training session of ISF and customs officers to combat drugs and crime in Lebanon. The ISF reports that close governmental cooperation exists with the major transit countries, particularly those in Europe. The Lebanese military also closely coordinates its activities against drug traffickers with its Syrian counterparts. Authorities seized $260,000 in narcofunds on behalf of INTERPOL's office in Copenhagen.

Domestic Programs/Demand Reduction. Until recently, Lebanese leaders did not perceive illicit drug use as a significant problem. As a result, the only entity in Lebanon that is engaged in treating and rehabilitating drug users is Oum al-Nour (ON), a Beirut-based NGO. According to the Director General of the organization, government officials are slowly realizing the threat posed by domestic consumption of illicit narcotics, and provide 40 to 50 percent of ON's yearly budget of $666,000. In addition, the organization receives support, mainly political and logistical, from Lebanon's Ministry of Social Affairs. ON estimates that the age of Lebanon's drug addicts has steadily decreased since the end of the country's civil war in 1990, with pre-college and college age youth now being the most vulnerable age group. ON statistics cite that the most commonly abused illicit substance is heroin but use of "designer" drugs such as methamphetamines and ecstasy is present and possibly rising.

ON operates three drug treatment centers in Lebanon, two for men and one for women, which are capable of providing continuous treatment to 45 patients a year. While the treatment facilities for hard-core addicts is adequate, the Director General of ON admits that the organization lacks out-patient care for those individuals whose addictions do not necessarily warrant hospitalization. ON also engages in drug prevention activities such as distributing antidrug paraphernalia on college campuses and promoting drug awareness among the population.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Between January 1 and November 30, 2000, 686 persons were arrested on charges related to narcotics production, transportation, or distribution. During this same time frame, a total of 1,756 drug-related cases were investigated. Throughout the year, the GOL made several efforts to counter narcotics activities in Lebanon, including:

  • In May 2000, the ISF and Lebanese Judiciary Police eradicated about 3,500 square meters of opium in the northern Beqa' Valley. There was one arrest in association with this operation.

  • In September 2000, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrested ten members of a money laundering ring a few miles south of Beirut. According to local media accounts of the arrest, the individuals were en route to the `Ayn al Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp in south Lebanon.

Corruption. Corruption remains endemic in Lebanon up to the senior level of government. While low-level corruption in the antinarcotics forces is possible, there is no evidence of wide-scale corruption within the ISF, which appears to be genuinely dedicated to combating the war on drugs.

Agreements and Treaties. Lebanon and the United States have no formal bilateral agreements addressing the issues of narcotics trafficking or extradition. Lebanon is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Cultivation and Production. The ISF estimates that approximately 50,000 square meters of land are used for hashish production, and 39,000 square meters are dedicated to poppy production. The ISF's claim to have destroyed all of the illicit poppy crops is likely to be accurate because such cultivation requires irrigation, which is only available in fields that the ISF strictly controls, and 7,250 square meters of hashish. GOL authorities maintain that as a result of destruction of poppy plantations, the production of heroin has been nearly eliminated. The GOL estimates that 15 MT of hashish was produced in 2000. Based on crop quality, one metric ton of green cannabis yields the following quantities: five kilograms of hashish first category (zahra); five kilograms of second category hashish (kabsheh); five kilograms of third category of hashish (bab talet); and two kilograms of hashish seeds. There is no evidence that these cannabis derivatives have a significant effect on the U.S..

Drug Flow/Transit. Transit via traditional smuggling routes has been curtailed by joint Syrian-Lebanese cooperation, but nonetheless continues. The transport of hashish across the Syria-Lebanon border has declined substantially in quantity and value since 1999 due to the dedication of the Lebanese and the Syrian governments to fighting drug trafficking and the continuation of a joint drug eradication program launched in 1992. Drug trafficking along the Israel-Lebanon border has been virtually nonexistent following the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 and the subsequent near-sealing of the border. Despite the government's efforts, however, the flow of illicit narcotics into and out of Lebanon continues. The end destination for indigenously produced hashish and opium is mainly Europe and the Middle East, however there have been scattered reports that such substances are being smuggled into the United States. The GOL also concedes that small quantities of morphine and heroin are smuggled overland from Turkey for local use.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

U.S. Policy Initiatives. In meetings with Lebanese officials, the USG continues to stress the need for diligence in preventing the production and transportation of narcotics, the importance of anticorruption efforts, and the merits of transparency in the banking system. USAID, in close cooperation with the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, continues its four-component program to aid and empower key Lebanese stakeholders, local government, media, and civil society in their efforts to fight corruption. The program aims to increase public awareness of the costs of corruption, strengthen investigative journalism, foster transparency and accountability at the municipal government level, and provide small grants to support anticorruption efforts by local groups. On the supply side, USAID is working with local villages to promote the substitution of illicit crops with legitimate, economically viable ones.

Bilateral Cooperation. In mid-September 2000, the Lebanese judiciary offered to assist the USG in prosecuting two Lebanese expatriates who were attempting to transport heroin into the U.S. from Lebanon. Cooperation also takes the form of counternarcotics training courses and operational guidance.

The Road Ahead. Given the level of Syrian involvement in Lebanese domestic affairs, success in combating narcotics cultivation and trafficking depends on the will of both the Syrian and Lebanese governments. Syria has demonstrated a continued commitment to antinarcotics actions in Lebanon. Syria is expected to continue this policy. The GOL has not successfully developed a socio-economic strategy to tackle the problem of crop substitution. The government was successful in destroying the illegal crops but has yet to find a suitable crop to replace the lost revenues and sustain the livelihoods of local farmers. The USG will continue to press the GOL to maintain its commitment to combating drug production and transit, implementing its anticorruption policies, and enforcing its new money-laundering statutes.


I. Summary

Lesotho is not a major producer of narcotics or precursor chemicals, nor does it have drug processing laboratories or high levels of money laundering. High quality marijuana is widely cultivated in Lesotho, including in the country's mountains, and is smuggled to major cities in South Africa, but is not smuggled outside the region, with the possible exception of some shipments to Europe. Lesotho suffers from the impact of South Africa-based organized crime, mainly in the areas of livestock and motor vehicle theft and armed robbery, against which most of the country's scarce police resources are deployed. Domestic narcotics abuse is not a serious social problem.

II. Status of Country

Some high quality marijuana grown in the rural, mountainous regions of the country is smuggled to major cities in South Africa, but it does not appear that Lesotho marijuana is shipped to widely outside the region. There is some indication that some marijuana might be shipped to Europe.

Lesotho is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. It has also approved the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Counternarcotics Protocol and the 1931 U.S.-UK Extradition treaty remains in force between the U.S. and Lesotho. In December 2000, Lesotho signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2000

Lesotho is concerned about the possible impact of organized crime, but its highest priorities in that regard are livestock and motor vehicle theft, both of which were the subject of new laws enacted by Parliament during 2000. The passage of the Prevention of Corruption and Economic Offenses Act in August 1999 seeks to address another high profile problem. The GOL is currently trying to staff the investigating body provided for by that legislation and to further study and adopt the best practices of SADC partners against public corruption.

Lesotho's scarce law enforcement resources have been stretched to the limit dealing with the foregoing problems, and the country has thus far been unable to develop a master plan consistent with the terms of the 1988 UN Drug Convention. A task force working in the Attorney General's Office is evaluating the need for additional laws based on models prepared by UNDCP for implementing the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Lesotho sent four participants to the U.S.-sponsored Regional Law Enforcement Training Needs Assessment Forum that was held in Gaborone from December 11-13. The GOL wants to improve its institutional capacity to fight crime, and is eagerly anticipating the training opportunities that will be afforded when the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) opens in Gaborone, Botswana, currently scheduled for late 2001.


I. Summary

The heart of Malawi's drug activity is marijuana. "Malawi Gold" is reputed to be of high quality and is viewed by abusers in the region as very desirable. Realizing the potential for monetary gain through its production, many in Malawi are turning to trafficking as a way to supplement or sustain their families. While Malawi is a major producer of cannabis, it is still only of regional significance. Its production does not significantly affect the U.S. Cocaine and Mandrax are abused in Malawi, but they are yet to equal the drug activity surrounding marijuana. However, Mandrax from India transiting Kenya also transits Malawi on its way to South Africa. Malawi is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

Drug abuse in Malawi is not recognized as a significant problem. Of greater concern are Malawi's porous borders, which contribute to an increasing presence of international drug trafficking. Recent arrests of non-Malawians have pointed out the attractive nature of Malawi as a transit site for traffickers.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs

The GOM is intolerant of illegal drug activity. In 1995, penalties were increased for drug offences from a minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment to a maximum of life imprisonment and/or MK500,000 (Malawi Kwacha). Presently there is a commission reviewing the "Dangerous Drug Act" to ensure it is up to date and comprehensive. The GOM is mindful of the 1988 UN Drug Convention to which it is a party, but limited resources prevent a sustained effort in achieving the goals of the Convention. About ten tons of cannabis were seized/destroyed during the current year, according to local enforcement officials.

As a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Malawi is a signatory of the "SADC Protocol on Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking." In 1997 Malawi signed an agreement continuing into force the 1931 U.S.-UK extradition treaty. Malawi is also a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 Protocol and the 1971 UN Convention on Pyschotropic Substances. In December 2000, Malawi signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. The UNDCP conducted a training course in 1997, and in 2000, the Dangerous Drug Unit received badly needed vehicles from the UN.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Bilateral Cooperation. Two senior Malawi Drug Officers attended a two-week regional seminar on drug control organized by DEA in Cape Town, South Africa in 1999.


Mauritius is a minor consumer and transshipment route for heroin from South Asia, primarily to South Africa. A small amount of cannabis, estimated at 75,000 plants maximum, is produced and consumed locally. There are increasing reports that Mauritians are smoking heroin and opium. An Economic Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Law was enacted in July, and the newly created Economic Crime Office is already carrying out investigations into suspected money laundering activity. A new Antidrug Law was passed in December, which reportedly will authorize the freezing of assets used in or derived from narcotics trafficking, as well as facilitate undercover operations.

Mauritius is a signatory to the 1988 UN Convention, but has not ratified it. However, Mauritius is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention and its 1972 Protocol and to the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. The United States recognizes the 1931 U.S.-UK Extradition Treaty as being in force with Mauritius and has asked the Mauritian Government to affirm that this is the case. In December 2000, Mauritius signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.

A 250-person Antidrug and Smuggling Unit (ADSU) within the National Police Force has primary responsibility for narcotics law investigations and enforcement, although a 37-member "Flying Squad" also carries out enforcement activities. ADSU has implemented a cooperation agreement with its counterpart in India, and continues to develop cooperative arrangements with Southern African Development Community (SADC) partners pursuant to the SADC Protocol on Illicit Drug Trafficking. Relations with the U.S. DEA are good. Destruction of cannabis plants has steadily increased over the last several years. Interestingly, cases begun for possession of heroin have also mounted steadily, but heroin seizures are low in 2000 at about 5.9 kilograms and show no clear trend over the last several years. In 2000, 16.9 kilograms of cannabis were seized, an increase from 3.6 kilograms in 1999. The authorities seized 5.7 grams of hashish in 2000. The authorities destroyed 54,718 cannabis plants in 2000, an increase from 45,444 destroyed in 1999 and 43,294 destroyed in 1998.

The government provides drug education and demand reduction programs and supports similar projects undertaken by NGO's. ADSU has discontinued its preparation of a counternarcotics master plan, based on the argument that narcotics abuse is not a major issue for Mauritius. Corruption is moderate by regional standards, and does not appear to affect counternarcotics efforts.

The United States periodically provides training for Mauritian law enforcement authorities, and two ADSU officers attended a regional training course in 2000.


I. Summary

Despite the Government of Morocco's (GOM's) law enforcement efforts, Morocco remains a major producer and exporter of cannabis. While there continues to be no evidence Moroccan cannabis reaches the United States in significant amounts, an estimated 2,000 tons is believed to reach Europe annually. Estimates vary, however, regarding the extent of cannabis cultivation in Morocco. The GOM's Royal Center for Remote Sensing estimates that Morocco's cannabis growing area covers a total of 15,000-20,000 hectares. These numbers are lower than those of the European Union (EU), which estimates the area of cannabis cultivation to be 70,000-75,000 hectares. They are also significantly lower than the numbers the Moroccan government has reported in the past. It is clear the threat posed by Moroccan enforcement efforts has not been sufficient to deter drug trafficking. This reality coupled with GOM budgetary constraints does not bode well for future progress against cannabis cultivation, production, and trafficking in Morocco. Morocco is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

Morocco consistently ranks among the world's largest producers of cannabis, and its cultivation and sale provide the economic base for much of northern Morocco. According to EU law enforcement officials, Moroccan cannabis is typically processed into hashish, resin, or oil and exported to Algeria, Tunisia, and Europe. To date, international money laundering and precursory chemicals are virtually non-factors within the Moroccan drug market.

While cannabis is the traditional drug of choice for Moroccans, there is also a small but growing domestic market for harder drugs such as heroin and cocaine. Newspaper reports on Morocco's role as a major producer and exporter of drugs allege a connection between local drug traffickers and international cartels such as Latin American cocaine rings. However, these allegations have never been substantiated.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2000

Policy Initiatives. In 1996, the GOM established a coordination unit for the fight against narcotics, Unite de Coordination de Lutte Anti-Drogue (UCLAD), in an effort to improve coordination between the various law enforcement services involved in the counternarcotics effort. UCLAD is subordinate to the Ministry of Interior. UCLAD officials report they have been instrumental in reworking legislation to increase the maximum allowable prison sentence to 30 years as well as increase fines for narcotics violations to a range of $20,000-$80,000. Ten years imprisonment remains the typical sentence for major drug traffickers arrested in Morocco. Coordination efforts among law enforcement agencies remain weak. UCLAD has not yet been able to establish centralized control over all drug-related matters.

The GOM's announced programs would, if fully implemented, bring it into compliance with the 1988 UN Drug Convention's goals and objectives. UCLAD continues to oversee cooperation between law enforcement services which have not traditionally been receptive to the exchange of information. However, UCLAD's centralized control of all drug-related matters is not yet completely realized. European diplomats believe this is partly the result of the lack of resources to fulfill the UCLAD mandate, and note that without increased funding, the aims of the UN Convention will remain unattainable in Morocco.

Accomplishments. In response to recommendations made by the United Nations' Anti-Drug Commission, in 1997 the Moroccan Ministry of Health began to assess the drug situation in Morocco. This ministry was responsible for proposing measures designed to address international protocols which led to the creation of the Agency for the Promotion of Economic and Social Development in the Northern Provinces, and eventually to the formation of UCLAD. Morocco is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Since 1989, Morocco has had an agreement with the United States pledging joint cooperation in fighting drug trafficking and production. In 1992, the GOM ratified legislation designed to implement the UN Convention. The GOM's estimates of hectares devoted to illicit cannabis cultivation are significantly lower than its estimates for 1999. The GOM attributes this reduction to its efforts to encourage the cultivation of alternate crops in cannabis-growing regions. This has been done primarily through the GOM's promotion of economic growth and foreign investment in the northern region.

Law Enforcement Efforts. As part of a 1992 antidrug initiative launched by the late King Hassan, 10,000 police were detailed to drug interdiction efforts in the north and Rif mountains in 1995. Approximately every six months, the GOM rotates personnel into this region and continues to maintain the same number of checkpoints. Moroccan forces also man observation posts along the Mediterranean coast, and the Navy carries out routine sea patrols and responds to sightings by the observation posts.

Corruption. The GOM does not promote drug production or trafficking as a matter of policy, and in the past it has disputed allegations that government officials in the northern territories are involved in the drug trade. However, in 2000 there were several highly publicized arrests involving drug trafficking by Moroccan officials in the northern region. This may be an indication the GOM is beginning to take a stronger stance against drug-related corruption.

Agreements and Treaties. Since 1993,a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty has been in force between Morocco and the United States. In 1989, Morocco and the U.S. signed a bilateral narcotics cooperation agreement which calls for cooperation in the fight against illicit production, trafficking, and abuse of narcotics. Morocco also has antinarcotics and/or mutual legal assistance treaties with the EU, France, Spain, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and the UK.

Cultivation/Production. Small farmers cultivate most Moroccan cannabis in the northern or Rif region, although some is also grown in the Souss Valley of the south. The average hectare of cannabis produces two to eight metric tons (mt) of raw plant, and it is estimated cannabis crops yield two billion U.S. dollars in revenues annually. The GOM has stated it is committed to the total eradication of cannabis production, but given the economic dependence on cannabis in Morocco's northern region, eradication is only feasible if accompanied by a highly subsidized crop substitution program.

Drug Flow/Transit. There are reports that Morocco is used as a transshipment point for hard drugs such as heroin and cocaine entering Europe. However, with the exception of the six tons of cocaine which unexpectedly washed up on the Moroccan coast in July 1997, there have been no substantial seizures of hard drugs in Morocco.

Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction). The GOM does not acknowledge a significant hard drug addiction problem and does not actively promote reduction in domestic demand for cannabis. It has established a program to train the staffs of psychiatric hospitals in the treatment of drug addiction.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

U.S. Policy Initiatives. Only very small amounts of narcotics produced in or transiting through Morocco reach the United States. U.S. policy goals in Morocco are designed to encourage GOM antinarcotics efforts; to cooperate with Moroccan law enforcement officials in curtailing production and transshipment of drugs; to provide training in law enforcement techniques; topromote GOM adherence to bilateral and international agreement requirements; to provide support for existing Moroccan-European cooperation in this area; and to encourage greater international cooperation to control Moroccan production and export of drugs.

Bilateral Cooperation. Pursuant to the 1989 agreement, the U.S. and Morocco maintain regular contact on antinarcotics issues. The U.S. has provided training and antinarcotics intelligence where applicable, and most recently conducted regional drug interdiction training in Morocco in December 1997.

The Road Ahead. The U.S. will continue to monitor the narcotics situation in Morocco, cooperate with the GOM in its antinarcotics efforts, and, together with the EU, provide law enforcement training, intelligence, and other support where possible.


I. Summary

Mozambique is not a significant producer of narcotics or a significant transshipment country for illegal drugs bound for the United States. Its porous borders, poorly policed seacoast, and inadequately trained and equipped law enforcement agencies, however, make it susceptible to use for production and transshipment of drugs destined primarily for the neighboring South African market. There is also growing concern, supported by anecdotal evidence, that Mozambique is being used as a transit point for drugs from South Asia heading for European markets. Information on drug use in Mozambique is limited, although available evidence suggests significant use of herbal cannabis (marijuana) and a rise in the consumption of synthetic drugs and heroin among a small urban elite. There are conflicting opinions as to local use of Mandrax (methaqualone) and hashish.

While the Mozambican government recognizes increasing drug use and drug trafficking as a problem, competing demands for scarce funds prevent it from devoting significant resources to the issue. The government has not made these areas priorities for seeking donor funding. Ongoing cooperation programs with UNDCP and bilateral donors are attempting to improve training of drug control officials and provide better interdiction and laboratory equipment. Corruption in the police and judiciary hampers antidrug efforts. Mozambique is a party to the 1998 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

Mozambique is not a significant producer of illegal drugs, although herbal cannabis (marijuana) is produced throughout the country for local consumption. Laboratories producing Mandrax (methaqualone) illicitly for the South African market were raided and closed down in 1995 and 2000. There is growing concern about Mozambique's role as a drug transit country. Some evidence suggests that Southwest Asian producers ship hashish through Mozambique to Europe and possibly Canada. The same producers are believed to use Mozambique to ship limited quantities of heroin to Europe and South Africa and Mandrax from India to South Africa. Recent evidence suggests a small Lusophone (Portuguese speaking) cocaine trafficking connection, where limited amounts of cocaine from Brazil transit Portugal and Angola or Mozambique on their way to South Africa. Lax enforcement of banking regulations and recent bank scandals have raised the possibility of limited money laundering, but no hard evidence to support this has yet been developed. The country's borders are extremely porous and the various border control agencies do not have adequate resources (training, equipment, or personnel) to fulfill their roles. Mozambique is not a producer of precursor chemicals.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2000

Policy Initiatives. Mozambique's National Assembly passed antinarcotics legislation in March 1997, covering trafficking and consumption of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, precursors, and substances of similar effect. The basic legislation created the Central Office for the Prevention and Fight Against Drugs, the chief government planning and coordination body on drug control. Mozambique has no national program for the progressive elimination of its cannabis crop.

In 2000, Mozambique passed new money laundering legislation. Regulation of commercial banks is now the responsibility of the nation's central bank, which lacks the resources to do its job effectively. Recent scandals in which commercial banks have seen large unexplained losses highlight the failure of the regulator. While no evidence of money laundering has been demonstrated, activity in this area is possible.

Accomplishments Mozambique's antidrug accomplishments are limited. Government resources devoted to the effort are meager. No comprehensive studies on drug trafficking, production, or use in Mozambique exist to provide guidelines for developing a master plan. Donor resources to combat illegal drug trafficking and use are also limited. Mozambique is, however, cooperating with the UNDCP through two projects designed to increase law enforcement capacity and border control.

Local law enforcement agents in some provinces have attempted to destroy cannabis crops. Mozambique cooperated with South Africa in 1995 and 2000 in raids on Mandrax factories near Maputo. No other drug production is known. The Mozambican government has also seized assets connected with the production of Mandrax. Distribution of drugs in Mozambique, outside of locally grown herbal cannabis (marijuana), is limited. Local rings distribute heroin and cocaine in Beira and Nampula. Police have arrested ring members and confiscated drugs, but the organizations' operations are believed to continue. The country has not effectively combated drug distribution networks in Maputo.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Mozambique has a dedicated seven-person drug unit operating in Maputo. Formed in 1997 and answering to the Chief of the Criminal Investigation Department of the National Police, according to an August 2000 UNDCP consultant report, the unit "exists virtually in name only." Outside of Maputo, hard pressed local police units have antinarcotics responsibilities. UNDCP is working with the Mozambique police service to establish six dedicated drug units nationwide with a total of 70 officers. The government is currently recruiting officers for the program, to be trained in February 2001 by the Spanish Guardia Civil.

Mozambique's immigration service, a police unit within the Ministry of the Interior, is limited to passing on its suspicions to the police or customs service. The UNDCP report views immigration's role as "not crucial to the drugs law enforcement effort."

Customs officers at Maputo's airport and seaport have received drug interdiction training under a UNDCP program. Maputo-based customs agents are developing an embryonic intelligence system, which includes drug control information, with support from an outside contractor. The entire national customs service is currently being modernized under contract with the British firm Crown Agents, which plans to introduce drug interdiction methods. UNDCP will work with customs agents at land borders as part of a tri-state program with Mozambique, South Africa, and Swaziland. The assistance package is still in the design stages.

Comprehensive drug seizure data for Mozambique is not available. Piecemeal data indicates that Mozambique's largest drug seizures were made in 1995, when the government seized 40,000 kilograms of hashish being offloaded in Maputo port along with 10 kilograms of heroin and 10 kilograms of cocaine. That same year, Mozambican police, with South African law enforcement assistance, raided a Mandrax factory near Maputo. (Eighty percent of world production of Mandrax is consumed in South Africa.)

In 1997, Mozambican police seized 15,000 kilograms of hashish at the Maputo port. The Central Office for the Prevention and Fight Against Drugs reported seizures of: 24 balls of hashish, nine blocks of hashish, 120 pieces of hashish, 135 balls of herbal cannabis (marijuana), 418.9 kilograms of loose herbal cannabis (marijuana), 35 packets of heroin, and 5,080 diazepam capsules in 1998. They also reported the destruction of 34 fields of herbal cannabis (marijuana). In 1998, Nampula police reported seizures of 25 kilograms of cannabis products, eight packages of hashish, and unspecified quantities of heroin and morphine. Recent seizures have been smaller. In Sofala province as of August 2000, police reported 36 seizures of cannabis products. They also reported between 1997 and 1999 seizures of one kilogram of cocaine, nine kilograms of hashish, 44 small wraps of heroin, 25 twists of hashish, and seven small wraps of cocaine. According to the UNDCP report the "small wraps of cocaine" were actually crack cocaine.

In 1999, 13 metric tons of herbal cannabis (marijuana) being grown in plantations in the province of Manica were destroyed. Also in 1999, police seized 135 grams of cocaine from what the Attorney General has described as a Congolese trafficking ring.

As of June 2000, Nampula police reported 16 seizures of cannabis products, with the largest single seizure weighing 20 kilograms. In August 2000, a ship ran aground near Inhambane with cargo that included 15,000 kilograms of hashish in one and two kilogram blocks that washed onto the shore. In the most effective drug control operation of the year, Mozambican customs and police officials combined with their South African counterparts and raided a Mandrax factory near Maputo.

The latest complete figures on drug arrests, convictions, and prosecutions available are for 1998. In that year, 130 people were arrested for trafficking and 39 were convicted. In addition, 1,327 individuals were charged with drug usage. Of these 400 went on trial with 344 being convicted. In his annual report to the National Assembly, the Attorney General stated without providing further details that 82 people were prosecuted for drug trafficking or usage in 1999.

Mozambique's National Assembly approved enabling legislation in March 1997 allowing, among other things, for the confiscation of drug-related assets. The GOM has seized assets connected with the production of Mandrax, but not yet with the actual "trafficking" in any illegal drug.

Corruption. Corruption in all areas is pervasive in Mozambique. Legislation prohibits official corruption, including narcotics specifically, but it is not rigorously enforced. Mozambique has not prosecuted any government officials for corruption relating to the production, processing, or shipment of narcotic and psychotropic drugs or controlled substances, nor has it prosecuted any individual for discouraging the investigation or prosecution of such acts. While allegations have been made in the independent press that senior government and FRELIMO party officials are involved in drug trafficking or in covering up drug trafficking, no hard evidence has yet emerged that supports these accusations.

Agreements and Treaties. Mozambique has no mutual legal assistance, precursor chemical, money laundering, or other counternarcotics agreements with the U.S. Mozambique is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Mozambique has ratified the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol. It is also a member of the Mutual Accord of Multilateral Assistance Regarding the Fight Against Crime in Southern Africa (1997). Similarly, Mozambique is a signatory to the 1997 Mutual Accord of Multilateral Assistance Related to Drug Trafficking in Southern Africa (SADC Protocol). In 2000, Mozambique signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols.

Cultivation/Production. Herbal cannabis (marijuana) is cultivated in Nampula, Cabo Delgado, Tete, Manica, and Sofala provinces. The Mozambican government has no standard methodology for estimating crop size, and no comprehensive estimates for the country exist. Intercropping is reportedly common.

Drug Flow/Transit. Mozambique is not a primary transit country for drugs destined for the United States, and there is little evidence that drugs transiting Mozambique have a significant effect on the United States. However, Mozambique appears to serve as a transit country for hashish, cannabis resin, heroin, and Mandrax originating in Southwest Asia. These drugs arrive in Mozambique by small ship. Mandrax is destined primarily for the South African market. Hashish and heroin are shipped on to Europe, and there is evidence that some hashish may also go to Canada. Arrests in Brazil and Mozambique suggest that cocaine is being shipped via "mules" (i.e., individual paid smugglers) from Brazil to Mozambique and Angola through Lisbon for onward shipment to South Africa. In addition, there is anecdotal evidence that Nigerian cocaine traffickers have targeted Mozambique as a gateway to the South African market. The extent of current trafficking is unknown.

Demand Reduction. The Mozambican government, through the Office for the Control of and Fight Against Drugs, has undertaken drug education programs in local schools in cooperation with bilateral and multilateral donors as part of its demand reduction efforts. The efficacy of the program has not yet been determined. No comprehensive study of Mozambique's drug abuse problem has been conducted. Marijuana has been abused in Mozambique for centuries. The abuse of Mandrax is more common in Maputo and other larger cities, but the drug's high cost places limits on its prevalence. Cocaine and heroin use is low, also because of their high price. There is also use of hashish and synthetic drugs, though experts differ as to their prevalence. Drug abuse treatment options in Mozambique are scarce.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Mozambique has no bilateral narcotics agreements with the United States, and there are no plans to negotiate such an agreement. There is little evidence that Mozambique is a source or transshipment country for drugs entering the U.S. market. Narcotics control assistance is part of our general interest in enhancing the abilities of Mozambique's law enforcement agencies. The U.S. has included and will continue to include Mozambican law enforcement officials in regional training programs including those relating to drug control. The regional training budget for Mozambique for FY 1999/2000 was $260,000. Mozambique has requested assistance in funding equipment for its Police Sciences Academy (ACIPOL) and is a target country for participation in the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) for Africa located in Gabarone, Botswana.


I. Summary

Namibia is not a major drug producer or exporter; however, it is increasingly being used as a drug transit country. Namibia has experienced a significant increase in drug-related criminal cases in the past year. The most common illicit drugs are cannabis and methaqualone (Mandrax). Namibia's Drug Law Enforcement Unit (DLEU) cooperates with neighboring countries and recently concluded one of its most significant narcotics cases involving a joint investigation with German law enforcement agencies. Namibian government officials express support for antinarcotics programs. Namibia's DLEU numbers only 45 (when fully staffed) and lacks basic resources, but this is not as a result of a lack of commitment, but rather inadequate resources. Namibia is not a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, but is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention as amended by the 1972 Protocol and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances.

II. Status of Country

Namibian police have discovered isolated cases of cannabis cultivation (grown for personal use), but to date, they have not uncovered any narcotic-producing laboratories. Nigerian traffickers control the couriers transporting cocaine through the country. Namibia is also a transit point for Mandrax, from India to South Africa. Indian and Pakistani groups are involve in trafficking Mandrax. South African traffickers smuggle South African marijuana to Namibia. Police suspect most illicit drugs are smuggled into Namibia by road, hidden in large trucks. While most of the narcotics are destined for the illicit South African market, more and more of the drugs are remaining in Namibia and feeding a growing domestic drug abuse problem. Police sources report significant increases in the use of cocaine, heroin, methaqualone, and LSD. Slightly more than three kilograms of cocaine were seized during the year. Small quantities of other drugs abused in the region were seized by local enforcement, and while almost a half metric ton of cannabis was seized, this quantity is small by comparison to seizures elsewhere in the region. Marijuana is the drug of choice in Namibia. Mandrax is used to a lesser extent. Namibia is experiencing a growing problem of cocaine and crack cocaine abuse; as noted above, there have been recent seizures of cocaine in Namibia.

Although Namibia is not a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, it has been a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention as amended by the 1972 Protocol and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances since March 1998. In December 2000, Namibia signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols.

The U.S. Government attempted to provide U.S. $30,000 worth of assistance to Namibia's DLEU at the close of last fiscal year, including sniffer dogs, drug test kits, and computers. Unfortunately, Namibia's Ministry of Justice was unable to approve the required Letter of Agreement in the short amount of time before the end of the fiscal year when the offer had to be withdrawn. The U.S. has not provided any antinarcotics assistance programs to Namibia in the past.

Namibian government officials have expressed concern over a significant increase in drug cases in the past few years and expressed interest in cooperating with international and U.S. law enforcement agencies. Namibia has been independent for only ten years and is in need of training and resources to enhance its prosecution of international narcotic cases.


I. Summary

Nigeria remains a worldwide hub of narcotics trafficking and money laundering activity. Nigerian organized criminal groups dominate the African drug trade, and transport narcotics to markets in the United States, Europe, Asia, and Africa. These criminal organizations occasionally fund their activities via Advance-Fee Fraud, commonly referred to as "419 scams." Years of military rule and an associated economic decline contributed significantly to the expansion of drug trafficking and criminality in Nigeria. The resulting severe unemployment and widespread corruption provided both an incentive and a mechanism for Nigerian criminal groups to capitalize on Nigeria's central location along the major drug routes and access global narcotics markets. Southeast Asian heroin smuggled via Nigeria accounts for a significant portion of the heroin imported into the United States. Nigerian criminal elements operating in South America transship cocaine through Nigeria on to Europe, Asia, and Africa, mainly South Africa. Nigerian-grown marijuana is exported to neighboring West African nations and to Europe, but not in significant quantities to the U.S.

Democratically elected President Obasanjo has publicly denounced this criminal activity and is attempting to improve the image of Nigeria within the international community. A campaign to root out corruption was implemented after President Obasanjo's inauguration in May 1999. The National Assembly passed tough anticorruption legislation that created an anticorruption Commission with broad powers. The Obasanjo Administration also supports the controversial 1990 NDLEA Act Number 33. This law dictates that Nigerians convicted of drug offenses abroad will be arrested upon their deportation back to Nigeria, and, if convicted, be liable for a minimum of 5 years additional imprisonment for harming the reputation of Nigeria. But corruption continues to be a problem, even for the Obsanjo Administration, which has experienced its own corruption scandals.

Over the years, Nigerian law enforcement agencies have had sporadic success in combating the various elements of the drug trade. A decree was implemented in 1995 to specifically combat the money laundering activities of narcotics smugglers. However, there have been few arrests to date and no convictions under that law. In addition, asset forfeiture has not been a successful deterrent against money laundering or drug trafficking activities. Interdiction and enforcement efforts are complicated by an absence of inter-agency cooperation and a serious lack of resources. Years of neglect by successive military regimes left the law enforcement community demoralized and ill-equipped to deal with sophisticated, international criminal networks. This problem is compounded by pervasive corruption throughout all levels of government. There have been a few arrests of major traffickers; however, it can take years for a case to actually come to trial and no mechanism exists to track cases. Cases are often "systematically lost" within Nigeria's judicial system. Nigeria did take a significant step in November of 2000 by transferring into U.S. custody four fugitives wanted on serious narcotics and narcotics-related charges, including two who are on the President's List of Significant Foreign Narcotics Traffickers under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. Nigeria is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

Nigeria produces no precursor chemicals or drugs that have a significant effect on the United States. However, Nigeria remains a major drug trafficking hub and Nigerian criminal elements operate global criminal-trafficking networks.

The law enforcement agency with primary responsibility for combating narcotics smuggling and drug abuse is the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA). The NDLEA was established in 1989, and works alongside Nigerian Customs, the State Security Service, the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC), the National Police, and the Nigerian Immigration Service at the various ports of entry. NDLEA's most successful interdictions have taken place at Nigeria's international airports. The agency has had some success apprehending individual low-level drug couriers transiting these airports. Smugglers have been forced to change tactics and ship contraband via Nigeria's five major seaports or across its porous land borders. Interdiction efforts are often hampered by a lack of cooperation among the relevant agencies.

As specialists in moving narcotics and other contraband, Nigerian criminal organizations are heavily involved in corollary criminal activities such as document fabrication, illegal immigration, and financial fraud. Their ties to criminals in the United States, Europe, South America, Asia and South Africa are well documented. Nigerian poly-crime organizations exact significant financial and societal costs, especially among West African nations with limited resources for countering these organizations.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2000

Policy Initiatives. The democratically elected Obasanjo Administration has not introduced any new major legislative or financial initiatives to combat narcotics trafficking, but it did transfer four defendants wanted on narcotics and narcotics-related charges, including two "Narcotics Kingpins", into the custody of U.S. law enforcement officials. Nigeria's counternarcotics policy is based on the National Drug Control Master Plan (NDCMP), in place since 1998/99. This plan assigns responsibilities to the various government ministries and agencies as well as NGOs and other interest groups. The master plan also outlines basic resource requirements and time frames for the completion of objectives. Many of these goals have not yet been met.

Both chambers in the National Assembly have narcotics affairs committees which monitor the performance of the NDLEA and Nigeria's counternarcotics strategy. In addition, a cabinet-level adviser on drugs and financial crimes reports directly to the President. The frequent change of leadership of the NDLEA has impaired the agency's interdiction activities. Over a period of six months there have been three NDLEA Chairmen. The present NDLEA Chief, Alhaji Bello Lafiaji, was appointed in October of 2000, and has declared an all-out offensive against drug trafficking. Chairman Lafiaji has called for the harmonization of Nigeria's narcotics legislation and has sought increased international assistance for the drug agency. The NDLEA has also embarked upon a publicity campaign to combat narcotics trafficking and drug abuse by staging various contraband destruction events around the country.

Accomplishments. A strong indication of the Nigerian government's commitment to cooperating with the U.S. on law enforcement during this past year was the transfer into U.S. custody of four fugitives wanted on serious narcotics and narcotics-related charges. In another accomplishment, a Nigerian General was reportedly court-martialed, stripped of his rank, dismissed from the Army and remains in the custody of military officials after being implicated in a heroin smuggling case, while he was stationed in Pakistan. According to the NDLEA, 2528 drug traffickers were arrested during the 2,000 and 264,292 kilograms of cannabis destroyed or confiscated, 50 kilograms. of cocaine and 56 kilograms. of heroin were seized. The NDLEA is also claiming to have destroyed more than a million kilos of cannabis in eradication operations. The exact seizure figures might differ sharply from these estimates obtained from NDLEA.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Nigerian counternarcotics efforts primarily focus on the interdiction of couriers transiting Nigeria's airports as well as a public campaign focused on destroying plots of cultivated marijuana throughout the country. Unfortunately, major narcotics-smugglers and their networks continue to escape arrest and prosecution. Law enforcement agencies do not possess the necessary resources or capabilities to combat these well-organized, international networks. Attempts by NDLEA to arrest and prosecute major traffickers and other associates often fail in Nigeria's enfeebled judicial system, which is subject to intimidation and corruption. Asset seizures from narcotics traffickers and money launderers, while permitted under Nigerian law, have never really systematically been utilized as an enforcement tool, but some convicted traffickers have had their assets seized over the years. The numbers of traffickers thus penalized are small, however.

Corruption. Pervasive corruption is a problem throughout Nigerian society. Estimated unemployment is over 25 percent. Civil servants' salaries are low. In addition salaries are frequently paid months late, compounding the corruption problem. After its inauguration, the Obasanjo Administration embarked on a public anticorruption crusade. Legislation was enacted and an anticorruption commission formed. A commission was also established to review government contracts awarded by past administrations. Unfortunately, the Obasanjo Administration has made little progress towards transparency and openness in its contracting and decision-making process. The administration itself has been plagued with accusations of corruption, exacerbated by political in-fighting between the President and the National Assembly. To date, there have not been any dismissals of high-level administration officials for corruption to add credence to the anticorruption efforts. There was, however, a recent case in which several Nigerian Customs officials involved in an attempt to smuggle heroin to the U.S. were apprehended and now face trial for their crime. Corruption remains a significant obstacle to counternarcotics efforts, especially in the judicial process. While the NDLEA has attempted to purge its ranks of officers suspected of corrupt practices, a fear of corruption hampers inter-agency cooperation as agencies are often distrustful and unwilling to share information.

Agreements and Treaties. Nigeria is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention and its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. The 1931 U.S.-UK Extradition Treaty, which was made applicable to Nigeria in 1935, is the legal basis for pending U.S. extradition requests, including five on narcotics or narcotics-related money laundering charges. Nigeria is a party to the World Customs Organization's Nairobi Convention, Annex on Assistance in Narcotics Cases.

Cultivation and Production. Cannabis remains the only illicit drug that is produced in any quantity throughout Nigeria. This drug is produced in all 36 states. Major cultivation occurs in central and northern Nigeria in addition to the Delta and Ondo states in the south. Marijuana, or "Indian Hemp" as it is locally known, is sold in Nigeria and exported throughout West Africa and into Europe. To date, there is no evidence of significant marijuana imports from Nigeria into the United States. The NDLEA has been engaged in an active eradication campaign. The NDLEA claims cannabis seizures in excess of 264 MT and eradication of cannabis plants in the field in excess of 1000 MT. this year. Recently, the NDLEA has highlighted this eradication campaign by inviting dignitaries to the various destruction ceremonies around the country and releasing press reports highlighting their eradication activities.

Drug Flow/Transit. Nigeria is a major staging point for Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin being smuggled to Europe and the United States and for South American cocaine being transported to Europe. While Nigeria remains Africa's drug transport hub, there are indications that the preferred methods of transshipment have changed. Improvement of the overall security posture at Murtala Mohammed International Airport has forced drug traffickers to ship by sea from Nigerian seaports, concealing large quantities of contraband in shipping containers.

Demand Reduction. Local production and use of marijuana has been a problem in Nigeria for some time; however, according to the NDLEA and NGOs, the abuse of harder drugs (e.g., cocaine, heroin) is on the rise. Heroin and cocaine are readily available in many of Nigeria's larger cities. Law enforcement officials admit that Nigeria remains a major narcotics transshipment point, but some officials deny that domestic drug abuse is on the rise. U.S. officials and training instructors find that many Nigerian officials do not understand that by serving as a transit point, Nigeria may itself begin to suffer significant drug abuse problems. The NDLEA continues to expand its antidrug clubs at Nigerian universities and distribute antidrug literature. The NDLEA also has plans to produce a teacher's manual for the primary and secondary school levels, which will offer guidance on teaching students about drug abuse.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. U.S.-Nigerian counternarcotics cooperation focuses on stopping individual couriers and on professionalizing the NDLEA and other law enforcement agencies. U.S. training and material assistance has continued, with the NDLEA the primary target for assistance. The U.S. DEA office deals with a small group of NDLEA representatives to lessen the chance of compromise by corrupt individuals. USG working-level representatives enjoy good access to their counterparts and there is an evident desire on both sides to strengthen these relationships. The new NDLEA Chairman appears committed to meeting agency goals and improving the morale of NDLEA officers. Police reform has been under discussion in Nigeria. Nigerian Commissions have reviewed plans for reform and assistance agencies have prepared their own suggestions for ways to proceed, but the task will be formidable as the police lack so much in the way of equipment, and their morale has suffered over the years as the situation deteriorated. Salaries are low, and are frequently paid months late, for example.

Bilateral Accomplishments. The turning over of four fugitives wanted on narcotics and narcotics-related charges in the United States was a key bilateral accomplishment of 2000. Cooperation between Nigerian and U.S. law enforcement agencies continues to increase, although much work remains to be done. The U.S. DEA office in Nigeria continues to work with the NDLEA on expanding their relationship. In October 2000, U.S. Customs conducted a State Department-funded Contraband Enforcement Team training program in Lagos for NDLEA officers.

The Road Ahead. The U.S.-Nigerian relationship has improved significantly with the reintroduction of democratic government in Nigeria. President Clinton's August 2000 visit to Nigeria highlighted areas of significant progress, but also illustrated that much more remains to be done. As noted elsewhere in this report, the narcotics and crime problems in Nigeria are deeply rooted in Nigeria's present governmental system, and in Nigerian society. It will require courageous political will for any Nigerian government to confront these difficult issues and bring about meaningful change.

The U.S. government is working to aid Nigeria in its counternarcotics efforts. One area of prime concern is the judiciary. Law enforcement efforts are often stymied by the slow pace of the judicial system, which can be attributed to both intimidation and corruption of the judiciary by criminal organizations. The U.S. Agency for International Development has implemented a "Rule of Law" program with the Nigerian government to help strengthen and professionalize the judiciary. In addition, within the judicial system, the Nigerian government needs to establish a reliable extradition process that will allow extradition requests to be heard expeditiously and fairly. Many U.S. extradition requests for narcotics traffickers have been outstanding for years.

The U.S. Government is also concerned about the continued situation of extremely low salaries for police officers and other law enforcement and justice personnel, as well as examples of misallocation of government resources while law enforcement needs go unmet. The government of Nigeria needs to demonstrate a commitment of its own resources to the fight against narcotics trafficking and transnational crime in order to strengthen its case for additional foreign donor assistance.

The U.S. government provided training for a Contraband Enforcement Team at Nigeria's International Airport. Hopefully, this team will be utilized effectively, and also serve as a model for inter-agency cooperation at other ports of entry. Since narcotics-trafficking and financial crimes are closely linked, the government of Nigeria must also strengthen and utilize its asset forfeiture legislation, already in place. In addition, Nigeria must work to bring its money-laundering laws into compliance with the FATF 40 recommendations and work to regulate its banking industry.

The U.S. government will continue to actively engage Nigeria on the issue of counternarcotics and money laundering. There have been incremental successes, but long-term progress will only come about through the continuation of a long-term dialogue and assistance, and a willingness on the part of Nigeria's government to confront difficult issues. The underlying institutional and societal factors that contribute to narcotics trafficking and money laundering activities in Nigeria are deep-seated and require comprehensive, long-term solutions.

Saudi Arabia

I. Summary

As a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the Government of Saudi Arabia continues to place a high priority on its efforts to eliminate narcotics trafficking and abuse. Narcotics-related crimes are punished harshly: under the Saudi interpretation of Islamic law, narcotics trafficking is a capital offense, enforced against Saudis and foreigners alike. Thirty-five convicted traffickers were executed in 2000. Saudi Arabia relies on a network of overseas drug enforcement liaison offices and on state-of-the-art detection and training programs to combat drug trafficking.

While Saudi officials are determined in their counternarcotics efforts, drug trafficking and abuse appear to be growing problems (albeit minor ones by comparison to many western nations). Because the Saudi Government provides no statistics on drug consumption, interdiction, and trafficking, it has been impossible to verify this assessment. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Saudi Arabia's relatively affluent population, large numbers of unemployed youth, and the high profit margins on narcotics smuggled to Saudi Arabia make the country an attractive target for drug traffickers and dealers.

II. Status of Country

Saudi Arabia has no significant drug production and, in keeping with its conservative Islamic values, places a high priority on fighting narcotics abuse and trafficking. The Government undertakes widespread counternarcotics educational campaigns in the media, health institutes, and schools. The Government has imposed the death penalty for drug smuggling since 1988. Due to these factors, drug abuse and trafficking do not pose major social or law enforcement problems. However, Saudi officials privately acknowledge that illegal drug use is on the rise.

The Saudi Government aims its efforts to treat drug abuse solely at Saudi nationals, who are treated at one of the nation's four drug treatment centers. There are no separate facilities for Saudi women, and expatriate substance abusers are jailed and summarily deported. Health officials confirm anecdotal reports of a general increase in substance abuse, but note that most addictions are not severe due to the scarcity of available narcotics and their diluted form. Heroin and hashish are the most heavily-consumed substances, but Saudi officials report that cocaine and amphetamines are also in demand. They state that some Saudi youths engage in paint and glue inhalation.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 2000

Policy Initiatives. The Ministry of Interior is Saudi Arabia's lead agency for drug interdiction, with over 20 overseas offices in countries identified as representing a trafficking threat. The Saudi Government also continues to play a leading role in efforts to enhance intelligence sharing among the six nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Saudi Arabia is a member of the UNDCP, and its drug enforcement personnel participate regularly in international training programs.

Accomplishments/Law Enforcement Efforts. Illegal narcotics are not cultivated or produced in Saudi Arabia. Drug seizures, arrests, prosecutions and consumption trends are not matters of public record, although local newspapers occasionally report drug seizures by Saudi officials. Saudi interdiction efforts tend to focus more on individual carriers than on operations designed to identify drug distributors and regional networks. With the help and advice of U.S. Customs advisors, Saudi Customs agents employ advanced detection techniques which have yielded an increase in drug seizures (predominantly heroin, cocaine, and hashish) at some points of entry.

Corruption. We have no evidence of involvement by Saudi Government officials in the production, processing, or shipment of narcotic and psychotropic drugs and other controlled substances.

Agreements and Treaties. There are no extradition or mutual legal assistance agreements in force between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. In December 2000, Saudi Arabia signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.

Cultivation/Production. Cultivation and production of narcotics in Saudi Arabia is negligible.

Drug Flow/Transit. Saudi Arabia is not a major transshipment point. Due in part to new detection techniques employed at major points of entry, seizures of narcotics coming primarily from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Turkey have increased.

Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction). The Saudi Government sponsors widespread media campaigns against substance abuse, as well as drug education programs directed at school-age children, health care providers, and mothers. Saudi officials believe that public and widely publicized executions of convicted traffickers serve as a deterrent to narcotics trafficking and abuse. The country's influential religious establishment actively preaches against narcotics use and Government treatment facilities provide free counseling to male Saudi addicts.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Strategies. The U.S. seeks to enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the Saudi Government. The Saudi Ministry of Interior is reviewing a non-binding Memorandum of Understanding, which the Department of State proposed in May 1996. The MOU calls for increased bilateral cooperation in information sharing, legal assistance, training, and demand reduction.

Bilateral Cooperation. Saudi officials actively seek and participate in U.S.-sponsored training programs and are receptive to enhanced official contacts with DEA.

The Road Ahead. The U.S. will arrange for regular visits of regional DEA officers to Saudi Arabia. It will also try to work with Saudi officials to plan how to cooperate on the Saudi offer to host a regional DEA-led narcotics training seminar for representatives of Arab League member states.


I. Summary

Trafficking of all types of drugs, primarily heroin, cocaine, and synthetics, exists in Senegal. Additionally, the Senegalese authorities state that precursor chemicals, which are used for the further fabrication of drugs, are being intercepted. Undetermined quantities of marijuana are grown throughout Senegal, primarily in the southern region (Casamance), but there is no evidence of shipment to the U.S. in significant quantities. Professional drug networks, many of which are operated by foreigners (e.g., Nigerians), are well established in the marijuana trade. The port of Dakar and the international airport of Dakar are the two principal points of entry/exit for drugs in Senegal. Senegalese authorities state that because there is not a direct flight coming from South America, cocaine is transshipped into Cape Verde. Nigerians are the biggest factor in the drug trade, though some Senegalese and Gambians are also involve. Senegal is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Drug consumption can be found in all age groups and professions in Senegal. Marijuana is the primary drug of choice, followed by synthetic drugs. The Senegalese state that these drugs are abused by persons primarily in the age group of 15 to 23 years, of which 98 percent of users are male. Sixty-five percent of this group has a junior high school education. The use of solvents is also found among youth, primarily between the ages of 12 and 19 years. These abusers are primarily "street kids." Some of the upper and middle class segments of society also use heroin and cocaine.

II. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2000

In 1997, Senegal instituted a national plan of action against drug abuse and the trafficking of drugs, but the funds to implement this plan have not yet been identified. Senegal is a poor country with many competing demands. Senegal's national plan is multidisciplinary and aims to:

  • control the cultivation, production, and traffic of drugs

  • inform the population of the dangers of drug use

  • develop a program to reintroduce drug addicts to society

Also, in 1997, an inter-ministerial committee to fight against drugs was established. The purpose of this committee has been to elaborate and coordinate the national political fight against drugs. This year the committee approved and carried out a drug cultivation reduction program, implemented by a non-governmental organization in the Casamance region. The first phase of the program involved a campaign to inform the public that more money could be earned for the farmers of marijuana if the land was used for other purposes. The campaign also argued that drugs were harmful to the environment and personal health, and that drugs were degrading the economy. Village committees have been established to pass on the above information in an attempt to sensitize people to the problem of drugs. The second phase of the program is to begin in 2001 where the village committees will suggest substitute crops to replace the marijuana presently being cultivated

Cannabis is by far and away the largest drug among seizures by Senegalese enforcement officers. Seizures of other drugs are so small relative to suspected trafficking in them as to suggest that enforcement is only getting a very small percentage of those drugs transiting Senegal. In 1999, the last year for which statistics are available, the authorities destroyed 42,000 kilograms of cannabis and seized 7,165 kilograms and 830 grams of marijuana leaf. They also seized 71 grams (382 doses) of heroin, 14 grams of marijuana resin, and 4,737 units of synthetic drugs. They made 2,674 drug-related arrests.

Senegal is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention and its 1972 Protocol, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Senegal signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols in December 2000.

South Africa

I. Summary

South Africa is committed to fighting domestic and international trafficking in illicit narcotic drugs, but reliable evidence suggests that the country continues to be an important transit area for cocaine (from South America) and heroin (from the Far East), primarily destined for domestic Southern African or European markets. In addition to being a large producer of cannabis, most of which is consumed in the Southern African region, South Africa may be the world's largest consumer of Mandrax (methaqualone). "Mandrax," a variant of methaqualone, is the drug of abuse of choice in South Africa, and its smuggling, primarily from India, but also from China and other sources, is the single most important money-earner for indigenous South African organized crime. By 1997, a study conducted by the South African Police Service found 192 indigenous organized criminal gangs active in all of South Africa. Ninety-two of these gangs were primarily focused on the international smuggling of narcotics, with Mandrax the leading drug.

South Africa is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. In 1999, South Africa and the U.S. signed a bilateral extradition treaty and a mutual legal assistance treaty. After much post-enactment tinkering by the South African Parliament, the Prevention of Organized Crime Act, particularly the asset forfeiture section, seems to have become a useful tool for law enforcement. In September 2000, the cabinet agreed to the text of an eagerly anticipated bill that will legally mandate reporting and record-keeping on certain financial transactions and that will create a Financial Intelligence Center (FIC). Predicting parliamentary timetables for enactment of bills is inexact at best, but there appears to be sufficient interest in the FIC legislation to allow passage by early 2001.

II. Status of Country

South Africa's transition to democracy and its integration into the world economy have been accompanied by the increased use of its territory for the transshipment of contraband of all types, including narcotics. Outdated regulatory and legislative infrastructures and a criminal justice system that is stretched just to deal with common "street crime" make South Africa a tempting target for international organized crime groups of all types. With assistance from the U.S. and other donors, South Africa is making slow progress in crafting an appropriate response to this situation.

South Africa has, for some time, been the origin, the transit point or the terminus, of many major smuggling routes; this was particularly so during the apartheid period. Additionally, South Africa has the most developed transportation, communications, and banking infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa. The country's modern international telecommunications systems (particularly wireless telephones), its direct air links with South America and Europe, and its permeable land borders provide opportunities for regional and international trafficking in all forms of contraband, including narcotics. Narcotics trafficking is very profitable for organized crime syndicates, and they have become heavily involved in stealing vehicles and trading them across South Africa's land borders for narcotics.

South Africa continues to rank among the world's largest producers of cannabis, although this production does not have a significant effect on the U.S. because the cannabis produced in South Africa is either consumed locally or exported to countries other than the U.S. Smuggling of cannabis to Europe continues to increase. While in 1999 there were seizures in the U.S. of cannabis originating in the Southern African region (Swaziland), none were reported in 2000.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2000

Policy Initiatives. Combating the use of and the trafficking in illicit narcotics is an important component of the anticrime agenda of the South African Government (SAG). As a practical matter, however, the SAG tends to target its limited anticrime resources on serious, violent domestic crime. (NB: South Africa has one of the world's highest murder and rape rates.) South Africa's porous borders are crossed daily by criminals trafficking in many forms of contraband, including, but certainly not limited to: illicit narcotics, stolen cars, illegal firearms, diamonds, and precious metals. The cabinet's interagency "Justice Cluster" works to help coordinate the law enforcement and criminal justice systems' response to these challenges. The Narcotics Bureau (SANAB) continues to suffer from a lack of training, resources, and qualified personnel.

Accomplishments. South Africa's 1998 Prevention of Organized Crime Act, which outlawed certain criminal conspiracies and put teeth into previous legislation outlawing money laundering, fared a bit better in the courts in 2000. The law was used more against narcotics offenses, after certain sections were re-drafted by Parliament to address drafting/conceptual inadequacies that were exposed in initial court cases. In a related development, to improve South Africa's enforcement effort against money laundering, in September 2000, the cabinet completed its deliberations on the text of another critical anti-money laundering bill that would legally mandate record keeping and disclosure of certain financial transactions. The legislation also would create a South African Financial Intelligence Center to receive financial information and statistics and analyze them for possible money laundering activity. It should be noted that the FIC bill is not targeted solely at drug traffickers, as money laundering is associated in South Africa with many forms of organized crime. Nevertheless, the FIC law should provide one more tool for identifying and building strong cases against drug trafficking organizations and drug-related money laundering operations.

Law Enforcement Efforts. SANAB and South African Customs continue to make seizures of cocaine arriving in South Africa at international airports. A cocaine smuggling ring among the employees of South Africa's national airline was uncovered in 2000. The aerial wing of the police carries out an airborne cannabis eradication program domestically and also offers cannabis eradication to regional states. The effectiveness of these operations is often hampered by lack of operational funds. Increased training of police and more units targeted on drug enforcement have led to more seizures of drugs destined for export. Crime statistics for the first five months of 2000, published by the South African National Police, indicate an increase in narcotics crime to levels not seen since 1995. However, the Police caution that narcotics crime, unlike crimes against persons and property, requires police action for detection. Thus, apparently increasing rates of narcotics-related crime could just reflect enhanced enforcement, as opposed to more criminal activity.

A discussion on drug control in South Africa is incomplete without consideration of South Africa's law enforcement issues. While individual efforts on the ground are applauded, the internal problems in law enforcement that exist across the board impede both anticrime and counternarcotics efforts. South Africa's counternarcotics situation is further complicated by its reliance on less effective neighbors to interdict contraband headed its way. Zambia, Mozambique, and Swaziland provided the most popular transit routes for the smuggling of Mandrax into South Africa. Lingering racism and inappropriate use of violence, especially by white officers against black suspects, and a view among whites that black criminal violence against them is underplayed in black-majority South Africa also limits police-civilian cooperation against crime.

Chapter Five of the Prevention Against Organized Crime Act sets out procedures for the confiscation of the proceeds and instrumentalities of all types of crime. The Act provides for both civil and criminal forfeiture. Criminal forfeiture is limited to illicit proceeds, while civil forfeiture can also be used against "facilitating" property. Asset forfeiture proceedings are instituted, and the management of seized assets is coordinated by the Asset Forfeiture Unit. To date, several houses, luxury vehicles, and furniture worth millions of Rand have been forfeited under civil forfeiture procedures. Criminal investigations are ongoing against persons from whom the assets were confiscated.

The revenue service has reorganized the South African Customs Service to make it more effective in interdicting and investigating smuggling of all types, including narcotics trafficking. South African Customs continues to be active in investigating the use of the mails for international criminal activities. Recently, customs officials at Port Elizabeth (a locale where South African Customs officials who had received U.S. contraband enforcement training are posted) spotted a suspicious container. A special investigative unit was alerted and a large shipment of Mandrax was discovered when the container was opened at the Johannesburg customs depot.

Corruption. Officials accused of corruption can be prosecuted under the 1992 Corruption Act. Accusations of widespread police corruption are frequent, but the experience of enforcement officers working from the U.S. Embassy in South Africa is that many of the failures and lapses by the police can be attributed as much to a lack of training and resources as to corruption. Credible evidence of narcotics-related corruption among senior South African law enforcement officials has not been brought to light. Nevertheless, some low level corruption—and much mal/misfeasance—among border control officials does appear to contribute to the permeability of South Africa's borders.

Agreements and Treaties. South Africa is a signatory to the 1996 Southern African Development Community (SADC) "Protocol on Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking." South Africa is also a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

In September 1999, the U.S. and South Africa signed a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty and a new extradition treaty to replace the existing 1947 extradition treaty. Instruments of ratification are expected to be exchanged in 2001. In August 2000, the U.S. and South Africa also signed a customs mutual assistance agreement and a Letter of Agreement on Anticrime and Counternarcotics Assistance. The Letter of Agreement provides for U.S. training and commodity assistance to several South African law enforcement agencies. In December 2000, South Africa signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols.

Cultivation/Production. Cannabis or "dagga" grows wild in southern Africa and is a traditional crop grown in many rural areas of South Africa, particularly the Eastern Cape and Kwa-Zulu Natal provinces. It also grows wild and is cultivated in neighboring Swaziland. It is possible to have three cannabis crops a year in some areas of Southern Africa. Most of South African-produced cannabis is consumed domestically in South Africa or in the Southern African region. However, increasing amounts are being seized in Continental Europe and the UK. In 1999, a 20 kilogram shipment of Swazi cannabis was seized by the U.S. DEA in the United States, but the USG is unaware of Southern African cannabis reaching the U.S. in 2000. Mandrax is also produced in South Africa for domestic consumption.

Drug Flow/Transit. Cocaine, in significant amounts, reaches South Africa from South America. Previously, Brazil was the most popular departure country. Miami may have replaced Rio de Janeiro in 1999 as the transfer point of choice for traffickers sending cocaine to South Africa from South America. The bulk of the cocaine entering South Africa probably is destined for re-export to Europe. Nevertheless, South African consumption of cocaine, both powder and "crack" (crystalline) apparently is increasing. Mindful of the U.S. struggle with its crack epidemic of the mid-to-late 1980's, South African authorities are concerned a similar crisis may occur in South Africa. Many illegal Nigerian residents in South Africa are involved in organized criminal elements, specializing in the smuggling of crack cocaine to South Africa. Nigerian gangs have also been found using South Africa as a base of operations for worldwide drug smuggling and so-called "419 Fraud." (419 Fraud is an international confidence racket, in which primarily Nigerian criminals seek access to foreign bank accounts for illicit transactions, which end up victimizing their foreign targets.) According to South Africa's Institute for Security Studies, of some 100,000 estimated Nigerian residents of South Africa, only 700 are legally permitted residents. Abuse of crack is growing faster than abuse of any other drug in South Africa; seizures have grown from 78 kilograms in 1993 to 636 kilograms in 1998. In the first six months of 2000, the South African Narcotics Bureau seized apx. 286 kilograms. of cocaine. This increase in crack seizures occurred even though its street price puts it out of reach for much of the population.

Heroin is smuggled into South Africa from Southwest and Southeast Asia; much of it is destined for onward shipment to Europe and, possibly, some small amount to the U.S. Heroin consumption among South African youth and some young people in other countries has also increased, particularly with the advent of smokable heroin. According to U.S. DEA and local NGOs monitoring epidemiological data in South Africa, South Africa has experienced a 40 percent increase in intravenous heroin users over the last three years, raising further concerns about the increased spread of HIV/AIDS. Mandrax, imported from India or locally produced in South Africa, is a popular illicit drug among segments of the South African populace. The amount of drugs transiting South Africa to the U.S. is probably minimal.

Domestic Programs. South Africa has had a long history of Mandrax and dagga (cannabis) abuse; drug counselors have noted increases in the number of patients seeking treatment for crack addiction in the past two to five years. General budgetary constraints have meant that SAG subsidies for non-government drug rehabilitation agencies have been cut the last two to three years. There are many people seeking treatment who are unable to register with any program, and for those who manage to enter a rehabilitation program, available services are constrained by lack of resources.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs.

Policy Initiatives. Crime is an important issue in South Africa. While much criminal activity is restricted in its impact to South Africa, an important share of all crime has an impact on the region, and on the rest of the world. U.S. law enforcement officers from the DEA, FBI, U.S. Customs, and Secret Service cooperate successfully with their South African counterparts. The U.S. also urges SAG to propose legislation that will strengthen South Africa's legal system and provide a legal framework for prosecuting more sophisticated organized criminal activities, including drug trafficking. In support of these objectives, the U.S. helped train a new, elite South African enforcement force called the "Scorpions." This unit targets organized crime and high-profile crime of all sorts.

Bilateral Cooperation. In July 2000, the U.S.-South Africa Bi-National Commission (BNC) Justice and Anticrime Cooperation Committee (JACC) held its second meeting. In the last two years the JACC has become an important focus of U.S.-South African anticrime and counternarcotics cooperation efforts. There has been excellent cooperation between SANAB and the DEA. Likewise, the relationship between U.S. Customs and its South African counterpart has been quite productive. Customs officials were recently in South Africa and several near-by countries to assess conditions at land border crossings and to make recommendations for improvements. The U.S.' long-term anticrime and counternarcotics strategy includes a program of continued assistance to and cooperation with South African law enforcement and criminal justice authorities.

The Road Ahead. The commitment to create an effective legal and regulatory infrastructure to combat drug trafficking, and all other forms of organized crime, exist both in SAG and in the SAG parliament, however, the process of implementing change is likely to be slow and uneven for a while.


I. Summary

International trafficking continues to grow in Swaziland. Local production consists of a large marijuana cash crop, some of which is consumed locally and some of which is exported, primarily to South Africa but also to Europe and, to a lesser extent, the U.S. Trafficking has become the major threat as multiple factors make Swaziland attractive as a regional base or transshipment point for international trafficking organizations. Its proximity to South Africa (the region's richest market for illicit narcotics), a lack of effective antidrug legislation, limited enforcement resources, a relatively open society, and a developed economic infrastructure all contribute to Swaziland being a hub. The 20-person antinarcotics unit within the Royal Swaziland Police has benefited from training opportunities and has proved increasingly successful at interdicting shipments. The unit's effectiveness, however, is limited by a lack of key resources and legislation to convict those arrested, as well as rumored corruption among related entities. Swaziland's strength is its high level of awareness of the potential problem, which has led to regional cooperation. This collaboration includes the arrest of a reputed drug kingpin, Mashesha Dlamini, who is presently awaiting trial, and the spraying of illicit marijuana cultivation, as a result of South African and USG assistance. The USG assisted in the aerial eradication effort by providing South Africa with access to a sprayer. The herbicide the South African government used to conduct the aerial eradication has not been shown to harm the environment. In other developments, the Royal Swaziland Police began to run antidrug seminars in high schools throughout the country. Swaziland is party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

Local official concern is growing, as anecdotal evidence and newspaper accounts point toward rapidly increasing narcotics trafficking in Swaziland. South African Narcotics Bureau (SANAB) personnel believe that bulk shipments of narcotics are being sent to Swaziland, where the narcotics are cut for onward shipment to South Africa, Europe, and to a lesser extent, the U.S. There is also reported use of harder drugs, including crack cocaine. Nigerian traffickers smuggle cocaine through Swaziland en route to South Africa.

Local narcotic drug cultivation is still largely limited to marijuana, with the crop considered by police to be "extensive." In addition to being consumed locally, marijuana is shipped to South Africa with some onward shipment, mostly to Europe but also to a lesser extent the United States. There is no evidence that Swazi marijuana reaches the U.S. in quantities sufficient to have a significant impact on the U.S. Local consumption consists of the local marijuana crop, plus small amounts of Mandrax, cocaine, and heroin. The largest metropolitan city, Manzini, is the center of illegal drug activity in Swaziland.

Swaziland's narcotics law dates from the 1920s. It does not address conspiracy, asset seizure, or money laundering; however these areas are expected to be addressed when the Swazi Parliament meets in the first quarter of 2001. At that time, the Swazi Parliament will review and vote to pass the new Money Laundering Bill and new antinarcotics legislation. Antinarcotics legislation is still in a draft form and a U.S. Department of Justice consultant will provide additional assistance with drafting of the law before it goes to Parliament. Swaziland has an extradition treaty with South Africa, as well as a protocol and mutual understanding on narcotics with Commonwealth Countries. Swaziland signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime in December 2000.

The police have a 20-person narcotics unit. It lacks vehicles, detection equipment, narcotics dogs, and office automation equipment, which significantly hinder its effectiveness. The unit's level of training, while increasing, remains limited. Additionally, it is sometimes called upon to perform routine, non-narcotics related police work, which detracts from its focus.

There are rumors of corruption amongst police, customs and other government officials. In 2000, a senior police officer was arrested, charged and convicted, and sentenced to a prison term of seven years without the option of a fine. Although corruption has been characterized as "mild" by expatriate police officials, it is thought to affect interdiction, arrests and convictions.

Swaziland is not considered a regional financial center, however it is a short distance from major South African cities, and is a different jurisdiction, so there is the potential for money laundering.

III. Country Action Against Drugs

Swaziland is a party to the SADC protocol on combating illicit drug trafficking. Swaziland has entered into agreements on narcotics control with Mozambique, and with South Africa and the UNDCP on a common project: "Capacity building against drug trafficking and organized crime in Southern Africa." In 2000, the Royal Swaziland Police, in conjunction with high school teachers, introduced a school program called "Youth Programs against Drugs." At least 6 seminars in schools were conducted during the year.

As indicated above, a senior police officer involved in the sale of marijuana was arrested, charged, convicted and sentenced to a seven-year prison term. Also one of the most feared drug traffickers, Mashesha Dlamini, is currently in custody after he was found in possession with 2908 kilograms of marijuana.

In 2000, the Royal Swaziland Police conducted about 26 hand spraying sessions to destroy about 113 hectares of marijuana. The Drug Unit, using sniffing dogs from South Africa, was able to confiscate a large quantity of cannabis hidden in trucks and ready to be exported overseas. Regional cooperation continues with South African antidrug officials, including the sharing of information. Swaziland has strengthened this cooperation through its tenure as chair of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (SARPCO). Swaziland officials welcome regional initiatives and cooperation. Both Swaziland and South Africa support UK-provided training and U.S. assistance.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

The USG supports Swazi efforts in drug interdiction and demand reduction in an effort to promote regional stability. Coordination is close with the regional DEA and other regional USG offices in Pretoria, which work on law enforcement issues. The U.S. will continue to support Swazi interdiction and demand reduction efforts and has the following near term objectives in Swaziland:

  • Urge rapid enactment of the updated drug legislation;

  • Continue assistance to eradicate cannabis crops;

  • Assist Swazi initiatives in the counterdrug arena, as budget ceilings permit;

In 2001, the U.S. Department of Justice will be sponsoring a consultant visit to Swaziland to assist the Assistant Attorney General in the drafting of antinarcotics legislation. An additional sum of money will also be spent to conduct a workshop for several Ministers of Parliament on the new legislation and to purchase computers for the police.


I. Summary

In 2000, the Syrian government continued to make progress in combating the drug trade, but Syria remains an important transit country. Jordan and the Gulf States are the primary destinations for drugs transiting Syria from Lebanon and Turkey. Syria has used its influence in Lebanon to assist Lebanese officials in significantly suppressing drug production and trafficking there in recent years. Counternarcotics cooperation with neighboring countries, particularly Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, is ongoing and robust. Syria's domestic drug abuse problem remains small, due largely to the active enforcement of existing laws and the cultural and religious norms that stigmatize substance abuse. Syria is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. In recognition of the Syrian government's drug control efforts, Syria was removed from the Majors List in 1997 and named a country of concern. Since then, the U.S. has continued to monitor Syria's efforts to suppress cultivation of poppies in the Syrian-controlled Lebanese Biqa' Valley and to monitor the effect of drugs transiting Syria on the U.S.

II. Status of Country

Syria is a transit country for hashish and heroin moving through the region, particularly from Turkey, but also from Lebanon. Syria is also a transit country for opium entering Lebanon from Afghanistan via Jordan. Opium transshipments through Syria increased in 2000, while shipments of cocaine from Brazil via Europe and Syria to Lebanon decreased in 2000. Increased shipments of drugs through Syria to Saudi Arabia and Israel via Jordan were also observed. The available evidence indicates that most narcotics transiting Syria go to other parts of the region and to Europe.

No members of the Syrian military stationed in Lebanon were prosecuted for drug trafficking in 2000. Despite previous allegations of such trafficking, Syrian counternarcotics officials maintain that drug production in the Syrian-controlled Biqa' Valley has decreased significantly, even in remote mountainous areas without roads. These officials acknowledge that some low-ranking individuals in the Syrian military have been arrested in the past with small amounts of drugs, but maintain that there have been no cases of Syrian military involvement in narcotics trafficking in the past several years.

Syria was added to the Majors List in the late 1980's because opium production in the Syrian-controlled Lebanese Biqa' Valley exceeded the threshold limits of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. In 1991, estimates determined that 3,400 hectares were being used for opium production in the Biqa' Valley. In 1992, Syria and Lebanon launched a successful eradication campaign that they have sustained to the present, reducing the area where opium is cultivated to approximately 150 hectares in recent estimates. The cultivation of cannabis, processed into hashish for primarily non-U.S. markets, was also reduced drastically during the same period. In recognition of these efforts, Syria was removed from the Majors List in 1997.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2000

Policy Initiatives. Syria's antitrafficking law of 1993 calls for the death penalty for certain offenses. Syrian authorities handed down two death sentences in narcotics-related cases in 2000; however, in practice the maximum sentence is 30 years, and most death sentences are reportedly commuted. Many cases are pending under the antitrafficking law, and there are ongoing prosecutions of drug offenders. There are provisions for the seizure of assets financed by profits from the drug trade, which are invoked on a case-by-case basis.

Accomplishments. Syrian authorities continued to work closely with their Lebanese counterparts to suppress the cultivation of narcotics in the Biqa' valley. As part of their interdiction efforts, the Syrian authorities confiscated seven kilograms of cocaine, 35 kilograms of opium, 37 kilograms of heroin, 182 kilograms of hashish, and 1.1 million Captagon pills. Syrian authorities reported the arrest of 2,232 individuals on narcotics-related charges in 2000. There were 377 convictions in drug-related cases; sentences included two death sentences, 17 life sentences, and 99 sentences of ten or more years of imprisonment.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Movement of precursor chemicals through Syria is believed to occur on a small scale, although Syrian authorities reported an increase in the smuggling of such precursors from Lebanon to Turkey via Jordan in 2000. Syrian authorities have historically seized only very small amounts of precursor chemicals in transit. In 1999 the Syrian government codified a 1996 plan to control these chemicals.

Syria cooperates closely with the Lebanese authorities in the areas of interdiction, cultivation, and production. In 2000, Syria continued to cooperate closely with Jordan on narcotics matters. Syrian counternarcotics officials maintain that cooperation with Turkey on narcotics control has steadily improved, and characterize the current working relationship as "excellent." In 1999 Syria participated in a regional seminar sponsored by the UNDCP.

Seizures of cocaine decreased to seven kilograms in 2000 from 32 kilograms in 1999 and 15.8 kilograms in 1998. While seizures of cocaine fell from 1999 to 2000, the overall amount of cocaine shipped through Syria also decreased. Seizures of opium rose in 2000 to 35 kilograms, as compared to five kilograms in 1999 and 1.2 kilograms in 1998. Seizures of heroin declined from 57 kilograms in 1999 to 37 kilograms in 2000. Syria has legislation which provides for seizure of assets financed by profits form the drug trade. The government has used this legislation to seize assets.

Corruption. In the past there have been unconfirmed reports of corruption among some Syrian military officials in Lebanon involving the issuance of passes permitting the free movement of goods and persons in return for bribes. The Syrian government has an Investigations Administration (Internal Affairs Division) responsible for weeding out corrupt officers in the counternarcotics unit and the national police force. The Investigations Administration is independent of both the counternarcotics unit and the national police and reports directly to the Minister of the Interior. According to Syrian authorities, there were no arrests or prosecutions of officers in the counternarcotics unit for corruption in 2000.

Agreements and Treaties. Syria is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 Protocol, as well as the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Syria maintains antidrug agreements with Cyprus, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey. In 1999 Syria renewed its antidrug agreement with Saudi Arabia. In 1996, Syria signed a new agreement with Pakistan which called for increased information-sharing in the counternarcotics field. Syria and the U.S. do not have a narcotics agreement, nor is there an extradition treaty between the two countries. Syria is a member of INTERPOL. In December 2000, Syria signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols.

Cultivation/Production. The GOS has an effective antinarcotics system in place that has reduced cultivation and production in Syria to negligible levels.

Drug Flow/Transit. Syrian officials estimated that in 2000 the overall flow of narcotics transiting Syria and destined for other countries in the region was approximately the same as in 1999. Transshipment of narcotics from Turkey continues to represent the major challenge to Syria's counternarcotics effort. Seizure statistics suggest a significant decrease in shipments of cocaine, heroin, and hashish, but those gains were offset by an increase in movement of opium from Afghanistan and Pakistan through Syria to Turkey. Transshipment of drugs via Jordan to the Gulf States has surpassed coca shipments to Lebanon, which decreased in 2000. While total seizures of captagon pills decreased from 1.5 million in 1999 to 1.1 million in 2000, Syrian authorities reported that the amount of captagon seized en route from Turkey to Saudi Arabia via Syria increased from 336,000 pills in 1999 to 890,000 pills in 2000. Drug interdiction remains the focus of the Syrian counternarcotics effort.

Domestic Programs/Demand Reduction. Due to the social stigma attached to drug use and stiff penalties under Syria's strict antitrafficking law, the incidence of drug abuse in Syria is low. The Syrian government's counternarcotics strategy, which is coordinated by the Minister of the Interior, uses the media to educate the public on the dangers of drug use, and drug awareness is also part of the national curriculum for school children.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. In meetings with Syrian officials, the U.S. continues to stress the need for diligence in preventing narcotics and precursor chemicals from transiting Syrian territory; the need to work with the Lebanese government in dismantling drug laboratories in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon; and the necessity of terminating any involvement, active or passive, of individual Syrian officials in the drug trade.

Bilateral Cooperation. U.S. Embassy officials in Damascus and DEA officials based in Nicosia maintain an ongoing dialogue with Syrian authorities in the counternarcotics unit. In addition, high-ranking U.S. officials periodically share their views and recommendations with the Syrian ministries of Foreign Affairs and Interior.

The Road Ahead. The U.S. will continue to encourage the Syrian government to maintain its commitment to combating drug transit and production in the region; to follow through on plans to enact anti-money laundering legislation; and continue to encourage Syria to improve its counternarcotics cooperation with neighboring countries. The U.S. will also encourage Syrian officials to continue their work with their Lebanese counterparts to ensure that drug production in Lebanon remains at low levels; to find and destroy drug processing laboratories in those areas where Syrian forces are present; and to work to minimize the involvement of Syrian officials in drug trafficking.


I. Summary

Tanzania is located along trafficking routes from Asia and the Middle East to South Africa, Europe and the United States. Drugs like hashish, Mandrax, cocaine, heroin, and opium have found their way into and through Tanzania's porous borders. In addition, the domestic production of cannabis is growing. As a result, drug abuse, particularly involving cannabis, as well as cocaine and heroin, is increasing, especially among younger people. Money laundering happens in Tanzania, but a very weak financial sector and under-trained and under-funded law enforcement make it difficult to track and prosecute.

Tanzania is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention; and, in conjunction with UNDCP, is seeking to address objectives of that convention. Recent accomplishments include a high profile and apparently successful master plan policy workshop and the establishment of an inter-ministerial Antidrug Commission. However, Tanzania is a poor country and lacks the necessary resources to make institutions effective. Despite public promises to combat graft, Tanzania is apparently unable to put a stop to rampant corruption.

II. Status of Country

Until 1989, Tanzania's contact with drugs was largely limited to the traditional cultivation of cannabis in some parts of the mainland. Since then, the situation has changed dramatically and new drugs like hashish, Mandrax, cocaine, heroin, and opium have found their way into and through Tanzania's porous borders.

In addition, the domestic production of cannabis is growing. As a result, drug abuse (particularly involving cannabis and Mandrax) is increasing, especially among younger people. Harder drugs (heroin and cocaine) are used in small quantities within the affluent classes. Recent reports indicate that crack cocaine has also been introduced to Tanzania, and is growing more prevalent. The growing tourism industry has created a larger demand for narcotics.

Tanzania is located along trafficking routes with numerous possible illegal points of entry. The drugs originate from Pakistan, India, Thailand, Burma, Iran, Syria, and South America en route to Europe, South Africa, and to a lesser extent, the U.S. The amount of drugs transiting Tanzania does not, however, significantly affect the U.S. Drugs enter Tanzania by air, sea, roads, and rail. Major points of entry include airports in Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar, and Kilimanjaro, and sea ports at Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar, as well as smaller ports like Tanga and Mtwara.

Despite a paucity of statistics about the narcotics trade in Zanzibar, and even fewer seizures, law enforcement officials widely believe that there are significant amounts of drugs passing through its sea and airports. Widespread corruption and a near absence of regulation on Zanzibar make it an ideal transit point.

There are also strong indications of a drugs-arms connection in Tanzania linked with the arms demand in the Great Lakes Region (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, etc.).

III. Country Actions Against Drugs

Policy Initiatives. In 1995 Tanzania passed the Prevention of Illicit Traffic and Drugs Acts, which establishes severe punishments for the production and trafficking of narcotics. It stipulates long sentences, including life imprisonment, and forfeiture of property derived from or used in illicit trafficking. Offenses under this act are not bailable. A 1995 act of parliament also created the Inter-Ministerial Antidrug Commission (IADC) (established in 1997) to define, coordinate, and promote Tanzania's national and sub-regional narcotics policies. The Government of Tanzania has recently put narcotics issues higher on the political agenda. President Mkapa has declared the government's Fight Against Drugs, involving the nine ministries that are party to the IADC, as well as five other ministries that work in close cooperation with the commission.

In 1999 UNDCP helped finance a workshop for the IADC to develop the framework for a national master plan to combat drug trafficking and abuse. A UNDCP-funded expert has been working with the commission and a plan has been submitted to the cabinet for approval. It is expected to be completed and published by mid-2001.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Tanzania has three antidrug police units of more than 50 officers; one in Dar es Salaam, one in Zanzibar, and a new unit in Moshi. These units just received six drug detection dogs from the United Kingdom to increase their detection capability.

A structured cooperation between the drug police in Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania is well established, with bi-annual meetings to discuss regional narcotics issues. This cooperation has resulted in significant increase in communication, as well as effectiveness in their individual narcotics control efforts. Through UNDCP, Tanzania receives technical cooperation that amounts to $700,000 for a multi-sectoral project that includes capacity building for law enforcement, institution building and demand reduction. Tanzania also participates in UNDCP regional projects. The Southern African Development Community, of which Tanzania is a member, has approved an antidrug action plan and will appoint a drug advisor.

In the most recent year for which accurate statistics are available, 1999, the GOT seized 7.1 kilograms of heroin, compared to 4.6 in 1997—an increase of 46.5 percent. In October 2000, police in the Dar es Salaam seaport seized over 295 kilograms of Mandrax from a container believed to be transiting Tanzania on its way from Mumbai to South Africa. Also in October, police at Dar es Salaam International Airport arrested a Tanzanian national carrying nearly 600 grams of cocaine from Rio de Janeiro to Switzerland. Four-and-a-half kilograms of heroin were seized on Zanzibar from three Tanzanian nationals traveling from Dubai to Mombasa.

Cultivation and Production. Traditional cultivation of cannabis takes place in remote parts of the country, mainly for domestic use. No figures exist, but police and government officials report that production is continuing to increase.

Drug Flow/Transit. Due to its location and porous borders, ports and airports, Tanzania, and in particular Zanzibar, has become an important transit country for narcotics moving in sub-Saharan Africa. Control at the ports is especially difficult as sophisticated methods of forged documents combine with poor controls and corrupt officials. Trafficking using document courier companies is becoming more common. Heroin trafficking in Tanzania is beginning to have an impact on the U.S. Afghan heroin entering Tanzania from Pakistan is being smuggled to the U.S. by Nigerian traffickers. In addition, a growing number of Tanzanians are arrested abroad for serving as drug couriers. The Port of Dar es Salaam is a major entry point for Mandrax from India headed towards South Africa. This trade is managed by Indian nationals and ethnic Indians of South African nationality.

Only small amounts of narcotics are seized due to lack of resources and corruption. For example, the Tanzanian Coast Guard which is responsible for a large portion of Tanzania's border including the Indian Ocean, Lake Victoria, Lake Tanganyika, Lake Malawi, and others, has only one functional boat, which was donated by the British in 1998.

Agreements and Treaties. Tanzania is a party to the 1998 UN Drug Convention. Tanzania has also signed the Southern African Development community (SADC) Protocol on Drug Control. The 1931 U.S.-UK Extradition Treaty is applicable to Tanzania.

Domestic Programs/Demand Reduction. Tanzania was traditionally believed only to be a transit point for narcotics, but signs point to an increase in consumer use. There has been no study of narcotics consumption, but UNDCP is finalizing the results of a rapid-assessment study it began in 1999. In addition, IADC has begun to compile narcotics statistics in a central databank. It is known that domestic demand is increasing due to both spill-over from trafficking and increased tourism. The tourist industry has brought ecstasy to Zanzibar and police reports confirm that crack cocaine is also consumed locally.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

U.S. policy initiatives and programs for addressing narcotics problems in Tanzania are focused on training workshops and seminars for law enforcement officials. In July 2000, DEA presented a two-week drug enforcement course in Nairobi which was attended by six Tanzanian antinarcotics officers. In January 2001, an antinarcotics officer attended a three-week course on narcotics and contraband interdiction. Four senior Tanzanian police officers attended a State Department-sponsored training assessment forum in Gabarone, Botswana in January 2001.


I. Summary

In 2000, Togolese authorities took aggressive action against drug traffickers by enforcing the Government's tough 1998 antidrug law. For the first time Togo has punished offenders using the heavy fines and long prison sentences provided for under the 1998 law. Togo is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

Togo cultivates small amounts of cannabis primarily for local consumption, and estimates that only a small amount of this cannabis is exported. The country's poor infrastructure coupled with high unemployment and desperate economic conditions are unlikely to allow for clandestine laboratories or the procurement of drugs by most of the Togolese citizenry. Nevertheless, Togo's relatively porous borders permit traffickers, mostly African and including many Nigerian nationals, relatively free access to the country. This ease of access has made Togo a transshipment point in the regional and sub-regional trade in narcotics, especially for heroin coming from Southeast and Southwest Asia, destined for Nigeria, and from there to Europe and the U.S. The GOT believes increased drug flows through Togo have led to an upsurge in violent crime in general. It also is aware that increased international trade may expand opportunities for narcotics trafficking.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 2000

Law Enforcement Efforts. Togo's difficult budget problems have stymied the implementation of most GOT-sponsored antidrug programs. There is neither money nor infrastructure for rehabilitation programs for drug addicts. In fact, only recently has the GOT begun to train its magistrates in how to handle cases and sentencing under the 1998 drug law. The GOT held many drug conferences this year to educate local officials involved with counternarcotics activities. The most recent drug education conference, held in November 2000, targeted local magistrates responsible for enforcing and prosecuting offenders under the 1998 drug law. It has been suggested that since 1990—during Togo's ongoing, if halting, democratic transition—precious resources that could have gone into the interdiction of illicit drugs have instead been diverted to ensure public order.

Policy Initiatives. Togo is now working methodically toward preventing the free flow of illegal drugs from entering the country. In an effort to meet its obligations under the 1988 UN Drug Convention, The GOT outlined a National Drug Strategy in 2000. The strategy, detailed in a major paper produced by the Ministry of Interior entitled "The Drug Menace in Togo," defines obstacles the GOT encounters in combating the illicit narcotic trade, such as budgetary difficulties and the problems posed by the country's porous borders. The strategy also sets forth three key objectives:

  • Improving the Management of Drug Control through promoting research in drug supply and demand and improving coordination of action in fighting against drugs.

  • Reducing supply through reinforcement of cooperation among agencies by creating a confidential databank, comprised of data from all agencies, with all agencies having common access; reinforcing cooperation and management controls among competing security agencies with overlapping authority in the area of equipment and human resources. (Note: Currently the National Police focus on drug interdiction in cities and at the Lome Tokoin International Airport. The National Gendarmerie also works at that airport as well as in non-urban areas and along the borders. The Customs Service also handles border controls.) Combating illegal production through law enforcement and eradication measures; combating money laundering of drug funds; and combating all levels of the illegal supplying of drugs, from the individual who is abusing a prescription to the drug kingpin who transships kilos of heroin or cocaine through Togo.

  • Reducing the demand in drugs by reinforcing preventive actions through the media, including education and drug awareness campaigns; enforcing rehabilitation, including detoxification and post-"cure" counseling and support; and reinforcing rehabilitation by developing training activities and providing assistance to former addicts.

In an effort to implement the national strategy, the GOT has called on donor countries for $3 million. This funding would be used to create many new programs such as a maritime targeting unit, two health centers, and a rehabilitation center. The plan calls for development of a new counternarcotics infrastructure, attacking the transshipment of narcotics as well as targeting major drug traffickers and organizations.

Agreements and Treaties. Togo is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Togo does not have an extradition treaty with the United States. The GOT has signed a quadripartite agreement with provisions to fight against illegal drug trafficking with the governments of Ghana, Benin, and Nigeria (including the extradition of criminals). In December 2000, Togo signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols.

Bilateral Cooperation. Togo hosted the ECOWAS Heads of State and Governments Conference in December 1999, which created an Inter-Governmental Group of Action Against Money-Laundering in West Africa. This was a significant milestone, for Togo's 1998 drug law penalizes financial transactions at the same level as narcotics smuggling or selling.

Drug Flow/Transit. GOT authorities involved with counternarcotics continued their interdiction efforts directed primarily at ports of entry. Seizures at the Lome's Tokoin International Airport have increased with an average smuggler trying to enter the country with approximately one kilogram of heroin or cocaine. Usually couriers swallow balloons filled with the illicit drugs. So far, the profile of smugglers is split 50-50 between Africans (mainly Nigerians) and Europeans. Most heroin couriers have used the air carrier Ethiopian Airways, which has connecting service from Pakistan in Addis Ababa. The GOT now publicly releases pictures of smugglers to media outlets, including national television and local newspapers (this is in accordance with the 1998 drug law). The most recent arrest involved a Nigerian national arriving at the Tokoin International Airport in November. The Nigerian had swallowed 1.2 kilograms of heroin, reportedly purchased in Pakistan. Local newspapers published his picture and a story detailing his possible punishment of 10 to 20 years in prison and an approximate $180,000 fine.

Drug Programs/Demand Reduction. Heroin and cocaine are readily available in Lome. The National Narcotic Control Board continues with their proactive measures similar to the D.A.R.E. program in the United States. Through the creative use of soccer games among youth groups throughout the country, the Committee has spread the word about the dangers of drug use and trafficking.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

The primary U.S. goal is to help the GOT combat transnational narcotics smuggling through assisting the GOT in improving its ability to interdict illicit narcotics entering Togo and to prosecute those traffickers who are caught. Togo's realization of the threat from narcotics trafficking, and its excellent planning response to that threat is the prerequisite to progress. But actually achieving the well-thought-out goals in Togo's plan will be difficult because of the hard fact of the country's ongoing political crisis and the resulting very poor state of Togo's finances.


I. Summary

Tunisia's role as a drug transshipment point is limited, but the government has continued its cooperation with neighboring states and with international bodies to interdict drug shipments. Tunisia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. In 1992 Tunisia passed drug-enforcement legislation to implement the convention. Tunisia is also party to the Arab Convention Against Illegal Trafficking In Drugs And Psychotropic Substances. The government has an active antidrug education program, focusing on youth. In December 2000, Tunisia signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols.

II. Status of the Country

Tunisia is not a significant drug transshipment point, and does not play a significant role in money laundering or precursor chemical production. Tunisia is a transit point for hashish from Morocco being smuggled to Europe. While consumption of narcotics was previously virtually unknown and remains limited, drug use, including of cocaine, ecstasy, marijuana, and cannabis, has increased in recent years, primarily at high schools, universities, and tourist resorts. There is no reliable information about whether scattered production of cannabis in northern Tunisia, which was legally cultivated for local use in pre-independence Tunisia, continues illicitly.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2000

Accomplishments. In July 2000, a court in the Tunisian city of Sfax, Tunisia's second-largest city, convicted the defendants in a case in which 50 defendants were involved and 340 kilograms of ecstasy were seized. In November 2000, a Tunis court heard a complex narcotics case involving 27 defendants of different nationalities (mainly French and Tunisians) accused of possessing and trafficking in heroin. These two cases indicate some increase in international drug trafficking to and through Tunisia. The Tunisian press has recently begun to report on major drug cases, with some allegations that wealthy, well-connected families are involved. The subject of narcotics trafficking remains somewhat stigmatized and public discussion is limited.

Corruption. There does not appear to be widespread drug-related government corruption. In an effort to control drug-related corruption, the 1992 drug law provides for sentences to be doubled if the crime is committed by a drug enforcement official or person involved in the administration or guarding of drug warehouses or depots.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

The U.S. supports Tunisian efforts to comply fully with the 1988 UN Convention, and seeks Tunisian support for U.S. international antinarcotics initiatives. There is no U.S.-Tunisia bilateral narcotics agreement, and there has been no recent U.S. assistance to the GOT on counternarcotics matters. The U.S. in the past provided narcotics-related training assistance in maritime security for Tunisian customs officials.

United Arab Emirates

I. Summary

Although it is not a drug producing country, the UAE is a crossroads for west-east trade and is proximate to major drug-producing and transit countries, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and India. It has 700 kilometers of coastline, is situated in a relatively affluent region, and has a domestic banking system that only recently (December 2000) adopted formal anti-money laundering regulations. These factors, combined with the country's laissez-faire attitude toward trade, make it vulnerable to narcotics trafficking. A reliable estimate of the volume and type of drug trafficking is not currently available, in part due to limited seizure data. But rising heroin abuse in the UAE as reported in the media and arrests of drug couriers planning to transit or who have already transited the UAE are evidence for concern. The failure of recently adopted money laundering measures to criminalize such activity adds to UAE's vulnerability.

Published statistics on narcotics seizures and domestic addiction reveal a growing drug problem among UAE and third-country nationals which, while not significant by U.S standards, is notable given the country's harsh drug laws. Officials of the Ministry of Interior's Federal Drug Enforcement Agency have informed U.S. officials that heroin is their main concern, although the majority of drug seizures are of hashish rather than heroin, opium, or cocaine. This Drug Enforcement Agency is tasked with coordinating drug enforcement efforts among the seven emirates comprising the UAE, as well as executing national antidrug strategy. The UAE government is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and is committed to the fight against international narcotics trafficking and narcotics abuse.

II. Status of Country

A major financial center and regional hub for air travel, commercial shipping and trade, the UAE also is a transshipment point for illegal narcotics from the drug cultivating regions of South and Southwest Asia to Africa and Europe. Some analysts estimate that less than one percent of the drugs likely transiting the Emirates reaches the United States. The UAE seized a nine ton shipment of mislabeled acetic anhydride, a chemical used to make opium into heroin, en route from India to Afghanistan in 1999, additional evidence of a UAE transshipment role in the regional drug trade.

Illegal trafficking occurs mainly in the northern emirates due to the emergence of Dubai and Sharjah as regional centers in the transportation of passengers and cargo, a porous land border with Oman, and the presence of active "free trade zones" in all the emirates but Abu Dhabi. Drug couriers intending to travel through the UAE are routinely arrested at airports in Pakistan, and many other couriers arrested in African airports carried their Afghan heroin cargo through Dubai.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2000

Policy Initiatives. The government of the UAE (UAEG) co-hosted a drug conference in October 1999 with the UNDP and presented a national drug control strategy targeting both the supply of and demand for illegal drugs. Supply reduction initiatives include the formation of a counternarcotics force within the UAE Coast Guard; establishment of special drug task forces throughout the emirates; registration of convicted drug offenders into a central database to deny entry at border points; assignment of specially trained counter narcotics officers to all border points to profile potential traffickers; increased cooperation with neighboring countries regarding information exchange and drug seizures; monitoring of precursor chemicals to ensure their legitimate use; and the signing of antinarcotics agreements with Pakistan and India. The UAE continues to formulate a national drug demand reduction plan. This plan is expected to focus on designing programs to ensure that all UAE citizens have suitable employment, receive incentives to lead stable family-oriented lives, and are provided financial incentives to cooperate with police in detecting drug crimes. In conjunction with reducing demand, the UAEG has established drug treatment centers for those identified as addicts.

UAE authorities continue to participate in international antidrug fora. The UAEG has been very receptive to State Department, DEA, U.S. Coast Guard, and other agency-sponsored training on money laundering, drug education, treatment, and prevention programs.

Agreements and Treaties. The U.S. does not have an extradition treaty or a mutual legal assistance treaty with the UAE. The UAE is a party to the 1998 UN Drug Convention and other multilateral or bilateral counternarcotics conventions, including agreements with Pakistan and India. The UAEG has also signed a number of Memoranda of Understanding with other governments, including the U.S. and U.K.

Law Enforcement. In 1998 the UAEG established its first regional narcotics liaison office in Islamabad, Pakistan, and is evaluating an initiative to establish a network of liaison offices. UAE officials have identified a requirement for a data center to coordinate narcotics-related information throughout the UAE and have taken preliminary measures to establish a countrywide database.

While punishment for drug offenses is severe, enforcement is hampered by the absence of legal provisions allowing asset forfeiture. The minimum sentence for individuals convicted of using drugs in the UAE is four years, or seven years if there also is a possession charge. In 1999 the death sentence was imposed on a Canadian citizen for possession with intent to distribute narcotics, later commuted to life in prison. No death sentence has ever been carried out in the UAE.

Some UAE successes with shallow-water interdictions have prompted narcotics traffickers to use alternate routes, particularly Oman's vast 1,500 km coastline for overland smuggling across the UAE-Oman border. In response, the UAEG has increased border patrols utilizing enhanced monitoring equipment.

Recognizing the need for increased monitoring at their commercial shipping ports and borders, the UAEG is making efforts to tighten inspections of cargo containers transiting the UAE. (Over two million containers entered the emirate of Dubai in 1998.) Customs officials are randomly searching containers and following up leads of suspicious cargo. The UAEG is in the process of procuring state-of-the-art equipment, which allows for rapid, thorough searches of shipping containers and vehicles.

Corruption. UAE officials aggressively pursue and arrest individuals involved in illegal narcotics trafficking and/or abuse. There is no evidence that corruption of public officials is a problem.

Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction). UAE authorities acknowledge that narcotics consumption is an increasing problem among the local population. The focus of the UAE government's domestic program is to reduce demand through public awareness campaigns directed at young people and the establishment of rehabilitation centers. UAE officials believe that adherence to Islamic religious mores and the imposition of severe prison sentences for persons convicted of drug offenses are effective deterrents to narcotics abuse. The UAEG has established treatment and rehabilitation programs. Under federal law, nationals who are addicted can present themselves to the police or to a rehabilitation center and be exempted from criminal prosecution. Patients undergo a two-year drug rehabilitation program that includes family counseling/therapy. Nationals who do not turn themselves in to local authorities are referred to the courts for prosecution. Third-country nationals or "guest workers" (approximately 80 percent of the UAE's population) convicted of narcotics offenses generally receive prison sentences and then are deported upon completing their sentences.

Drug Flow/Transit. The volume of legitimate commercial trade via the UAE's many air and seaports makes it difficult to detect illegal drug smuggling operations. While the UAE's geographical location, large shipping and transit infrastructure, and emphasis on a streamlined movement of cargo could attract narcotic trafficking organizations, there have been no large or containerized drug seizures in the UAE. Information compiled from arrests and seizure data in other transit and destination countries documents a transshipment role for the UAE, but the magnitude of that role is not clear. No official countrywide statistics are available in the public domain, nor have any significant UAE related drug seizures occurred in country. Arrest and seizure information from other countries, however, supports a growing body of opinion that narcotics smuggling from South and Southwest Asia to Europe and Africa via the UAE is increasing. Hashish, heroin and opium shipments originate mainly in Afghanistan, pass through Pakistan and Iran, and are smuggled to the UAE in cargo containers or on small vessels and powerboats, sometimes arriving overland through Oman. The amount of the U.S. heroin market supplied from South Asia is low (estimates range from five to 15 percent), and it is unlikely that the heroin that reaches the U.S. through the UAE is in an amount sufficient to have a significant effect on the U.S.

Local press reports the street value of one kilogram of Pakistani hashish to be USD 4,658 in Abu Dhabi and USD 3,288 in Dubai. Prices are said to be higher in the relatively more affluent Abu Dhabi and Dubai emirates.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

U.S. Government policy seeks continued and enhanced participation by the UAEG in programs dealing with narcotics trafficking, the diversion of precursor chemicals, and money laundering. In 2000 the UAE participated in regional training programs with Pakistan and Oman to improve maritime narcotics interdiction.

Bilateral Cooperation. Although the UAE has no bilateral narcotics agreement with the U.S., UAE authorities cooperate willingly with U.S. investigative efforts to the extent possible under UAE law. UAE officials are eager to engage in exchange programs with U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration personnel.

The Road Ahead. The U.S. will continue to support the UAEG's efforts against illicit narcotics trafficking and money laundering. The USG will encourage the UAEG to focus enforcement efforts on dismantling major trafficking organizations and prosecuting their leaders, and to enact asset forfeiture and seizure legislation.


I. Summary

Zambia is not a major drug producer or exporter, and it is not a significant drug transit country, but Mandrax headed for South Africa does transit Zambia. There is, however, some cultivation of cannabis. The Zambian Drug Enforcement Commission (DEC) cooperates well with the U.S. and other nations' law enforcement agencies, but, to date, there have been relatively few prosecutions of major drug traffickers in Zambia. There is no question of Zambian officials' commitment to vigorous drug enforcement, but the overall program suffers from a lack of resources. Zambia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

Production of drugs in Zambia is limited, with cultivation of cannabis the only significant issue. Cannabis is grown mostly in rural areas as a cash crop supplement to subsistence agriculture. There are reports of seizures of Zambian origin cannabis in neighboring states, and Zambian enforcement officials seized sizeable quantities themselves. Zambia is unlikely to emerge as a significant source for cannabis. Cannabis is used among the urban young and, to a lesser degree, by villagers in rural areas. No reliable statistics on use are available.

There is a small, but reportedly growing consumption of imported drugs, including heroin, cocaine, Mandrax (methaqualone tablets), hashish, and amphetamines by foreigners resident in Zambia as well as wealthier young Zambians. Some of these same drugs are trafficked to southern Africa, but while there have been seizures at the international airport and at border crossings, this trafficking is limited in scope, with the exception of Mandrax, which is moderate in scope.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2000

Zambia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. The 1931 U.S.-UK Extradition Treaty is applicable to Zambia. A Drug Control Master Plan was launched in October 1998. The objectives of the plan are research on the extent of the drug problem and demand reduction through enhanced public awareness of the dangers of drug abuse. During the first year of the project, drug awareness materials were developed and distributed to schools in three provinces. In the past year a rapid assessment study on the extent of drug abuse in Zambia was carried out. The plan has one additional year to run.

In July 2000, drug detection dog kennels were opened at the Zambian Drug Enforcement Commission (DEC) headquarters in Lusaka. The kennels were funded in part by the Finnish government. Four South African trained dogs were funded by the UNDCP. There have been no reports of drug seizures using the dogs, but they would seem to exercise a deterrent effect on possible violators.

Also in July 2000, the DEC sponsored a two-day workshop in Lusaka for members of parliament and representatives of civil society on the impact of drug trafficking and money laundering on the nation. Among the recommendations unanimously adopted at the final plenary session was that a bill on prohibition and prevention of money laundering, withdrawn from parliament by the cabinet after a first reading, be reintroduced to parliament by the executive branch. To date this has not been done.

As of October, the DEC had made 1,942 narcotics arrests for the year 2000. While the large majority of these were low-level Zambian cultivators, street traffickers and abusers, 23 Somalis and 16 citizens of the Democratic Republic of the Congo were also arrested. During the same period, the DEC obtained 739 convictions for narcotics-related crimes. During the first 10 months of the year, Zambian enforcement officials seized almost 7 MT of cannabis and more than 124 kilograms of Mandrax and other synthetic drugs and pills.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

The U.S. contributed 10 used computers and monitors to the DEC and 24 drug test kits for use at international airports and border crossings. In late December 2000, a team of U.S. Customs and INS experts were preparing to visit Zambia's border with Tanzania as part of a joint project to improve law enforcement and, generally, to improve operations at land border crossings in southern and eastern Africa.


I. Summary

Zimbabwe is not a major producer, supplier or exporter of illicit narcotics. Drug use in Zimbabwe is generally limited to cannabis, the majority of which is imported from Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. Although Zimbabwe is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and ratified the SADC (Southern African Development Community) Protocol on Narcotics Cooperation, a unified government program of prevention and enforcement remains largely unfunded and inactive. Zimbabwe has neither requested, nor has it received USG assistance in the past two years. On April 26, 2000, the U.S.-Zimbabwe extradition treaty entered into force. In December 2000, Zimbabwe signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.

II. Status of Country

Production, cultivation and trafficking of narcotics in Zimbabwe are rather limited, as is the production of precursor chemicals. Although cannabis is cultivated in the rural areas on a small scale for local use, most cannabis available in Zimbabwe is imported from neighboring countries such as Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. Hashish, cocaine, heroin and LSD are other narcotics that have been noted in very limited quantities in larger urban areas such as Harare, Bulawayo, and Gweru. Unaffordable to the mainstream population, these drugs are generally used by a few affluent suburban youths. Zimbabwe has also been identified as a transshipment point for Mandrax (Methaqualone), a drug produced in India and Pakistan for distribution in South Africa. Some cocaine bound for South Africa transits Zimbabwe; this traffic is under the control of Nigerians.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2000

The implementation of a five-year Drug Control Master Plan commenced in January 2000 and stressed four specific areas of concern: prevention, treatment, rehabilitation and law enforcement. However, law enforcement authorities are not presently engaged in specific programs to combat drug use, production or transshipment, and view the antinarcotics effort as minor in comparison with other law enforcement challenges that they routinely face. Police have seized limited quantities of narcotics and offenders have been prosecuted in the courts, but these actions are generally considered by-products of law enforcement activities other than those in the counternarcotics arena. There are no known indicators to demonstrate or suggest that government officials are engaged in or encourage illicit drug production or distribution.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Zimbabwe's problems with illicit drugs appear to be relatively small, certainly in comparison with many neighboring countries. Still, it is unfortunate that the GOZ's interest in the counternarcotics arena appears to have been sidelined by a more pressing, yet controversial, political agenda.


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