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Overview for 2000

For U.S. international antidrug programs, the year 2000 was one of important accomplishments and serious challenges. Long-term cooperation with our Western Hemisphere allies continued to bear fruit. We successfully attacked drug crop expansion, enhanced interdiction efforts, worked to arrest leaders of drug trafficking syndicates, and narrowed the opportunities for the drug trade to launder drug profits. At the same time, we provided our partners essential training assistance to strengthen their law enforcement and judicial systems, while helping them with programs to reduce drug consumption in their own countries.

The year's most noteworthy accomplishment was to keep the total Andean coca crop from expanding significantly. Six years of joint air and riverine interdiction, eradication operations, and alternative development programs have profoundly altered the map of coca cultivation in the Andes. There have been dramatic reductions in two major coca growing countries, Peru and Bolivia. Once the world's two leading coca-producers, both countries saw cultivation drop to unprecedented lows in 2000. In 1995, Peru had 115,300 hectares and Bolivia 48,600 hectares of coca under cultivation. Five years later, U.S. Government surveys show 34, 200 hectares for Peru and 14,600 hectares for Bolivia, a drop of roughly 70 percent in both countries. This is an extraordinary achievement. Given the deep-rooted traditions of coca use that predate Columbus in both countries—along with the intense pressures from trafficking organizations to protect their enormously lucrative crop—such reductions represent progress that few could have anticipated a few years ago. Even with an 11 percent increase in cultivation in Colombia , total Andean coca cultivation at the end of the year remained essentially stable at 185,000 hectares, with a statistically insignificant increase of less than two percent over last year's total of 183,000 hectares.

Outside of our hemisphere, a major achievement was the virtual elimination of opium poppy from Pakistan, which as recently as 1992 was the world's third largest supplier of illicit opium. Over the last decade poppy cultivation has fallen from 8,530 to 515 hectares. The Government of Pakistan has demonstrated leadership and political will in uprooting poppy cultivation from numerous remote and inaccessible areas. The U.S. has worked closely with Pakistan in a sustained manner to provide the local population with real choices, investing in roads and improvements to the infrastructure in traditional opium production areas.

The major drug syndicates' campaign to expand coca cultivation in Colombia again offset the reductions in Bolivia and Peru. USG experts estimate that in 2000, coca cultivation in Colombia increased by 11 percent to 136,200 hectares. Much of the increase was in San Jose del Guaviare province. USG surveys also detected new cultivation in the northern departments of Bolivar and Norte de Santander, areas where the smaller ELN guerrilla movement exercises influence. The drug trade seems to be hedging its bets, by dispersing cultivation to widely separated corners of the country to put the maximum strain on the Colombian government's finite eradication resources.

The Colombian drug syndicates have not only expanded coca cultivation, they have achieved extraordinary levels of efficiency in extracting cocaine from coca leaf. Field work carried out under Operation Breakthrough, an interagency yield study that has been underway for nearly a decade, indicates that higher yielding varieties of coca are being cultivated in Colombia. The study also indicates that Colombian laboratory operators have become more efficient in processing coca leaf into cocaine base. USG experts believe that this improved efficiency ratio enabled Colombian refiners to produce about 580 metric tons of cocaine in 2000.

We have also found ourselves facing a new kind of challenge. The drug trade has, in effect, become the silent partner of all the rival parties seeking to destabilize Colombia. This "narco-political" alliance has developed gradually over the past five years. The Colombian syndicates, witnessing the vulnerability of Peruvian and Bolivian coca supply to joint interdiction operations in the late 1990's, decided to move most of the coca cultivation to Colombia's southwest corner, an area controlled by the FARC, the country's oldest insurgent group. The guerrillas have provided protection—at a price. The syndicates continue to reap their enormous profits, which the FARC, as well as its enemies, the rival AUC self-defense units, "tax" in order to buy arms and war supplies. As the 37-year struggle has escalated, drug revenues have become the lifeblood of the armed conflict, with all parties prepared to go to great lengths to protect this source of economic survival. Making illicit drugs the main funding source for the insurgency has raised the stakes for all concerned. With the drug trade now an organic part of the Colombian civil conflict, the question facing the antidrug coalition will be how to reduce the supply of illegal drugs without exacerbating local conflicts that threaten regional stability. This is likely to remain the most important antidrug challenge facing us over the next few years.

In July 2000, the U.S. took a major step toward meeting this challenge by enacting legislation that provided a comprehensive $1.3 billion assistance package to support the Government of Colombia's "Plan Colombia." The U.S. assistance package will help Colombia address the breadth of the challenges it faces—its efforts to fight the illicit drug trade, to increase the rule of law, to protect human rights, to expand economic development, to institute judicial reform, and to foster peace. It supplements ongoing U.S. counternarcotics programs totaling $330 million that were already in place. Under Plan Colombia, the U.S. will support justice sector reform and alternative development projects and will provide equipment, training, and technical assistance to the Colombian antinarcotics police and the military to increase their capability to eradicate illicit coca and opium poppy cultivation and to conduct interdiction operations. The initial geographical focus is in the department of Putumayo in southern Colombia, where the majority of illegal crops are cultivated and where the greatest number of illegal armed groups operates. To counter this threat, the U.S. aid package provides for the training and equipping of a 2,900-person Counternarcotics Brigade. The second battalion in the brigade completed its training in December 2000 and, along with the first (which completed training in 1999), is now operational.

We faced different obstacles in limiting the cultivation of opium poppy, the source of heroin. Unlike coca, which currently grows in only three Andean countries, one can find opium poppy in nearly every region of the world. As an annual crop with as many as three harvests per year, opium poppy is much harder to eliminate, especially since 93 percent of the world's estimated opium gum is produced in Afghanistan and Burma, countries where we have limited influence. The opium poppies that affect us most directly, however, are those cultivated in Colombia and Mexico. Although between them they account for less than three percent of the world's estimated production, the bulk of the heroin entering the United States comes from these two countries, where we assist the governments in opium poppy eradication campaigns. Therefore, eradication programs in these two countries can have a significant impact on the flow of U.S.-bound heroin.

The USG estimates that Mexico effectively eradicated 7,600 hectares of opium poppy in 2000. Factoring in the ravages of a drought, the year-end total harvest was only 1,900 hectares of opium poppy, or about one percent of global cultivation. This is the lowest level recorded in Mexico since accurate surveys were implemented in 1986. The Mexican crop potentially could have produced an estimated 2.5 metric tons of heroin. As a result, in 2000, nearly two tons less heroin were available to the U.S. market than in 1999. In Colombia, the Colombian National Police estimates that aerial operations eradicated 9,254 hectares of opium poppy in 2000. Final opium cultivation totals, however, were not available at time of publication.

We have continued to work effectively in Southeast and Southwest Asia, formerly the priority producers of heroin that affected the United States, to eliminate crops in Thailand, Laos, and Pakistan. Because of the political situation there, we do not work directly in Burma, the world's second largest producer of opium. We do, however, support a small United Nations Drug Control Program there and have supported regional law enforcement efforts to stem transit of opium and heroin out of Burma. The USG has strongly supported and encouraged counternarcotics cooperation, aimed at Burmese producers and traffickers, in Thailand, China and other ASEAN countries. Burmese production is at its lowest level in years and has held steadily at that level for the past three years. Thailand has continued to operate one of the most successful crop eradication and substitution programs in the world. This year eradication forces destroyed 758 hectares of poppy, leaving Thailand with a harvest considerably less than 1,000 hectares for the second year in a row.

As in Thailand, opium production in Pakistan continues to fall, but neighboring Afghanistan remains the world's largest producer. While the political situation in Afghanistan also prevents direct action there, we have worked with regional neighbors, including the Six Plus Two Group, to put pressure on the Afghanistan authorities to curtail the trade. Preliminary reports indicate that the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan may have put into place an apparently effective ban on production in the 2000-2001 growing season. However, other reports indicate that a sufficient stockpile exists from earlier years so as to meet demand easily. It is vital to keep the pressure up in these regions even though they produce only a small portion of U.S. consumption at this time, because traffickers will come back to these sources if those in Colombia and Mexico are eliminated.

Striking at the Syndicates

Law enforcement authorities in key countries continued to weaken the drug syndicates by arresting important operatives. For example, in March, Mexican authorities arrested the financial chief of the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO),Jesus Labra Aviles. Two months later, the Mexican military captured its operations chief, arrested Ismael "El Mayel" Higurera Guerrero. Peruvian authorities, in turn, arrested Adolfo Cachique Rivera (whose brothers, Segundo and Abelardo were arrested earlier), co-head of a major Peruvian cocaine base trafficking organization. His arrest effectively ended the illegal cocaine operations of this organization, which had exported multi-kilogram quantities of cocaine base to Brazil and Colombia for over nine years. Likewise, improved cooperation in Southeast Asia has led to arrests of several major trafficking figures associated with Burmese organizations. Though the position of drug boss never remains vacant for long, losing a leader inevitably impairs a drug syndicate's effectiveness. Moreover, arresting high-level traffickers demonstrates—to the criminals and to the governments fighting them alike—that over time even the strongest syndicates are highly vulnerable to coordinated and sustained international pressure.

Systemic Improvements

We have been working with many governments to strengthen their judicial and banking systems to restrict the possibilities for penetration and manipulation by the drug trade. Judicial systems are particularly vulnerable. There have been instances where law enforcement agencies in source and transit countries have successfully jailed prominent traffickers, only to see them released after a seemingly indefensible or inexplicable decision by a single judge.

That situation is changing, thanks to U.S. assistance. In 2000, several countries continued to modify their laws and professionalize their court systems through reforms ranging from installing more modern equipment to changing the way judges are appointed. Though there are still instances of judges arbitrarily dismissing evidence against or releasing well known drug traffickers, the number of such cases is declining, thanks to courageous action on the part of some governments. In August 2000, for example, a former Bolivian narcotics judge was sentenced to 12 years in prison for accepting a bribe in a 1999 narcotics trafficking case. This court decision represents the first time a Bolivian judge has ever been prosecuted and convicted under Bolivian narcotics statutes. The investigation, arrest, and sentencing of the judge represent a tremendous achievement for the counternarcotics effort in Bolivia and set an example for other governments whose judiciary is also open to manipulation by the drug trade.

Extradition

Among the fates that the drug lords fear most is extradition to stand trial in the United States. The long sentences meted out to notorious drug criminals in the U.S. are stark reminders of what can happen to even the most powerful cartel leaders when they are subject to the U.S. system of justice and can no longer control their environment through bribes and intimidation. However, many countries still prohibit the extradition of their nationals. In negotiating new extradition treaties and protocols to existing treaties, we work hard to persuade other countries to accept provisions providing for extradition of nationals.

Money Laundering

In 2000, we also worked with our allies to narrow the drug trade's ability to bank their profits. Money laundering is indispensable to organized crime. Even astronomical sums of illegal drug money are worthless until they can be legitimized—laundered—and moved into legitimate financial and commercial channels. During the past year, we continued to work with our partners in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to make it as difficult as possible for the drug trade to legitimize its fortune. At the conclusion of the FATF June 2000 plenary meeting, the FATF published a report that stated that 15 countries and territories had "serious systemic problems with money laundering controls and that they must improve their rules and practices as expeditiously as possible or face possible sanctions." The publication of this report represents enhanced international cooperation in the fight against money laundering; however, several countries' financial institutions—especially banks in offshore jurisdictions—are still willing to accept—or even solicit—funds of questionable provenance. With the FATF initiative, the Transnational Organized Crime Convention and the Wolfsberg Principles, we have seen important international progress over the past year Thanks to a greater awareness of their global financial responsibilities, more countries are tightening loopholes that favor criminal funds, as the Money Laundering section of the report indicates. Such measures move us closer to a common goal of eventually shutting drug money out of the international financial system altogether. The INCSR section on Money Laundering and Financial Crimes contains a full discussion of money laundering issues, including country by country profiles.

The Threat from Synthetic Drugs

The demand for methamphetamine and other synthetic amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), including MDMA ("Ecstasy") has been increasing both in the industrialized nations and most of the countries of the developing world. Methamphetamine rivals cocaine as the stimulant of choice in many parts of the globe, including the U.S., where "meth" is one of the fastest growing drugs. The relative ease of manufacturing methamphetamine from readily available chemicals appeals as much to small drug entrepreneurs as to the large international syndicates. It eliminates the need to rely on vulnerable crops, such as coca or opium poppy. Synthetics allow individual trafficking organizations to control the whole process, from manufacture to sale on the street. They also have large profit margins and can be made anywhere. There are centers of methamphetamine production in countries as far apart as Burma, China, North Korea, Mexico, and Poland. In Southeast Asia, methamphetamine has displaced heroin as the main drug menace, although the trafficking organizations are the same as those that produce heroin.

The 2001 National Drug Control Strategy, quoting the Drug Enforcement Administration, notes that methamphetamine also represents one of the fastest-growing drug threats in the U.S. today. Well entrenched drug trafficking organizations, based in Mexico and California, control a large percentage of the U.S. methamphetamine trade. Though Mexico is the principal foreign supplier of methamphetamine and precursors for the United States, we also have our own domestic methamphetamine production, as demonstrated by DEA's seizure of over 1,810 methamphetamine laboratories in 2000. State authorities seized thousands more.

Ecstasy, an amphetamine analogue, is another drug that has gained popularity in the U.S . It is the street name for 3, 4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine or MDMA. Ecstasy first gained notoriety in the 1990's along with the "rave" dance culture that swept over Europe's younger generation. Ecstasy's stimulant properties provided a chemical boost allowing participants to dance for hours at all-night discotheque parties known as "raves." Over the years, Ecstasy has developed its own international cult following, as one can see from internet sites that give detailed instructions on how to make and use MDMA "safely." Much of the MDMA available on the international drug market is manufactured in clandestine laboratories in the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, in Belgium.

Ecstasy's most pernicious quality is that many of its young users do not consider it a dangerous drug. It is viewed by users as a non-addictive stimulant without lasting side effects. When an addictive drug develops a reputation for being relatively benign, efforts to suppress it become correspondingly difficult. In much of Europe, ecstasy has become the drug of choice for young people in their late teens and early twenties, as seizure data in various INCSR chapters indicate. Authorities in countries as different as France, Estonia, and Iceland report disturbing increases in ecstasy consumption and seizures. Ecstasy use has also enhanced the role of relatively new representatives of organized crime. According to the U.S. 2001 National Drug Strategy, Israeli Organized Crime syndicates—some composed of �migr�s with links to Russian Organized Crime syndicates—have gained control over a significant share of the European market.

Europe is not alone. We have our own ecstasy problems at home. The University of Michigan's 26th Monitoring the Future survey reported in December 2000 that more American teenagers use ecstasy than cocaine. In one year, the percentage of 12th graders reporting any use of ecstasy in the previous twelve months rose from 5.6 percent to 8.2 percent. While Ecstasy use began primarily as an East Coast phenomenon, it has since become more widespread. If Ecstasy use continues to rise, it may well become a national drug priority requiring more stringent international control efforts of the type used to contain the flow of cocaine and heroin.

Precursor Chemicals

Though they do not rely on botanical sources, trafficking organizations that manufacture stimulants and other synthetic drugs have a vulnerable point—the need for precursor chemicals. Where cocaine and heroin refining operations require widely available and relatively substitutable "essential chemicals," ATS production requires "precursor chemicals", such as ephedrine, pseudoephedrine or phenylpropanolamine. These chemicals have important but fewer legitimate uses and are commercially traded in smaller quantities to discrete users. It is crucial to chemical control that each country have an effective, flexible system that regulates the flow of key precursor chemicals, without undue burdens on legitimate commerce. For that reason, the United States, the European Commission, and the UN's International Narcotics Control Board worked in 2000 with other states to establish an informal multilateral system of information exchange on chemicals.

Controlling Supply

The Department of State's mission is to stem the flow of drugs to the United States. To do so, we attack drug supply at critical points along a five-point grower-to-user chain linking the consumer in the U.S. to the grower in a source country. In case of cocaine or heroin, the chain begins with the growers cultivating coca or opium poppies, for instance, in the Andes or Burma, and ends with the cocaine or heroin user in a U.S. town or city. In between, lie the processing (drug refining), transit (shipping), and wholesale distribution links.

Our international counternarcotics programs target the first three links of the grower-to-user chain: cultivation, processing, and transit. The closer to the source we can attack, the greater our chances of halting drug flows altogether. When source crops are destroyed or left unharvested, no drugs can enter the system. It is the equivalent of removing a malignant tumor before it can metastasize. Crop control is by far the most cost-effective means of cutting supply. In an ideal world, with no drug crops to harvest, no drugs could enter the distribution chain and there would be no need for costly enforcement and interdiction operations.

The real world of counternarcotics programs, however, is much more complex. Crop reduction has enormous political and economic implications for the producing country, since it always means attacking the livelihood of an important sector of the population. Implementing crop control programs takes time, as governments develop viable alternatives for the affected population. As a result, while pursuing the goal of crop elimination, we cannot neglect the processing and distribution stages. Our programs therefore must constantly shift resources to those links where we can have both an immediate and a long-term result.

Though it is the most efficient way of eliminating a drug crop, large-scale eradication is neither politically nor socially feasible in many countries. As our experience over the past few years in Peru and Bolivia has demonstrated, the right combination of effective law enforcement actions and alternative development programs can produce truly remarkable results. We remain prepared to work closely with the governments of the coca growing countries to find the best way to eliminate illegal coca in different national contexts.

Coca Reduction

The coca crop offers the most immediate opportunity for radical reductions. For now, at least, extensive coca cultivation occurs in only three countries—Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. With modern technology we can locate the growing areas precisely. Thus, unlike a multi-ton load of finished cocaine distributed among trucks, boats, and aircraft, a coca field is a large, stationary target. Eliminating coca on the ground is also highly cost-effective. USG studies indicate that in Bolivia and Peru, where the alkaloid content of the coca leaf is high, every 200 hectares of coca taken out of production deprives the drug trade on average of a metric ton of refined cocaine. So even manual eradication can make a difference. By this measure, the 15,353 hectares taken out of production in Bolivia and Peru are the equivalent of keeping approximately 77 metric tons of cocaine from entering the system.

The most effective crop control alternative, however, is to use our high-speed spray aircraft. If these planes had unobstructed access to the principal coca plantations, they could destroy a large percentage of the coca crop in a matter of months using environmentally safe herbicides. With the shift of the bulk of coca cultivation into the rebel-control zone of southwestern Colombia, our aircraft have faced a more difficult situation. Though he concentration of coca cultivation in a geographically confined area gives the planes a better target, it also exposes them to a level of hostile gunfire for which they were not designed. The United States Government's $1.3 billion narcotics assistance to Colombia should offer possibilities for dealing with this threat.

Political Will

The most potent weapon against the drug trade is an intangible—political will. It determines whether any given program will succeed or fail. If political will is weak when criminal organizations are strong, corruption soon creeps into political structures. Left unchecked, such corruption gradually undermines the rule of law and weakens democratic institutions. Therefore, a basic objective of U.S. counternarcotics policy is to bolster political will in the key source and transit countries in order to prevent drug interests from becoming entrenched. In those nations where political leaders have had the courage to sacrifice short-term economic and political considerations in favor of the long-term national interest, we have seen the drug trade falter. And where political will has wavered, we have seen the drug syndicates flourish and corruption set in.

The Power to Corrupt

The drug trade's access to nearly unlimited amounts of money gives it the wherewithal to subvert even relatively strong societies. In terms of weight and availability, there is currently no commodity more lucrative than drugs. Illegal drugs are relatively cheap to produce and offer enormous profit margins that allow the drug trade to generate criminal revenues on a scale without historic precedent. At an average retail street price of one hundred dollars a gram, a metric ton of pure cocaine has a retail value of $100 million on the streets of a U.S. city—two or three times more if the drug is cut with adulterants. By this gauge, the 132 metric tons of cocaine that the United States Government seized in 1999—full figures are not yet available for 2000—are worth as much as $13.2 billion to the drug trade—more than the gross domestic product of many countries. If only a portion of these profits returns directly to the drug syndicates, we are still speaking of hundreds of millions, if not billions of dollars not subject to any control. To put these sums into perspective, for FY 2001 the United States Government's budget for international drug control operations was approximately $18.8 billion dollars. That is the street value of roughly 19 metric tons of cocaine. The drug cartels have lost that much in a few shipments and scarcely felt the loss.

Such wealth gives the large trafficking organizations a virtually unlimited capacity to corrupt. In some ways, the drug syndicates may pose a greater threat to democratic government than armed insurgencies, since they operate out of sight. Guerrilla armies or political terrorist organizations use open violence to topple governments. In contrast, the large drug syndicates covertly seek to corrupt and manipulate existing governments to guarantee themselves a secure operating environment. They do so by co-opting certain key officials, such as a Minister of the Interior, a Defense minister, or a chief of the national police. A real fear of democratic leaders should be that one day the drug trade might take de facto control of a country by putting a majority of elected officials, including the president, directly or indirectly on its payroll. Though such a scenario has yet to play out, in the past few years there have been some disturbing near-misses. We can forestall the possibility of a government manipulated by drug lords from ever becoming a reality by keeping the focus on eliminating corruption.

The Certification Process

Drug corruption needs anonymity for survival. Exposing it regularly to public scrutiny brings drug corruption out of the shadows. Section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act requires the President to certify annually that each major drug producing or transit country has cooperated fully or has taken adequate steps on its own to meet the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention, including rooting out public corruption. Governments that do not meet the standard—only a handful have failed to do so in 15 years—lose eligibility for most forms of U.S. military and development assistance. Humanitarian aid, narcotics-related assistance, and some other forms of assistance are not affected, but the governments face a mandatory "no" vote by the United States Government on loans in six multilateral development banks.

Most governments are now aware that U.S. law requires the President to provide this annual assessment of counternarcotics cooperation. Many governments resent what they perceive as a unilateral, subjective assessment of their performance, with no reciprocal accountability from the United States. However, each determination is the product of a year-long consultative process. We work with our partners to establish realistic, mutually acceptable goals for certification evaluation purposes, based on the goals and objectives of the UN Convention. The relevant benchmarks are established by both governments and the factual basis for any judgment is clearly set forth in the certification determinations. Though controversial, throughout its 15 year-existence the certification process has proved to be a powerful, if blunt, policy instrument for enhancing counternarcotics cooperation. We will continue to examine the entire certification process to ensure that it continues to enhance cooperation and will look for additional opportunities to advance our counternarcotics goals. As noted in this report, recent years have seen a dramatic shift towards greater international cooperation on narcotics matters, and certification, or any alternative, must reflect the evolving international environment as is seeks to further heighten international cooperation.

Next Steps

The balance sheet at the end of 2000 shows that we are on the right track. Sustained cooperation with our partners over the past decade has kept the drug syndicates constantly on the defensive. To maintain this edge, in the year ahead we must continue to press the drug trade at every point— reducing drug cultivation, breaking up drug syndicates, destroying labs, interdicting large drug shipments, disrupting the supply of the necessary processing chemicals, and attacking drug money flows. Though action at all points of the process is necessary, we know that we can inflict the most lasting damage at the crop cultivation and financial operations stages. We have shown that through concerted action, drug cultivation can be significantly reduced. Now we need to make equally important progress in disrupting the illegal drug conglomerates' financial operations.

Though organized crime is powerful in its underworld milieu, it loses its advantage when it has to operate in the legitimate world. The drug syndicates are especially vulnerable when it comes to cashing in their profits. The enormous revenues of the he drug trade are at the same time its strength and its weakness. To stay in business the drug trade needs a reliable supply of drugs to generate revenue; at the same time it requires a steady flow of money to buy the drugs. Like a legitimate enterprise, the drug syndicates partially finance future growth by borrowing against future earnings. Consequently, every metric ton of drugs that does not make it to market represents a potential loss of tens of millions of dollars in essential revenue. On the revenue end, cash proceeds are useless unless they can be reinvested in new drug crops, arms, bribes, advanced technologies and other assets to keep the syndicates operating. By cutting off the flow of money and drugs long enough, we can choke off the lifeblood of the drug trade.

The international financial community, working through the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the regional Financial Action Task Forces, has made considerable headway in closing off the major avenues for legitimizing the proceeds of international crime. The days when criminal organizations could deposit large blocs of cash or transfer enormous sums to anonymous bank accounts with no questions asked are long behind us. Yet, despite our progress, we have only closed off some of the more obvious avenues for money laundering. International drug syndicates are nothing if not adaptable and have become more sophisticated in circumventing our roadblocks. Therefore, working closely with our partners, we will encourage all governments to refine their oversight mechanisms, tighten regulations, enact anti-money laundering legislation, and strictly enforce all money laundering laws. We will also develop better ways to identify, freeze and, ultimately, cause forfeiture of illegal drug proceeds before they can be invested. In the United States, we will continue to use the International Economic Emergency Powers Act to keep the drug trade from exploiting legitimate companies for criminal purposes.

We have advanced considerably in the decade and half since the crisis years when coca cultivation was exploding upward exponentially and the United States confronted a cocaine problem of epidemic proportions. Well-targeted programs and close international cooperation have helped us achieve many of our immediate goals. Cocaine use is down dramatically from the peak years and has been kept in check since. The coca crop is has been contained; most of the big drug cartels have been fragmented, and the most violent of the drug bosses of the 1980s and '90s are either dead or in jail. The mechanisms for long-term international cooperation are in place and working effectively. The international drug control community can take pride in this progress.

There is still, however, a long way to go. The drug trade has too much to lose not to exploit every opportunity to expand production and try to divide the international coalition threatening it. Yet it knows that it cannot survive a concerted, sustained campaign by a coalition of democracies individually determined to crush it. Our responsibility is to keep that coalition strong.

Cocaine and Heroine Control in 2000

Coca and Cocaine

Though cocaine use has fallen sharply in the last decade and half, cocaine remains our greatest illicit drug threat. Despite successes in limiting the Andean coca crop, cocaine still flows to the U.S. in enormous quantities. The 300 or so metric tons of cocaine that typically flow to the U.S. in any given year are enough to supply the consuming public with high purity drugs at stable prices. A USG interagency assessment estimated cocaine flows to the United States rose to slightly over 240 metric tons in the first six months of the year. This is roughly 40 percent more than during the same period in 1999—a clear sign that cocaine use is by no means passe. The 2001 National Drug Control Strategy reports that throughout the year, cocaine was readily available in most U.S. metropolitan areas, with law enforcement agencies continuing to report serious problems with cocaine, crack, and the crime it spawns.

The United States remains the largest single market for both forms of cocaine, but thanks to active drug awareness programs in the last decade, demand has not grown appreciably. Consequently, the drug syndicates have been looking elsewhere for markets with greater growth potential. With its economic prosperity, excellent transportation and communications networks and the increasing abolition of national border controls within the European Union, Europe offers the best prospect for increasing cocaine consumption.

Throughout Europe, cocaine seems to have the prestige and allure of danger, thrills, and enhanced endurance that attracted American athletes, media stars, and Wall Street traders to the drug in the 1980's. Europe, however, is only part of a much larger global market. Cocaine in quantity is available in virtually every major city of the world, including some in Asia and the Middle East, Africa, and South America. Because much of the rest of the world is still several years behind us in its appetite for cocaine, we can expect demand for cocaine elsewhere to continue to increase until governments strengthen the whole gamut of antidrug measures, including prevention, demand reduction, and enforcement programs.

Cocaine Source and Transit Country Highlights

For more than 15 years, the United States has had cooperative drug control programs with the main cocaine source and transit countries of Latin America. The goal of these programs has been to reduce total coca cultivation to the amount necessary to meet the legitimate world demand for medicinal cocaine. While we are still far from that goal, our cooperative efforts have made remarkable progress, given the enormous financial incentives for drug syndicates and insurgent groups to expand the crop. Thanks to joint interdiction and crop control programs, the face of coca cultivation in the Andean countries has changed radically. The two salient success stories come from Peru and Bolivia, once the main sources of illicit coca. Cultivation in those two countries is now at the lowest level since we began accurate crop surveys in 1986. As a result, the two countries rank a very distant second and third, respectively, to Colombia.

Such progress in Peru and Bolivia, however, has ratcheted up pressure on Colombia's drug syndicates to compensate for losses by further expanding cultivation into areas beyond the central government's control. Colombian coca cultivation in 2000 increased by 11 percent—a figure that would have been considerably higher without the sustained effort to attack the coca fields with spray aircraft. The aerial eradication program, a Colombian National Police initiative conducted with USG support, treated approximately 47,000 hectares in 2000, more than a 30 percent increase from 1999's total. Still greater gains are expected from the aerial eradication program as Plan Colombia's counternarcotics components bring additional resources into play and extend the program to more remote areas. At the end of 2000, the USG estimates that there were 136,200 hectares of coca under cultivation.

Colombia broadened the scope of its eradication program in 2000 with the introduction of a voluntary eradication program. While similar programs have been used in Colombia's poppy growing regions, where developmental assistance and improved social services are provided in exchange for the abandonment of illicit cultivation, this was the first time they had been brought into coca country. Because the program began late in the year and a the longer period is needed to measure results, the initial effects of these efforts is not expected to be noticed until 2001.

Bolivia, which only allows manual coca eradication, had only 14,600 hectares of coca under cultivation at the end of the year, a 33 percent drop from 1999. Since 1995, Bolivia's crop has decreased by more than half and is now the smallest in a decade. Bolivia's government achieved a key goal in 2000 by eliminating all but 600 hectares of coca in the Chapare, the region where the bulk of the country's illicit coca cultivation had been concentrated. Now that less than 14,000 hectares of coca remain under cultivation in the Yungas region, the Bolivian government has outlined plans to limit cultivation levels to the quantities needed for internal indigenous use and export to the pharmaceutical and commercial market. With U.S. Government support, a full range of counternarcotics alternative development projects, coca elimination, and law enforcement interdiction programs can be initiated early in the next year. These multiple successes in crop reduction have moved the Government of Bolivia within reach of its goal of eliminating all illicit coca by the year 2002.

Peru, once the world's major coca producer, had 34,200 hectares of coca under cultivation at the end of 2000. This was a 12 percent drop from the 1999 total of 38,700 hectares. Since the peak year of 1992, the Peruvian coca crop has been reduced by three quarters, an extraordinary achievement that even the most optimistic experts could not have predicted. There is no evidence of large scale, commercial coca cultivation in Ecuador. However, there is concern that coca cultivation could expand over the border into Ecuador as a result of Colombian Government eradication efforts in Putumayo Department. The Ecuadorian national police have discovered and dismantled several small cocaine refining laboratories, processing coca paste imported from Peru and Colombia. Ecuadorian authorities seized more than three metric tons of cocaine in 2000.

Geography has made Central America and the Caribbean natural transit routes for drugs moving to the United States. Since the drug trade follows the path of least resistance, drug routes vary according to the effectiveness of law enforcement and interdiction operations in each area. For the second consecutive year, government action in Central America seems to have forced the drug cartels away from traditional overland routes. As a result, cocaine seizures in Costa Rica in 2000—two metric tons—again fell drastically compared to the previous three years. The price of crack cocaine in Costa Rica has almost doubled, while the cost of cocaine HCl has increased by 50 percent compared to 1998. This can partially be attributed to the current preference by traffickers of directing their shipments into Guatemala and Mexico, avoiding the rest of the isthmus.

Guatemala is still the preferred country in Central America for storage and consolidation for onward shipment of cocaine to the United States. Recent USG interagency flow estimates indicate that 300 to 400 metric tons of cocaine are shipped through the Central American corridor to Mexico and the United States annually. Guatemalan law enforcement agencies interdicted close to one and a half metric tons of cocaine in 2000. This was a significant drop from the previous year's 10 metric tons even though narcotics- related arrests almost doubled to 842. Crack seizures were up around 300 percent, highlighting the marked increase in domestic consumption brought about by the narcotraffickers paying for transit services with drugs rather than money.

Reduced seizures in Panama confirm the apparent shift of trafficking patterns away from the established drug routes. By the end of 2000, Panamanian authorities had seized 6.6 metric tons of cocaine. Unable to sustain losses incurred in 1997-98, traffickers changed their trafficking patterns. Although cocaine seizures in 2000 declined from the record 9 and 10 metric tons seizures of 1997 and 1998, they nonetheless represent nearly a 40 percent increase over the 1999 figure.

Mexico is the transit and distribution hub for the bulk of the drugs moving to the United States. Once Colombian cocaine reaches Mexico and Central America, powerful Mexican drug syndicates move the drug to U.S. markets. During 2000, the eastern Pacific coast of Mexico continued to be the favored route for maritime trafficking because of the vast area and a lack of natural choke points. Transport of drugs involving single vessels or multiple vessels possibly in collusion occurs there using go-fast boats, fishing vessels and commercial carriers. In the first ten months of 2000, Mexican authorities seized slightly over 18 metric tons of cocaine, a 30 percent decrease from 1999. This decline suggests that traffickers have been shifting a significant part of their transit away from overland to maritime routes.

When enforcement in the Central American isthmus threatens to disrupt U.S.-bound drugs, the Caribbean's importance increases as a transshipment area. According to U.S. estimates, cocaine flow through Jamaica quadrupled during the first half of 2000 compared to the same period the previous year, exceeding the total estimated flow for 1999; yet, seizures were lower. Cocaine seizures in 2000 in the Bahamas increased 47 percent over the previous year, as Bahamian authorities seized nearly three metric tons of cocaine. The Dominican Republic seized over one-and-a-quarter metric tons of cocaine, slightly more than in 1999. Just under a quarter of a metric ton was seized by Haiti, about half the amount seized in 1999.

Heroin and Opiates

Heroin, once associated only with dead-end "junkies" on the fringes of society, has gradually crept back into the mainstream U.S. drug scene. Epidemiologists and drug control experts fear that a new generation, ignorant of the usually irreversibly addictive qualities of the drug, could swell the rolls of future addicts. Heroin, unfortunately, has an insidious property that appeals to trafficker and addict alike: it allows many addicts to develop a long-term tolerance to the drug, giving the illusion that they can control use. While cocaine—especially crack cocaine—abuse often leads to escalating consumption that can kill an addict in five years, a heroin habit can last for decades. Even worse, many addicts can hide their addiction and appear to function normally, as long as they have access to a maintenance "fix." Stories of prominent heroin addicts known to have preserved the facade of a normal life for years can only add to youthful skepticism over heroin's real dangers.

Another complication is the gentrification of heroin use. Gone are the scenes of the archetypal heroin addict injecting himself or herself with a dirty needle and dying miserably in a filthy back alley. Today's prospective heroin user in the United States can avoid needles altogether. High purity Colombian heroin can be sniffed like cocaine, sparing the user both the need for syringes and the fear of contracting AIDS from infected needles. The consequences of addiction, however, are the same—a physical and psychological dependency with withdrawal symptoms that make conquering an addiction extremely difficult. There are an estimated 980,000 hard core addicts in the United States. Including casual use, the figure may be 1.2 million. Evidence of combined drug use suggests that growing numbers of the United States' 1.8 million cocaine addicts are using heroin to cushion the "crash" that follows the "rush" of using crack.

Outside of the United States, heroin still reigns as the hard drug of choice in many countries. According to United States Government estimates, total potential world-wide opium production increased in 2000, with approximately five thousand metric tons potentially available. This was more than enough to supply global heroin demand many times over, and was bad news for antidrug programs in Europe, the principal consumer of Southwest Asian heroin. Afghanistan again surpassed Burma in potential opium gum production, though its total cultivation was not as great as in previous years. Afghan opium poppy cultivation jumped 25 percent in 2000 to a total of 64,510 hectares, enough potentially to produce 3,656 metric tons of opium or 365 metric tons of heroin—twenty times the estimated annual U.S. heroin requirement. By comparison, though Burma cultivated 108,700 hectares of opium poppy in 2000, their potential yield was 1,085 metric tons of opium gum, one third of the Afghan total. As opium gum yields are much higher in Afghanistan, that country now potentially produces nearly three quarters of the world's opium gum.

We can expect this boom in heroin availability to exacerbate heroin addiction problems, not only in Europe but also in all the countries along the heroin supply routes. Despite active enforcement programs in most transit countries, Southwest Asian heroin continues to move in large quantities into every important market in Europe, Russia, and the other countries of the former Soviet Union. From the size of seizures, it appears that larger and larger amounts are entering the pipeline. In 2000, Turkey seized nearly six metric tons of heroin, an enormous quantity by any standards. Italy seized 1.8 metric tons. With heroin demand potentially open-ended and heroin availability unlikely to be seriously diminished, in the twenty-first century we can expect to see a continuing flow of the drug to nearly every country on the globe.

In the Western Hemisphere, the big drug syndicates seem to be gambling on a new generation of heroin addicts to help keep them in business. In anticipation of a growing demand in North America, the Colombian drug syndicates have committed substantial resources to heroin production. Most, if not all, of it is destined for North America. Over the past five years, there has been a shift in heroin supply patterns to the United States. Colombian and Mexican heroin have displaced Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin in most of the United States. While some Southeast heroin continues to flow to U.S. markets in undetermined quantities via Canada and by international mail, the bulk of the heroin seized and identified by United States Government agencies in 2000 was of Colombian and Mexican origin. Most of the heroin seized by United States Government law enforcement agencies in 2000 east of the Mississippi River was of Colombian origin. West of the Mississippi, Mexican heroin dominated seizures.

Heroin Source and Transit Country Highlights

In the Golden Triangle area of Southeast Asia, opium cultivation was up for the first time in three years. Total hectarage climbed by 18 percent to 135,040 hectares. Potential yields rose six percent to 1,316 metric tons. Burma's crop increased 21 percent to 108,700 hectares in 2000. Because of bad weather in some areas, potential opium yields dropped, however, to 1,085 metric tons, five metric tons fewer than in 1999. Following two years of drought, favorable weather conditions in Laos allowed an increase in 2000 of opium poppy cultivation by six percent to 23,150 hectares, and of potential opium production by 50 percent to 210 metric tons of opium, or 18 metric tons of heroin. That is approximately 16 percent of the region's estimated output. Already marginal production in Thailand increased only slightly to 890 hectares capable of yielding six metric tons of opium gum or one ton of heroin, less than a fraction of one percent of Southeast Asian potential production. In Vietnam, poppy cultivation increased slightly to an estimated 2,300 hectares. Potential yields were 15 metric tons of opium or slightly over a metric ton of heroin.

Southwest Asian opium poppy cultivation rose by 22 percent in 2000 to 65,025 hectares. The estimated yield rose from 2,898 metric tons of opium gum in 1999 to 3,667 metric tons in 2000. All of this increase occurred in Afghanistan, which thanks to very high yields per hectare is the world's leading source of illicit opium gum. The Afghan crop was at an all-time high of 64,510 hectares, a 25 percent increase. In contrast, opium poppy cultivation in Pakistan was at an all-time low of 515 hectares. Government of Pakistan initiatives played an important role in this decline. In 2000, Pakistani authorities increased their heroin seizures 85 percent to 7.4 metric tons. The Government of Iran also continued its vigorous interdiction efforts, seizing some 253 metric tons of drugs in 1999, about 80 percent of it heroin and morphine base from Afghanistan, and 116 metric tons through the first six months of 2000.

Europe is particularly vulnerable to large increases in Southwest Asian opium production. Afghanistan supplies most of the heroin that has been pouring into European cities for years. Heroin moves to Europe along the so-called Balkan Route. After passing through Turkey, the Balkan Route splits into several branches. The traditional route passes through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia en route to Western Europe. The northern branch carries heroin to Romania, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and points north. The southern leg crosses through Croatia, Slovenia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece and Albania to the countries of Western Europe. Every country along the route now faces serious domestic drug problems. Turkish drug syndicates, with distributors in ethnic enclaves in a large number of European cities, largely oversee the Balkan Route commerce. In several European countries, including Italy, Albanian traffickers control much of the heroin distribution.

Eurasian organized crime groups continue to play an important role drug trafficking in Europe and Central Asia. These crime groups have exploited their access to heroin sources developed during the Soviet Union's war with Afghanistan. Eurasian crime groups, including gangs controlled by Russian ethnic minorities from the Caucasus, survived even under the Soviet regime, and entered post-Soviet Europe with the advantage of criminal expertise, contacts, and established smuggling and distribution networks. They use their networks to transport Southwest Asian heroin through Central Asia to Russia, as well as onward to the Baltics and Western Europe.

Russia itself now faces serious addiction problems among its populace. Dominating all other drug issues is the continued dramatic increase in the flow of Afghan heroin into Russia via Central Asia. In 2000, 80 percent of the heroin seized in Russia came from the Afghan region. The UNDCP estimates that the amount of heroin brought into Russia from that region has more than doubled in the last year alone. Government authorities put the number of addicts at about two million, although the figure could well be higher. According to Russian press sources, the Interior Ministry has noted a continuing increase in the growth rate of hard drug addiction. Opium, heroin, and synthetic drugs are taking the place of crude traditional narcotics such as poppy straw extract.

Geography and history make Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, formerly important poppy growing regions for the Soviet Union, natural conduits for much of the drug traffic into Russia. Kazakhstan provides a bridge for Southeast Asian heroin to move to Europe and Russia from Asia. The bulk of drugs seized by Kazakh authorities originate in Afghanistan. The other countries offer profitable access routes for Southwest Asian, especially Afghan, heroin into Russia, the other New Independent States, and Europe. Heroin, which fetches high prices in Russia and Europe, has been a tempting source of cash to finance the civil war in Afghanistan and continued insurgent activity in Uzbekistan.

Nigeria continues to be Africa's most important heroin distribution hub. Just as Colombian and Mexican traffickers dominate the cocaine trade, Nigerian criminal organizations control a large part of the world's heroin traffic. Nigerian drug couriers dominate the international heroin smuggling trade and move Southeast Asian heroin originating in Burma from Thailand to the United States, especially to Chicago. There is a scarcely a country that does not report arrests of Nigerians for heroin trafficking. They surface in Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, and in every country in Europe. Though the Government of Nigeria has taken radical steps to suppress the endemic corruption that facilitates drug trafficking, the heroin smuggling organizations are so well entrenched that they are likely to remain the principal international conduits for the drug.

With a poppy crop responsible for less than four percent of the world's opium production, Colombia is nonetheless the Western Hemisphere's largest grower of opium poppies. High purity Colombian heroin now accounts for the bulk of the heroin in the eastern United States. Colombian opium poppy cultivation in 1999 was estimated to be 7,500 hectares capable of producing 75 metric tons of opium gum or slightly less than eight metric tons of heroin. The Colombian National Police estimates that aerial operations eradicated 9,254 hectares of opium poppy in 2000. Final opium cultivation totals for 2000, however, were not available at time of publication.

After Colombia, Mexico is the largest opium producer in the Western Hemisphere. It currently supplies the bulk of the heroin flowing to the western half of the United States. In 2000, Mexican government eradication efforts were remarkably successful. They cut opium poppy cultivation 50 percent to an all-time low of 1,900 hectares, the lowest level since we have had our current survey techniques. This crop could potentially have yielded 24 metric tons of opium gum or 2.5 metric tons of heroin. In 2000, Mexican authorities seized 268 kg of heroin, (a 50 percent increase over 1999) kilograms of heroin.

Demand Reduction

Drug "demand reduction" refers to efforts to reduce world-wide use and abuse of, and demand for narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The need for demand reduction is obvious, since escalating drug use and abuse continue to take a devastating toll on the health, welfare, safety, security, and economic stability of all nations. As a result, foreign countries are requesting more technical assistance from the United States Government to address their demand problems, citing long-term U.S. experience and efforts in this area. Assisting countries to reduce drug consumption helps in a small, but important way, to preserve the stability of that country.

Our demand reduction strategy integrates a broad spectrum of initiatives. These include efforts to prevent the onset of use, intervention at "critical decision points" in the lives of vulnerable populations to prevent both first use and further use, and effective treatment programs for the addicted. Other aspects encompass education and media campaigns to increase public awareness of the deleterious consequences of drug use/abuse and community-coalition building. This latter effort involves the development of private/public sector demand reduction coalitions designed to mobilize national and international opinion against the drug trade and to encourage governments to develop and implement strong counternarcotics policies and programs. The demand reduction program also provides for evaluations of the effectiveness of these efforts and for research studies to use these findings to improve similar services provided in the U.S.

In 2000, INL funded comprehensive multi-year scientific studies on pilot projects and programs developed from INL-funded training to learn how these initiatives can help assist U.S.-based demand reduction efforts. Previous smaller studies indicated that selected countries which have developed successful drug treatment/rehabilitation modalities from INL-funded training have high program retention rates and reduced rates of violence and recidivism. INL also sponsored Central America and Caribbean regional anti-gang conferences in San Salvador, El Salvador and Miami, Florida for government and non-government organizations responsible for assisting drug abuse/violence prone youths. This initiative identified best practices and resources for reducing gang-related youth violence in the two regions. INL continued to emphasize the development of a first-ever international network of drug prevention programs. As part of this effort INL and the Government of Italy sponsored an international prevention summit in Palermo, Italy where over 600 prevention program representatives from over 70 countries participated. At the same time, INL worked with NGOs to enhance the Drug Prevention Network of the Americas (DPNA), a coalition of prevention programs from Canada, the U.S., the Caribbean, and Latin America. A complementary network of 3,000 Latin American treatment programs was also significantly enhanced. Developing countries that were the recipients of INL-funded training and technical assistance continued to self-fund their own programs developed from this assistance.

International Organizations

International organizational efforts continue to be a key component of the overall U.S. counternarcotics strategy. Through multilateral organizations the United States has the opportunity to encourage contributions from other donors who are unable to undertake individual counternarcotics assistance programs. Counternarcotics assistance through international organizations also decreases the erroneous perception that drugs are exclusively a U.S. problem. The U.S. participation in multilateral programs also supports indigenous capabilities in regions where the U.S. is unable to operate bilaterally for political or logistical reasons. Moreover, the U.S. contributions to UNDCP have had significant impact on the operations and expansion of UN counternarcotics programs and policy. In 2000, Comoros, Estonia, Maldives, San Marino, and Kuwait became parties to the 1988 UN Convention.

During 2000, OAS/CICAD, with United States Government support and participation, issued the first hemispheric report of the Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism (MEM), a hemispheric peer review system to evaluate each OAS Member State's antidrug strategies and efforts. The MEM, which was mandated by the Second Summit of the Americas in 1998, was negotiated over an 18 month period by an Inter-governmental Working Group (IWG), and was completed at the August IWG session in Ottawa. The OAS formally approved the MEM in October of 1999.

The MEM issued its first Hemispheric Evaluation and 34 individual country reports at the CICAD First Special Session, 11-15 December, 2000. The focus for the first round of evaluations was to provide a frame of reference for subsequent evaluations. The member OAS member states see the MEM as an evolving process which will grow stronger in its capacity to identify trends and monitor individual and collective progress on narcotics matters. As the report notes, the MEM is based on "respect for the sovereignty, territorial jurisdiction, and domestic legal systems of the states and principles of reciprocity, shared responsibility, and balanced treatment of the issue."

Chemical Control

Chemical diversion control is a proactive and straightforward strategy to deny traffickers the chemicals they must have to manufacture illicit drugs. It involves the regulation of licit commerce in the chemicals most necessary for drug manufacture to ensure that only transactions for which legitimate end-uses have been established are permitted to proceed, thereby preventing the diversion of drug-producing chemicals from licit trade to illicit drug manufacture.

The need for chemical control has been internationally accepted. Article 12 of the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988 UN Drug Convention) establishes the obligation for parties to the Convention to control their chemical commerce to prevent diversion to illicit drug manufacture. The two tables of the Annex to the Convention list 22 chemicals as those most necessary for drug manufacture and, therefore, subject to control.

The United Nations International Narcotics Control Board has a central role in the implementation of international chemical control initiatives.

The essential element of effective international chemical control is rapid multilateral exchange of information between competent national authorities on proposed transactions in regulated chemicals in order to identify and stop or seize those shipments involving chemicals likely to be diverted to illicit drug manufacture. National control systems alone cannot prevent diversion. The United States Government continues to seek the establishment of formal and informal mechanisms for this information exchange.

Many governments consider chemical control a trade issue to be handled by trade ministries/agencies with a bias toward promoting, not regulating, trade. This tends to reinforce the reluctance of companies to share information that will in turn be shared with other governments, for fear it which reach competitors.

Within the past two years, groups of concerned governments have joined together to develop tracking operations for certain key chemicals. The first, Operation Purple, tracks all shipments over 100 kilograms of potassium permanganate, a key and difficult-to-substitute chemical used in cocaine manufacture, from exporting country to final end-user. Over 840 shipments have been tracked and over 80 have been stopped or seized to prevent their diversion. A similar operation, Operation Topaz, is now being initiated to track shipments of acetic anhydride, a key heroin chemical. The feasibility of similar operations against the chemicals used in synthetic drug manufacture is being examined.

Methodology for Estimating Illegal Drug Production

How Much Do We Know? The INCSR contains a variety of illicit narcotics-related data. These numbers represent the United States Government's best effort to sketch the dimensions of the international drug problem at this time. The numbers range from cultivation figures, relatively hard data derived by proven means, to crop production and drug yield estimates, data that become softer as more variables come into play. As in previous years, we publish these data with an important caveat: the yield figures are potential, not final numbers. Although they are useful for determining trends, even the best are ultimately approximations.

Each year, as we get better data through field research, we revise our estimates. This type of field research is far from easy. The clandestine, violent nature of the illegal drug trade makes it difficult to develop precise information. At the same time, the harsh terrain on which many drugs are cultivated is not always easily accessible This is particularly relevant given the tremendous geographic areas that must be covered, and the difficulty of collecting reliable information over diverse and treacherous terrain.

What We Know With Reasonable Certainty. The most reliable information we have on illicit drugs is how many hectares are under cultivation during any given year. For a decade and a half, the United States Government has estimated the extent of illicit cultivation in a dozen nations using proven statistical methods similar to those used to estimate the size of licit crops at home and abroad. We can therefore estimate the area under cultivation with reasonable accuracy.

What We Know With Less Certainty. The picture is less clear where crop yields are concerned. How much of a finished product a given area will produce is difficult to estimate. Small changes in factors such as soil fertility, weather, farming techniques, and disease can produce widely varying results from year to year and place to place. Moreover, most illicit drug crop areas are not easily accessible to the United States Government, making scientific information difficult to obtain. So, we are estimating potential crop available for harvest. Not all of these estimates allow for losses, which could represent up to a third or more of a crop in some areas for some harvests. The value in estimating the size of the potential crop is to provide a consistent basis for a comparative analysis from year to year.

Since cocaine remains at the top of the United States Government's drug-control priority list, we have gradually improved our yield estimates. Our confidence in coca leaf yield estimates, as well as in the finished product, has risen in the past few years, based upon the results of field studies conducted in Latin America. Nine years ago, after completing preliminary research, the United States Government for the first time began to make its own estimate of dry coca leaf yields for Bolivia and Peru instead of relying solely on reports from the governments of those countries. Last year, for the first time, we were able to estimate coca yields in Colombia. Additional research and field studies have helped refine these estimates and make similar improvements possible in estimates of other drug crops. In all cases, multiplying average yields times available hectarage indicates only the potential, not the actual final drug crop available for harvest.

Harvest Estimates. Estimating how much coca leaf, opium gum, and cannabis is actually harvested and available for processing into finished narcotics remains a major challenge. Although we are improving our techniques, at this time we cannot accurately estimate this amount with precision for any illicit crop in any nation.

While farmers naturally have strong incentives to maximize their harvests of what is almost always their most profitable cash crop, the harvest depends upon the efficiency of farming practices and the wastage caused by poor practices or difficult weather conditions during and after harvest. Up to a third or more of a crop may be lost in some areas during harvests.

In addition, mature coca (two to six years old) is more productive than immature or aging coca. Variations such as these can dramatically affect potential yield and production. Additional information and analysis is allowing us to make adjustments for these factors. Similar deductions for local consumption of unprocessed coca leaf and opium may be possible as well through the accumulation of additional information and research.

Processing Estimates. The wide variation in processing efficiency achieved by traffickers complicates the task of estimating the quantity of cocaine or heroin that could be refined from a crop. These variations occur because of differences in the origin and quality of the raw material used, the technical processing method employed, the size and sophistication of laboratories, the skill and experience of local workers and chemists, and decisions made in response to enforcement pressures. (See Yield Estimates below.)

Figures Change as Techniques and Data Quality Improve. Each year, research produces revisions to United States Government estimates of potential drug production. This is typical of annualized figures for most other areas of statistical tracking that must be revised year to year, whether it be the size of the U.S. wheat crop, population figures, or the unemployment rate. For the present, however, these statistics represent the state of the art. As new information becomes available and as the art improves, so will the precision of the estimates.

Status of Potential Worldwide Production

In evaluating the figures below, one must bear in mind that they are theoretical. They represent estimates of potential production—the amounts that the United States Government estimates could have been produced if, and only if, all available crops were to be converted into finished drugs. Since these estimates do not always make allowance for losses, actual production is probably lower than our estimates. The figures shown are mean points in a statistical range.

Potential Opium Production. In Southeast Asia, opium poppy cultivation and potential opium production increased modestly in 2000. After three years of decline, cultivated area increased in 2000 by approximately 18 percent to 135,040 hectares. Potential opium gum production, however, rose only by about six percent to 1,318 metric tons, capable of yielding110 metric tons of heroin, if all the gum were processed. Bad weather in a number of areas, particularly in Burma, hurt potential opium gum production. Burma, the world's second largest opium producer, increased cultivation 21 percent, from 89,500 hectares in 1999 to 108,700 in 2000. Better weather in Laos, the world's third largest opium producer, led opium poppy cultivation to expand by six percent, from 21,800 hectares in 1999 to 23,150 hectares in 2000. Potential opium gum production rose 50 percent in 2000 from 140 metric tons to 210 metric tons. Although the increase in cultivation was responsible for part of this growth, an increase in estimated yields also contributed. The same favorable weather also increased opium poppy cultivation in Thailand by seven percent, from 835 hectares in 1999 to 890 in 2000, though estimated yields remained at six metric tons.

Opium poppy cultivation in Southwest Asia rose again in 2000, marking a decade-long trend of increasing cultivation in Afghanistan. Total cultivation in the area went up by 23 percent to 65,025 hectares, potentially yielding 3,667 metric tons of opium or 366 metric tons of heroin. Almost all of the expansion was in Afghanistan, which had 64,510 hectares of opium poppy potentially yielding 3, 656 metric tons of opium at the end of 2000. If all of this gum were processed into heroin, it could yield 365 metric tons of heroin, roughly 20 times the estimated heroin consumption requirement of the United States. In contrast, Pakistan had negligible cultivation: 515 hectares of poppy, potentially yielding 11 metric tons of opium or a metric ton of heroin. Though Burma still has the most area devoted to opium poppy, the incredibly high yields in Afghanistan makes it the world's largest opium and heroin producer.

The United States Government continues to examine the illicit drug crop situation in Russia and Central Asia. While some of these countries may be able to produce significant opium poppy harvests, the United States Government still lacks sufficient data to identify and measure all suspected areas. Estimates in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, however, showed cultivation there to be negligible.

Although opium poppy cultivation in the Western Hemisphere is miniscule by Asian standards—perhaps two percent of the global total—it is important to the United States, since nearly all the heroin refined from it is destined for the United States. Colombia and Mexico, the Hemisphere's two opium producing countries, have maintained active crop control efforts that have kept overall poppy cultivation in check. No cultivation data is yet available for 2000 for Colombia. In Mexico, for a the second consecutive year, opium poppy cultivation fell drastically, this time by nearly 50 percent thanks to a combination of eradication and drought. At the end of the year, there were 1,900 hectares of opium poppy—a record low for the decade and a half during which we have had accurate surveys of the Mexican crop. Assuming no losses, the estimated potential yield was 24 metric tons of opium gum, or 2.5 metric tons of heroin. No significant opium poppy cultivation was detected in Guatemala.

Coca Cultivation. Worldwide coca cultivation increased marginally from 183,000 hectares in 1999 to 185,000 hectares at the end of 2000. Despite an active eradication program, Colombia an saw its coca cultivation grow from 122,500 hectares at the end of 1999 to 136,200 hectares in 2000. In Bolivia, government action reduced cultivation by 33 percent, from 21,800 hectares in 1999 to a record low of 14,600 hectares in 2000. Peru's coca crop fell by 12 percent from 38,700 hectares at the end of 1999 to 34,200 hectares in 2000. Some coca is cultivated in inaccessible areas of Brazil, but its extent is unknown. Ecuador has only negligible amounts of coca at this time.

Cocaine Field Estimates

The cocaine yield figure is offered with the same caveat as the crop harvest yield data: it is a figure representing potential production. It does not in every case allow for losses or the many other variables that one would encounter in a "real world" conversion from plant to finished drug. In fact, the amount of cocaine HCL actually making it to market is probably lower. Efficiencies vary greatly. A United States Government team that studied cocaine processing in Bolivia's Chapare region in 1993 found that in the laboratories under observation processing efficiency was lower than previously thought. The estimate for Bolivia was reduced accordingly. The reverse has happened in 1999 with Colombia, where United States Government researchers determined that not only were coca leaf yields were nearly twice as great as previously estimated, but that processing efficiencies allow Colombian traffickers to extract much higher percentages of cocaine alkaloid than previously supposed.

In 2000, taking into account estimates of local consumption and local seizures, the United States Government calculates that 768 metric tons of cocaine HCl theoretically could have been available from Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru for worldwide export. This figure assumes that virtually every coca leaf was converted into cocaine HCl and there were no losses inefficiency, bad weather, disease, or the deterrent effects of law enforcement. The total includes 145 metric tons potentially available from Peru, 43 metric tons potentially available from Bolivia, and approximately 580 metric tons potentially available from Colombia. In publishing these numbers, we repeat our caveat that these are theoretical numbers, useful for examining trends. Though every year research moves us closer to a more precise cocaine yield estimate for Latin America, we do not yet know for certain the actual amount available for distribution.

Consumption Data

Most of the chapters in this report contain some user or consumption data. For the most part, these are estimates provided by foreign governments or informal estimates by United States Government agencies. There is no way to vouch for their reliability. They are included because they are the only data available and give an approximation of how governments view their own drug abuse problems. They should not be considered as a source of data to develop any reliable consumption estimates.

Marijuana Production

Cannabis cultivation in Mexico in 2000 rose very slightly from 3,700 hectares with a potential yield of 6,700 metric tons in 1999 to 3,900 hectares in 2000, with a potential yield of 7,000 metric tons of marijuana. The Mexican government took out of production some 13,000 hectares of cannabis in 20009. In Colombia's traditional cannabis growing zones, where intensive eradication in previous years had virtually destroyed the crop, there was a resurgence of cultivation in 1993 to an estimated 5,000 hectares. That estimate did not change in 2000. The size of Jamaica's cannabis crop in 2000 is still under review. We recognize that there may be considerable undetected cannabis cultivation in Central and East Asia, and on the African continent, though there is no evidence that any of this cannabis significantly affects the United States. As we gather more accurate information, we will report significant findings in future INCSRs.

Worldwide Illicit Drug Cultivation

1992-2000 (All Figures in Hectares)

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

Opium

- - - - - - - - -

Afghanistan

64,510

51,500

41,720

39,150

37,950

38,740

29,180

21,080

19,470

India

- - -

2,050

3,100

4,750

5,500

4,400

-

Iran(1)

- - - - - - - - -

Pakistan

515

1,570

3,030

4,100

3,400

6,950

7,270

6,280

8,170

Total SW Asia

65,025

53,070

44,750

45,300

44,450

50,440

41,950

31,760

27,640

Burma

108,700

89,500

130,300

155,150

163,100

154,070

154,070

146,600

153,700

China

- - - - -

1,275

1,965

- -

Laos

23,150

21,800

26,100

28,150

25,250

19,650

19,650

18,520

25,610

Thailand

890

835

1,350

1,650

2,170

1,750

2,110

2,110

2,050

Vietnam

2,300

2,100

3,000

6,150

3,150

- - - -

Total SE Asia

135,040

114,235

160,750

191,100

193,670

176,745

177,795

167,230

181,360

Colombia

-

7,500

6,100

6,600

6,300

6,540

20,000

20,000

20,000

Lebanon

-

-

-

-

90

150

-

440

na

Guatemala

- - - - -

39

50

438

730

Mexico

1,900

3,600

5,500

4,000

5,100

5,050

5,795

3,960

3,310

Total Other

1,900

11,100

11,600

10,600

11,490

11,779

25,845

24,838

24,040

Total Opium

201,965

178,405

217,100

247,000

249,610

238,964

245,590

223,828

233,040

Coca

- - - - - - - - -

Bolivia

14,600

21,800

38,000

45,800

48,100

48,600

48,100

47,200

45,500

Colombia

136,200

122,500

101,800

79,500

67,200

50,900

45,000

39,700

37,100

Peru

34,200

38,700

51,000

68,800

94,400

115,300

108,600

108,800

129,100

Ecuador

- - - - - - - - -

Total Coca

185,000

183,000

190,800

194,100

209,700

214,800

201,700

195,700

211,700

Cannabis

- - - - - - - - -

Mexico

3,900

3,700

4,600

4,800

6,500

6,900

10,550

11,220

16,420

Colombia

5,000

5,000

5,000

5,000

5,000

5,000

4,986

5,000

2,000

Jamaica

- - -

317

527

305

308

744

389

Total Cannabis

8,900

8,700

9,600

10,117

12,027

12,205

15,844

16,964

18,809

(1) USG surveys in 1998 revealed no cultivation of opium in Iran's traditional growing areas.

Worldwide Illicit Drug Cultivation

1987-1991 (All Figures in Hectares)

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

Opium

- - - - -

Afghanistan

17,190

12,370

18,650

23,000

18,500

India

- - - - -

Iran

- - - - -

Pakistan

8,205

8,220

6,050

11,588

9,970

Total SW Asia

25,395

20,590

24,700

34,588

28,470

Burma

160,000

150,100

143,000

104,200

76,021

China

- - - - -

Laos

29,625

30,580

42,130

40,400

-

Thailand

3,000

3,435

4,075

2,843

2,934

Total SE Asia

192,625

184,185

189,205

147,443

78,955

Colombia

1,160

- - - -

Lebanon

3,400

3,200

4,500

na

na

Guatemala

1,145

845

1,220

710

-

Mexico

3,765

5,450

6,600

5,001

5,160

Vietnam

- - - - -

Total Other

9,470

9,495

12,320

5,711

5,160

Total Opium

227,490

214,200

226,225

187,742

112,585

Coca

- - - - -

Bolivia

47,900

50,300

52,900

48,900

41,300

Colombia

37,500

40,100

42,400

34,000

25,600

Peru

120,800

121,300

120,400

110,400

108,800

Ecuador

40

120

150

240

300

Total Coca

206,240

211,820

215,850

193,540

176,000

Cannabis

- - - - -

Mexico

17,915

35,050

53,900

5,003

5,250

Colombia

2,000

1,500

2,270

4,188

5,005

Jamaica

950

1,220

280

607

680

Total Cannabis

20,865

37,770

56,450

9,798

10,935

Worldwide Potential Illicit Drug Production

1992-2000 (All Figures in Metric Tons)

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

Opium Gum

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Afghanistan

3,656

2,861

2,340

2,184

2,174

1,250

950

685

640

India

-

-

-

30

47

77

90

-

-

Iran

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Pakistan

11

37

66

85

75

155

160

140

175

Total SW Asia

3,667

2,898

2,406

2,299

2,296

1,482

1,200

825

815

Burma

1,085

1,090

1,750

2,365

2,560

2,340

2,030

2,575

2,280

China

-

-

-

-

-

19

25

-

-

Laos

210

140

140

210

200

180

85

180

230

Thailand

6

6

16

25

30

25

17

42

24

Vietnam

15

11

20

45

25

-

-

-

-

Total SE Asia

1,316

1,247

1,926

2,645

2,815

2,564

2,157

2,797

2,534

Colombia

-

75

61

66

63

65

-

-

-

Lebanon

-

-

-

-

1

1

-

4

-

Guatemala

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Mexico

21

43

60

46

54

53

60

49

40

Total Other

21

118

121

112

118

119

60

53

40

Total Opium

5,004

4,263

4,453

5,056

4,285

4,165

3,417

3,675

3,389

Coca Leaf

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Bolivia

13,400

22,800

52,900

70,100

75,100

85,000

89,800

84,400

80,300

Colombia(1)

583,000

521,400

437,600

347,000

302,900

229,300

35,800

31,700

29,600

Peru

54,400

69,200

95,600

130,200

174,700

183,600

165,300

155,500

223,900

Ecuador

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

100

100

Total Coca

650,800

613,400

586,100

547,300

552,700

497,900

290,900

271,700

333,900

Cannabis

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Mexico(2)

7,000

3,700

8,300

8,600

11,700

12,400

5,540

6,280

7,795

Colombia

4,000

4,000

4,000

4,133

4,133

4,133

4,138

4,125

1,650

Jamaica

-

-

-

214

356

206

208

502

263

Belize

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Others

3,500

3,500

3,500

3,500

3,500

3,500

3,500

3,500

3,500

Total Cannabis

14,500

11,200

15,800

16,447

19,689

20,239

13,386

14,407

13,208

(1)Coca and Cocaine yield figures for 1995-1999 were revised upward in 1999, based on USG studies. See Methodology section of INCSR 2001 for details.

(2)Cannabis yield figures updated in November 1999, based on information provided the Mexican Attorney General's Office.

Worldwide Potential Illicit Drug Production

1987-1991 (All Figures in Metric Tons)

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

Opium Gum

-

-

-

-

-

Afghanistan

570

415

585

750

600

India

-

-

-

-

-

Iran

-

-

-

-

300

Pakistan

180

165

130

205

205

Total SW Asia

750

580

715

955

1,105

Burma

2,350

2,255

2,430

1,280

835

China

-

-

-

-

-

Laos

265

275

380

255

225

Thailand

35

40

50

25

24

Vietnam

-

-

-

-

-

Total SE Asia

2,650

2,570

2,860

1,560

1,084

Colombia

-

-

-

-

-

Lebanon

34

32

45

-

-

Guatemala

11

13

12

8

3

Mexico

41

62

66

67

50

Total Other

86

107

123

75

53

Total Opium

3,486

3,257

3,698

2,590

2,242

Coca Leaf

-

-

-

-

-

Bolivia

78,000

77,000

78,200

79,500

79,200

Colombia

30,000

32,100

33,900

27,200

20,500

Peru

222,700

196,900

186,300

187,700

191,000

Ecuador

40

170

270

400

400

Total Coca

330,740

306,170

298,670

294,800

291,100

Cannabis

-

-

-

-

-

Mexico

7,775

19,715

30,200

5,655

5,933

Colombia

1,650

1,500

2,800

7,775

5,600

Jamaica

641

825

190

405

460

Belize

49

60

65

120

200

Others

3,500

3,500

3,500

3,500

1,500

Total Cannabis

13,615

25,600

36,755

17,455

13,693

Parties to the 1988 UN Convention

Country

Date Signed

Date Became a Party

1. Afghanistan

20 December 1988

14 February 1992

2. Algeria

20 December 1988

5 May 1995

3. Andorra

Accession

23 July 1999

4. Antigua and Barbuda

Accession

5 April 1993

5. Armenia

20 December 1988

28 June 1993

6. Argentina

Accession

13 September 1993

7. Australia

14 February 1989

16 November 1992

8. Austria

25 September 1989

11 July 1997

9. Azerbaijan

Accession

22 September 1993

10. Bahamas

20 December 1988

30 January 1989

11. Bahrain

28 September 1989

7 February 1990

12. Bangladesh

14 April 1989

11 October 1990

13. Barbados

Accession

15 October 1992

14. Belarus

27 February 1989

15 October 1990

15. Belgium

22 May 1989

25 October 1995

16. Belize

Accession

24 July 1996

17. Benin

Accession

23 May 1997

18. Bhutan

Accession

27 August 1990

19. Bolivia

20 December 1988

20 August 1990

20. Bosnia and Herzegovina

Succession

01 September 1993

21. Botswana

Accession

13 August 1996

22. Brazil

20 December 1988

17 July 1991

23. Brunei Darussalam

26 October 1989

12 November 1993

24. Bulgaria

19 May 1989

24 September 1992

25. Burkina Faso

Accession

02 June 1992

26. Burma

Ratified

11 June 1991

27. Burundi

Accession

18 February 1993

28. Cameroon

27 February 1989

28 October 1991

29. Canada

20 December 1988

05 July 1990

30. Cape Verde

Accession

08 May 1995

31. Chad

Accession

09 June 1995

32. Chile

20 December 1988

13 March 1990

Country

Date Signed

Date Became a Party

33. China

20 December 1988

25 October 1989

34. Colombia

20 December 1988

10 June 1994

35. Comoros

Accession

1 March 2000

36. Costa Rica

25 April 1989

8 February 1991

37. Cote d'Ivoire

20 December 1988

25 November 1991

38. Croatia

Succession

26 July 1993

39. Cuba

7 April 1989

12 June 1996

40. Cyprus

20 December 1988

25 May 1990

41. Czech Republic

Succession

30 December 1993

42. Denmark

20 December 1988

19 December 1991

43. Dominica

Accession

30 June 1993

44. Dominican Republic

Accession

21 September 1993

45. European Economic Community

8 June 1989

31 December 1990

46. Ecuador

21 June 1988

23 March 1990

47. Egypt

20 December 1988

15 March 1991

48. El Salvador

Accession

21 May 1993

49. Estonia

Accession

12 July 2000

50. Ethiopia

Accession

11 October 1994

51. Fiji

Accession

25 March 1993

52. Finland

8 February 1989

15 February 1994

53. France

13 February 1989

31 December 1990

54. Gambia

Accession

23 April 1996

55. Germany

19 January 1989

30 November 1993

56. Georgia

Accession

8 January 1998

57. Ghana

20 December 1988

10 April 1990

58. Greece

23 February 1989

28 January 1992

59. Grenada

Accession

10 December 1990

60. Guatemala

20 December 1988

28 February 1991

61. Guinea

Accession

27 December 1990

62. Guyana

Accession

19 March 1993

63. Haiti

Accession

18 September 1995

64. Honduras

20 December 1988

11 December 1991

65. Hungary

22 August 1989

15 November 1996

66. Iceland

Accession

2 September 1997

67. India

Accession

27 March 1990

Country

Date Signed

Date Became a Party

68. Indonesia

27 March 1989

23 February 1999

69. Iran

20 December 1988

7 December 1992

70. Iraq

Accession

22 July 1998

71. Ireland

14 December 1989

3 September 1996

72. Italy

20 December 1988

31 December 1990

73. Jamaica

2 October 1989

29 December 1995

74. Japan

19 December 1989

12 June 1992

75. Jordan

20 December 1988

16 April 1990

76. Kazakhstan

Accession

29 April 1997

77. Kenya

Accession

19 October 1992

78. Korea

Accession

28 December 1998

79. Kuwait

2 Ocotober 1989

3 November 2000

80. Kyrgyzstan

Accession

7 October 1994

81. Latvia

Accession

24 February 1994

82. Lesotho

Accession

28 March 1995

83. Lebanon

Accession

11 March 1996

84. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

Accession

22 July 1996

85. Lithuania

Accession

8 June 1998

86. Luxembourg

26 September 1989

29 April 1992

87. Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Rep.

Accession

18 October 1993

88. Madagascar

Accession

12 March 1991

89. Malaysia

20 December 1988

11 May 1993

90. Malawi

Accession

12 October 1995

91. Maldives

5 December 1989

7 December 2000

92. Mali

Accession

31 October 1995

93. Malta

Accession

28 February 1996

94. Mauritania

Accession

1 July 1993

95. Mexico

16 February 1989

11 April 1990

96. Moldova

Accession

19 February 1995

97. Monaco

24 February 1989

23 April 1991

98. Morocco

28 December 1988

28 October 1992

99. Mozambique

Accession

8 June 1998

100. Nepal

Accession

24 July 1991

101. Netherlands

18 January 1992

8 September 1993

102. Nicaragua

20 December 1988

4 May 1990

Country

Date Signed

Date Became a Party

103. Niger

Accession

10 November 1992

104. Nigeria

1 March 1989

1 November 1989

105. Norway

20 December 1988

1 January 1994

106. Oman

Accession

15 March 1991

107. Pakistan

20 December 1988

25 October 1991

108. Panama

20 December 1988

13 January 1994

109. Paraguay

20 December 1988

23 August 1990

110. Peru

20 December 1988

16 January 1992

111. Philippines

20 December 1988

7 June 1996

112. Poland

6 March 1989

26 May 1994

113. Portugal

13 December 1989

3 December 1991

114. Qatar

Accession

4 May 1990

115. Romania

Accession

21 January 1993

116. Russia

19 January 1989

17 December 1990

117. St. Kitts and Nevis

Accession

19 April 1995

118. St. Lucia

Accession

21 August 1995

119. St. Vincent and the Grenadines

Accession

17 May 1994

120. San Marino

Accession

10 October 2000

121. Sao Tome and Principe

Accession

20 June 1996

122. Saudi Arabia

Accession

9 January 1992

123. Senegal

20 December 1988

27 November 1989

124. Seychelles

Accession

27 February 1992

125. Sierra Leone

9 June 1989

6 June 1994

126. Singapore

Accession

23 October 1997

127. Slovakia

Succession

28 May 1993

128. Slovenia

Succession

6 July 1992

129. South Africa

Accession

14 December 1998

130. Spain

20 December 1988

13 August 1990

131. Sri Lanka

Accession

6 June 1991

132. Sudan

30 January 1989

19 November 1993

133. Suriname

20 December 1988

28 October 1992

134. Swaziland

Accession

3 October 95

135. Sweden

20 December 1988

22 July 1991

136. Syria

Accession

3 September 1991

137. Tajikistan

Accession

6 May 1996

Country

Date Signed

Date Became a Party

138. Tanzania

20 December 1988

17 April 1996

139. Trinidad and Tobago

7 December 1989

17 February 1995

140. Togo

3 August 1989

1 August 1990

141. Tonga

Accession

29 April 1996

142. Tunisia

19 December 1989

20 September 1990

143. Turkey

20 December 1988

2 April 1996

144. Turkmenistan

Accession

21 February 1996

145. UAE

Accession

12 April 1990

146. Uganda

Accession

20 August 1990

147. Ukraine

16 March 1989

28 August 1991

148. United Kingdom

20 December 1988

28 June 1991

149. United States

20 December 1988

20 February 1990

150. Uruguay

19 December 1989

10 March 1995

151. Uzbekistan

Accession

14 August 1995

152. Venezuela

20 December 1988

16 July 1991

153. Vietnam

Accession

4 November 1997

154. Yemen

20 December 1988

25 March 1996

155. Yugoslavia

20 December 1988

3 January 1991

156. Zambia

9 February 1989

28 May 1993

157. Zimbabwe

Accession

30 July 1993

Signed but Pending Ratification

1. Gabon

20 December 1989

2. Holy See

20 December 1988

Not UN member

3. Israel

20 December 1988

Awaiting Money Laundering Legislation

4. Mauritius

20 December 1988

5. New Zealand

18 December 1989

6. Philippines

20 December 1988

7. Switzerland

16 November 1989

Not UN member

8. Zaire

20 December 1988

Other

1. Anguilla

Not UN member

2. Aruba

Not UN member

Other

3. Bermuda

4. BVI

Not UN member

5. Cambodia

6. Central African Republic

7. Chad

8. Congo

9. Djibouti

10. DPR Korea

11. Hong Kong

Not UN member

12. Laos

13. Liberia

14. Liechtenstein

15. Marshall Islands

16. Micronesia, Federated States of

17. Mongolia

18. Namibia

19. Papua New Guinea

20. Samoa

21. Sao Tome and Principe

22. Taiwan

Not UN member

23. Thailand

24. Turks & Caicos

Not UN member

25. Vanuatu

[End.]

[This is a mobile copy of Policy and Program Developments]