If a scroll bar appears below the following table, swipe the table to move left/right of the dashed line.

Strategic Goal 4: Weapons of Mass Destruction

Reduce the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction to the United States, Our Allies, and Our Friends

Public Benefit

Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery has acquired new urgency since the events of 9/11 and the subsequent October 2001 anthrax attacks. These events have put a personal face on the threat of WMD and missiles. Success in reducing this threat is the only viable option, as access by terrorists to WMD and delivery system materials opens the door to their use against the American homeland and U.S. interests abroad.

The Department is vigorously involved in reducing the global WMD and missile threat, and is pursuing active measures that include improved and effectively enforced export controls, agreements reducing current stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and cooperative efforts to build missile defenses. Moreover, the Department seeks strengthened implementation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), aimed at halting the spread of nuclear weapons, as well as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), targeted at banning chemical and biological weapons, respectively, and strengthening efforts to keep them out of the arsenals of rogue states.

A transformed relationship with Russia is a key element of U.S. strategy. Upon taking office, the President declared that he wanted to change the U.S.-Russian relationship from one of nuclear balance of terror to one based on common responsibilities and interests. In 2001, the President made a commitment to achieve a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons, consistent with national security requirements, and invited Russia to join the United States in building defenses against the common threat posed by rogue state missiles that could threaten both countries, as well as U.S. allies. This new strategic framework with Russia contributes directly to reducing the WMD threat.

The Department will work with Russia to dispose of excess Russian weapons plutonium, dismantle warheads, and use U.S. assistance programs to retrain Russian nuclear scientists. The Department will also work with the Newly Independent States (NIS) to ensure they have effective export controls that meet internationally recognized standards. In cooperation with European and East Asian allies, as well as China, the Department will work to prevent Iran from acquiring the foreign technology needed for nuclear weapons programs.

The Department is also responsible for establishing verification policy and ensuring that these issues are a central element of arms control and nonproliferation agreements and commitments. To this end, the Department oversees the verification aspects of such agreements and commitments as they are being formulated and negotiated, assesses and reports on compliance with existing arms control and nonproliferation agreements and commitments, and coordinates the development of technology in support of arms control and nonproliferation objectives.

Finally, the destabilizing effect of the spread of WMD and their delivery systems worldwide has real consequences. Regional instability sends global political, economic, and social ripples. Tensions in South Asia are illustrative of the risk of the spread of WMD and missiles, as well as their possible use. The Department is responding to the President's imperative that halting WMD and missile proliferation are central elements of U.S. foreign policy.


If a scroll bar appears below the following table, swipe the table to move left/right of the dashed line.

Performance Goal 1

Bilateral Measures, Including the Promotion of new Technologies, Combat the Proliferation of WMD and Reduce Stockpiles.

Summary: Projected FY 2004 Performance

The Department will engage with individual countries and regions in a variety of ways and fora to reduce the WMD proliferation threat, focusing on key areas in Eurasia, East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. The Department will commit significant diplomatic and financial resources to prevent the flow of WMD/missile expertise from Eurasia. This effort will include pursuing an array of threat reduction programs in Russia and the Eurasian countries to control and dispose of excess WMD and missile-related materials. In particular, these programs will include moves to eliminate excess fissile materials; ensure that nuclear, biological, chemical weapon, and missile-related expertise is not transferred to states of concern and terrorists; secure dangerous biological pathogens; and help countries meet their arms control obligations. The Department seeks to enhance significantly the traditional measures aimed at preventing the proliferation of WMD, missiles, related technologies, and materials by the end of 2004.

The Department is providing U.S. assistance to strengthen national export control systems in potential WMD source countries. In South Asia, improved and effective enforcement of export controls is vital to ensure that India and Pakistan do not become sources of sensitive materials and technology for other proliferators. The Department is also increasing export control cooperation with key transit/transshipment countries in the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf. The Department will continue border control assistance to Central Asia and the Caucasus. These controls are designed to prevent transfers of such items to end-uses and end-users of proliferation concern, including rogue states and terrorist networks.

If a scroll bar appears below the following table, swipe the table to move left/right of the dashed line.

Example of an FY 2002 Achievement:
U.S.-Russia Strategic Offensive Reductions --
In May 2002, Presidents Bush and Putin signed the Moscow Treaty, reflecting the dramatic shift from Cold War rivalry to partnership based on the principles of mutual security, trust, openness, and cooperation. When it enters into force, the treaty will legally bind the United States and Russia to reduce the levels of strategic nuclear warheads by the end of 2012 to between 1,700 and 2,200 - about one-third of current levels.

The Department will also focus its energies on deepening the new strategic framework with Russia, expanding cooperation with NATO and Russia on missile defenses, and engaging in a strategic dialogue with China and India.

Regarding the new strategic framework, the Department will continue to operationalize the vision of the May 2002 U.S.-Russian Joint Declaration, which stated that "The era in which the U.S. and Russia saw each other as an enemy or strategic threat has ended. We are partners and we will cooperate to advance stability, security, and economic integration, and to jointly counter global challenges and to help resolve regional conflicts." The Department's efforts will include both implementation of the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, and broader U.S.-Russian cooperation in security areas. Under the Moscow Treaty, the United States and Russia will each reduce the number of its strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next ten years. The Department will explore transparency measures with Russia to enhance confidence in each party's treaty implementation.

In the broader area of security cooperation and transparency, Russia appears to be prepared to agree on voluntary transparency, predictability, and confidence-building measures with regard to missile defense-related plans and programs. The Department will seek Russian agreement on a range of joint research and development cooperation projects. The Department will also work with NATO and other allies to gain their agreement to deploy missile defense systems to defend allied forces against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, and later to defend allied territory and population centers against long-range ballistic missiles.

Regarding China, the Department will work to enhance mutual understanding and transparency, particularly with respect to mitigating China's reaction to U.S. missile defense programs.

Summary: Indicators, Results, and Targets

If a scroll bar appears below the following table, swipe the table to move left/right of the dashed line.

Baseline

Results

Targets

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Indicator #1: Access to Weapons of Mass Destruction Impeded.

Russia: Provided technology and assistance to Iran and India.

China: Announced it would not assist other countries in developing ballistic missiles.

North Korea: Negotiated about ending missile exports.

NIS Countries: One (Ukraine) of twelve NIS countries enforced export controls.

Russia:
Partially halted assistance to Iran.

China:
Implemented its 1997 nuclear commitment, but not its 2000 missile commitment.

North Korea:
D
id not export nuclear material or technology, but continued to seek buyers for missile exports.

NIS Countries:
Marked increase in meeting export control standards and in interdicting WMD and related components.

Russia:
Exported technology; increased attention to Iran's WMD and missile programs.

China:
Implemented its 1997 nuclear commitment but not its 2000 missile commitment.

North Korea:
Accepted U.S. offer for talks, but continued to export missile-related items.

NIS Countries:
European countries developed export controls; some NIS countries moved towards controls.

Russia:
Stops nuclear cooperation with Iran; fully adheres to NSG guidelines.

China:
Fully implements and adheres to 1997 nuclear commitment and November 2000 missile commitment, including effective enforcement of comprehensive missile-related export controls.

North Korea: Eliminates or freezes its MTCR class missile programs exports; agrees to all commitments in the Agreed Framework.

NIS Countries:
Significant progress by NIS and other countries towards enforcement of export control standards.

Russia:
Stops nuclear and missile cooperation with Iran.

China:
China adheres to 1997 nuclear and 2000 missile commitments.

North Korea:
Maintains its missile flight-test moratorium and to constrain its missile- related exports.

NIS Countries:
All but one meet internationally recognized export control standards.


If a scroll bar appears below the following table, swipe the table to move left/right of the dashed line.

Baseline

Results

Targets

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Indicator #2: States Conform to International Non-Proliferation Norms of Behavior.

South Asia: Continued unilateral nuclear testing moratoria, restraints in nuclear and missile programs, and stronger export controls. Experts cooperated with India to improve export control regulation and mechanisms.

Middle East: Iraq defied UN inspectors. Iran continued WMD development.

East Asia: North Korean moratorium on missile testing and freeze at Agreed Framework continued, but North Korea continued missile exports.

South Asia: Continued unilateral nuclear testing moratoria; restraints in nuclear and missile program; stronger export controls.

Middle East: Iraq defied UN inspectors. Iran continued WMD development.

East Asia: North Korean moratorium on missile testing and freeze at Agreed Framework continues, but continued missile exports.

South Asia: Onward proliferation concerns remain.

Middle East: Broad international support for pressure on Iraq leads to two landmark UN Security Council Resolutions; Goods Review List (1409) and resumption of weapons inspections (1441). Smart sanctions denied Iraq technologies necessary for WMD and missiles. Iran continued WMD and missile development. Strengthened export controls in region.

East Asia: North Korea acknowledged its uranium enrichment program, lifted the Agreed Framework freeze, announced withdrawal from the NPT, and expelled IAEA monitors. The Long Range Missile flight-test moratorium continued, but North Korea's missile-related exports also continued.

South Asia: Restraint on missile programs and testing moratoria continue. Progress by India and Pakistan on bringing export controls in line with international standards.

Middle East: Controls on Iraq receive international support. Iraq and Iran denied nuclear weapons technologies. Stronger export controls throughout region.

East Asia: Progress on verifiable constraints on North Korea's missile policy; and (*) the irreversible end to its nuclear weapons program.

Language following (*) is a revision from initial FY 2003 target.

South Asia: Restraint on nuclear and missile programs continued testing moratoria; India and Pakistan hold talks. Effective export controls implemented by India and Pakistan.

Middle East: New controls on exports to Iraq prevent the supply of WMD and missile related material and technology to Iraq from abroad. Iran denied technologies. Strengthened export controls in the region.

East Asia: North Korea remains a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT; no plutonium reprocessing; uranium enrichment program shut down and elimination begun in a verifiable and irreversible manner; re-freeze of plutonium program; IAEA prepared to assess program history; North Korea cooperates with IAEA on safeguards, including beginning assessment of program history.

Indicator #3: Progress Toward Implementing Fissile Material Projects.

U.S.-Russian agreement on plutonium disposition completed.

Plutonium disposition suspended; Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement (PPRA) suspended.

Progress made on Russian plutonium stockpile implementation and transparency issues.

Preparations for negotiations of U.S.-Russian plutonium-disposition multilateral framework are on track.

PPRA Amendment and fossil fuel implementing agreement concluded, awaiting Russian government approval to sign.

Russian warhead dismantling continuing; U.S.-Russian Plutonium Disposition Agreement and financing structures for assistance completed.

Multilateral framework and international financing plan completed.

Mayak FMSF contains at least several tons of plutonium under bilateral transparency.

Implementation of PPRA fully underway.


If a scroll bar appears below the following table, swipe the table to move left/right of the dashed line.

Baseline

Results

Targets

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Indicator #4: Number of Russian / NIS Weapons Scientists Redirected in Civilian Activities and Progress in Developing Self-Sustaining Civilian Alternative Employment.

Engaged more than 30,000 scientists in peaceful civilian efforts; moved to support sustainable transition from weapons to civilian work.

Up to 40,000 scientists and several new high-interest institutes now engaged.

Engaged cumulative total of 50,000 scientists, of whom about 26,000 were former WMD scientists.

Eight new U.S. industry partners recruited.

Three new technological applications brought to market, including Neurok TechSoft (linear differential equation solver), a laser-based flourocarbon detector, and new computer animation technology.

Continued expansion of partnerships and technology markets.

Maintain engagement of core WMD/missile expertise and add any new expertise/institutes deemed to represent a U.S. national security risk.

Indicator #5: Status of Cooperation With Allies on new Strategic Framework. (New Indicator)

N/A

Baseline:

Consultations began with allies on new strategic framework.

Intensive consultations with allies continued on U.S. policies and decisions, including Moscow Treaty. Allies welcomed the treaty.

NATO allies agree to specific missile deployment goals/options.

Allies and friends support deployment of a limited U.S. missile defense system; some allies join U.S. on specific missile defense-related projects.


If a scroll bar appears below the following table, swipe the table to move left/right of the dashed line.

Baseline

Results

Targets

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

ndicator #6: Status of Cooperation With Russia on new Strategic Framework. (New Indicator)

N/A

Baseline:

Consultations began with Russia on New Strategic Framework.

USG established the basis of a New Strategic Framework for its security relationship with Russia that consists of, among other things, a new approach to deterrence that relies on both offensive and defensive means.

The United States exercised its right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, thus removing the principal legal obstacle to pursuing alternative approaches to developing an effective missile defense system.

The Department led or participated in over 125 consultation visits on U.S. missile defense efforts, threat assessments, and ABM Treaty withdrawal, as well as leading to forming cooperative missile defense development programs, and instituted a regular dialogue with Russia designed to increase transparency and openness in missile defense endeavors.

Agreement reached on transparency and predictability measures to enhance confidence in strategic reductions and missile defenses.

The United States and Russia begin implementing new transparency and predictability measures to enhance confidence in strategic reductions and strategic stability.

The United States and Russia begin working on missile defense-related research and development projects.

The United States and NATO reach agreement with Russia within the NATO framework about missile defense cooperation.

Means and Strategies by Target

Means and Strategies Common to all Targets Within the "Access to Weapons of Mass Destruction" Indicator

Active diplomatic measures, (e.g., demarches and consultations with other nations, the UN, the IAEA, and other international organizations and NGOs, as needed).

Encourage governments to use comprehensive export control legislation and enhanced enforcement capabilities developed with U.S. assistance to prevent, deter, and interdict shipments of proliferation concern.

Appropriate Department and USG interagency stakeholders vet and the NSC approves U.S. demarches and negotiating positions

Russian technology proliferation

Nonproliferation dialogue with Russia (to halt WMD/missile proliferation to Iran); active diplomacy to sensitize Europe to the dangers of Iran's programs and ensure that European political outreach to Iran includes efforts to halt Iran's WMD/missile efforts.


China does not assist in nuclear and missile development

Engage China, including at the highest levels, to make clear that it must halt Chinese entities' WMD/missile-related transfers to countries of concern (e.g., Iran); continue to make clear that effective enforcement of export controls is key.

Halt North Korean missile exports

Work with regime partners, friends and allies to halt illicit North Korean missile-related exports and to echo the U.S. call to North Korea to maintain its long-range missile flight-test moratorium.

Means and Strategies Common to all Targets Within the "States Conform to International Nonproliferation Norms of Behavior" Indicator

Active diplomacy, (e.g., demarches and consultations) with other nations, the UN, the IAEA and other international organizations and NGOs), as needed.

Via regime Plenaries (NSG, MTCR, AG, and WA) and outreach activities, work to strengthen regime controls, urge restraint in WMD/missile programs (including with non-partners); engage non-partners to urge that they bring their respective nonproliferation policies and practices (including export controls) in line with international norms.

Encourage countries to adopt the control lists of the international nonproliferation regimes and ensure effective control of items of proliferation concern, not only exports but also over the movement through their territories.

Work to have additional countries subscribe and implement the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation; have Code running smoothly.

Appropriate Department and USG interagency stakeholders vet and the NSC approves U.S. demarches and negotiating positions.

South Asia: Continued unilateral nuclear testing moratoria; restraints in nuclear and missile program; stronger export controls

Engage India and Pakistan on WMD/missile concerns including further development of programs, testing, deployment, and exports.

Middle East: Iraq defiance of UN inspectors

Work with the UN Security Council and other entities to negotiate, implement, and enforce controls on exports to Iraq effectively.

East Asia: Progress on verifiable constraints on North Korea's missile programs; North Korea complies with international agreements.

Work with regime partners, friends and allies to halt illicit North Korea missile-related exports and to echo the U.S. call to North Korea to maintain its long-range missile flight-test moratorium.

Complete multilateral framework and international financing plan (US/Russia Agreement).

Accomplished through bilateral and multilateral negotiations with Russia and key donor states such as the G-7 and Sweden.

Careful preparations/meetings for negotiations are designed to ensure that the plutonium-disposition multilateral framework, necessary Russian program decisions, and the linked U.S. domestic program, stay on track.

Detailed negotiations with the G-7 allies and Sweden on the specifics of the plutonium-disposition multilateral framework and financing are required.

This strategy has so far resulted in pledges of $700 million and additional pledges are likely by the 2003 G-8 Summit at Evian, as well as considerable common ground for upcoming negotiations on the framework.

• Appropriate Department and USG interagency stakeholders vet and the NSC approves U.S. demarches and negotiating positions.


Maya FMSF contains at least several tons of plutonium under bilateral transparency.

Accomplished through bilateral negotiations with Russia centered on fissile material storage facility (FMSF) transparency arrangements.

Appropriate Department and USG interagency stakeholders vet and the NSC approves U.S. demarches and negotiating positions.

Implement the PPRA.

This is accomplished through bilateral negotiations with Russia.

The strategy is to achieve signature and begin implementation of replacement implementing agreement to cease plutonium production under PPRA through shutdown and replacement of reactors by fossil fuel plants rather than core conversion. These also must be access arrangements for U.S. personnel overseeing fossil fuel plant construction and initial contracts.

Continue to monitor shutdown reactors and Russian plutonium in storage; develop procedures to measure agreed attributes of stored Russian plutonium.

Appropriate Department and USG interagency stakeholders vet and the NSC approves U.S. demarches and negotiating positions.

Maintain and increase civilian redirection of core former Soviet WMD/missile expertise.

Solicit and fund civilian research projects by former Soviet WMD scientists/institutes through the intergovernmental Science Centers in Moscow and Kiev.

Expand efforts to engage former BW and CW scientists/institutes that might be vulnerable to targeting by proliferant states or groups.

Recruit new U.S. industry partners to collaborate with Science Centers.

Actively market new technological applications developed by the Science Centers. Examples include Neurok TechSoft (linear differential equation solver), a laser-based flourocarbon detector, and Animatek computer animation technology.

Promote links between former WMD scientists/institutes with global civilian science community.

Develop sustainability models for biological institutes and production facilities for application to selected former BW facilities.

Reorganize Science Centers to allow better development of technology commercialization from research and increased success in cooperative research competitions.

Continue well managed project audits and newly developed computer-based financial accounting/project monitoring system.

Coordinate with other governmental and non-governmental programs

Outreach made possible by extensive data collected and maintained in accessible databases by the Science Centers and periodic reporting by U.S. embassies in Moscow and Kiev.

Allies and friends support deployment of a limited U.S. missile defense system; some allies join the United States on specific missile defense-related projects.

Continue intensive work at NATO, bilaterally with other friends and allies, and in various international fora to ensure shared understanding of the WMD/missile threat and to agree on common approaches for addressing that threat.

Engage in extensive public diplomacy activities to inform countries and publics about the WMD and missile threat, and promote acceptance of the U.S. missile defense program.

Consult bilaterally with certain allies, particularly the U.K. and Denmark, to seek their support for use of their territory for the necessary infrastructure of U.S. missile defense plans.

Consult bilaterally with NATO allies and other countries about specific ways they can participate in research and development and other projects related to missile defense.


The United States and Russia begin implementing new transparency and predictability measures to enhance confidence in strategic reductions and strategic stability.

Work with Russia in the START Joint Compliance and Implementation Commission (JCIC) and, when established, in the Moscow Treaty Bilateral Implementation Commission to resolve outstanding implementation issues and to foster enhanced confidence and transparency regarding START/Moscow Treaty implementation.

Work with Russia in the Consultative Group of Strategic Security Working Group 1 and through exchanges between the Department and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to foster broader strategic confidence and transparency.

The United States and Russia begin working on missile defense-related research and development projects.

Work with Russia within the framework of the Consultative Group on Strategic Stability in the Missile Defense Working Group to determine what Russia might contribute to joint projects on missile defense research and development.

The United States and NATO reach agreement with Russia within the NATO framework about missile defense cooperation.

Work with Russia in the NATO-Russia Council on theater missile defense cooperation to lay the conceptual framework to facilitate the development of a future joint non-Article V NATO-Russia missile defense rapid reaction capability to protect deployed military forces and critical assets, and identify next steps.


If a scroll bar appears below the following table, swipe the table to move left/right of the dashed line.

Performance Goal 2

Strengthened Multilateral WMD Agreements and Nuclear Energy Cooperation Under Appropriate Conditions.

Summary: Projected FY 2004 Performance - Multilateral WMD Agreements

In the wake of the events of 9/11, the global war on terrorism redoubled the Department's determination to reduce the risks that terrorists and the states that harbor them might acquire and use WMD. This has added urgency to the need to bolster the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the international safeguards regime, the CWC, and the BWC. The bedrock of the Department's nuclear nonproliferation strategy is the NPT, for which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays a key verification role. For the IAEA in 2004, the Department hopes to strengthen the agency's operations, replace outdated equipment, and support development of new measures to verify that nuclear materials removed from nuclear weapons by the United States and Russia are not re-used for weapons.

If a scroll bar appears below the following table, swipe the table to move left/right of the dashed line.

Examples of FY 2002 Achievements:
OPCW Leadership Change --
In an unprecedented diplomatic move of last resort, the United States led efforts to change the leadership of the OPCW's Technical Secretariat, whose Director-General (DG) had led the OPCW into financial and administrative crisis. The United States is helping the new DG focus the OPCW on its core CWC implementation missions and regaining financial solvency.
Positive Outcome for 1st PrepCom Meeting -- U.S. efforts to support the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference contributed to a positive outcome that addressed a full range of substantive issues, including the importance of treaty compliance and strengthened IAEA safeguards.

To buttress the NPT, the Department will continue to work to strengthen the IAEA. Mindful of the risks from countries such as Iraq and Iran, the Department will fund and work with the IAEA on improved safeguards on nuclear materials and facilities and increase its ability to ferret out covert weapons efforts. The Additional Safeguards Protocol sets an important new nonproliferation norm that every country should accept. The Department will also seek political support within the review process toward the 2005 NPT Review Conference (RevCon) for actions to reinforce the NPT barrier to proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The discovery of a clandestine highly enriched uranium (HEU) enrichment program in North Korea and its subsequent decisions to terminate IAEA safeguards and withdraw from the NPT have led to a serious situation on the Korean peninsula. The Department is rallying support behind an effort designed to encourage North Korea to reconsider these decisions and return as a party to the NPT. The Department seeks a North Korea that is a fully compliant non-nuclear state party to the NPT.

In May 2002, the President sent to the Senate for ratification the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol to strengthen safeguards which will assist the Department's ongoing diplomatic efforts to encourage universal acceptance and implementation of the Additional Protocol. Other critical areas requiring strong support are IAEA's nuclear safety program and its nuclear materials security initiatives. The Department will seek support from other states to assist the IAEA in reducing the risks of nuclear terrorism, and to ensure that the IAEA's regular budget provides sufficient resources for the safeguards program. By the end of 2004, the Department expects to address critical programs designed to counter nuclear terrorism and implement strengthened safeguards, among others. The Department will also champion the development of advanced safeguards technology and procedures, confront unique safeguards challenges, combat nuclear smuggling, and strengthen nuclear safety measures in Eastern Europe and Eurasia.

Strengthening international nonproliferation regimes such as the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Supplier's Group (NSG), the Missile Control Technology regime (MTCR), the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), and the Australia Group (AG) remains critical to the Department. The United States has helped lead international efforts to develop and initiate the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC), a continuous, everyday process.

Another high priority for the Department is to strengthen the CWC primarily by ensuring that the new leadership of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has the wherewithal to carry out its full inspection program. A series of voluntary contributions is fiscally preferable to increasing substantially the base of the OPCW's budget. The Department will also continue to work to improve OPCW's budget processes and its focus on core missions. The Department will continue efforts to expand the number of States Parties to the CWC, and to facilitate destruction of Russian chemical weapons stockpiles. By the end of 2004, the Department hopes to ensure that the OPCW has optimized its inspection activities so that they may better reflect the potential risks posed by different categories of chemical facilities and has increased the efficiency of inspections of chemical weapons destruction.

The Department will work to persuade other States Parties of its new approach to strengthening implementation of the BWC. The United States believes the most effective way to counter the biological weapons threat is to focus on national efforts to improve implementation of the BWC. It would be a step forward if all States Parties were to make greater efforts to ensure that biological weapons could not be transferred to illegitimate groups or acquired because of lax security, and that national laws regarding possession and transfer of biological agents are tightened and strictly enforced.

The Department will continue working with other states to complete an International Monitoring System (IMS) (originally envisaged as part of the CTBT) that will improve U.S. and other countries' capabilities for monitoring possible nuclear tests anywhere in the world. In addition, the Department will continue work at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament to resume negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) that would cap the amount of material available for use in nuclear weapons.

The Department wants to strengthen existing nonproliferation treaties and upgrade the means to verify compliance, including strengthening compliance with the safeguards and verification requirements of the NPT, and encouraging adherence to and compliance with the CWC and BWC.

Summary: Projected FY 2004 Performance - Nuclear Energy Cooperation

The Department will promote the role of nuclear energy in sustainable development and ensure that the United States continues to be seen as a reliable and valuable partner in international nuclear cooperation. In pursuing this, the Department will provide advice and technical assistance to other countries, including those operating unsafe Soviet designed reactors, in meeting international standards of safety and physical security. Over the past few months, the Department has launched pilot projects with Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) funding that address the global problem of radiation sources, which can be used in terrorist "dirty" bombs. The Department also nearly concluded the Multilateral Environmental Program in the Russian Federation Framework (MNEPR) Agreement to manage spent fuel and radioactive waste from defense programs safely. This important work will continue, and in the case of NDF, will expand as more projects are sought.

If a scroll bar appears below the following table, swipe the table to move left/right of the dashed line.

Examples of FY 2002 Achievements:
Smooth Operation of Cooperation Agreements --
Continued smooth operation of cooperation agreements, licensing nuclear exports and enhanced international nuclear export controls were achieved by initiating information sharing and proposing expansion to consider terrorist activities.
Nuclear Damage Compensation -- The Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage was sent to the Senate for ratification.

The Department will continue to work with industry and other governments to ensure the smooth operation of existing cooperative relationships that account for significant export earnings and provide the entree for discussion of nuclear proliferation issues. The Department will also pursue a nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia, if Russia-Iran issues are resolved. The Department also will continue to press for a non-binding commitment that focuses on strengthening and reinforcing the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive sources to help in preventing terrorist access to material that could be used for a radiological or "dirty" bomb.


Summary: Indicators, Results, and Targets

If a scroll bar appears below the following table, swipe the table to move left/right of the dashed line.

Baseline

Results

Targets

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Indicator #1: Strengthen Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The 2000 Review Conference showed wide support for the NPT; forty-five countries have signed the IAEA safeguards protocol.

Fifty-two countries have signed the IAEA safeguards protocol.

PrepCom I for the 2005 NPT RevCon concluded smoothly.

The IAEA took action on integrated safeguards and emphasized financial needs; nine more states signed, bringing the total to sixty-seven, of which, twenty-eight protocols have entered into force.

The IAEA Board approved a multi-year program with a substantial increase in funding, to $11 million annually.

The NPT remains strong; the review process continues with no disruption. Several more states sign or bring into force the IAEA safeguards protocol. The IAEA anti-nuclear terrorism program receives adequate funding and expands assistance.

The first increase in the safeguards budget is used successfully by the IAEA to meet critical needs.

More states take action on strengthening safeguards protocol. The IAEA continues to reflect U.S. views.

PrepCom III for the 2005 NPT Review Conference (RevCon) concludes satisfactorily.

Indicator #2: Strengthen the Physical Protection Convention (CPPNM).
(New Indicator)

N/A

N/A

Baseline:

The IAEA met to discuss whether the CPPNM should be revised or strengthened. Experts made recommendations

The Experts Group recommended "well defined amendment" to CPPNM for consideration by the Drafting Group.

The Drafting Group worked on recommendations for consideration by a revision conference.

Conference approves a series of amendments to the CPPNM to cover nuclear material in domestic use.

The United States signs the revised CPPNM, which is sent to the Senate for ratification. A sufficient number of states sign the revised CPPNM to allow it to enter into force.


If a scroll bar appears below the following table, swipe the table to move left/right of the dashed line.

Baseline

Results

Targets

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Indicator #3: Strengthen the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

At total of 133 States Parties.

The United States began implementing U.S. industry obligations. Discussions with Russia on CW destruction moribund.

A total of 144 States Parties. The United States fully implemented its industry obligations, i.e., to conduct sixteen inspections of U.S. industry facilities. OPCW budget problems continued. Some destruction of Russian stocks begun.

Four States Parties (Nauru, Uganda, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Samoa) were added to the CWC, and two other states (Libya and Thailand) voiced intent to join.

The United States fully implemented CWC industry obligations by meeting all declaration and reporting requirements, hosting eight industry inspections, and successfully resolving issues from five previous inspections.

Three of the six Congressional conditions for granting authority for U.S financial assistance for Russian stockpile destruction have been resolved; limited progress was made on the other three conditions; Congress granted the President waiver authority. As a result of intense Department efforts, significant international financial assistance was provided.

In the summer of 2002, the United States succeeded in bringing about a change in the leadership of the OPCW Technical Secretariat and called for voluntary donations to resolve the immediate OPCW financial crisis. The United States made a
$2 million voluntary contribution, and sought and obtained agreement of the States Parties for a ten percent increase in the 2003 OPCW budget.

A total of 150 States Parties.

One CW destruction facility in Russia begins operations. OPCW under good management and conducting full inspection program.

Additional CWC States Parties.

OPCW well managed and adequately funded.

Work begins on a second CW destruction facility in Russia.


If a scroll bar appears below the following table, swipe the table to move left/right of the dashed line.

Baseline

Results

Targets

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Indicator #4: Number of States Parties who Incorporate U.S. Proposals in Their National Approaches to Controlling the Biological Weapons Threat.

The States Parties continued work on the BWC Protocol. The United States worked with the Ad Hoc Group Chairman to fix deficiencies in the BWC Protocol.

The States Parties continued work on the BWC Protocol. The United States rejected the flawed BWC Protocol because it would harm the U.S. pharmaceutical industry and undermine U.S. security.

Development of effective measures to strengthen the BWC continued.

U.S. alternative proposals incorporated by 18-20 BWC States Parties in their national approaches to control the BW threat.

U.S. alternative proposals incorporated by 25-30 BWC States Parties in their national approaches to control the BW threat.

Indicator #5: Reactor Closures and Nuclear Waste Improvements.

Several reactor closures agreed to in NIS and other Eastern European countries; negotiations held on nuclear waste framework agreement.

Several NIS plants closed; G-7 adopted the goal of pressuring Russia to close unsafe reactors.

Positive results achieved in Eastern Europe: e.g., Lithuania and Armenia; Bulgaria shut down two of its four high-risk reactors.

Liability agreement reached with Russia allowing U.S. participation in waste cleanup; implementing agreements negotiated.

Closure of key plants in the former Eastern Bloc; G-7 and Russia agree to new reactor closure agenda; the international community funds programs to deal with Russian nuclear waste problems.

Progress toward closure of key plants in the former Eastern Bloc, including Ignalina. Bulgaria takes steps toward closure of one plant. Armenia continues progress.


If a scroll bar appears below the following table, swipe the table to move left/right of the dashed line.

Baseline

Results

Targets

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Indicator #6: Extension of Benefits of Nuclear Cooperation to U.S. Partners and Implementation of Provisions of Existing Cooperation Agreements.

The United States had nuclear cooperation agreements with the IAEA, EU, and twenty-five other nations; new nuclear technology transfers to China stalled; the United States conducted regular consultations on protection of U.S.-supplied nuclear material; the United States reached necessary agreements on security arrangements for transfer from Europe to Japan; Generation IV International Forum (GIF) on innovative reactor designs began well.

U.S.-China discussions made substantial progress; GIF successfully drafted/approved; no significant issues about security of U.S.-origin nuclear materials; United States continued as reliable partner in nuclear cooperation.

U.S.-China Agreement for Cooperation implemented successfully. U.S.-China discussions on retransfer consents concluded, but agreement not yet in force.

GIF developed list of new technologies for international development and continued as a leading forum for international cooperation in advanced reactor development for safety, sustainability, and proliferation resistance.

No security problems arose with U.S.-origin nuclear material.

United States continued as reliable partner in nuclear cooperation. Agreement extended with Morocco, but not with Indonesia. Other agreements remained in force.

Peaceful nuclear cooperation with China proceeds smoothly; GIF proceeds as a viable forum for reactor cooperation; no security problems arise from U.S.-origin nuclear material; other cooperation programs proceed normally.

Peaceful nuclear cooperation with partners continues without difficulties. If initiated, negotiation of nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia makes substantial progress.

New nuclear cooperation programs initiated.

Means and Strategies: Multilateral WMD Agreements

The IAEA uses the first increase in its safeguards budget to meet critical needs.

• Pursue consultations with the IAEA; key supporters of safeguards seek to influence the IAEA in establishing priorities for distribution of additional resources.

• In response to the nuclear terrorism threat, support IAEA work that provides enhanced assistance to states for detection and prevention, including developing guidance and providing training and advisory services.

• Continue close collaboration with the IAEA to ensure that both its safeguards and anti-terrorism programs gain widespread financial, in-kind, and political support.

• Appropriate Department and USG interagency stakeholders vet and the NSC approves U.S. demarches and negotiating positions.


More states take action on strengthening the safeguards protocol; the IAEA continues to reflect U.S. views.

• Work closely with the IAEA and key nations supporting the Additional Protocol to focus energies and resources on countries with significant nuclear activities.

• These consultations are designed to help the IAEA take positive action on implementing integrated safeguards and assist the IAEA in articulating its financial needs.

• The United States lays down a strong marker on safeguards priorities at the 2005 NPT Review Conference, through consultations with the IAEA and other nations committed to the strengthened safeguards system.

• Appropriate Department and USG interagency stakeholders vet and the NSC approves U.S. demarches and negotiating positions.

The United States signs the revised CPPNM, which goes to the Senate for ratification; sufficient number of states sign the revised CPPNM to allow it to enter into force.

• Seek to strengthen the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) to extend its coverage to include nuclear material in domestic use.

• Drafting group meets for the fifth time to consider recommendations with the goal of creating a package of amendments for a revision conference.

• The conference will approve the amendments package to the CPPNM to cover nuclear material in domestic use.

• Appropriate Department and USG interagency stakeholders vet and the NSC approves U.S. demarches and negotiating positions.

Seek additional States Parties to the CWC.

• Remind states that have signed but not yet ratified the CWC of the value of ratification.

• Develop strategies for approaching states that have not yet signed the CWC, taking account of their concerns and explaining why the CWC would be in their interest.

OPCW is well managed and adequately funded.

• Urge States Parties to make voluntary contributions so that the OPCW can resolve its financial crisis without raising assessments.

• Seek additional U.S. voluntary contributions and cost-free U.S. experts to assist the OPCW in its administrative and budgeting restructuring.

Work begins on a second CW destruction facility in Russia.

• Work with Russia and the U.S. Congress to meet Congressional conditions for U.S. financial assistance for Russian CW destruction facilities.

• Work with the EU, G-8, and other organizations to generate additional international funding for Russian CW destruction programs.

25-30 BWC States Parties incorporate U.S. alternative proposals in their national approaches to controlling the BW threat.

• Individually and collectively work with other BWC States Parties to persuade them of the value of U.S. alternative proposals, and assist in improving their national approaches, as needed.

• Consult with all other BWC States Parties in annual experts meetings to elaborate on U.S. alternative proposals and agree on common standards and measures.


Means and Strategies: Nuclear Energy Cooperation

Make progress toward closure of key plants in the former Eastern Bloc, including Ignalina. Bulgaria takes steps toward closure of plant. Armenia continues progress.

• Work bilaterally with the countries concerned and multilaterally through the G-7 and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

• Consultations lead to G-7 adoption of the goal of pressuring Russia to close unsafe reactors.

• Appropriate Department and USG interagency stakeholders vet and the NSC approves U.S. demarches and negotiating positions

Continue peaceful nuclear cooperation with partners without difficulties; if initiated, make substantial progress on negotiation of nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia.

• As ombudsman, lead diplomatic support to U.S. nuclear power industry.

• Provide incentives for improved Russian and Chinese nonproliferation behavior.

• Define and negotiate new nuclear cooperation agreements, as appropriate.

• Support and participate in appropriate international fora for development of advanced reactors.

• Engage NGO, public, industry and environmental groups to make the case for nuclear energy cooperation under appropriate nonproliferation conditions and controls.

New nuclear cooperation programs initiated.

• As ombudsman, lead diplomatic support to U.S. nuclear power industry.

• Negotiate new nuclear cooperation agreements, as appropriate.

• Support and participate in appropriate international fora for development of advanced reactors.

• Engage NGO, public, industry, and environmental groups to make the case for nuclear energy cooperation under the appropriate nonproliferation conditions and controls.


If a scroll bar appears below the following table, swipe the table to move left/right of the dashed line.

Performance Goal 3

Verification Integrated Throughout the Negotiation and Implementation of Nonproliferation and Arms Control Agreements and Commitments and Rigorous Enforcement of Compliance with Implementation and Inspection Regimes.

Summary: Projected FY 2004 Performance

The Department is responsible for establishing policy that assesses and articulates the elements of verifiable nonproliferation and arms control agreements and commitments. The Department is also responsible for establishing noncompliance policy by weighing data against obligations and commitments to determine whether the actions of a nation or an entity are in compliance.

The success of verification regimes can be measured by the degree to which they are crafted to provide confidence in deterring and detecting noncompliance. In this regard, verifiability is enhanced when intelligence is robust and credible information on activities to be limited or proscribed can be collected, the language of an agreement or commitment is clear and is structured to maximize the information the Department expects to obtain, and the policy process of analyzing the data using reasonable standards of evidence is rigorous. Verification can be judged effective when the degree of verifiability is sufficient given the probability of noncompliance, the acceptability of the risks associated with both undetected and detected noncompliance, and the ability of the United States to respond to or deny the harmful effects of noncompliance on the United States.

If a scroll bar appears below the following table, swipe the table to move left/right of the dashed line.

Example of an FY 2002 Achievement:
Verification Mission --
In a new initiative, the Department transferred funds in July 2002 to the Department of Defense to help preserve a technical collection capability critical to the Department's verification mission. These funds were used to establish a program to replace the aging COBRA JUDY radar, a sea-borne system that contributes to verifying the START Treaty and characterizing foreign ballistic missile systems, as well as a Program Office, and enable the United States to acquire a replacement several months early, saving about a year in development time and hedging against a gap in collection coverage.

Timely and rigorous compliance assessments are essential to inform policymakers whether other nations and entities are complying with their commitments and to enable timely and appropriate responses to violations. As such, it is essential that the Department rigorously assesses activities and verifies that parties to agreements and commitments follow through on their obligations.

In 2004, the Department will expand and strengthen its compliance assessments by fully utilizing sensitive compartmented intelligence information regarding WMD activities and the proliferation behavior of other nations and entities. Applying additional rigor to compliance assessments will further support and inform the process for evaluating and determining sanctions in 2004. In addition, the Department will expand its compliance diplomacy efforts to resolve U.S. compliance concerns and gain support for redoubled enforcement efforts. A major Department focus will be to develop an ongoing dialogue with key Congressional committees on verification and compliance issues and requirements.

In carrying out its mission, the Department has produced a verifiability assessment of the Moscow Treaty. The Senate provided its advice and consent to ratification of the Moscow Treaty on March 6, 2003.
The Department has identified the elements of and is seeking international support for verifiable dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons capability. The Department is also assessing a verifiable ban on North Korean missile production, testing, and exports. The Department also will turn its attention to developing the Administration's approach to the conduct of challenge inspections under the CWC. In an effort to support compliance diplomacy, the Department will pursue an open source information initiative to gather all available information to enhance detection and analysis of noncompliance, as well as support strategies for enforcement.

Strengthening the Department's efforts to develop and implement verification concepts and to advocate the development and deployment of intelligence capabilities to monitor WMD will continue in 2004. To this end, the Department will seek permanent funding lines for key intelligence community assets and will assess the impact on treaty verifiability of changes to these assets.

The Department also will advocate a robust Verification Assets Fund (V Fund) to preserve critical assets and to identify and promote R&D of promising verification technologies. Additionally, the Department will continue to manage the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group (NPAC TWG) that annually reviews $500-million worth of arms control and nonproliferation verification R&D across twenty-five USG agencies. By bringing together these agencies, the NPAC TWG identifies ongoing arms control and nonproliferation R&D throughout the USG and seeks to eliminate redundancies, identify gaps, and facilitate enhanced coordination and better products. In 2004, the Department will continue to participate in more than thirty USG intelligence groups that monitor and assess weapons and proliferation activities. Based on the Department's involvement in these groups, appropriate action related to sensors and other assets is directed in support of arms control and nonproliferation objectives (see box). In 2004, the Department will release the World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) Report for 2003, which will contain CY 2002 updates. The WMEAT is widely used by the Department, other USG agencies, academia, and other countries to conduct analyses of world military trade.

In an effort to improve the Department's ability to coordinate arms control, nonproliferation, and political-military efforts with other USG agencies, foreign governments, international organizations, and U.S. delegations abroad, ten classified and unclassified videoconferencing systems have been installed in the Department and at select military locations where Department personnel are stationed. The Department has also installed operational video systems at the U.S. Missions in Geneva and Vienna, the U.S. Mission to the UN in New York, the Harry S Truman Building, State Annex 1, and at five military locations.

The Department will continue its work to ensure that the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) system resources, operational procedures, and trained personnel are available and ready to support new arms control and nonproliferation agreements and commitments as they are negotiated and become operational. To this end, the Department will maintain critical round-the-clock staffing, while increasing automation of message processing to meet notification requirements. Work will also proceed on the development of an emergency back-up communications site outside of the Harry S Truman Building to meet NRRC requirements for communications with sites in Russia and the NIS countries.


Summary: Indicators, Results, and Targets

If a scroll bar appears below the following table, swipe the table to move left/right of the dashed line.

Baseline

Results

Targets

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Indicator #1: Verification Integrated into Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements and Commitments. (New Indicator)

N/A

N/A

Baseline:
Moscow Treaty Verifiability Report completed.

U.S. positions on verification requirements developed.

Transparency Measures for the Moscow Treaty developed, as necessary.

Revised Target:

The Senate provided its advice and consent to ratification of the Moscow Treaty on March 6, 2003.

Analyze and make decisions on role of transparency measures to support Moscow Treaty implementation and Bilateral Implementation Commission activities.

Seek Senate ratification of the Moscow Treaty. Seek to enforce Russian compliance with START in support of the Moscow Treaty Implement and enforce Moscow Treaty.

Devise and carry out strategy for integrating the START verification regime implementation, national monitoring activities, and as necessary, transparency measures to enhance monitoring of and confidence in implementation of the Moscow Treaty.

N/A

N/A

Baseline:
North Korean Verifiable Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons Capability and Verifiable Missile Ban.

Prepared assessment of the elements of the verifiable dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear weapons capability. Maintained capability to finalize verification regime for ban on North Korean indigenous and export programs for ballistic missiles in preparation for negotiations.

USG approves elements of verifiable dismantlement for use with other nations. As international situation permits, enter into negotiations on verifiable ban on North Korean indigenous and export ballistic missile programs.

Pursue North Korean agreement to verifiable dismantlement of their nuclear programs, and ensure that verification requirements are implemented. Pursue verifiable ban on North Korean indigenous and export ballistic missile programs.


If a scroll bar appears below the following table, swipe the table to move left/right of the dashed line.

Baseline

Results

Targets

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Indicator #2: Submission of Presidential Report on Compliance with Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements and Commitments.

CY 1999 Annual Noncompliance Report submitted to Congress, but not on time.

CY2000 Annual Noncompliance Report not submitted to Congress on time, and instead was combined with the CY 2001 report.

CY 2001 Annual Noncompliance Report submitted to the NSC on time, but needed revision to meet more fully Congressional requirements.

CY 2001 Report on Compliance with the CWC was submitted to the NSC, but needed revision to meet Congressional requirements more fully.

CY 2001 Report on Compliance with the CFE Treaty submitted to the NSC on time.

Revised Target:

CY 2001 Annual Noncompliance Report (which incorporated CY 2000 activities) was submitted to the NSC, but not yet submitted to Congress.

Timely submission of the CY 2002 Annual Noncompliance Report to Congress.

Participate in rigorous review of proliferation behavior to determine sanctionable activities.

Pursuant to Senate Resolutions of Ratification, prepared and submitted to the NSC, the CY 2002 Annual Reports on Compliance with the CWC and the CFE Treaty. Reports submitted to the Senate.

Revised Target:

Annual Noncompliance Report covering CY 2003 activities submitted to Congress on time

Participate in rigorous review of proliferation behavior to determine sanctionable activities.

CY 2003 Annual Reports on Compliance with the CWC and the CFE Treaty submitted to the Senate.


If a scroll bar appears below the following table, swipe the table to move left/right of the dashed line.

Baseline

Results

Targets

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Indicator #3: Compliance Diplomacy Strategy Developed To Enforce Compliance with Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements and Commitments.
(New Indicator)

N/A

N/A

Baseline:
Compliance issues associated with the CWC enforced.

Visits conducted in four countries under the provisions of Article IX of the CWC to clarify and resolve compliance issues. Compliance issues were resolved as a result of several of these visits.

During these bilateral discussions with several States Parties, the United States identified its concerns and necessary mitigating steps. The United States also proposed to a State Party a plan for conducting possible site visits to address U.S. CWC compliance concerns.

Five States Parties responded to follow-up demarches and the Department resolved its compliance concerns with some States Parties.

Revised Target:
Clarify and seek resolution of U.S. compliance concerns. Visits under Article IX of the CWC will be proposed to clarify and resolve compliance issues. Bilateral compliance consultations will be conducted.

Work with Congress to enlist support in enforcing Russian compliance.

Work with Congress to enlist support in enforcing Russian compliance.

Clarify and seek resolution of U.S. compliance concerns. Visits under Article IX of the CWC will be proposed to clarify and resolve compliance issues. Bilateral compliance consultations will be conducted.

Pursue open source information in support of compliance diplomacy.

Work with Congress to enlist support in enforcing Russian compliance.

N/A

N/A

Baseline: Compliance issues with the BWC enforced.

Protocol to the BWC was not supported at the BWC Ad Hoc Group, nor revived at the Fifth Review Conference. The United States called for violators to come into compliance with the BWC.

Concerns about noncompliance with the BWC were raised in all BWC consultations leading up to the resumed Fifth BWC Review Conference; the United States made this a major focus of the Conference.

Articulate and seek international support for enforcement of compliance with the BWC at appropriate forums and in bilateral consultations.

Gain adherence of all NIS countries to the BWC.

Promoting compliance with the BWC is a principle thrust of U.S. BWC activities at appropriate forums and in bilateral consultations.


If a scroll bar appears below the following table, swipe the table to move left/right of the dashed line.

Baseline

Results

Targets

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Indicator #4: Prepared for Rapid Assessment of Allegations of Biological and Chemical Weapons Use. (New Indicator)

N/A

N/A

Baseline:
Rapid assessment of allegations of biological and chemical weapons use.

Requirement for rapid assessment policy is identified. Team is formed and research begun on methodology and policies to accomplish.

Department develops U.S. policy for the rapid assessment of allegations of biological and chemical weapons use.

Department and USG interagency group validate agreed U.S. policy for the rapid assessment of allegations of biological and chemical weapons use, which is deployed during the 2004 Annual Meeting of BWC States Parties.


If a scroll bar appears below the following table, swipe the table to move left/right of the dashed line.

Baseline

Results

Targets

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Indicator #5: Intelligence Collection Resources Promoted to Support Arms Control and Nonproliferation Verification Objectives. (New Indicator)

N/A

N/A

Baseline: Verification Assets Fund utilized.

Verification Technology R&D and intelligence assets coordinated and supported.

The Department provided $400,000 to initiate a Program Office and to advocate funding the replacement for the COBRA JUDY radar (operated by the Department of Defense and the intelligence community), critical for verification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and for missile proliferation assessments.

The Verification and Compliance Bureau (VC) co-chaired the interagency Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group (NPAC TWG), which acts as a central Coordinator for verification technology and identifies shortfalls in funding for critical arms control and nonproliferation R&D projects. The Department finalized the biennial NPAC TWG Report. As co-chair, VC assisted in sponsoring major symposia on Biological Weapons Detectors, Nuclear Explosion Detection, Chemical Weapons Detectors, and Unattended Radiation Sensors.

Seek Congressional support for endowing the Verification Assets Fund mandated by Congress in 1999 in support of preserving intelligence assets and funding R&D critical for supporting arms control and nonproliferation objectives.

Conduct the annual NPAC TWG Conference. Assist in conducting several major symposia involving NPAC TWG focus groups.

Identify and fund Verification Assets Fund projects which are important for monitoring WMD activities.

Urge and obtain redeployment of key intelligence assets against a significant threat.

Identify and fund Verification Assets Fund projects which are important for monitoring WMD activities.

Draft and coordinate the NPAC TWG Report among all interagency participants.

Participate in over 30 USG intelligence groups which monitor and assess weapons and proliferation activities, and direct appropriate action related to sensors and other assets in support of arms control and nonproliferation objectives.

Indicator #6: Report on World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) Published.

Release of WMEAT 1998 Report
(CY 1997 update).

Release of most of WMEAT 1999-2000 Report (with CY 1998-1999 updates) on Internet and SIPRINET.

WMEAT 1999-2000 Report completed and prepared for printing.

Release of WMEAT 2002 Report (CY 2001 updates) by the end 2003.

Release of WMEAT 2003 Report (CY 2002 updates) by the end 2004.


If a scroll bar appears below the following table, swipe the table to move left/right of the dashed line.

Baseline

Results

Targets

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Indicator #7: Timely Treaty-Mandated Communications.

NRRC Agreement Amendment Protocol signed by the Secretary in January 2000. Study of architecture for GGCL replacement system began (the current system is operational only until 2005).

Study of architecture for GGCL replacement system took place.

START partners (former Soviet nuclear states) considered completed U.S. proposal for replacement of current Government-to-Government Communications Links (GGCL) system; Integrated Notification Application (INA), designed to support CFE, Open Skies and VC 1999 notification exchange was being tested; OSCE Network Phase II Migration was on track.

Proof of concept tests conducted on U.S. end for the preferred GGCL replacement design.

START Treaty Parties consider and accept U.S. design for GGCL architecture.

Coordination of international testing of accepted GGCL replacement architecture design.

Indicator #8: Nuclear Verification Information System (NVIS) Enhances Verification of Compliance With Nuclear Testing Treaties and Moratoria.

Identified need to improve classified and open source information access for verifying compliance with nuclear testing treaties and moratoria.

Initial contracts concluded for development of Phase I of the NVIS tool on the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

Received and used information from U.S. National Technical Means (NTM) and open sources to verify compliance with nuclear testing treaties, commitments, and moratoria.

Use NVIS to verify international compliance with nuclear testing treaties, commitments and moratoria and to develop USG compliance positions.

Compatible NVIS tools operate on classified and unclassified systems to access seismic, radionucleide, satellite, and other intelligence information for verifying international compliance of nuclear testing treaties, commitments, and moratoria.

Means and Strategies by Target

Moscow Treaty: Seek to enforce Russian compliance with START in support of the Moscow Treaty; implement and enforce the Moscow Treaty. Devise and carry out strategy for integrating START verification regime implementation, national monitoring activities and, as necessary, additional transparency measures to enhance monitoring and confidence in Moscow Treaty implementation.

• Participate in the Bilateral Implementation Commission.

• Develop and negotiate useful transparency measures as identified.

• Assess compliance through Verification and Compliance Analysis Working Group (VCAWG) and include in demarches and the Annual Noncompliance Report.

North Korea: Pursue North Korean agreement for verifiable dismantlement of their nuclear programs; ensure that verification requirements are implemented. Pursue a verifiable ban on North Korean indigenous and export ballistic missile programs.

• Participate in negotiations.

• Develop and coordinate Secretary's Verifiability Assessment of the final agreement.

• Assess compliance through Verification and Compliance Analysis Working Group (VCAWG), raise issues with North Korea, and include in the Annual Noncompliance Report.

• Coordinate with the intelligence community on known facilities and identify gaps in knowledge.

• In coordination with National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) nuclear weapons labs, U.S. allies, the IAEA, and other entities, develop monitoring objectives for each element of the dismantlement of the North Korea's nuclear weapons capability.

• In coordination with national and international partners, develop robust verification techniques for each monitoring objective and gain acceptance of the verification suite.

• Work with appropriate agencies to identify funding sources for dismantlement monitoring/verification tools and for implementation of verification activities within North Korea.

• Have staff coordinate with affected agencies; host international workshop on dismantlement; brief Congressional staff in support of funding for international dismantlement activities and for implementation of verification activities.

• Work to obtain funding and support for a program that contains nuclear weapon knowledge and technology.

Submit the CY 2003 Annual Noncompliance Report to Congress on time.

• Rigorously analyze all source intelligence to supply well-grounded conclusions.

• Fully utilize sensitive, compartmented intelligence information on WMD activities and the proliferation behavior of nations and entities included in the Report.

• Record VCAWG compliance assessments of existing agreements and report in a comprehensive and timely manner.

• Streamline interagency coordination process.

• Rigorous review and analysis of proliferation behavior to determine sanctionable activities.

Develop diplomatic strategy to enforce compliance with arms control and nonproliferation agreements and commitments; promote compliance with BWC as a principle thrust of U.S. BWC activities at appropriate forums.

• Prioritize approaches to selected countries.

• Seek out additional occasions to use diplomatic approaches to pursue more than one objective at a time, with a focus on CWC and BWC compliance.

• Prepare for CWC Challenge Inspection activities within the USG and internationally.

CY 2003 rapid assessment of allegations of BW and CW use.

• The Department expands the composition of the CW/BW Allegations of Use Team with additional disciplines.

• USG experts consult with outside experts.

• Interagency collaborators are brought into the Team.

• Deploy U.S. policy related to allegations of BW use at the 2004 Annual Meeting of BWC States Parties.

Utilize the Verification Assets Fund (V Fund). Coordinate and support Verification Technology R&D and intelligence assets. Participate in USG intelligence groups that monitor and assess weapons and proliferation activities, and direct appropriate action related to sensors and other assets.

• Obtain IPA to assist in managing the $7-million effort for the V Fund.

• Continue and expand the contract with MITRE to assist in supporting the efforts to coordinate the NPAC TWG.

Release the WMEAT 2003 Report (CY 2002 updates) by the end of 2004.

• Issue another double report in 2003 to make reporting more up to date.

• Adopt new automation strategies to speed up production.


Coordinate international testing of accepted Government-to-Government Communications Links (GGCL) replacement architecture design.

• The VC and IRM Bureaus will coordinate on U.S.-Russian system testing.

• VC and IRM will involve Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus in coordinating server-based system testing.

• Review results and make final recommendations for server-based system start-up.

Enhance verification of compliance with nuclear testing treaties, commitments, and moratoria through use of the Nuclear Verification Information System (NVIS) on multiple systems.

• Assess current Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) requirements for nuclear test monitoring and timely reporting of results. This requires coordination with the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC); the Weapons, Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center (WINPAC); and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).

• Evaluate and provide guidance on Verification and Compliance (VC) Bureau-funded enhancements to the classified AFTAC Event Reporting Tool, to ensure that AFTAC reporting comprehensively meets Department needs for timely reporting of U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System (USAEDS) monitoring results.

• Provide technical direction and guidance to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratory in their ongoing development of the Nuclear Verification Information Tool (NVITool) software, to ensure that the tool functions as designed and meets Department needs for nuclear test information access and management.

• Develop and coordinate interagency clearance of a proposal for reciprocal visits to nuclear tests sites of key countries. Support the review and clearance process, as determined by the NSC.

Summary: Verification/Validation and Crosscutting Activities

If a scroll bar appears below the following table, swipe the table to move left/right of the dashed line.
Performance Goal 1

Bilateral measures, including the promotion of new technologies, combat the proliferation of WMD and reduce stockpiles.

Verification and Validation

Data to measure performance and progress are derived from intelligence reporting cables from U.S. embassies and meetings, principals' committee/deputies committee (PC/DC) decisions, decision memos, interagency USG input, and, where appropriate, treaty and regime documents and meetings. For the Science Centers, data are collected and maintained in accessible databases in Moscow and in Kiev. Data and performance measurement are also derived from reports by independent outside auditors. Data generally cover all relevant issues and are usually reliable.

Crosscutting Activities

The Department collaborates with the intelligence community; the Departments of Defense, Commerce, Energy, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture; FBI; CBP; Coast Guard; JCS; EPA; NRC; NSC; OVP; MTCR; Nuclear Suppliers' Group; Zangger Committee; UN Security Council; KEDO; NATO allies; IAEA; EU members; G-8 members; P-5 members; India; Japan; South Korea; Norway; Pakistan; academia; Congress; and the private sector.


If a scroll bar appears below the following table, swipe the table to move left/right of the dashed line.

Performance Goal 2

Strengthened multilateral WMD agreements and nuclear energy cooperation under appropriate conditions.

Verification and Validation

Data to measure performance and progress are derived from direct participation, intelligence, reporting cables, PC/DC decisions, decision memos, interagency input, and, where appropriate) IAEA documents and meetings, and trip reports. Data cover all relevant issues and are reliable. For the IAEA and OPCW, data to measure performance and progress are derived from IAEA and OPCW Board decisions and other IAEA and OPCW documentation, USG policy papers and decision documents, and U.S. diplomatic reporting (particularly from IAEA and OPCW) and e-mail. Data also come from other USG personnel involved in supporting programs (e.g., from NRC and Department of Energy).

Crosscutting Activities

The Department collaborates with the Departments of Defense, Energy, Transportation, and Treasury; OVP; NSC; NRC; USAID; adherents to the NPT and CWC; IAEA; OPCW; relevant NGOs; and the U.S. nuclear and chemical industries.


If a scroll bar appears below the following table, swipe the table to move left/right of the dashed line.

Performance Goal 3

Verification integrated throughout the negotiation and implementation of nonproliferation and arms control agreements and commitments, and rigorous enforcement of compliance with implementation and inspection regimes.

Verification and Validation

Data to measure performance and progress are derived from intelligence, reporting and analysis, diplomatic reporting cables, direct participation in multilateral and bilateral forums, open sources of information, reporting by international inspectorates, data declarations, treaty notifications, documents submitted to international implementing bodies, information submitted as confidence building measures, on-site inspections, National Technical Means, and notifications exchanged among agreement signatories. Data are cross-compared, analyzed, and tested for accuracy and for verification. PC/DC decisions, decision memos, IAEA documents, meetings, and trip reports, interagency input, treaty, agreement, and commitment documents and meetings, and Congressional activities also play a part in validating performance.

For North Korean nuclear dismantlement, verification will be self-evident with the development of objectives, list of monitoring and verifying tools, international consensus on elements of the verification regime, and funding and implementation of verification of dismantlement activities.

Data are assessed through the applicable VCAWG and compliance judgments are rendered. Findings are recorded annually in the President's Annual Noncompliance Report.

Performance of NVIS development tasks are verified and validated by the implementation of these software tools on the classified system and their routine use within the Department.

The performance of test site transparency will be validated by the occurrence of reciprocal test site visits with key countries.

Crosscutting Activities

The Department collaborates with the intelligence community; the Departments of Defense, Energy, and Commerce; JCS; NSC; NRC; MTCR; IAEA; G-8 members; and P-5 members. The Department also collaborates with NGOs, other States Parties, adherents to the Moscow Treaty, INF, START, and MTCR, and (for CWC issues) the OPCW Technical Secretariat.

For North Korean nuclear dismantlement, international consensus on elements of dismantlement, development, use and validation of verification procedures and tools, international support for dismantlement mandate and verification - all will support momentum for U.S. nonproliferation goals and may be applicable to dismantlement of nuclear weapons activities in other countries of concern.

NVIS development will require significant collaboration with other agencies - the NVIS tool is being developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratory, and will be shared with AFTAC and the NNSA.

Test site transparency initiatives will require full interagency coordination with the NNSA, weapons intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control organization in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, NSC, and others.

Contents