October 9, 2012

Disclaimer

This is a report of the International Security Advisory Board (ISAB), a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide the Department of State with a continuing source of independent insight, advice, and innovation on scientific, military, diplomatic, political, and public diplomacy aspects of arms control, disarmament, international security, and nonproliferation. The views expressed herein do not represent official positions or policies of the Department of State or any other entity of the United States Government.


Date: 10/09/2012 Description: Final Report of the International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) on Pakistan and U.S. Security Strategy - Part One from ISAB Chair William Perry - State Dept Image


TABLE OF CONTENTS

ISAB Report on Pakistan and U.S. Security Strategy

Appendix A –Summary of Findings and Recommendations

Appendix B - Terms of Reference

Appendix C - Members and Project Staff

Appendix D - Individuals Consulted by the Study Group


ISAB Report on Pakistan and U.S. Security Strategy

The situation in Pakistan today poses certain risks for our security and international security generally. That situation, quite likely, will deteriorate in the coming months and years, posing grave threats to American interests. We have addressed this possibility in a separate, classified paper. Here, we present a discussion aimed at avoiding such an outcome, and promoting a substantial improvement in the security situation in South Asia.[1]

How should we think about Pakistan? As a failed state that is thwarting American aims in South Asia? As a state that helped drive Soviet troops from Afghanistan and hastened the end of the Soviet Union? As a sponsor of state terrorism in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and in India? As a state that accepted U.S. drone bases on its territory and provided logistical access to Afghanistan?

Pakistan is all of these things and each of these actions was motivated by Pakistan’s perceptions of its interests. Its external interests have been defined fairly consistently over the years by a strategic vision that has not changed much in several decades. Its essence can be summed up as follows:

Do everything possible to hold together the several ethnic and regional groupings of the country so as to avoid any further splintering of the nation’s territory. Achieve defensive depth through influence over Afghanistan and good relations with other Muslim states. Use nuclear deterrent and asymmetric warfare capabilities to counter India’s superiority in conventional forces. Develop security relations with major nations -- China and the United States -- that will offset or neutralize India’s relations with those states.

There is very little that the United States could do to change that strategic outlook in any significant way. The question is whether we can live with a Pakistan that acts in accordance with these strategic principles. If the answer is “no, we cannot,” an array of actions could be taken, over time, to deprive Pakistan of the strategic depth it seeks, to align the United States more closely with India, to combat Pakistan’s asymmetric warfare capabilities, to limit its ability to exploit its nuclear status, and even to undermine its national unity and territorial integrity.

Such a course would almost certainly do serious damage to short- and long-term U.S. national interests, globally and in the region. These include:

An over-riding national interest in preventing nuclear weapons or fissile material from being transferred, lost, or stolen from Pakistani authorities. This risk will only increase as Pakistan begins to operate more and larger nuclear facilities, making accountability much more difficult. Dealing with this threat will require working with the Pakistani military as well as the civilian government.

Preventing a South Asian nuclear war, slowing the Pakistani nuclear weapons program, and avoiding a nuclear arms race with India. These goals will be served by reduced tension and increased confidence between India and Pakistan, and the U.S. should clearly work to promote this movement.

A Pakistan that has the political will and capacity to deny safe haven for those who wish to do harm to U.S. interests at home or abroad.

In our efforts to accomplish these goals, we should recognize certain realities:

First, there is no reasonable alternative to a re-engagement with Pakistan, primarily through its civilian government, by looking for ways to cooperate in areas of common interest.

Second, we should engage with Pakistan’s principal neighbors, China, India, Afghanistan, and Iran, looking for areas in which our goals for Pakistan intersect with theirs.

Third, our government could be better organized to design and pursue an integrated policy focused on Pakistan, which is also consistent with our objectives in India, China, and elsewhere regionally. The tilt towards Afghanistan and the military medium is understandable when we are fighting a war, but refocusing our policy and policy-making process should come with our reduced commitment in Afghanistan.

Fourth, no framework exists for deterring or preventing nuclear terrorism launched from non-states, or failed states controlled by non-state actors. To this end, we should consider leveraging existing “open source” cyberspace/global communication networks/social media tools in order to uncover, disrupt, and/or shape unhelpful activities.[2]

The long-term interests of the U.S. vis-à-vis Pakistan should be a major part of our national strategy towards the region, broadly defined. These long-term interests can be ignored only at our peril and can be damaged if we focus exclusively on short-term dangers. These long-term interests are:

To influence to the best of our ability the gradual evolution of all elements of the Muslim world toward more tolerant, democratic, and modern societies, integrated with the rest of the world, and providing little encouragement for Islamist extremism and terrorism.

To accommodate the rise of China and of India to major power status in a way that results in a stable international system in the Asia-Pacific region.

To encourage India and Pakistan to resolve their differences over Kashmir and other disputed areas, and to develop mutually beneficial economic relations.

To promote conditions that permit the strengthening of Afghanistan’s governmental and civil society institutions so that Afghanistan can maintain its independence and enjoy mutually beneficial relations with its neighbors.

To prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities beyond those nations that now possess them, to discourage the use of nuclear weapons, and eventually to roll back the nuclear weapons arsenals of all states that currently possess them.

To develop regional strategies and relations even farther afield, to include Iran and the region of the Persian Gulf.

American and Pakistani strategic goals often are, or appear to be, at odds. For instance, American relations with India and China can appear hostile to Pakistan, and Pakistan’s insistence on exerting significant leverage in Afghanistan’s political and economic choices, already appears opposed to American interests. Also, differences over nuclear issues have bedeviled U.S.-Pakistan relations for years; they will continue to do so if one extrapolates this history into the future.

In light of such differences in strategic goals, some observers in both countries have reached the conclusion that dropping all attempts at cooperation is the only answer. Many more believe that a relationship between the two countries can be maintained only at the level of a few strictly defined and very limited agreements, where mutual trust does not have to be a crucial element.

Both schools of thought fail to allow for the substantial areas in the national goals of Pakistan and the U.S. that are either not in conflict or could be mutually supportive. These, in brief, are as follows:

Use the full range of instruments of U.S. policy and influence to prevent an India-Pakistan war.

Support and strengthen Pakistan’s territorial integrity and national unity.

Work for an outcome in Afghanistan that is not in conflict with the goals of the U.S. and Pakistan.

Build a relationship between Pakistan and the U.S. that supports the national aspirations of Pakistan with respect to economic development and sovereignty over all its internationally recognized territory.

Renounce and fight against the use of terrorism as a tool of national policy.

Enter into international activities designed to strengthen the safety and security of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials.

Work for equal treatment in reducing the threat of nuclear war everywhere in the world.

Promote Pakistan’s economic development and deeper integration in the global trade and financial system.

Strive for better mutual understanding through people-to-people programs, military-to-military exchanges, and educational cooperation programs.

Such a platform for future U.S.-Pakistan relations could become operationally meaningful if two things happened: (1) the two nations entered into a discussion of their national goals at senior, influential levels inside and outside of government; and (2) specific actions, programs, and policies were identified in the case of each major national goal that are supported by those who shape public opinion in each country.

The principal - and most visible - conduit for U.S./Pakistan contact should be civilian-to-civilian. For our side, in most cases, that means the Department of State and Embassy team, but at times may appropriately include the President, Vice President, and the Advisor to the President for National Security Affairs. With the impending end of the NATO combat role in Afghanistan, the highly visible role played by the Chairman of the JCS and the CENTCOM Commander in the diplomacy of U.S.-Pakistan relations should sharply decrease. At the same time, contacts and cooperation within the military sphere, between Pakistani and American military officers, can play an essential role in developing and sustaining proper civil-military relations in a democratic Pakistan.

Recognizing that the counterterrorism mission and other security concerns will remain our top priority, U.S. military assistance to the Pakistani military should also include increased capabilities to respond to large scale natural disasters. This should be accompanied by a U.S. effort to support a South Asian-wide capability to respond to such disasters, i.e., regional centers, interoperable communications capacity, regional exercises and planning, military-to-military exchanges within and outside the region focused on disaster responses, etc.

NATO should be encouraged to organize broad military-to-military exchanges with Pakistan and professional education jointly and with individual member states of the alliance. The Marshall Center at Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany has played a similar role with respect to the military and diplomatic establishments of the Former Soviet Union. With a NATO lead, the Marshall Center would seem to be well positioned to do this with Pakistan, with complementary efforts from the various national establishments of NATO members.

Pakistan, as Pakistani leaders have recently acknowledged, finds itself burdened with an outsized military establishment that is sapping its economy and placing its long-term viability at risk. However, recognizing that the Pakistani military establishment will likely continue to play a central role in shaping Pakistani policy and doctrine in the foreseeable future, we should review, improve upon, and share the lessons we learned in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union in order to highlight the many dangers and misperceptions associated with our own past Cold War policies/doctrines. Also, it is essential, both to the future of Pakistan and to U.S. interests in the region, that the U.S. make a major effort to craft policies and initiatives that will provide Pakistan with the opportunities and investment resources that will allow it to participate in the dynamic growth that is taking place in the region.

The U.S. political leadership needs to emphasize that, while we are concerned about the use and security of nuclear weapons in Pakistan, we are motivated by a strong belief that America’s interests and Pakistan’s future can best be served by an economically strong and democratic Pakistan that is increasingly integrated into the regional and world economy.

Beyond the bilateral relationship between Pakistan and the U.S. lies the realm of each nation’s relation with third parties: nations like India and China, Afghanistan, the Arab states, and Iran. The U.S.-Pakistan strategic dialogue must extend to these other countries as well. It will not do to have Pakistan and the U.S. agree on a set of mutually supportive national goals and policies if other concerned nations actively oppose them or subtly undermine them. This is why U.S. policies that put a primary focus on the Afghan-Pakistan axis cannot succeed. Too many other countries in the Middle East, Central and South Asia, East Asia, and Europe have a stake in Pakistan. They see that nation not as inseparably linked with the American exit from Afghanistan, but as a key player in the Muslim world and in the political dynamics of a large part of Asia.

This is particularly true with regard to pressing matters of immediate concern to the U.S., our allies and partners. These include:

Competitions for influence in Afghanistan, especially as between India, Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.

The role of Islam and other religions, as they play out "geopolitically," where the role of Saudi Arabia and its "religious offshoots" are particularly important and seem to be far more profound than is evident in U.S. policy.

The role of Iran and especially American perceptions of it and policies toward it. Relations between Iran and Pakistan, and Iran and India are of signal importance in shaping the future of South Asia as well as of South West Asia, and are essential to the charting of effective policies for the entire region.

Of direct relevance to arms control efforts in South Asia and the broader region is the Iranian issue, where it is profoundly in our interest to persuade Iranian leaders that their acquisition of nuclear weapons could create risks to their security, political interests, and perhaps even their survival that would outweigh the benefits they might expect from acquiring these weapons.

What happens in South Asia, and what the countries of that region do in Afghanistan and beyond -- as far west as Iran and Iraq -- will also matter to the NATO alliance and other partnerships, and have a major impact on judgments about American "reliability."

A post-Iraq, post-Afghanistan U.S. foreign policy is called for, and Pakistan should figure importantly in that. It is not a policy to be crafted solely or perhaps even primarily in the government or in think tanks in Washington, although that probably will be the beginnings of it. Like the Marshall Plan of post-World War II, it should be a policy that is shaped by vigorous interaction with America’s partners, in Asia as well as in Europe. It will be a policy that knows limits -- limits imposed by economic circumstances and by recognition that America’s global reach, while still formidable, will continue to require accommodation to the interests of other nations. American diplomacy will need to operate more in this mode than has been the case in recent decades, and Pakistan is a good place to start.

Recommending diplomatic tactics is not the purpose of this paper, but some principles of conduct may be advanced and debated. The classic distinction between nations as being either the object of policy or the subject of policy is useful here. Pakistan for too long has been the object of our policy. We knew what we wanted Pakistan to do, and we were willing to give or withhold favors to have our way. That continues to be the mindset of too much of American diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan. It will no longer work. To the extent it had value; it has outlived its usefulness. From now on, Pakistan must be a subject of our policy, meaning that our two nations should devise a modus vivendi in fairly concrete terms, along the lines described above.

Other nations should be brought into this common understanding of what the two countries will try to do together to advance each other’s goals. Afghanistan, India, and Iran should be the first. They will be dubious about the whole exercise. But if they see America and Pakistan acting out the script they all have jointly devised, their attitudes can change. This is what a “principled foreign policy” really is. It should be the way America conducts its policies in the next phase of its history.


Appendix A – Summary of Findings and Recommendations

1. There is no reasonable alternative to a re-engagement with Pakistan, primarily through its civilian government, by looking for ways to cooperate in areas of common interest.

2. We should engage with Pakistan’s principal neighbors, China, India, Afghanistan and Iran, looking for areas in which our goals for Pakistan intersect with theirs.

3. Our government could be better organized to design and pursue an integrated policy focused on Pakistan, which is also consistent with our objectives in India, China, and elsewhere regionally. The tilt towards Afghanistan and the military medium is understandable when we are fighting a war, but refocusing our policy and policy-making process should come with our reduced commitment in Afghanistan.

4. No framework exists for deterring or preventing nuclear terrorism launched from non-states, or failed states controlled by non-state actors. To this end, we should consider leveraging existing “open source” cyberspace/global communication networks/social media tools in order to uncover, disrupt, and/or shape unhelpful activities.

5. Ensure that the long-term interests of the United States vis-à-vis Pakistan are a major part of our national strategy towards the region, broadly defined. Potential areas of overlap in the national goals of Pakistan and the United States are:

a. Support and strengthen Pakistan’s territorial integrity and national unity.

b. Work for an outcome in Afghanistan that is not in conflict with the goals of the U.S. and Pakistan.

c. Build a relationship between Pakistan and the United States that supports the national aspirations of Pakistan with respect to economic development and sovereignty over all its internationally recognized territory.

d. Renounce and fight against the use of terrorism as a tool of national policy.

e. Enter into international activities designed to strengthen the safety and security of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials.

f. Work for equal treatment in reducing the threat of nuclear war everywhere in the world.

g. Promote Pakistan’s economic development and deeper integration in the global trade and financial system.

h. Strive for better mutual understanding through people-to-people programs, military-to-military exchanges, and educational cooperation programs.

6. A platform for future U.S.-Pakistani relations could become operationally meaningful if two things happened: (1) the two nations entered into a discussion of their national goals at senior, influential levels inside and outside of government; and (2) specific actions, programs, and policies were identified in the case of each major national goal that are in turn supported by those who shape public opinion in each country.

7. The principal – and most viable – conduit for U.S.-Pakistan contact should be civilian-to-civilian. At the same time, contacts and cooperation within the military sphere, between Pakistani and American military officers, can play an essential role in developing and sustaining proper civil-military relations in a democratic Pakistan.

8. Recognizing that the counterterrorism mission and other security concerns will remain our top priority, U.S. military assistance to the Pakistan military should also include increased capabilities to respond to large scale natural disasters. This should be accompanied by a U.S. effort to support a South Asian-wide capability to respond to such disasters.

9. NATO should be encouraged to organize broad military-to-military exchanges with Pakistan and professional education jointly and with individual member states of the alliance.

10. Recognizing that the Pakistani military establishment will likely continue to play a central role in shaping Pakistani policy and doctrine in the foreseeable future, we should review, improve upon, and share the lessons we learned in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union in order to highlight the many dangers and misperceptions associated with our own past Cold War policies/doctrines.

11. It is essential that the U.S. make a major effort to craft policies and initiatives that will provide Pakistan with the opportunities and investment resources that will allow it to participate in the dynamic growth that is taking place in the region.

12. Treat Pakistan as a subject – not as an object – of USG policy.


Appendix B - Terms of Reference

Date: 08/11/2011 Description: Memorandum for the Chair, International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) - State Dept Image


Appendix C - Members and Project Staff

Board Members

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Dr. William Perry (Chairman)

Mr. Charles Curtis (Vice Chairman)

Dr. Graham Allison

Dr. Michael R. Anastasio

Hon. Doug Bereuter

Dr. Bruce G. Blair

Mr. Joseph Cirincione

Hon. Terry Everett

Amb. Robert Gallucci

Amb. James Goodby

Amb. Robert E. Hunter

Dr. Shirley Ann Jackson

Dr. Raymond Jeanloz

Dr. David A. Kay

Lt. Gen. Frank Klotz (USAF, Ret.)

Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs (USA, Ret.)

Rep. Harold Naughton

Mr. Robert N. Rose

Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft (USAF, Ret.)

Mr. Walter Slocombe

Dr. James Tegnelia

Mr. William H. Tobey

Dr. Ellen Williams

Dr. Joan B. Woodard

Study Group Members

Amb. Robert Gallucci (Chairman)

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Mr. Joseph Cirincione

Hon. Terry Everett

Amb. James Goodby

Amb. Robert E. Hunter

Dr. Raymond Jeanloz

Dr. David A. Kay

Rep. Harold Naughton

Dr. James Tegnelia

Project Staff

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Mr. Richard W. Hartman II

Executive Director, ISAB

Mr. Christopher Herrick

Deputy Executive Director, ISAB

Mr. Matt Brechwald

Ms. Kathryn Schultz

Executive Secretaries

Ms. Thelma Jenkins-Anthony

ISAB Action Officer


Appendix D - Individuals Consulted by the Study Group Persons Consulted in Study Group Meetings

September 6, 2011

Ms. Kathryn Schultz

Nonproliferation, Office of Regional Affairs,

Department of State

November 7, 2011

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Assigned Briefers

WINPAC, Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Daniel Feldman

Deputy to the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Department of State

American Journalist

Reporting from Pakistan

Dr. Neil Joeck

Senior Fellow, Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Mr. Timothy Lenderking

Director of Pakistan Affairs, Department of State

Assigned Briefers

Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Near East and South Asia, Department of State

Jan 13, 2012

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Dr. Thomas Graham

Brookhaven National Laboratory

Mr. Paul Kerr

Analyst in Nonproliferation at the Congressional Research Service, Washington DC

Mr. Michael Curry

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism Office, Department of State

Ms. Daniela Helfet

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism Office, Department of State

Mr. Geoff Pyatt

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asia, Department of State

Mr. Philip Reiner

Director, Afghanistan and Pakistan, National Security Staff

Mr. Michael Newbill

Director, South Asia, National Security Staff

February 07, 2012

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Assigned Briefer

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Mr. Matt Brechwald

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Office of Regional Affairs, Department of State

April 18, 2012

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Dr. Gary Hufbauer

Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics



[1] While all ISAB members have approved this report and its recommendations, and agree they merit consideration by policymakers, some members do not subscribe to the particular wording on every point.

[2] For example, communications strategies based on information gained from open source material might influence the actions of the community dealing with proliferation activity, and might also be used to potentially deter and/or change cost-benefit calculations of non-state actors. The application of “open source” mining and “crowd sourcing” could produce new tools to uncover unhelpful activity in a manner that is open to dissemination, supplementing the current activities and tools of the DoD and intelligence communities. These “open source” strategies and methods could be applied in the South Asia context and could prove particularly useful across the spectrum of nonproliferation, counterproliferation, counterterrorism, and counter-WMD mission sets.

[This is a mobile copy of Pakistan and U.S. Security Strategy]