START I -- Article by Article Legal Analysis (part 3)
ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE RELATED AGREEMENTS STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE RELATED AGREEMENTS
Associated with the START Treaty are four related separate agreements, signed by the U.S. Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister. The first three separate agreements, all signed in Moscow on July 31, 1991, include an agreement on the early exhibition of strategic offensive arms; an agreement on early exchange of lists of inspectors, monitors and aircrew members; and an agreement on the exchange of geographic coordinates and site diagrams. The fourth separate agreement, signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming on September 23, 1989, is an agreement on the advance notification of major strategic exercises.
ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE AGREEMENT ON EARLY EXHIBITIONS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
The Agreement on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms (Agreement) consists of a preamble and seven Articles. The Agreement establishes the procedures by which the Parties will arrange and conduct exhibitions and inspections as required by paragraphs 11 and 12 of Article XI of the Treaty and Section XIV and XV of the Inspection Protocol prior to entry into force of the Treaty. Each Party needs to conduct such early exhibitions and inspections specified in the cited provisions in order to ensure the ability to begin accurate and reliable inspections in a timely manner after entry into force. (Items subject to exhibition under the Treaty that are not exhibited during early exhibitions, for whatever reason, must be exhibited after entry into force. For example, if the Treaty enters into force within 240 days after signature, and certain items subject to exhibition under the Treaty are not exhibited during early exhibitions, then those must be exhibited after entry into force. Alternatively, if entry into force were to be delayed, new systems developed between the early exhibition and entry into force would also have to be exhibited.)
Article I and Article II work together to provide that inspections and exhibitions provided for in paragraphs 11 and 12 of Article XI of the Treaty are completed no later than 240 days after signature of the Treaty. Article II further provides that each Party shall conduct these exhibitions and inspections according to the procedures provided for in the Inspection Protocol, except for special provisions provided for in Articles III and IV of this Agreement, as are discussed below. Inspection teams are limited to no more than 15 inspectors; unlike other inspection teams, which are generally limited to ten inspectors, inspection teams for early exhibitions and exhibitions during the baseline period allow for 15 inspectors because of the numbers and diversity of systems that might be exhibited.
Articles III provides additional rules related to the provision of lists of inspectors and aircrew members. No less than 30 days prior to an exhibition, the inspecting Party must provide to the exhibiting Party (1) a list of no more than 25 proposed inspectors and (2) a list of no more than 25 proposed aircrew members. These lists will not fulfill the obligations set forth in the Agreement on the Early Exchange of Lists. However, a party may choose from lists presented in fulfillment of the Agreement on Early Exchange of Lists for the purposes of exhibitions conducted under this agreement. The specific information required for the lists is set forth. Article III also establishes that an exhibiting Party must notify an inspecting Party, no less than 10 days prior to an exhibition, of its agreement with or objection to the inspectors and aircrew members identified on the list. Procedures for objecting are set forth in paragraph 6 of Section II of the Inspection Protocol. The exhibiting Party must provide the necessary travel documentation to the inspectors and aircrew members.
Article IV stipulates that arrangements for air transportation shall be made in accordance with the provisions in Section IV of the Inspection Protocol, with two technical exceptions: (1) diplomatic clearance numbers and airplane routings must be provided no less than 30 days before each exhibition and (2) points of entry for early exhibitions and inspections shall be Washington, D.C., for the United States, and Moscow for the U.S.S.R.
Article V stipulates that the exhibiting Party shall provide special protection for inspectors and aircrew members on its territory. This formula, drawn from one used during trial verification experiments, is necessary since inspectors and aircrew members cannot be given diplomatic immunity under this executive agreement, whereas inspectors and aircrew members are granted diplomatic immunity under the Treaty.
Article VI limits the legal effect of this Agreement, by providing that it will not be construed to prejudice the rights of the Parties or to impose additional obligations, except as stated in Articles I and II of the Agreement.
Article VII provides that the Agreement enters into force upon signature, and terminates upon completion of the exhibitions and inspections provided for within the Agreement. Information obtained during these exhibitions and inspections, and recorded in the inspection reports remains valid for discharging Treaty obligations even when this Agreement is terminated. The Agreement is not necessary once the Treaty enters into force because then the normal procedures for inspections and exhibitions, as set forth in the Treaty and Inspection Protocol, will apply.
ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE AGREEMENT ON THE EARLY EXCHANGE OF LISTS OF INSPECTORS, MONITORS, AND AIRCREW MEMBERS PROPOSED FOR INSPECTIONS AND CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES
The Agreement on The Early Exchange of Lists of Inspectors, Monitors, and Aircrew Members Proposed for Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities (Agreement) consists of a preamble and five Articles. The Agreement establishes the procedures by which the Parties will provide initial lists of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members, as required by paragraph 1 of Section II of the Inspection Protocol. Each Party needs to exchange and approve lists of proposed inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members prior to entry into force of the Treaty because the initial inspections under the Treaty will take place beginning 45 days after entry into force, and there would not be sufficient time for lists to be approved if the Parties were to wait for entry into force to exchange and approve such lists.
Article I provides for lists of proposed inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members to be exchanged on an agreed date no later than 30 days before entry into force of the Treaty. Unlike most implementation actions, which are assigned to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), the agreement on the date is to be made through diplomatic channels. This was done because this agreement was negotiated before the Parties decided on the early establishment of the JCIC.
Article II provides rules for amending the lists exchanged pursuant to Article I, prior to entry into force of the Treaty. Each Party may change its lists only one time within any 21-day period beginning on the date of exchange of such lists. Each Party can propose adding up to 30 inspectors, 25 monitors, and 25 aircrew members to the lists. Note that these rules track with those in paragraph 4 of Section II of the Inspection Protocol for amending the lists after entry into force of the Treaty. Once the Treaty enters into force, these lists will constitute the initial lists provided for in paragraph 2 of Section II of the Inspection Protocol.
Article III stipulates that the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers will be used to exchange lists and amendments to lists.
Article IV limits the legal effect of the Agreement, by providing that it will not be construed to prejudice the rights of the Parties or to impose additional obligations, except as stated in Articles I and II of the Agreement.
Article V provides that the Agreement will enter into force upon signature and will terminate once the Treaty enters into force. The Agreement is not necessary once the Treaty enters into force because then the normal procedures for maintaining lists of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members, as set forth in Section II of the Inspection Protocol, will be in effect.
ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE AGREEMENT ON EXCHANGE OF COORDINATES AND SITE DIAGRAMS
The Agreement on Exchange of Coordinates and Site Diagrams (Agreement) provides the geographic coordinates for facilities and locations declared in the Memorandum of Understanding, and site diagrams for the facilities that will be subject to inspection in accordance with the Treaty. While such information concerning U.S. facilities is normally unclassified, the Soviet Union wished to deny public access to geographic coordinates of its sensitive facilities. Therefore, the Parties have agreed to take steps to ensure that this Agreement will not be released to the public. Site diagrams are part of this agreement, and thus not made public, because they contain geographic coordinates. This Agreement includes the obligation to update the coordinates along with updates of other data in the Memorandum of Understanding. The text of this Agreement, along with its annexes, which list the geographic coordinates and site diagrams, has been provided to the Senate, and a classified analysis has been included.
ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE AGREEMENT ON RECIPROCAL ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR STRATEGIC EXERCISES
The Agreement on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises (Agreement) consists of a preamble and six Articles. The Agreement provides for each Party to give the other advance notification of one major strategic forces exercise that includes the participation of heavy bombers each year. This Agreement was signed on September 23, 1989, and was sent to the Congress under the Case Act shortly thereafter. It is included here because it is related to the START Treaty and because its inclusion will make it easier to understand the overall START regime. In particular, paragraph 2 of Article XIII of the main Treaty text sets forth a variety of provisions that apply to the exercises that are notified pursuant to this Agreement. (See Analysis of the main Treaty text above.)
Article I provides that, on the basis of reciprocity, each Party will give the other Party no less than 14 days advance notice of the beginning of one major strategic forces exercise that includes the participation of heavy bomber aircraft to be held during each calendar year.
Article II provides that the notifications will be sent through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, and will be provided no less than 14 days prior to the beginning of the exercise.
Article III provides that the Parties will hold consultations to consider questions relating to the implementation of the Agreement. Article III of the Agreement also provides for possible amendments to the Agreement aimed at furthering the implementation of its objectives. Consultations on major strategic exercises were held in the START negotiations, resulting in the provision of paragraph 2 of Article XIII. Further consultations could be held in the future should the Parties agree to them.
Article IV provides that the Agreement will not affect the obligations of either Party under other agreements.
Article V provides that the Agreement will be of unlimited duration, and that it may be terminated by either Party upon 12 months written notice.
Article VI provides that the Agreement enters into force on January 1, 1990, with notifications pursuant to the Agreement commencing with the calendar year 1990.
ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF LETTERS EXCHANGED BY THE HEADS OF DELEGATION
STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE LETTERS
Ambassador Brooks and Ambassador Nazarkin exchanged seven letters at the Presidential Summit in Moscow concluding agreements on behalf of their governments. Although the agreements follow a similar form and are legally binding, they are not integral parts of the Treaty; rather, they are agreements, associated with the Treaty, that have the legal status of Executive Agreements.
The seven letters fall into three groups. Two of the letters, dealing with an exchange of photographs and with engineering site surveys, allow for implementation of specific steps prior to entry into force of the Treaty itself. Four of the letters, dealing with the phasing of reductions of heavy ICBMs, launch canisters, silos used as launch control centers, and the Soviet Bear D (TU-95RTs), amplify the Treaty and affect only the Soviet Union. They are contained in separate letters, rather than in the Treaty itself, in deference to Soviet domestic political considerations. The final letter provides amplifying details on verification of the U.S. B-1 bomber; these details were placed in a separate letter at the request of the United States, due to our desire for reciprocity given that matters of comparable concern to the Soviets had been placed in separate letters.
I. EXCHANGE OF LETTERS CONCERNING PHASING OF REDUCTIONS OF HEAVY ICBMs
This agreement consists of an exchange of letters, dated July 30, 1991, between Ambassadors Brooks and Nazarkin. The letter from Ambassador Brooks accepts formal assurances set forth in Ambassador Nazarkin's letter.
Those assurances address the phasing of the reduction by the Soviet Union of specified deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers. The Soviet Union states that such items shall be reduced such that no fewer than 22 of such items shall be reduced each year until the Treaty's limits on such items and for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs have been reached.
Two important separate Soviet obligations are contained in the Soviet letter. The first concerns the rate of reductions. The obligation is to reduce at least 22 heavy ICBM launchers each year during the period of reductions (22 each year for seven years equals the 154 heavy ICBM launchers required to be reduced under the Treaty). Note that the obligation is a repeating annual one, not a cumulative obligation. Thus, if 30 heavy ICBM launchers were to be eliminated in the first year, an additional 22 would still be required to be eliminated the second year, and in each subsequent year, until 154 total launchers have been reduced.
The second obligation concerns the method of reductions. The reductions must be through elimination (i.e., through physical destruction), rather than through conversion. This provision was included to ensure that heavy ICBM silos could not be removed from accountability as heavy ICBM launchers and reconverted to heavy ICBM silos later.
The letters exchanged on the reduction of heavy ICBMs refer to the obligations combined therein as statements reflecting the official positions of the United States and the Soviet Union." The other letters exchanged are agreements on behalf of the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union. Because of this difference in phrasing, Minister Bessmertnykh provided a letter to Secretary Baker, signed on July 30, 1991 during the Presidential Summit in Moscow, in which he confirmed that the July 30, 1991 letter from Ambassador Nazarkin to Ambassador Brooks is legally binding.
II. EXCHANGE OF LETTERS CONCERNING THE BEAR D BOMBER
This agreement consists of a July 31, 1991 exchange of letters between Ambassadors Brooks and Nazarkin. The letter from Ambassador Brooks accepts a proposal set forth in Ambassador Nazarkin's letter.
The proposal addresses airplanes designated Tu-95RTs by the Soviet Union and Bear D by the United States. Under the Treaty the Tu-95 is listed as an existing type of heavy bomber. Thus all Tu-95 variants should be either deployed heavy bombers, non-nuclear heavy bombers, test heavy bombers, training heavy bombers, or former heavy bombers. The Twelfth Agreed Statement, however, exempts the 37 existing TU-95RTs (Bear D) maritime patrol airplanes from being considered as former heavy bombers. The proposal complements and amplifies that Agreed Statement by providing information on the Tu-95RTs, as well as the opportunity to verify that information. The proposal stipulates that the airplanes are for maritime operations, are not heavy bombers, and have not been equipped with air-to-surface weapons or undergone conversion; it also lists distinguishing features for these airplanes and stipulates that the Soviet Union has 37 such airplanes.
The Parties agree that not later than 240 days after signature of the Treaty, the Soviet Union is (i) to provide photographs to aid in the identification of such airplanes, (ii) conduct an exhibition of one such airplane, under specified conditions, and (iii) exhibit, upon request of the United States, the other 36 such airplanes under specified conditions.
The 37 airplanes are not to be based at air bases for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, heavy bomber flight test centers, or training facilities for heavy bombers. They shall not be considered to be former heavy bombers and thus shall not be accountable" under the Treaty limits for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers.
In the event the Soviet Union continues to produce such airplanes, all such new airplanes will be treated as former heavy bombers under the Treaty and subject to inspection to confirm that they are not equipped for air-to-surface weapons.
This agreement enters into force upon entry into force of the Treaty and remains in force while the Treaty is in force, except for the three obligations mentioned above that enter into force upon signature of the Treaty and remain in force for 240 days.
III. EXCHANGE OF LETTERS CONCERNING THE B-1 BOMBER
This agreement consists of a July 31, 1991 exchange of letters between Ambassadors Brooks and Nazarkin. The letter from Ambassador Nazarkin accepts a proposal set forth in Ambassador Brooks' letter.
The proposal reflects an agreement on the distinguishability of the B-1 heavy bomber. The need for such an agreement arises from the fact that, among existing types of heavy bombers, the B-1 is unique in having been tested with long-range nuclear ALCMs but not having been deployed in the category equipped for" such ALCMs. The provisions concerning distinguishability in this agreement gave the Parties a basis for their agreement that the currently deployed B-1s will count under START as heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs.
Specifically, the letters address the distinguishability between categories of the B-1 heavy bomber. The B-1 was originally designed for a multi-role capability (i.e., as a penetrating heavy bomber, carrying both nuclear and conventional weapons, with the added capability to launch long-range nuclear ALCMs). The B-1 has been deployed as a penetrating heavy bomber and does not carry long-range nuclear ALCMs, and as a result the deployed B-1s were configured as equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. This entailed leaving the movable bulkhead in the internal weapons bay in its original position, making the bay too small to carry long-range nuclear ALCMs. In addition, the United States agreed in the letters to cover the external pylon attachment points of the deployed B-1 force by a process equivalent to welding. These actions prevent rapidly converting deployed B-1s into aircraft equipped for long-rang nuclear ALCMs, and allow the Soviets to distinguish deployed B-1s from the two B-1 test heavy bombers that were tested with long-range nuclear ALCMs. Additionally, the letters establish a commitment that would further hinder loading long-range nuclear ALCMs onto B-1s by allowing neither unique support equipment for loading long-range nuclear ALCMs onto B-1s nor equipment for loading the pylons of long-range nuclear ALCMs onto B-1s to be located at air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs.
The B-1 was designed with numerous external attachment joints. Physically, there would be room to mount 14 long-range nuclear ALCMs externally. Together with the eight that could be carried internally, this would allow a single bomber to carry a total of 22 long-range nuclear ALCMs, which could have been inconsistent with the prohibition on equipping U.S. heavy bombers for more than 20 long-range nuclear ALCMs, found in paragraph 20 of Article V. However, program decisions preclude use of two sets of the B-1 attachment joints used for carriage of a single long-range nuclear ALCM pylon. No pylons for these attachment joints exist. These two sets of joints are specifically addressed by subparagraph (c) of the second paragraph of the letter. Two of the remaining attachment joints also serve as jacking points for use during aircraft maintenance. These two, therefore, are allowed to remain uncovered and in place, so as to permit jacking.
The substantive portion of the agreement provided on the B-1 is found in subparagraphs (a) through (h) of the second paragraph of each letter. Subparagraphs (a) and (b) repeat the distinguishing features of B-1 bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs; these are listed in subparagraph (a)(ii)(3) of Annex G of the Memorandum of Understanding. By including them in this agreement, the Parties accept these features as sufficient to demonstrate distinguishability. The phrase covering, using a process equivalent to welding" allows covers to be bonded over the attachment joints, precluding rapid conversion of a deployed B-1 into a bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
Subparagraph (c) deals with the two extra" sets of attachment joints and provides that, so long as these joints remain covered by a process equivalent to welding, they will not be used in determining the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the B-1 is equipped. As a result, if B-1 bombers are subsequently converted to carry long-range nuclear ALCMs, they will be considered to be equipped for 20 or fewer such ALCMs, not 22, and will be in compliance with the provisions of paragraph 20 of Article V.
Subparagraphs (d) and (f) effectively ban the following at non-long-range nuclear ALCM B-1 bases: (i) unique equipment for moving weapons bay bulkheads, (ii) equipment for loading long-range nuclear ALCM pylons onto B-1s (i.e., the equipment designated by the U.S. Air Force as the pylon handling fixture), (iii) the pylons themselves, and (iv) B-1 rotary launchers that carry long-range nuclear ALCMs. The word unique" with respect to bulkhead moving equipment is intended to clarify that the ban does not extend to such general industrial equipment as forklifts. Photographs of the unique equipment prohibited from such bases were provided the Soviet side for information; however, the size threshold for inspections is not altered by this ban. The purpose of these constraints is to make it more time-consuming and difficult to modify the B-1 to carry long-range nuclear ALCMs. In effect, these provisions mean that a B-1 would have to go to a depot-level maintenance facility to be converted, a process that would be easily observed if it occurred on a large scale.
Subparagraph (e) makes all B-1 heavy bombers not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs (the total deployed force) subject to inspection during the baseline period (i.e., from 45 to 165 days after entry into force.) This provision is thus designed to provide assurance that no deployed B-1 bombers are equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
In subparagraph (g), the Parties agree not to list technical characteristics of the B-1 test heavy bombers in the Memorandum of Understanding, but to exhibit such test heavy bombers for purposes of distinguishability. These provisions are required because the only B-1 heavy bombers ever equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs were two test heavy bombers. Test heavy bombers are not normally subject to inspection nor are their technical characteristics listed in the Memorandum of Understanding. At the same time, the general Treaty approach to distinguishability is to list technical characteristics of heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs and then demonstrate, through exhibitions and other methods, how these characteristics differ from those listed for heavy bombers of the same type that are equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs.
Subparagraph (h) provides that similar provisions will apply to comparable bombers of the Soviet Union (i.e., those of a type from which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested but some of which are not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs). The provision was included in the interest of ensuring reciprocity in the future. Although this provision could be read to apply to the Soviet Bear airplanes, the Parties did not intend it to apply to them.
This agreement enters into force upon entry into force of the Treaty and remains in force while the Treaty is in force.
In addition to this exchange of letters, the Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs informed Soviet negotiators on February 7, 1991, during a series of meetings in Geneva, that, while the United States had never converted B-1s to carry long-range nuclear ALCMs, and had no plans to do so, if the United States elected to do so in the future, our best estimate was that converting a B-1 by reconfiguring the bomb bay bulkhead and restoring the ALCM pylon attachment joints would require approximately 11.5 to 13.5 days per aircraft. The Under Secretary of State further stated that restoration of the ALCM pylon attachment joints would be conducted at a depot (i.e., a major repair facility), not at an air base, and that, while reconfiguration of the bomb bay bulkhead could be done at the B-1 base, this would probably also be done at a depot. This statement was made for information only, and was not intended to represent any commitment or obligation on the part of the United States.
IV. EXCHANGE OF LETTERS CONCERNING SILO LAUNCH CONTROL CENTERS
This agreement consists of a July 31, 1991 exchange of letters between Ambassadors Brooks and Nazarkin. The letter from Ambassador Brooks accepts a proposal set forth in Ambassador Nazarkin's letter.
The proposal addresses conversion and elimination of launch control centers in connection with the obligation of the Parties in paragraph 11 of Article V of the Treaty not to convert silos used as launch control centers into silo launchers of ICBMs. Only the Soviet Union possesses silo launch control centers. The Parties agree that, once the Treaty enters into force, when a group or groups of silo launchers of ICBMs are to be eliminated, the eliminating Party is to do one of three things to the launch control centers associated with the eliminated silo launchers: eliminate them, convert them for other purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty, or retain them for their original purposes.
If the conversion option is chosen for a silo used as a launch control center and the silo is to be opened, the other Party must be given 30 days prior notice, and it then has the right to visit the silo, under procedures to be agreed upon in the JCIC, to confirm that it is not being converted into a silo launcher of ICBMs.
This agreement enters into force upon entry into force of the Treaty and remains in force while the Treaty is in force.
V. EXCHANGE OF LETTERS CONCERNING LAUNCH CANISTERS
This agreement consists of a July 31, 1991 exchange of letters between Ambassadors Brooks and Nazarkin. The letter from Ambassador Brooks accepts a proposal set forth in Ambassador Nazarkin's letter.
The proposal addresses launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Currently only the Soviet Union has launch canisters for mobile ICBMs and the letters specifically address only Soviet obligations in the context of current Soviet practices. During the negotiations, the sides agreed that the obligations incurred by the Soviet Union in these letters would not extend to the U.S., even if we were to develop and deploy a canisterized mobile missile. First, the Parties agree that unfinished launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be transported from locations where they are manufactured only to final assembly facilities for such ICBMs. Launch canisters assembled as a unit with a missile without a front section shall have external differences from unfinished launch canisters.
Second, there are various provisions applicable to the Soviet Union's launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs remaining after launches. Such expended" launch canisters must either be eliminated in accordance with Treaty provisions, or remain in the open at the launch site with the front end open. Elimination may be carried out either in situ or at a C or E facility. In the latter case, notification is required for the movement of an expanded canister to the C or E facility. Elimination of expended canisters is subject to verification by national technical means of verification.
This agreement enters into force upon entry into force of the Treaty and remains in force while the Treaty is in force.
VI. EXCHANGE OF LETTERS CONCERNING ENGINEERING SITE SURVEYS
This document consists of a July 31, 1991 exchange of letters between Ambassadors Brooks and Nazarkin. The letter from Ambassador Brooks accepts a proposal set forth in Ambassador Nazarkin's letter.
The proposal addresses engineering site surveys to be conducted at facilities subject to continuous monitoring. The Parties agree to provide each other, no later than 60 days after signature of the Treaty, specified engineering data on such facilities, including information on the perimeter portal and exit locations, underground utilities, proposed termination points for water, sewage, and electrical supply lines, power supply fluctuations, electrical power disruptions over specified time periods, type of electrical current, topography of the area to be continuously monitored, and vehicular traffic at the facility. The purpose of the early exchange of information is to expedite the establishment of continuous monitoring after entry into force of the Treaty.
In accordance with this proposal, U.S. information was provided to the Soviet Union on September 27, 1991. Soviet information was provided to the United States on September 26, 1991.
This agreement entered into force on the date of signature of the Treaty. It remains in force for 12 months unless it is terminated earlier or the Treaty enters into force, in which latter case it remains in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. It may be extended upon agreement of the Parties, subject to the above-described conditions. This provision for termination was included because of the provisional application of this agreement prior to the entry into force of the Treaty. As was noted above in the discussion of the exchange of letters concerning photographs, those letters, the letter on engineering site surveys and Section IV of the Telemetry Protocol all have similar language concerning provisional application.
VII. EXCHANGE OF LETTERS CONCERNING PHOTOGRAPHS
This agreement consists of a July 31, 1991 exchange of letters between Ambassadors Brooks and Nazarkin. The letter from Ambassador Nazarkin accepts a proposal set forth in the letter of Ambassador Brooks.
The proposal addresses the exchange of photographs of systems and support equipment covered by the Treaty and its associated documents. The Parties agree that specified photographs are to be exchanged prior to signature of the Treaty; that specified photographs are to be exchanged on the date of signature of the Treaty; and that specified photographs are to be exchanged after signature of the Treaty either during an elimination or during the initial technical exhibitions in the course of confirming technical data and distinguishing features. Specific lists of photographs within each group are provided in the three Annexes to the exchange of letters.
The first two exchanges occurred on the morning of July 31 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow and at the Kremlin. At these exchanges, only one photograph of the SS-18 ICBM of the Soviet Union was provided, although two variants of that missile are listed in Annex F to the MOU. Even though both variants are not listed in this letter, the fact that both variants are listed in the MOU means that the Soviets are obligated to provide photographs of both variants. They have agreed to do this. The third group of photographs to be exchanged includes photographs of systems in non-standard configurations (B-1 heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs; Soviet ICBMs assembled outside launch canisters; Soviet SLBMs disassembled into stages). Because of the effort that will be required to provide the photographs in this third group, the Parties agreed not to require these photographs to be provided at signature, but to allow the photographs to be taken during exhibitions or eliminations when the systems will be displayed for other purposes. The criteria for producing photographs are specified in Annex J to the MOU, and the Parties are given the right to raise questions about the photographs in the JCIC.
This agreement enters into force on the date of its signature, July 31, 1991. It remains in force for 12 months unless it is terminated earlier or the Treaty enters into force, in which latter case it remains in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. It may be extended upon agreement of the Parties, subject to the above-described conditions. This provision for termination was included because of the provisional application of this agreement prior to the entry into force of the Treaty. Note that this provisional application language is similar to that of Section IV of the Telemetry Protocol and to that of the letters, discussed below, on engineering site diagrams.
ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF CERTAIN CORRESPONDENCE RELATED TO THE TREATY
Over the course of the negotiations, several specific issues were solved with the aid of letters between cabinet level officials, primarily the U.S. Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister. None of these letters are legally binding agreements; rather they serve to clarify and resolve issues related to the Treaty, but outside its framework. The letters undertake no new commitments, except for the U.S. political commitment to terminate ballistic missile submarine operations at Holy Loch, Scotland, and the related Soviet political commitment not to establish similar facilities.
I. EXCHANGE OF LETTERS ON THIRD-COUNTRY BASING
Although dated July 31, 1991, the contents of the exchange of letters on third-country basing was negotiated in late 1990. At that time, two issues concerning third-country basing were at issue: U.S. ballistic missile submarine operations from Holy Loch, Scotland, and Soviet insistence on some form of right to inspect U.S. forces abroad.
For almost 30 years the United States operated ballistic missile submarines from Holy Loch, Scotland. These submarines, although operating from Holy Loch for extended periods, were permanently based in the United States. As a result, the United States does not consider operations from Holy Loch to be "basing" within the meaning of that term in the Treaty. The Soviet Union, in contrast, regarded these operations as basing. The resulting impasse was broken following a U.S. decision -- made for programmatic, not arms control reasons -- to terminate operations at Holy Loch. Secretary Baker's letter informed the Soviets of that fact. Further, since the United States is shifting to a force of Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, which operate from permanent bases without being supported by forward-deployed submarine tenders, Secretary Baker's letter further indicated that the United States would not establish facilities similar to Holy Loch in the future.
Secretary Baker's letter also noted the agreement, codified in paragraph (c) of the Eighth Agreed Statement, that the Parties "do not rule out the possibility" that inspections or visits might be used in the resolution of compliance debates involving third countries.
The Soviet response essentially repeated the points made by Secretary Baker, adding assurances that the Soviet Union had no arrangements similar to Holy Loch and would not establish such arrangements in the future.
II. EXCHANGE OF LETTERS ON NON-NUCLEAR ALCMs WITH MULTIPLE WARHEADS
The exchange of letters dated December 6, 1990, between Secretary Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze served as the mechanism for the Soviet Union to drop its proposed ban on long-range non-nuclear ALCMs armed with two or more weapons. The sides had previously agreed to a ban on long-range nuclear ALCMs armed with two or more nuclear weapons (now codified in paragraph 18(e) of Article V of the Treaty). Soviet negotiators asserted that a companion ban on non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons was necessary because a Party might otherwise use the testing of such a weapon to covertly develop a long-range nuclear ALCM armed with multiple nuclear weapons.
The letters, although dated December 6, were negotiated substantially earlier; their formal exchange was delayed until a convenient Ministerial meeting. In the U.S. letter, Secretary Baker made four substantive points. First, he reaffirmed the ban on long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple nuclear weapons. Second, he expressed the U.S. interpretation that producing, testing, or deploying long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons "for the purpose of acquiring the capability in the future to deploy long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons" would be inconsistent with Treaty obligations. Third, Secretary Baker indicated that long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons, like any other long-range non-nuclear ALCMs, would have to be distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs in accordance with provisions of the Treaty. Finally, the Secretary of State noted that a Party would have the right to raise any concerns or ambiguities within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission as specified for in Article XII of the then-current Joint Draft Text of the Treaty (Article XVI in the final Treaty).
None of these points constitute new obligations; they merely restate existing Treaty obligations. Thus this letter and the Soviet reply add no obligations to either Party. The Soviet reply repeated the same four points. Once again, this added no new obligations.
III. U.S. LETTER ON THE TACIT RAINBOW CRUISE MISSILE
Tacit Rainbow was a proposed non-nuclear tactical cruise missile under development with a range (as range is defined in the START Treaty) of between 600 and 800 kilometers. Tacit Rainbow was planned for deployment on both tactical aircraft and heavy bombers. The Tacit Rainbow system has subsequently been cancelled, but in May 1990 the United States still expected to deploy the system and sought to ensure that Tacit Rainbow would not be treated as a long-range nuclear ALCM under START.
During the May 1990 Moscow Ministerial, the United States and the Soviet Union reached agreement on a number of issues related to long-range ALCMs, including accepting a 600 kilometer cut-off range for defining "long-range" nuclear ALCMs. As part of this overall solution, the Parties reaffirmed the agreement reached in June 1988 that "existing" long-range ALCMs would all be considered to be nuclear under START, while "future" long-range ALCMs would be considered to be nuclear unless they were distinguishable. At issue was the cut-off date for dividing existing systems from future systems.
The United States proposed, and the Soviet Union accepted, initial flight testing from a heavy bomber on or before December 31, 1988 as the appropriate cut off (this provision is now codified in paragraph 9(f) of Article III of the Treaty). Since Tacit Rainbow had not been flight-tested from a heavy bomber on or before that date (although it had been flight-tested from another airplane before that date), Tacit Rainbow could then, under this criterion, be treated as a long-range non-nuclear ALCM distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs, and not be captured under START.
While accepting the basic approach, the Soviet Union expressed concern about the Tacit Rainbow system, that long-range non-nuclear cruise missiles could be used to provide heavy bombers with a long-range nuclear ALCM capability. As a result, the U.S. Secretary of State, on May 19, 1990, sent the Soviet Foreign Minister a letter seeking to clarify the situation with regard to Tacit Rainbow. The contents of this letter were not negotiated or discussed with the Soviet Union in advance.
In the letter the United States made three substantive points. First, Secretary Baker reaffirmed the acceptability of the December 31, 1988, cut-off date to distinguish between current and future long-range ALCMs, noting that, under such a cut-off date, Tacit Rainbow would be treated as a future non-nuclear ALCM. Second, the Secretary of State provided formal assurances that Tacit Rainbow was a non-nuclear ALCM and thus would be covered by the Treaty provisions governing long-range non-nuclear ALCMs. Finally, the Secretary of State indicated that the range of Tacit Rainbow was between 600 and 800 kilometers. This final point had no bearing on the treatment of Tacit Rainbow, since all ALCMs with ranges greater than 600 kilometers are considered "long-range" ALCMs under the Treaty.
The letter involves no undertakings on the part of the United States. It does, however, provide a formal U.S. assurance that Tacit Rainbow was not a long-range nuclear ALCM and that the United States had no plans to provide it a nuclear capability. Based on these assurances, the Soviet Union accepted the U.S. approach to distinguishability between long-range nuclear and long-range non-nuclear ALCMs and accepted the December 31, 1988 cut-off date.
IV. SOVIET LETTERS ON HEAVY ICBMs
During a September 1990 Ministerial Meeting between Secretary Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, held in New York City on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly, the sides, among other things, agreed on the provisions on heavy ICBMs now in the Treaty. Part of that agreement is reflected in the provisions of paragraph 2(d) of Article V and in the Fifth Agreed Statement. Taken together, these provide a limited right to relocate heavy ICBM launchers in exceptional circumstances. Although the "exceptional circumstances" were not spelled out, both Parties understood them to be circumstances arising from the turbulent internal political situation in the Soviet Union, which suggested the possibility that the Soviet government might desire to make such relocations as a consequence of the increasing local and republic autonomy within the Soviet Union.
During a subsequent visit to the Soviet Union, the Secretary of Defense pressed the Soviet Defense Minister about their need to construct new SS-18 silos. The Soviet Defense Minister responded that there were no such plans, thus casting doubt on the Soviet need for the provisions the United States had accepted in New York. As a result, the United States sought clarification.
An initial (undated) letter from Soviet Defense Minister Yazov to Secretary of Defense Cheney, provided partial clarification, but did not address all U.S. concerns. While it reaffirmed the Soviet obligation that any new silos would be constructed "simultaneously with the elimination" of older silos and thus that the limit of 154 heavy ICBM launchers would not be exceeded, it gave no insight to the circumstances which might require new construction.
The December 6, 1990, letter from the Soviet Defense and Foreign Ministers to the United States Secretaries of State and Defense provided that clarification. It reaffirmed earlier Soviet assurances that the limits of the Treaty would not be exceeded. This second Soviet letter cited two reasons for replacing heavy ICBM silos, both reflected in the Fifth Agreed Statement. The first was the possibility of accident. The second was the possibility of relocation "for non-military considerations, particularly in connection with the internal political developments that are taking place in our country." The Soviet letter noted that the Soviet Union had no current plans for such relocation.
The Soviet Foreign Minister communicated with the U.S. Secretary of State again on December 30, 1990, in a letter addressing a series of issues that had arisen out of the Houston Ministerial of December 1990. In that letter, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze reconfirmed the conditions of new heavy ICBM silo construction. Specifically, he reconfirmed that construction of new heavy ICBM silos could be undertaken only to replace heavy ICBM silo launchers destroyed in an accident or to relocate such launchers threatened by internal political emergencies. Consequently, the Soviet Foreign Minister concluded that the replacement of heavy ICBM silo launchers did not include the possibility of extensive new silo construction.
Based on these clarifications, the United States confirmed the agreement reached in New York and accepted the heavy ICBM provisions negotiated there. The Soviet letters provide formal confirmation of the intent of the Parties that relocations of heavy ICBM silos not result in exceeding the limits of the Treaty and that such relocation only be allowed in the case of extraordinary circumstances of a non-military nature relating to internal Soviet political factors.
ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF DECLARATIONS AND STATEMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE TREATY
In addition to the formal agreements and exchanges of letters, the Parties also exchanged various statements and declarations. A variety of joint and other statements were exchanged in Geneva during the negotiations. Declarations" on sea-launched cruise missiles and the Soviet Backfire (Tu-22M) bomber were exchanged between the U.S. Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister in Moscow on July 31, 1991. The texts analyzed below were handed over in written form. The purpose and status of these statements and declarations vary, as indicated below.
The United States and Soviet Union exchanged identically worded Declarations of Policy Concerning Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles." The Soviet side also provided a Declaration Concerning the TU-22M Medium Bomber" (known to the United States as Backfire). Both Declarations are the results of political compromises which arose during the negotiations. Both are politically binding" rather than legally binding." The difference is as follows:
An undertaking or commitment that is understood to be legally binding carries with it both the obligation of each Party to comply with the undertaking and the right of each Party to enforce the obligation under international law. A political" undertaking is not governed by international law and there are no applicable rules pertaining to compliance, modification, or withdrawal. Until and unless a Party extricates itself from its political" undertaking, which it may do without legal penalty, it has given a promise to honor that commitment, and the other Party has every reason to be concerned about compliance with such undertakings. If a Party contravenes a political commitment, it will be subject to an appropriate political response.
1. SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE DECLARATIONS
The Declaration of Policy by the United States of America Concerning Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles" consists of eleven unnumbered paragraphs. The first paragraph places the Declaration in context and undertakes a politically binding obligation to make annual declarations of the planned deployments of long-range nuclear SLCMs. The second paragraph makes it clear that the U.S. declaration of SLCM deployments will be made only on a reciprocal basis and specifies that the first such declaration will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty.
The third, fourth, fifth, and sixth paragraphs specify what must be included in the annual declarations. The obligation is to declare the maximum number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles for each of the following five years. The Parties agreed that the forms of the Declaration would be as follows: For the year beginning , __/199_ , the deployments of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles planned by the United States of America will not exceed ." (As previously noted, the wording of the declaration is the same for Soviet systems.) The declarations may be revised annually. That is, if in 1992 the United States were to declare that it planned to deploy 300 nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles in 1994, the U.S. 1993 Declaration could alter that number either by increasing it or decreasing it. The Parties agree, however, that the number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles would not exceed 880 in any one year. Note that this is a limit on the number actually deployed (i.e., the number actually on-board surface ships and submarines), not on the number possessed. There is no limit on the number of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles the Parties may possess. A limit on deployment of 880 long-range nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles is larger than any current or planned U.S. inventory of long-range nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles.
On September 27, 1991, as part of a far-reaching initiative on nuclear weapons, the President announced that the United States will withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from its surface ships and attack submarines, meaning that all nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles will be removed from U.S. ships and submarines. Therefore, although the U.S. will continue to abide by its political commitment to provide an annual declaration of planned deployments, the annual U.S. declaration will be zero as soon as the Department of the Navy completes implementation of the President's directive. Likewise, consistent with President Gorbachev's October 4, 1991, statement on the withdrawal of Soviet naval tactical nuclear weapons, the annual Soviet declaration is also expected to be zero.
Paragraphs 5 and 6 make is clear that the declarations only apply to nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles of ranges greater than 600 kilometers. Non-nuclear SLCMs are not covered and nuclear SLCMs of ranges between 300 and 600 kilometers are not subject to declarations, but are covered in paragraph 10.
In Paragraph 7, the Parties agree to exchange information on the types of surface ships and submarines capable of carrying deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles. The word "type" has the sense of what is more commonly referred to as "class" of ship or submarine in the United States. Thus, on entry into force, the United States will list as "types" items such as the Los Angeles Class nuclear attack submarine or Arleigh Burke Class destroyer, rather than simply list "attack submarine" or "destroyer". The Soviet Union will provide similarly specific information. The information exchanged under this paragraph will not be made public.
In the eighth paragraph the Parties renounced producing or deploying sea-launched cruise missiles of any range armed with two or more nuclear weapons. Neither Party possesses such weapons, nor are there any U.S. plans for their development.
The ninth and eleventh paragraphs must be understood in light of the political compromise which led to this declaration. Throughout most of the negotiations the Soviet Union sought to include nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles within the Treaty. The United States rejected this inclusion, both on the ground that nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles are not strategic weapons and on the ground that limits on nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles are inherently unverifiable. For both these reasons, the United States was unwilling to accept any limitations on sea-launched cruise missiles in the Treaty. The phrase invites the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to make comparable declarations" in the ninth paragraph is related to the policy stated in the second paragraph that the United States will make declarations only on the basis of reciprocity.
The statement that the Declarations may be supplemented by any cooperative measures that may be agreed" and the obligation in the eleventh paragraph to continue to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification" were intended to indicate that the United States would reassess (though not necessarily change) its position if, in the future, effective methods of verification were found. No such methods have been identified, and there are no on-going U.S. - Soviet discussions in this area.
The tenth paragraph is also the result of a political compromise. The United States sought to include in the annual declarations nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles with ranges less than 600 kilometers, since such missiles could pose a threat to U.S. coastal targets. The Soviet Union, which deploys a large number of short-range nuclear-armed SLCM types, sought to make the cut-off 600 kilometers, citing the precedent of the protocol to the SALT II Treaty. As a compromise the Parties agreed to exchange, on a confidential basis, annual information on the number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles with ranges between 300 and 600km. Only the Soviet Union possesses nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles in this range. The number of such cruise missiles is not included in the 880 limit referred to in the declarations. Again, consistent with President Gorbachev's statement of October 4, l99l, on the withdrawal of naval tactical nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union declaration should be zero.
Section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act specifies that "no action shall be taken under this or any other law that will obligate the United States to disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States, except pursuant to the Treaty-making power of the President under the Constitution or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States." Although submitted to the Senate for information, these declarations do not fall within the purview of Section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act since they are not legally binding and thus do not "obligate" the United States within the meaning or purview of Section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.
2. BACKFIRE DECLARATION
The "Declaration by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning the Tu-22M Medium Bomber" was also the result of a compromise reached during the negotiations. The United States sought to include the Backfire (TU-22M) as a heavy bomber. The Soviet Union, asserting, as it did during the SALT II negotiations, that the Backfire was not a heavy bomber, sought to exclude it entirely. The issue was resolved when the Parties agreed to exclude the Backfire from the Treaty in return for a Soviet political commitment. The resulting declaration contains two obligations. First, the Soviet Union declares that it will not give the Backfire an intercontinental capability in any manner including, but not limited to, by equipping the bomber for in-flight refueling. In addition, the Soviet Union obligates itself not to have more than 300 air force and 200 naval Backfires. These are separate limits; there is no freedom to mix between them.
Like the declaration on nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles, the Backfire Declaration is politically binding and remains in force for the duration of the Treaty. (See the analysis accompanying the heavy bomber definition in the Definitions Annex for a discussion of START constraints on future bombers that are similar to the Backfire.)
On July 29, 1991, during the final plenary session, the Parties exchanged a number of joint statements. Both Parties intend these statements to be authoritative interpretations of specific Treaty provisions. The text of the statements were, in each case, agreed between the Parties and conformed in English and in Russian.
It is important to distinguish between "Agreed Statements" and the similar-sounding, but quite different, joint statements" analyzed in this section. "Agreed Statements" are integral parts of the Treaty and have equal legal standing with all other portions of the Treaty. As such, they are subject to the advice and consent of the Senate as to ratification, and cannot be altered except through amendment in accordance with Article XVIII. In contrast, joint statements" are negotiated authoritative statements of interpretation, which amplify the intent of the Parties with respect to specified provisions of the Treaty. As such, they are not legally a part of the Treaty, nor are they subject to ratification, although they are associated with the Treaty. They are, therefore, submitted only for the information of the Senate.
The "Joint Statement on New Missile Production Technology Processes" was necessary because of the possibility that solid rocket motors for mobile ICBMs could be developed in which the solid propellant could be removed from the casing non-destructively after initially being cast. In theory, non-destructive removal of propellant could allow a Party to circumvent the requirement to destroy mobile ICBMs in excess of non-deployed missile limits by removing the propellant and destroying no more than an empty casing. In the joint statement, both Parties stated that they had no solid-propellant ICBMs that would permit non-destructive removal. They also agreed that, if in the future mobile ICBMs are produced using so called insertable cartridge" or other technology that allows non-destructive removal of solid propellant, they will consult within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to determine applicable elimination procedures. Absent any agreement in the Commission, the procedures already set forth in Section I of the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination would remain in effect, except that a Party could not remove propellant from the stages in accordance with paragraph 2(d) of that Section, since the negotiating record makes clear that that provision, and the corresponding provision in paragraph 3 of Section VII of the Protocol, were intended to address only destructive removal of propellant.
The "Joint Statement Regarding Data Updates" was required to codify the agreement between the Parties that data on future facilities or items were required to be provided and would follow the form of the MOU at Treaty signature. If a facility or item was not listed in the MOU at Treaty signature, because it had not yet been built or converted to support strategic offensive arms, and if that facility later becomes subject to the Treaty, a notification must be provided according to the complete list of categories of data. If the facility is built or converted between signature and entry into force, this notification would be provided as part of the initial data update after entry into force. Otherwise, notification would be provided, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, within 5 days after the facility becomes subject to the Treaty; this would subsequently be reflected in the six-month data update. This joint statement also codifies the agreement that, while some categories of data may have applied only to one Party at the time of signature, the other Party is required to provide the full breadth of data provided by the first Party should the category later apply to the second Party. In this regard, the statement recognizes that the MOU provides for changing the make-up of categories of data.
An example of the application of some categories of data only to one Party at time of signature is the category ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of "ICBMs", which, for the U.S., has the simple entry "NONE," while for the Soviet Union has the complete list of the appropriate categories, such as "Deployed ICBM", "Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs", "Deployment Area", "Restricted Area," and "Maintenance Facility," the last two having further subdivisions into, respectively, "Deployed ICBMs", "Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs," and "Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs", and "Non-Deployed ICBMs", "Non-Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs", "Training Models of Missiles", "Transporter-Loaders", and "Road-Mobile Training Launchers." Thus, if the U.S. acquires such ICBMs, all those categories of data would have to be filled in.
The Parties reached this agreement to eliminate the need to reproduce long lists of categories for items or facilities that one of the Parties did not possess and that, if listed, would be followed by the repetitive NONE" in each data field.
The "Joint Statement on Costs Relating to the Convening of a Session of the JCIC on the Territory of one of the Parties" was included in recognition of the fact that, while the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission will normally meet in Geneva, it might meet in other locations. Section VI of the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, which provides that each Party shall bear its own costs in connection with the work of the Commission, was based on the assumption that the Commission would meet in Geneva. By this joint statement the Parties agree that, should they elect to meet in another location, they will determine in advance whether or not different cost arrangements are required. It should be noted that the similar body established under the INF Treaty, the Special Verification Commission, has never met outside of Geneva.
The "Joint Statement on the Ban on Support Equipment at Eliminated Facilities" was included because the Parties elected not to provide a comprehensive list of support equipment in the Treaty. Such a list might have failed to capture all items that might be considered to be support equipment and would have failed to capture new types of support equipment. Instead, the Parties relied on a general definition of support equipment: vehicles and mobile or transportable equipment used to support the operation of an ICBM or SLBM." Nevertheless, in the interest of clarity, since the Parties agreed that certain specific items were examples of support equipment, these items were listed in the joint statement. The joint statement also makes it unambiguously clear that the items listed as examples of support equipment would be prohibited at eliminated facilities, as stipulated in paragraph 27 of Article V of the Treaty.
The "Joint Statement on Narrow Directional Beaming" was included when the Parties agreed not to attempt to define narrow directional beaming" in the Definitions Annex to the Treaty. The joint statement establishes the intent of the Parties that the purpose of such a ban is to ensure near-omnidirectional radiation of broadcast signals during flight-tests of ICBMs or SLBMs.
The "Joint Statement on the Term 'Ton'" and the "Joint Statement on Weapon Storage Areas" were necessary for linguistic reasons, in order to allow the certifying officials to state with certainty that the English and Russian were identical. The addition of the word metric" before the word ton was necessary in the English text in order to avoid ambiguity between a metric ton (1000 kilograms) and an English ton (2000 pounds). In contrast, the Russian language has only one type of ton" (i.e., 1,000 kilograms); there is no Russian language counterpart for the English word meaning 2,000 pounds.
The Russian term translated as "weapon storage area" has the connotation of short term storage, whereas the English term has no such connotation. The Joint Statement makes it clear that, as used the Treaty, both Parties understand that weapon storage areas are used for both long term and short term storage of nuclear and non-nuclear armaments.
Due to the complicated and prolonged discussions on the use of charter aircraft, the "Joint Statement on Charter Flights" was necessary because the Parties could not agree on treaty provisions regulating the use of such charter flights. The Joint Statement establishes that the absence of discussion of charter flights in the Inspection Protocol was not intended to preclude such flights. The joint statement obligates the Parties, if necessary for transport pursuant to the Treaty, to agree on procedures for charter flights within the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
The "Joint Statement Concerning Currency of Payment for Costs Relating to Implementation of the START Treaty" provides formal acknowledgement that the Parties have yet to agree on the currency of payment for costs associated with various arms control agreements, including the START Treaty. The Inspection Protocol provides details on the allocation of costs, but is silent on the issue of the currency of payment. During the negotiations, the Soviet Union believed that all costs should be paid in freely-convertible currency, while the United States took the position that certain costs should appropriately be paid in local currency (i.e., in rubles which were, at time of signature, not convertible on the international monetary market). The United States agreed to pay in dollars for special arrangements to visit Soviet submarine tunnels and exhibitions of Bear D bombers, but made it clear that these arrangements were without prejudice to the final resolution of the currency payment issue. This dispute extends beyond the START Treaty; the joint statement makes it clear that the Parties will resolve the issue in a broader context.
The "Joint Statement Concerning Interpretive Data" establishes that the intent of the Parties in providing the interpretive data listed in sub-paragraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol is to facilitate verification. In addition, the joint statement makes clear that paragraph 1(b) of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, which requires exchange of names of telemetry parameters and of conversion factors, only applies to telemetric information necessary to determine the values for the parameters of acceleration, separation times, and reentry vehicle separation commands and release times. Both of these provisions are inherent in the Treaty; the joint statement was included to avoid any possible ambiguity.
The "Joint Statement on the Exchange of Site Diagrams" makes it clear that the exchange of site diagrams of facilities subject to suspect site inspection, like the exchange of all other site diagrams, are required to meet the criteria in Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. The exchange of such diagrams was not completed prior to Treaty signature because agreement on which facilities would be subject to such inspections was reached only shortly before signature and more time was required by both Parties to complete the diagrams. The joint statement also records the Parties' intention that facilities or portions of facilities involved in the production of solid rocket motors not be subject to inspection. The agreement in the joint statement to exchange site diagrams of facilities subject to suspect site inspection no later than 30 days after signature is redundant; an identical obligation is found in paragraph 4 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. All site diagrams, including those for facilities subject to suspect site inspections, were exchanged on schedule on August 30, 1991.
The "Joint Statement in Connection with Procedures for Confirming Launch Weight" should be read in connection with the obligation in paragraph 10 of Section XIV of the Inspection Protocol, which provides that, if a Party declares a new type of ICBM or SLBM on the basis of launch weight, the inspecting Party shall have the right to weigh or determine by other agreed means the launch weight of both the new type of ICBM or SLBM and the existing and previously declared new types used as the bases of comparison. Paragraph 10 of section XIV of the Inspection Protocol makes it clear that agreement on the procedures for weighing or for determining the weight by other means is a prerequisite for deployment of the new type declared on the basis of a change in launch weight. This joint statement confirms that obligation and was included so that there could be no ambiguity about the nature of the obligation assumed. In addition, the joint statement records the intention of the Parties to avoid artificially delaying reaching agreement on procedures for weighing or for determining the weight of ICBMs or SLBMs by other means.
In addition to the joint statements, the Parties exchanged a number of other statements. Most were so-called reciprocal statements, whereby the Parties made parallel, though not necessarily identical, statements on a variety of subjects. The bulk of these were exchanged formally during the final plenary sessions of the negotiations on July 29, 1991. There are three exceptions. The statements on the Tri-Service Short-Range Attack Missile were exchanged in a meeting between Ambassador Brooks and Ambassador Nazarkin on July 27, 1991. The statements on the relationship between START and the ABM Treaty were exchanged between Ambassador Brooks and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Obukhov on June 13, 1991. The second Soviet statement on non-circumvention was inadvertently omitted from the final plenary and, while dated July 31, 1991, was handed over by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in September 1991. The fact that a statement was or was not made at the final plenary has no particular legal significance.
The "other" statements are of four kinds. The first kind of statement is a negotiated unilateral statement whereby one Party undertakes a politically-binding obligation. The second kind of statement provides a voluntary undertaking by a Party. The third kind of statement is the functional equivalent of a joint statement, indicating the mutual intent of the Parties. Like the text of the joint statements, the texts of these second kind of statements were negotiated and agreed between the Parties. The fourth and final kind of statement serves to place on the record the positions of the Parties on topics which could, in theory, become the subject of dispute in the future. These four kinds of statements are discussed in the four following corresponding sections of the analysis.
1. NEGOTIATED UNILATERAL STATEMENT
At the final plenary on July 29, 1991, the United States presented a "Unilateral Statement by the United States of America Concerning the B-2 Heavy Bomber." The text of this statement, which is intended to be politically binding, was negotiated with the Soviet Union as part of the overall solution to the issue of inspecting the B-2 heavy bomber. Under the Treaty, the B-2 heavy bomber is exempt from exhibition and inspection unless and until it is tested with a long-range nuclear ALCM.
The statement has three parts. First, the United States certifies that it has no plans to equip deployed B-2 heavy bombers for long-range nuclear ALCMs until such an ALCM has been flight-tested from a B-2 heavy bomber. This statement was made in response to Soviet concern that the testing of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs might be used to give the B-2 a capability as a long-range nuclear ALCM carrier. The second part of the statement simply acknowledges that, once a long-range nuclear ALCM is flight-tested from a B-2, the relevant Treaty requirements will apply. This statement adds nothing to the obligations of the United States and merely restates Treaty provisions. The final portion of the unilateral statement simply states that, should the Soviet Union, in the future, deploy a heavy bomber that is never tested with any long-range nuclear ALCM, that heavy bomber would be treated the same as the B-2 with respect to Treaty requirements for exhibition and inspection.
2. STATEMENTS INVOLVING VOLUNTARY ACTIONS
The identically-worded "Statements of Policy Concerning Encryption and Jamming" provide for the voluntary cessation of encryption and jamming beginning 120 days after signature of the Treaty (i.e., beginning on November 28, 1991.) This is not an instance of provisional application of the Treaty, but a voluntary, non-binding act of good-will by both Parties. Thus, it does not engage any of the Treaty provisions on data denial. Specifically, there are no provisions for exemptions, no specific requirements to make or broadcast measurements, and no requirements to exchange telemetry tapes or information. To avoid having an open-ended obligation if ratification is delayed, the Parties agreed that this voluntary restraint from encryption and jamming would last for one year, beginning 120 days after Treaty signature, unless the Treaty enters into force sooner.
3. STATEMENTS DOCUMENTING AGREED UNDERSTANDINGS
The Parties exchanged identically worded statements "On Consultations Relating to the Release to the Public of Data and Other Information." Paragraph 6 of Article VIII of the Treaty, provides that the Parties will hold consultations on the release to the public of data and other information exchanged under the Treaty. The Treaty thus allows for the possibility that the Parties might elect not to make such data (for example, the locations of specific strategic offensive arms) public. The exchange of statements makes it clear, however, that the Parties intend to follow the precedent of the INF Treaty, as codified in an April 1990 exchange of diplomatic notes.
The April 1990 exchange of notes bans the release of original language texts of notifications (this is consistent with the agreement establishing the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers), as well as the release of the name of any individual mentioned in such notifications. INF information (other than names of individuals) contained in notifications is divided into three categories: that which will not be released, that which can be released after three months, and that which can be released after three months unless the other Party objects. In INF, all notifications involving changes in data fall into the second category; thus information contained in them may be released to the public after the three-month interval. Following this precedent, information contained in START notifications involving changes of data (except for geographic coordinates, which may not be released) may also be released to the public after three months. This precedent applies only to data similar to that exchanged under the INF Treaty; other data (such as that associated with telemetry tapes) will not be made public.
In these statements, the Parties agree to conclude consultations on the details of applying the INF precedent prior to entry into force of the START Treaty. Such consultations will take place within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
The reciprocal "Statements on Launch-Associated Support Vehicles and Driver Training Vehicles" were necessary to take account of Soviet plans for possible future conversion of such vehicles, as well as to take account of existing Soviet practices. Launch associated support vehicles and driver training vehicles, which are captured by the definition of support equipment, are banned from eliminated facilities under paragraph 27 of Article IV of the Treaty. Soviet driver training vehicles could be converted for use as tank trucks used for the transportation of various liquids. While such converted tank trucks would no longer be driver training vehicles" or support equipment," and hence would not be banned from eliminated facilities, they would be very similar externally to driver training vehicles. Similarly, the Soviets claim to have a number of vehicles (mobile kitchens, sleeper vans, etc.) which are similar externally to launch associated support vehicles, but which are not launch associated support vehicles, and thus also would not be banned from eliminated facilities. In these negotiated statements, the Soviet Union states that, if a compliance concern arises, the Soviet Union will provide additional information on the vehicles that give rise to such concerns. In return the United States acknowledges that such information would be helpful in discussing compliance concerns when and if such concerns arise.
The U.S. "Statement on Non-circumvention of the START Treaty" describes the existing U.S. pattern of cooperation with the United Kingdom. The statement, negotiated with the Soviet Union, makes it clear that the pattern of cooperation involves maintaining the independent British nuclear deterrent, rather than simply selling the British a specific weapon system. The Soviets tried to limit the concept of the U.S.-UK pattern of cooperation to the D-5, then -- failing that -- to SLBMs only. The United States rejected categorically any such confinement of the U.S.-UK pattern of cooperation. The pattern of cooperation currently" includes agreement to sell the United Kingdom the Trident II weapon system; the pattern of cooperation is not, however, limited to Trident II. Finally, the U.S. statement endorses the British intent to maintain their strategic nuclear deterrent as a minimum one. This statement was included in deference to Soviet concerns with excluding British forces affected by U.S. patterns of cooperation from START and allowing unrestricted U.S. support of the modernization of those forces.
The comparable Soviet statement takes note of the U.S. statement, and sets forth the Soviet position that U.S. assistance to the British that both circumvented the terms and purposes of the START Treaty and altered the strategic balance could jeopardize Soviet supreme interest and be grounds for withdrawal from the START Treaty under the provisions of Article XVII.
A separate Soviet statement, dated July 31, 1991, indicates that the Soviet Union has no patterns of cooperation involving the transfer of strategic offensive arms. Thus the Soviets are prohibited by Article XVI of the Treaty from establishing any such patterns of cooperation with third countries.
4. STATEMENTS SETTING FORTH POSITIONS ON POSSIBLE FUTURE ISSUES
The remaining reciprocal statements constitute the formal placing on the record of the positions of the two Parties on issues that could arise in the future.
The exchange of statements on the SS-N-23 was made necessary by a Soviet revelation, late in the negotiations, that they consider the SS-N-23 to be of a different design than the United States believes it to be. Paragraph 1 of Section I of the Throw-Weight Protocol provides two different methods of determining ICBM or SLBM throw-weight. One method applies to ICBMs or SLBMs that carry more than one reentry vehicle and whose final stage executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles. The other method applies to all other ICBMs and SLBMs. During the negotiations the United States understood, and believed that the Soviet Union agreed, that the first method was included in the Throw-weight Protocol to take account of the Soviet SS-N-23, an SLBM whose final stage dispenses multiple reentry vehicles directly. Near the end of the negotiations, however, Soviet negotiators asserted that, since the rocket engine of the final stage of the SS-N-23 was jettisoned prior to the time that dispensing of the reentry vehicles began, what remained following this jettisoning was not a final stage," but rather a self-contained dispensing mechanism, albeit of exceptionally unusual design. They further asserted that the jettisoned rocket engine (essentially a nozzle and combustion chamber) constituted the final stage, despite the fact that the jettisoned portion clearly does not conform to the agreed definition of stage." As a result, Soviet negotiators claimed that it was correct to calculate the ballistic missile throw-weight of the SS-N-23 based on the rules for all other ICBMs and SLBMs, including those with self-contained dispensing mechanisms. The Soviet approach resulted in a ballistic missile throw-weight for the SS-N-23 less than the throw-weight derived by the approach that the United States believed to be appropriate.
As part of the overall final agreement on ballistic missile throw-weight values, the United States accepted the Soviet throw-weight value for the SS-N-23 and thus, for purposes of throw-weight calculations, accepted the Soviet characterization of the SS-N-23 as falling under paragraph 1(b) of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol. The U.S. statement was issued to make it clear that this acceptance was unique to the calculation of SS-N-23 throw-weight; that the United States did not agree with Soviet assertions on the design of the SS-N-23, but believed that the final stage of the SS-N-23 is used to dispense more than one reentry vehicle; and that the United States reserved the right to challenge any future Soviet attempts to characterize similar ICBMs or SLBMs of new types or modifications of existing types as being subject to paragraph l(b) of Section I of the Throw-Weight Protocol. The Soviet statement simply repeated, without attempting to provide technical details, the Soviet assertion that the throw-weight of the SS-N-23 -- and by implication, the throw-weight of new types of ICBMs or SLBMs of similar design -- should properly be calculated using the procedures of paragraph l(b) of Section I of the Throw-Weight Protocol. (See the analysis of the Throw-weight Protocol for further discussion of these two methods of determining throw-weight.)
The "U.S. Statement on Attachment Joints" and the Soviet Statement Concerning the Purposes of Inclusion in the Memorandum of Understanding of Data on the Distance Between Joints for Attaching Long-range Nuclear ALCMs" were made necessary because of different bomber design practices between the two Parties. For the United States, some attachment devices are used on the wings and fuselage of bombers to carry more than one type of weapon (so called universal attachment joints"). The presence or absence of such an attachment device says nothing about the type of armament with which the bomber is equipped. As a result, for U.S. bombers, attachment joints cannot be used to determine whether or not a particular bomber is or is not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. In contrast, the Soviets have stated that their attachment joints are weapon-specific. Thus, certain attachment joints are used for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs and for no other purpose. The presence of such attachment joints on Soviet bombers, therefore, is a valid indication that the bomber is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMS.
The Parties agreed to list dimensions of attachment joints in Section (i) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding and to list the distance between attachment points for specific long-range nuclear ALCMs in Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding. The U.S. statement implies that these listings are included in the Memorandum of Understanding only to help determine the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a particular bomber is equipped, and it makes clear that such listings are inappropriate for use as specified features making U.S. heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs distinguishable from those not so equipped. The U.S. statement also states that since such attachment joints are installed on airplanes other than heavy bombers, their presence is not sufficient to consider such airplanes to be heavy bombers. The Soviet counter-statement, while generally accepting the U.S. position, preserves the Soviet view that attachment joints are an optional distinguishing feature, which could, at the discretion of the Party owning the heavy bomber, be used to determine whether a bomber is or is not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
The "U.S. Statement on Underground Structures" and the parallel Soviet statement result from the long-standing U.S. concern over the three large Soviet underground structures (sometimes referred to as submarine tunnels") that are mentioned in the statements. These massive tunnels were initially constructed a number of years ago, but construction of sea-level entrances was never completed. This was confirmed by a visit of a U.S. team to these structures in February l99l. Paragraph 25 of Article V of the Treaty bans such structures if they are accessible by ballistic missile submarines. The Twenty-third Agreed Statement obligates the Soviet side not to make the three existing structures accessible by waterborne craft of any displacement.
The U.S. statement noted that construction of additional similar structures would raise questions about Soviet intent to continue to comply with paragraph 25 of Article V. The U.S. statement also affirmed that there are no U.S. plans for constructing similar structures in the United States and notes that the United States proceeded from the premise that the Soviet Union would exercise similar restraint. The Soviet counterstatement repeats the Soviet obligation from the Twenty-third Agreed Statement and lays down a reciprocal admonition that the United States not construct similar structures.
The "Statement by the Soviet Side at the U.S.-Soviet Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms concerning the Interrelationship between Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms and Compliance with the Treaty between the U.S. and the USSR on the Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems" and the counter Statement by the U.S. Side at the U.S.-Soviet Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms" set forth the positions of the two sides on the relationship between the START Treaty and continued adherence to the ABM Treaty. The statements were exchanged on June l3, l99l, but were not discussed.
The Soviet Union's statement claims that withdrawal from the ABM Treaty or material breach of the Treaty by one of the Parties would constitute an extraordinary event jeopardizing the supreme interests of the other Party, and that such an event would, thus, be grounds for withdrawal from the START Treaty pursuant to Article XVII of the Treaty. The U.S. statement states that the full exercise by the U.S. of its legal rights under the ABM Treaty would not constitute a basis for withdrawal from START. The statement further notes that Soviet statements, that a future or hypothetical U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would constitute grounds for Soviet withdrawal from START, are without legal or military foundation. Finally, the U.S. statement notes that, should future negotiations lead to agreed changes in the ABM Treaty, such changes would not be a basis for questioning the effectiveness or viability of the START Treaty.
The U.S. and Soviet statements on the Tri-Service Stand-off Attack Missile (TSSAM) were exchanged on July 27, l99l. In June l99l, following press reports of the development of the TSSAM, the U.S. delegation provided the Soviets, as a courtesy, a copy of the U.S. Air Force press release on the new missile. The Soviets subsequently took the occasion to express their longstanding concern that development and testing of non-nuclear cruise missiles could be used as a cover for covertly giving heavy bombers not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs the capability of deploying long-range nuclear ALCMs. The Soviets further indicated their longstanding concern over the U.S. practice of using so-called universal attachment joints and the fact that they would be used for the TSSAM and are on both the B-52 and the B-2. If TSSAM were tested from the B-2, therefore, the Soviet statement claimed, the B-2 might be used as a carrier of long-range nuclear ALCMs. (See previous discussion.)
The U.S. response simply stated the fact that the Tri-Service Stand-off Attack Missile is a non-nuclear, short-range cruise missile completely unrelated to the START Treaty. The U.S. response also asserts that the use of TSSAM on the B-2 would not imply that the B-2 was equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs or alter the status of the B-2 under START. The statement reaffirmed the previous U.S. assurance (see previous discussion of the U.S. B-2 statement) that the B-2 heavy bomber would not be given a capability to employ long-range nuclear ALCMs unless and until a long-range nuclear ALCM was tested from a B-2.
ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE MEMORANDUM
The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) consists of a Preamble, four Sections, and ten Annexes.
The MOU establishes the data base required to be exchanged between the Parties prior to Treaty signature pursuant to Article VIII of the Treaty, and sets forth instructions as to how specific data will be provided. Arranged by category of data, the data include the number, location, and types of ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, support equipment, and related facilities. The MOU also lists the technical characteristics for ballistic missile systems, mobile launchers of ICBMs, support structures, and support equipment that are limited by the Treaty, as well as the technical data for heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs.
The initial data base, which has already been exchanged by the Parties, is the data for each of these categories of data and technical characteristics as of September 1, 1990. This date was chosen by the sides in late 1990 to permit sufficient time for data exchange and analysis of the other side's data prior to signature of the Treaty. It should be noted that inclusion of data in the MOU does not constitute agreement on such data, unless specifically noted. This permits questions on the accuracy of data to be raised by a Party without the other Party responding that such data was "agreed" and thus not susceptible to subsequent challenge.
Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol to the Treaty, the initial update of all the categories and technical characteristics contained in the MOU will occur within 30 days of the entry into force of the Treaty; the data in this update are required to be effective as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty. Thereafter, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, the MOU categories and technical characteristics will be updated no later than 30 days after the expiration of each six-month period following the entry into force of the Treaty, and, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, no later than 5 days after an event that results in a change of data according to agreed categories of data.
Technical and distinguishability exhibitions of weapons systems will be conducted prior to entry into force of the Treaty, pursuant to the Parties' Agreement on Early Exhibitions. These exhibitions will enable the United States to check, by on-site observation and measurement, technical information contained in the MOU on ICBMs, SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, deployed heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, training heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs. Exhibitions of future systems will be conducted in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12 of Article XI of the Treaty. Some of the technical data obtained during such exhibitions can be reconfirmed during subsequent inspections. Data update inspections of facilities listed in the MOU, which can be held up to 15 times per year, will also help confirm the accuracy of data provided pursuant to the Treaty.
The volume of data exchanged by the Parties in this Memorandum of Understanding signifies a major milestone in U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements, surpassing that exchanged under the INF Treaty. Especially significant is that the MOU covers forces, equipment and facilities that constitute much of the entire strategic forces infrastructure, including facilities that are not subject to on-site inspection.
Throughout the MOU the term "NONE" is used to signify that a Party currently does not have a particular item or facility; the use of a dash (-) in the MOU signifies that the particular entry or category of data is not applicable to the Party; and the use of a blank ( ) in the MOU signifies that data currently does not exist, but that a Party agrees to provide it when it becomes available.
The START Treaty follows the normal treaty drafting practice of having the name of the United States and the U.S. data appear first in the English text, while the name of the Soviet Union and Soviet data appear first in the Russian text. The MOU is an exception to this rule. By agreement between the Parties, and in order to reduce the workload of preparing the document, U.S. data comes first, in both language texts, in Sections I and III and Annexes A, C, E, G, and I. Likewise, Soviet data comes first, in both texts, in Section II and Annexes B, D, F, and H.
The MOU Preamble states that, pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty, the Parties have exchanged data current as of September 1, 1990, on ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBMs, SLBMs, long-range nuclear ALCMs, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, support equipment, and related facilities.
SECTION I - NUMBERS OF WARHEADS AND THROW-WEIGHT VALUES ATTRIBUTED TO DEPLOYED ICBMs AND DEPLOYED SLBMs, AND NUMBERS OF WARHEADS ATTRIBUTED TO DEPLOYED HEAVY BOMBERS
Section I sets forth the number of warheads and throw-weight values attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs, and the number of warheads attributed to deployed heavy bombers. This Section provides space for entering changed values for the number of warheads and throw-weight values attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs except for the SS-18, which is not permitted to be changed with respect to either value. The initial data for ICBMs and SLBMs of existing types contained in this Section is considered to be "agreed." Throw-weight is recorded to the nearest 50 kilograms in accordance with paragraph 6 of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol.
SECTION II - AGGREGATE NUMBERS
Section II lists the data on aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms that are limited or restricted by the Treaty. This data aggregates the data current as of September 1, 1990, contained in Annexes A, B, and C. This aggregate data includes the Soviet SS-N-17 SLBM, despite the fact that the SS-N-17 is not listed as an existing type of SLBM in paragraph 10(a)(ii) of Article II of the Treaty. The 12 SS-N-17 launchers on the single Yankee II SSBN existing on September 1, 1990, were eliminated before Treaty signature. Thus, the SS-N-17 is included throughout the MOU but will be deleted in the initial MOU update provided within 30 days after entry into force in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.
SECTION III - AGGREGATE NUMBERS OF DEPLOYED ICBMs OR SLBMs TO WHICH A REDUCED NUMBER OF WARHEADS IS ATTRIBUTED
Section III sets forth the data on ICBM bases and submarine bases, and on aggregate numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs of existing types deployed at those bases, on which the number of warheads attributed is reduced pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article III of the Treaty. Section III also accounts for the downloading of all SS-N-18s (from 7 warheads to 3), and specifically allows for the future option of downloading the MM-III, as well as for the downloading of two additional types for each Party.
SECTION IV - ADDITIONAL AGGREGATE NUMBERS
Section IV lists additional aggregate numbers related to limitations provided for in the Treaty other than the central limits of Article II. The following comments are relevant:
-- In accordance with paragraph 10(b)(i) of Article III of the Treaty, the U.S. Peacekeeper ICBM and the Soviet SS-24 ICBM are considered "ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs;" however, those deployed in silos do not count against the aggregate limit on warheads deployed on mobile launchers of ICBMs.
-- Neither Party declared in the MOU transporter-loaders for road-mobile ICBMs. Such transporter-loaders are allowed but limited by paragraph 5 of Article IV of the Treaty.
-- No heavy bombers converted for use as ground trainers and no ICBM launcher, ICBM, SLBM, launch canister or heavy bomber or former heavy bomber static displays are listed. Paragraph 7 of Article IV of the Treaty limits the number of ground trainers and static displays established after signature. Existing ground trainers and static displays are "grandfathered" but are listed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Annex I to the MOU.
-- With one exception, all of the data listed in Section IV is within the limits specified by the Treaty. That exception is the 37 Soviet fixed test launchers. Paragraph 2(d) of Article IV limits the number of fixed test launchers to no more than 25. Since this limit is effective immediately upon entry into force, the Soviet Union will be obligated to destroy 12 fixed test launchers before that time.
The penultimate paragraph provides for the provisional application of paragraphs 4 through 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum so that site diagrams and photographs can be exchanged before entry into force of the Treaty. The Parties have agreed that the Treaty and its associated documents enter into force when the Parties exchange instruments of ratification. Therefore, in accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which the United States recognizes as codifying existing international law on the subject, the Parties need to provide or agree on the provisional application of provisions that will be in effect prior to entry into force.
The use of this form for provisional application is virtually identical to that used in the Telemetry Protocol and JCIC Protocol. Moreover, this form follows closely that of the Protocol on the Provisional Application of Certain Provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990.
This paragraph also sets forth that these paragraphs of Annex J are to apply for a 12-month period, unless prior to that time a Party informs the other Party of its decision to terminate the provisional application of any of these provisions, or unless the Treaty enters into force. Of course, once the Treaty enters into force these provisions have the same status as all other provisions. The 12-month limit is necessary to ensure that provisional application not continue in perpetuity. This paragraph also provides the Parties with the option to extend the period of provisional application for additional periods, subject to the same limitations that initially apply.
A final provision, like those in the Protocols, provides that, pursuant to subparagraph (b) of Article XV of the Treaty, additional measures can be agreed upon by the Parties with respect to this Memorandum to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if changes need to be made in the Memorandum that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, then such changes as are agreed upon shall be made within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), without resorting to the amendment procedures set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty.
Pursuant to Article XVII of the Treaty, the Memorandum of Understanding is deemed to be an integral part of the Treaty.
ANNEX A - ICBMs and ICBM LAUNCHERS
Annex A sets forth the numbers of deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, non-deployed ICBMs, non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, and support equipment, as well as data on related facilities, by base and location. As with Annexes B and C, the beginning of the Annex contains aggregate data, which are used to carry forward the more significant totals into Sections II and IV of the MOU. Annex A also preserves formats for categories of data for which neither side has an actual entry in the initial MOU (e.g., ICBM Loading Facilities), by using a dash (-). Such a practice will be found at numerous other locations within the MOU.
ANNEX B - SLBMs AND SLBM LAUNCHERS
Annex B sets forth the numbers of deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers and non-deployed SLBMs, as well as data on related facilities, by base and location. As noted above, the SS-N-17 SLBM and Yankee II SSBN are included in the September 1, 1990, data but have since been eliminated.
Ballistic missile submarines in conversion or overhaul are listed at the base to which they are permanently assigned. This was done to avoid bringing naval shipyards under the START Treaty. Since sensitive equipment and technology could not be adequately protected during inspections at shipyards, and since submarines generally can be monitored through national technical means of verification, this approach was judged acceptable. Ballistic missile submarines operating from Holy Loch, Scotland, as well as the missile tenders supporting them, are listed under the Polaris Missile Facility, Atlantic, in Charleston, South Carolina. The United States does not regard its operations in Holy Loch as constituting "basing" within the meaning of the Treaty. In a July 31, 1991, letter from Secretary Baker to Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh, however, the United States indicated its intent to terminate operations at Holy Loch within five months of entry into force and not to establish similar facilities in the future. In his July 31, 1991 response, Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh stated that the Soviet Union would not establish facilities similar to Holy Loch in the future.
ANNEX C - HEAVY BOMBERS AND FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS
Annex C sets forth the numbers of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, as well as data on related facilities, by base and location. Entries provide for accounting of heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs up to 150 for the U.S. and 180 for the USSR, which are attributed with a fixed number of warheads that may be fewer than the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the heavy bombers are actually equipped. There are no provisions for data in the MOU concerning long-range non-nuclear ALCMs. Such information is passed through notifications but is not recorded in the MOU. Paragraph 23 of Article V of the Treaty mandates segregated basing for all categories of heavy bombers. The U.S. data in this Annex does not reflect such basing, but such basing will be implemented prior to entry into force.
ANNEX D - SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES
Annex D sets forth the numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs at space launch facilities and the locations of such space launch facilities.
ANNEX E - ELIMINATED FACILITIES
Annex E lists those facilities formerly declared in the MOU that, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section IX of the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination, are considered eliminated for the purposes of the Treaty, and whose elimination has been notified in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. By definition, no such facilities existed upon signature of the Treaty.
ANNEX F - ICBM AND SLBM TECHNICAL DATA
Annex F sets forth the technical characteristics of ICBMs and SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, and related support equipment. These technical characteristics will be checked during exhibitions of such items prior to entry into force of the Treaty, and, for future items, during subsequent exhibitions. Annex 11 to the Inspection Protocol, as well as paragraphs 13, 14, 15, and 16 of Annex J to the MOU, are related to how measurements will be taken during such exhibitions.
ANNEX G - HEAVY BOMBER TECHNICAL DATA
Annex G sets forth the technical characteristics of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, to include distinguishing features between variants of a type and category of heavy bomber. The procedures for checking such characteristics are contained in Annex 4 to the Inspection Protocol. Annex G provides for technical characteristics and distinguishing features on heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, and distinguishing or recognition features, but not technical characteristics, for other categories of heavy bombers. Such distinguishing or recognition features are used to demonstrate under which classification an airplane is counted under the Treaty counting rules.
ANNEX H - LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCM TECHNICAL DATA
Annex H sets forth the technical characteristics of long-range nuclear ALCMs. The procedures for checking such characteristics are contained in Annex 4 to the Inspection Protocol.
ANNEX I - OTHER DATA REQUIRED BY THE TREATY
Annex I is organized to capture a variety of lists related to Treaty implementation. This includes data on the number and location of static displays related to ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, and heavy bombers and former heavy bombers converted for use as ground trainers, in existence at the time of signature of the Treaty that are not subject to the limitations provided for in subparagraphs 7(a) and 7(b) of Article IV of the Treaty. This Annex also lists the names and locations of facilities subject to continuous monitoring and monitored facilities; all production and storage locations of solid rocket motors for the first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, subject to the limitations contained in paragraph 10 of Article IV of the Treaty; the testing locations of solid rocket motors of first stages (with or without nozzles attached) for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, subject to the limitations contained in paragraph 10 of Article IV of the Treaty; and the locations where static testing occurs for first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs not subject to the limitations contained in subparagraph 1(a) of Article IV of the Treaty, for missiles that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles with or without launch canisters pursuant to subparagraphs 3(b) and 3(c) of Article III of the Treaty. Additionally, Annex I records the names of ICBMs, SLBMs, submarines, heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, other airplanes, ALCMs, and, where applicable, variants referred to in the Treaty, its Protocols, the MOU, and Annexes, as they are known by the Parties; the points of entry for inspection sites and facilities subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facilities; the routes for flights of inspection airplanes to the points of entry; the ports of the U.S. where special purpose submarines are based; and the facilities subject to suspect-site inspection. Subsequent to Treaty signing the United States proposed updated flight routes to avoid the independent Baltic states.
The designators for Bison A and Bison B given in paragraph 8 of Annex I are reversed. Bison A is the correct U.S. designator for the Soviet M-4 airplane and Bison B is the correct U.S. designator for the Soviet 3MS-2 airplane. The Soviet Union is being informed of this error.
ANNEX J - OTHER REQUIREMENTS
Annex J, unlike other annexes to the Memorandum of Understanding, contains no data. Instead, it codifies the rules for precision of data, for preparation of site diagrams, for photographs, and for the measurement of ICBM and SLBM missile and stage lengths. As an integral part of the Memorandum of Understanding, which is, itself, an integral part of the Treaty, Annex J is legally binding and has equivalent status to any other portion of the Treaty.
Paragraph 1 of Annex J specifies the precision with which geographic coordinates are to be provided. Unlike the Memorandum of Understanding to the INF Treaty, in which coordinates are specified to the nearest second for some facilities, geographic coordinates under START are, in general, given only to the nearest minute. This precision was agreed upon in view of stated Soviet concerns that more precise coordinates might provide information of military value. Paragraph 1 provides an exception to this general rule in cases where facilities (or locations) are within one minute of latitude and longitude of each other (i.e., within roughly one nautical mile of each other) and are of the same type and appearance. Furthermore, while paragraph 1 specifies that coordinates of silo launchers in a silo launcher group at an ICBM base and launch control centers are to be given only to the nearest minute, paragraph 3 of Annex J provides a mechanism for requiring additional information on these and other facilities if the inspecting Party believes that two or more facilities within one minute of each other cannot be differentiated. As specified in paragraph 6 of Article VIII of the Treaty, geographic coordinates are not made public but, at Soviet insistence, are included in a separate classified Agreement on the Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams. The provision of paragraph 1, that each Party will use the system of coordinates that is commonly employed by that Party, is necessary since the Parties use different models of the surface of the earth in establishing coordinates. However, the actual locational differences between the two coordinate systems are on the order of only 200 meters or less.
Paragraph 2 of Annex J specifies that large training facilities and test ranges (i.e., those with an area greater than 10 square kilometers) shall not have site diagrams but shall be identified by geographic coordinates on the perimeter. Site diagrams of areas larger than 10 square kilometers would be of such a scale as not to be usable.
Paragraph 3 of Annex J provides an opportunity for a Party to raise problems with two locations within one nautical mile of each other that the observing Party considers to have the same appearance. The owning Party is then obligated either to provide clarifying information or to provide more accurate coordinates. The reference in paragraph 3 of Annex J to paragraph 7 of Section I of the Notification Protocol is in error.Paragraph 6 of Section I of the Notification Protocol is used to raise the issue; paragraph 7 of Section I of the Notification Protocol is used to provide the clarifying information or more precise coordinates. This error will be corrected through diplomatic channels or within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Paragraph 4 of Annex J codifies the basic obligation to provide site diagrams. Initial site diagrams were exchanged on August 30, 1991; site diagrams for new facilities are provided at the time the new facility notification is given in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. Paragraph 4 of Annex J further provides basic requirements for site diagrams and specifies that they should include geographic coordinates. Because of this, and in accordance with the provisions of Section 6 of Article VIII of the Treaty, site diagrams are not released to the public, although copies have been submitted to the Senate for its information.
Paragraph 5 of Annex J provides specialized rules for site diagrams of ICBM bases. Such rules are necessary because of the large size of such bases and the disparity between the practices of the Parties. Note that for rail garrisons the designation" of each parking site is required to be shown on the site diagram; such designations are used in specifying parking sites at which cooperative measures are carried out in accordance with paragraph 1(b) of Article XII of the Treaty. Note, too, that for restricted areas and maintenance facilities, only the approximate boundaries" of such areas and facilities are required, since they comprise relatively large areas.
Paragraph 6 of Annex J provides more rules for site diagrams associated with mobile ICBM bases. Because deployment areas are so large, a site diagram of them would not be useful; therefore deployment areas are identified by geographic coordinates. The nature of rail garrisons is such that there is no need to draw boundaries. This is so because trains are limited to movement along track, and to support from structures that are either rail served or located in the immediate vicinity of the track. To avoid ambiguity, the paragraph specifies that such site diagrams must include all parking sites, rail entrances and exits, rail lines, and associated structures large enough to contain items of inspection. Structures where reentry vehicles are stored are specifically exempted from inspection in view of the sensitivity of such storage.
Paragraphs 7 and 8 of Annex J provide specific regulations for site diagrams of SLBM bases and air bases for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers.
Paragraph 9 of Annex J provides general rules for site diagrams. Subparagraph 9(a) provides general rules intended to standardize all site diagrams. Subparagraph 9(c) provides additional rules applicable to facilities subject to continuous monitoring, while subparagraph 9(b) provides rules for all other facilities. Separate rules for facilities subject to continuous monitoring and for other facilities are needed since inspectors have no access to the interior of facilities subject to continuous monitoring, but have special concerns with the boundary of the facility. In contrast, for other facilities subject to inspection, the interior is of prime concern. Subparagraph 9(b)(iv) specifies that, in the case of the construction or elimination of structures at facilities, updated site diagrams need only be provided during pre-inspection procedures. This provision was agreed in order to lessen the burden of maintaining updated site diagrams.
Paragraph 10 of Annex J specifies the photographs required and provides rules for ensuring adequate quality of photographs exchanged between the Parties. The paragraph calls for photographs to be appended to this memorandum". All photographs that were exchanged on July 31, 1991, in accordance with an exchange of letters signed between heads of delegations on that date, have been appended to the Memorandum of Understanding. Future photographs will be exchanged through diplomatic channels in accordance with paragraph 3(c) of Section I of the Notification Protocol. Additional photographs may be taken during technical characteristics exhibitions, distinguishability exhibitions, and baseline exhibitions, as provided for in paragraph 15 to Section XIV and paragraph 10 to Section XV of the Inspection Protocol.
Paragraph 11 of Annex J specifies that data shall be included in Annexes A, B, and C to the Memorandum of Understanding for ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers based or stored at the specified bases or facilities. This ensures, inter alia, that visiting strategic offensive arms need not trigger an update to Annexes A, B, or C, provided that the visit" does not constitute a change in where the item is based" or stored." In any event, movements of strategic offensive arms are notified in accordance with Section II of the Notification Protocol.
Paragraph 12(a) of Annex J establishes the precision with which linear measurements are recorded in the Memorandum of Understanding. Paragraph 6 of Section I of the Throw-Weight Protocol specifies that throw-weight will be recorded to the nearest 50 kilograms. While the Treaty does not specify the precision to which launch weight or stage weight is to be recorded, the Parties agreed during the negotiations that launch and stage weight would be recorded to the nearest tenth of a metric ton (i.e., to the nearest 100 kilograms). Paragraph 12(b) of Annex J makes it clear that separate technical data are required on all variants of ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs.
Paragraph 13 serves to standardize the way in which the length of an assembled ICBM or SLBM is measured. Subparagraph 13(b) is made necessary because of the design of certain ICBMs and SLBMs, in which the front section or reentry vehicles are inside the airframes.
Paragraphs 14 and 15 of Annex J provide two separate methods for measuring the length of the first stage of ICBMs and SLBMs, depending on the purpose for the measurement. For purposes of determining a new type on the basis of a change in first stage length (with or without a change in throw-weight), it is necessary that measurements be made between two points that are difficult to alter without fundamentally redesigning the first stage. Thus, as indicated in paragraph 15, the Parties have agreed to use the length of the solid rocket motor case or the liquid propellant tank as the first stage length. Lengths determined in accordance with paragraph 15 are only provided when required, i.e., when needed to demonstrate a new type based on a change in first stage length or whenever a new type of mobile ICBM is declared. In addition, for the SS-25 and the Peacekeeper, the lengths that are specified in paragraph 15 are used to determine the size criteria for certain types of inspections under the Treaty, in accordance with Annex 12 to the Inspection Protocol.
Such a length is not needed for other Treaty purposes, such as verifying the identity of missiles or stages encountered during inspections. The Parties therefore, in paragraph 14, specify a different method of determining first stage length for these purposes. Separate provisions are provided for ICBMs and SLBMs maintained, stored, and transported in stages and for ICBMs and SLBMs stored or transported as assembled missiles. These separate provisions are necessary, since, in some assembled designs, there is no uniform point of joining between first stage and upper stages. The lengths determined in accordance with paragraph 14 of Annex J are listed in Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding.
Inasmuch as some ICBM or SLBM designs could use, for example, raceways or stabilizing fins, paragraph 16 of Annex J specifies that such protruding elements will be excluded in determining the diameter of ICBM or SLBM stages.