Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance

[START Treaty Signed July 31, 1991]

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOL ON CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION OF ITEMS SUBJECT TO THE TREATY STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE PROTOCOL

The Protocol on Conversion or Elimination (the Protocol) consists of a Preamble and nine Sections.

Pursuant to Article VII of the Treaty, the Protocol sets forth detailed procedures for the conversion and elimination of strategic offensive arms and facilities subject to the Treaty. Such items, once eliminated in accordance with the procedures in the Protocol, are no longer subject to Treaty constraints and numerical limitations. Items converted in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol shall be subject to all Treaty constraints and numerical limitations that apply to converted items once all the appropriate procedures have been completed. This means that the procedures set forth in the Protocol must be used in order to achieve compliance with the numerical limitations and constraints specified in Articles II, III, IV, and V of the Treaty.

In addition to this Protocol, more general inspection procedures applicable to inspections of the conversion or elimination of items are specified in Section XI of the Inspection Protocol, and the requirements for notifications of the processes of conversion and elimination are specified in Section IV of the Notification Protocol.

The Protocol sets forth a number of means by which strategic offensive arms and facilities subject to the Treaty may be eliminated, converted or otherwise removed from accountability under the Treaty:

  • elimination at conversion or elimination facilities (applicable to ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and their launch canisters, road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, mobile training launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers and former heavy bombers)
  • elimination in situ (applicable to silo ICBM launchers, silo training launchers, silo test launchers, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, and soft-site launchers)
  • conversion at a conversion or elimination facility (applicable to heavy bombers and former heavy bombers)
  • removal from accountability by flight tests or static testing (applicable to ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs)
  • removal from accountability by accidental loss or disablement beyond repair (applicable to ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, their launch canisters, silo launchers of ICBMs, silo training launchers, silo test launchers, mobile launchers of ICBMs, mobile training launchers, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, SLBM launchers, static display items, and heavy bombers and former heavy bombers converted for use as ground trainers).
  • removal from accountability by means of static display (applicable to ICBMs, SLBMs, launch canisters, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers and former heavy bombers)
  • conversion for use as ground trainers (applicable to heavy bombers and former heavy bombers)
  • elimination of facilities.

The Protocol does not contain specific procedures for elimination of SLBMs or ICBMs other than ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, because, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article IV of the Treaty, such missiles, if non-deployed, are not numerically limited. However, paragraph 3 of Article VII of the Treaty specifies that such missiles are subject to Treaty limitations until they have been eliminated by rendering them inoperable, precluding their use for their original purpose. In such a case, the Party carrying out the elimination is required to provide a notification, in accordance with subparagraph 4(e) of Section IV of the Notification Protocol, that the missile has been eliminated. The Protocol does not require that, for each launcher eliminated, a missile and/or shipping container and/or associated support equipment be eliminated. The missile that was once contained in the launcher can be considered to be a non-deployed missile, or it can be eliminated.

Section I of the Protocol sets forth procedures for the elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and their launch canisters. Section II provides procedures for elimination of silo ICBM launchers, silo training launchers, and silo test launchers. Section III sets forth procedures for the elimination of mobile launchers of ICBMs, mobile training launchers, and fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Section IV sets forth procedures for the elimination of SLBM launchers. Section V provides procedures for the elimination of soft-site launchers. Section VI sets forth procedures for the conversion or elimination of heavy bombers and the elimination of former heavy bombers. Section VII provides procedures for the removal from Treaty accountability of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs as a result of flight tests and static testing. Section VIII sets forth procedures for removal from, or changes in, Treaty accountability as the result of accidental loss, disablement beyond repair, use as static display, and used as a ground trainer. Section IX sets forth procedures for the elimination of facilities.

Pursuant to subparagraph (b) of Article XV of the Treaty, additional measures can be agreed upon by the Parties with respect to the Protocol to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agreed that, if changes need to be made in the Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, then such changes would be made within the framework of the JCIC, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty. The Eleventh Agreed Statement, for example, recognizes that there are no procedures for the elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs containing a stage equipped with a liquid propellant main rocket engine or for the elimination of heavy bombers that have no tail sections. Such ICBMs and such heavy bombers will not be eliminated until the JCIC agrees on the appropriate procedure.

Pursuant to Article XVII of the Treaty, the Protocol is deemed to be an integral part of the Treaty.

PREAMBLE

The Preamble provides that the Parties have agreed upon procedures governing the conversion or elimination of the strategic offensive arms limited by the Treaty, as well as fixed structures and facilities.

SECTION I PROCEDURES FOR ELIMINATION OF ICBMs FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs AND THEIR LAUNCH CANISTERS

Section I consists of seven paragraphs. This Section sets forth rights and obligations of the Parties with respect to the elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and their launch canisters.

Paragraph 1 of Section I provides that eliminations of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and their launch canisters that are carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in this Section must be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs. The list of such facilities is contained in Annex A to the Memorandum of Understanding and is subject to periodic updating. Paragraph 1 also requires that such elimination be subject to inspection. In this connection, paragraph 1 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol requires that, 30 days prior to the initiation of the elimination, a notification must be transmitted to the other Party, providing information on the number of missiles and launch canisters to be eliminated, the date of their elimination, and the place of their elimination. This notification permits the receiving Party to prepare to send an inspection team to observe the elimination.

Paragraph 2 of Section I contains all the steps that may or must be done to the missile and its launch canister prior to the arrival of the inspection team that will conduct the confirmatory inspection. Of these steps, only the first, removal of the reentry vehicles from the missile, is mandatory. The term "reentry vehicle" is a defined term, and includes any weapon contained in the reentry vehicle. Neither this Protocol nor any other provision of the Treaty imposes any further obligations or restrictions on the use of reentry vehicles that are removed from missiles. The other items that may be removed from the missile are listed in paragraph 2. There are no requirements regarding the timing or location of the removal of the items. Therefore, reentry vehicles could be removed at a maintenance facility months prior to a missile's arrival at a conversion or elimination facility. The sides noted in the Joint Statement on New Missile Production Technology Processes that they used only case-bonding techniques, not insertable cartridges. The non-destructive removal of propellant is not permitted under the Treaty.

Paragraph 3 of this Section provides the measures to be carried out by inspectors after their arrival at the conversion or elimination facility but prior to the initiation of the elimination process. This paragraph provides that the inspectors shall take measurements and observations of the missiles and launch canisters in order to confirm the numbers and types of the missiles and launch canisters to be eliminated, using equipment listed in Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol that had been cleared at the point of entry. Inspectors and representatives of the inspected Party also are required to read the data from and inspect the unique identifier in accordance with Annex 6 to the Inspection Protocol. The Party eliminating an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs must have provided, in a notification in accordance with paragraph 7 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol, data to be used to identify the type of such ICBM within its launch canister for the first elimination of such a type of ICBM. If inspectors are still unable to determine the type of the missile in its launch canister, representatives of the inspected Party are required to take steps to resolve the problem, including permitting inspectors to view the inside of the canister through maintenance hatches or openings cut for the purpose of viewing, or removing the missile from its launch canister, if necessary. The reason that removing the missile from its launch canister is not mandatory is that the Soviet side claimed that its solid propellant missiles are dangerous when removed from their environmentally controlled canisters due to the unstable and explosive nature of the solid propellant. The Soviets also cited technical, support, and manufacturing considerations that led them to keep the missile in its canister. But more importantly, the Soviet side elevated to the level of principle the association of the launch canister with its missile. As far as the Soviet side was concerned, the launch canister was an inseparable part of the missile. The Eleventh Agreed Statement provides that procedures for the elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs containing a stage equipped with a liquid-propellant main rocket engine shall be agreed within the framework of the JCIC prior to the elimination of such ICBMs, since the procedures contained in this paragraph do not apply to such ICBMs. Any elements that are not specifically mentioned in paragraph 4 of this Section may be salvaged from the missile and launch canister prior to their elimination. The inspectors are required to observe the actual elimination. After observing the elimination, the inspection team leader is required to confirm in an inspection report that the inspection team has completed its inspection.

Paragraph 4 of Section I sets forth the elimination process for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and identifies the specific elements of the missile that have to be cut, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion in order to comply with the elimination requirements. All stages must be destroyed by explosive demolition or burning, unless all solid fuel has been removed from the stage by liquefaction. In addition, the rocket nozzles, motor cases, interstage skirts, the self-contained dispensing mechanism, the front section, including the reentry vehicle platform and the front section shroud, must be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or destroyed by explosion. As with Paragraph 3 of this Section, only those elements that are specifically mentioned have to be destroyed; all other elements may be salvaged, that is, there is no requirement to destroy reentry vehicles or the weapons contained in the reentry vehicles.

Paragraph 5 of Section I sets forth the elimination process for launch canisters of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, and it describes what must be done to launch canisters. For unitary design canisters, the canister must be cut in half, cut into three pieces, or crushed, flattened, or destroyed by explosion. For a canister made up of segments, each of the segments must be cut in two, at places other than assembly joints, or crushed, flattened, or destroyed by explosion. Each of these processes would render the canister unusable for its original purpose. The procedures contained in this paragraph apply whenever a Party eliminates a launch canister for an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs. However, if, after a flight test, a Party eliminates a launch canister, it is not subject to on-site inspection of the elimination process. The procedures for verifying such elimination are set forth in the letters exchanged by the Heads of Delegation, the "Exchange of Letters Concerning Launch Canisters." Also, the Twentieth Agreed Statement permits the sides to refurbish launch canisters after launches.

Paragraph 6 of Section I provides that the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall fill out the inspection report provided for in Section XVIII of the Inspection Protocol. This report, which attests to the inspection team's observation of the elimination process, includes the measurements and observations that the team made prior to the elimination. The report does not constitute the official judgment of the inspecting side that the other side has fully complied with its obligations; such a determination is made after the report has been analyzed in capitals.

Paragraph 7 of Section I provides that ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after completion of the procedures provided for in this Section. This paragraph also states that a change in data according to categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding shall be made in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

SECTION II PROCEDURES FOR ELIMINATION OF SILO LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs, SILO TRAINING LAUNCHERS, AND SILO TEST LAUNCHERS

Section II consists of nine paragraphs and sets forth the rights and obligations of the Parties with respect to the elimination of silo launchers of ICBMs, silo training launchers, and silo test launchers.

Paragraph 1 of Section II states that elimination of silo launchers of ICBMs, silo training launchers and silo test launchers shall be carried out in situ and shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification. Inasmuch as the elimination process can be monitored by national technical means, the Treaty and the Protocol provide no inspection rights with respect to the elimination of silos. However, to aid verification by national technical means, notification of the intention to eliminate such launchers must be provided 30 days in advance of the initiation of the elimination process, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol.

Paragraph 2 of Section II sets forth the requirement that, prior to the initiation of the elimination process of silo launchers of ICBMs and silo test launchers, all missiles and shipping containers for ICBMs or ICBM stages, as well as all support equipment, shall be removed at least 1000 meters from each such launcher to be eliminated. The purpose of such removal is to reduce the potential for uncertainty in monitoring the elimination process by national technical means. There is no requirement that missiles, shipping containers, and support equipment be moved at least 1000 meters away from silo training launchers, since, pursuant to paragraph 2(e) of Article IV of the Treaty, a silo training launcher may contain only a training model of a missile.

Paragraph 3 of Section II specifies the action that constitutes initiation of the elimination process for silo launchers of ICBMs, silo training launchers, and silo test launchers, i.e., when the silo doors have been opened, removed, or eliminated. Notification of this action is provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol, and is used to begin the period of time allowed for the completion of the elimination, 180 days, which is specified in paragraph 8 of this Section.

Paragraph 4 of Section II states that a silo launcher of ICBMs in the process of being eliminated shall be considered to contain a deployed ICBM, and thus to be subject to the limitations provided for in Article II of the Treaty, until the elimination procedures provided for in subparagraph 6(a) of this Section have been carried out. It further provides that notification of the completion of the relevant procedures shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol .

Paragraph 5 of Section II states that a silo test launcher or a silo training launcher in the process of being eliminated shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after completion of the procedures provided for in subparagraph 6(a) or paragraph 7, respectively, of this Section. It further states that notification of the completion of the relevant procedures shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. The relevant limitations on silo test launchers and silo training launchers are contained in Article IV of the Treaty.

Paragraph 6 of Section II sets forth the elimination process for silo launchers of ICBMs or silo test launchers. Subparagraph 6(a) provides that the silo door shall be removed, dismantled, or destroyed and the silo headworks and the silo shall be destroyed by excavation to a depth of no less than eight meters, or by explosion to a depth of no less than six meters. Subparagraph 6(b) provides that, following completion of the procedures provided for in subparagraph 6(a), the silo may be filled to the level of the bottom of the hole created by the excavation or explosion. Subparagraph 6(b) further provides that, to enhance safety, the resultant hole may be graded during the 180-day period provided for in paragraph 8 of this Section, in order to reduce the safety hazard to those nearby, but it may not filled with earth until expiration of the 90-day period provided for in paragraph 9 of this Section, in order to aid verification by national technical means.

Paragraph 7 of Section II sets forth the elimination process of a silo training launcher, which is to be accomplished by removing, dismantling, or destroying the silo door and by destroying the silo headworks by excavation or explosion. There are no depth requirements for the excavation or explosion of silo training launchers due to safety concerns stemming from the fact that such launchers are normally in close proximity to buildings.

Paragraph 8 of Section II requires that the elimination process of a silo launcher of ICBMs, a silo training launcher, and a silo test launcher be completed no later than 180 days after its initiation. Paragraph 2 of this Section, and the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol, establish the beginning of this period. Paragraph 8 also requires that, if grading was performed during the elimination process, notification of the completion of such an elimination process be provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol. Notification of the end of the elimination process is required only if grading was conducted during the elimination, because, otherwise, completion of the process would occur when the launcher was destroyed and the notification updating the Memorandum of Understanding, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, would be provided.

Paragraph 9 of Section II provides that silos shall remain visible to national technical means of verification during the entire elimination process and for the following 90-day period, after which they may be filled with earth.

SECTION III PROCEDURES FOR ELIMINATION OF MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs, MOBILE TRAINING LAUNCHERS AND FIXED STRUCTURES FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs

Section III consists of ten paragraphs and sets forth procedures for the elimination of mobile launchers of ICBMs, mobile training launchers and fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

Paragraph 1 of Section III states that elimination of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, road-mobile training launchers, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, and rail-mobile training launchers that are carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in this Section shall be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs. This paragraph further states that such elimination shall be subject to inspection. In this connection, paragraph 1 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol requires that, 30 days prior to the initiation of the elimination, a notification must be transmitted to the other Party, providing information on the number of mobile launchers of ICBMs and mobile training launchers to be eliminated, the date of their elimination, and the place of their elimination. This notification permits the receiving Party to prepare to send an inspection team to observe the elimination. Forty-eight hours after the mobile launcher of ICBMs or mobile training launcher arrives at the conversion or elimination facility, regardless of when the inspection team arrives, a notification of the completion of its transit from its original location must be provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

Paragraph 2 of Section III provides the measures to be carried out by inspectors after their arrival at the conversion or elimination facility but prior to the initiation of the elimination process. The inspection team arrives at the conversion or elimination facility after having provided notification, at least 72 hours in advance, of its arrival at the point of entry of the Party eliminating the mobile launchers; this notification is provided in accordance with paragraph 5 of Section III of the Inspection Protocol. The procedures for transporting the inspectors to the facility are similar to those for other inspections, and are found in Sections IV, V and VI of the Inspection Protocol. The inspectors shall take measurements and observations of the mobile launchers in order to confirm the numbers and types of such launchers to be eliminated, using equipment listed in Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol that had been cleared at the point of entry. The inspectors are required to observe the actual elimination. After observing the elimination, the inspection team leader shall confirm in an inspection report that the inspection team has completed its inspection.

Paragraph 3 of Section III sets forth the elimination process for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and road-mobile training launchers. This paragraph specifies what elements must be destroyed as part of the elimination process for road-mobile launchers; primarily, it is the erector-launcher mechanism and leveling supports, together with their mountings, that must be destroyed. In addition, the length of the vehicle chassis must be reduced by at least 0.78 meters, and the removed pieces may not be reattached. The prohibition on reattachment arose out of the fact that, after completing elimination procedures on SS-23 launchers under the INF Treaty, the Soviets welded sections back on some vehicles. Elements not specified for destruction, such as missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, may be salvaged, and the vehicle may be used after elimination, but only for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty. The latitude to use the eliminated vehicles arose from Soviet desire to reuse military equipment for economically productive purposes.

Paragraph 4 of Section III sets forth the elimination process for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and rail-mobile training launchers. As with road-mobile launchers, these procedures require destruction of the erector-launcher mechanism. However, unlike the chassis of a road-mobile launcher, which may be salvaged, the railcar or flatcar of a rail-mobile launcher is required to be cut in half, rendering it useless.

Paragraph 5 of Section III provides that the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall fill out the inspection report provided for in Section XVIII of the Inspection Protocol. This report, which attests to the inspection team's observation of the elimination process, includes the measurements and observations that the team made prior to the elimination.

Paragraph 6 of Section III provides that road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, road-mobile training launchers, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, and rail-mobile training launchers shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after completion of the procedures provided for in this Section. This paragraph also states that a notification of a change in data according to categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding shall be made no later than five days after the completion of the elimination.

Paragraph 7 of Section III requires that elimination of fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be carried out in situ, shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification, and shall be subject to inspection pursuant to paragraphs 8 and 9 of Article XI of the Treaty, i.e., conversion or elimination inspections and close-out inspections. While the elimination of fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, which are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding, are subject to observation by national technical means, the remains of the eliminated structures are subject to inspection, in accordance with paragraph 9 of Section XI of the Inspection Protocol, during a base-line data inspection, data update inspection, reentry vehicle inspection, post-dispersal inspection of mobile launchers of ICBMs, or close-out inspection at the facility at which the fixed structure was located.

Paragraph 8 of Section III sets forth the elimination process for fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs. The superstructure of each fixed structure must be dismantled or demolished and removed from its base or foundation, and the base or foundation must be destroyed.

Paragraph 9 requires that the destroyed base or foundation of each eliminated fixed structure remain visible to national technical means of verification either: (a) for the 90-day period following the completion of the elimination process; or (b) until an inspection of the structure at a restricted area or rail garrison is conducted pursuant to paragraphs 8 and 9 of Article XI of the Treaty.

Paragraph 10 states that, upon completion of the inspection conducted pursuant to paragraphs 8 and 9 of Article XI of the Treaty, the hole resulting from the excavation or explosion of each such structure may be filled and the remains of the destroyed base or foundation of each such structure may be removed from the restricted area or rail garrison. That paragraph also permits filling the hole and removing the remains 90 days after the completion of the elimination process, if an inspection was not conducted.

SECTION IV PROCEDURES FOR ELIMINATION OF SLBM LAUNCHERS

Section IV consists of eight paragraphs and sets forth procedures for the elimination of SLBM launchers.

Paragraph 1 of Section IV states that the elimination of SLBM launchers carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in this Section shall be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities for SLBM launchers. That paragraph also states that such elimination shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification.

Paragraph 2 of Section IV provides that, prior to the initiation of the elimination process for SLBM launchers, all missiles shall be removed from such launchers.

Paragraph 3 of Section IV specifies the action that constitutes initiation of the elimination process for SLBM launchers, i.e., when the ballistic missile submarine has been positioned at the conversion or elimination facility with all missile launch tubes empty and launch-tube hatches opened or removed. Notification of this action is provided in accordance of paragraph 2 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol, and is used to begin the period of time allowed for the completion of the elimination, which is specified in paragraph 6 of this Section. The launcher does not change its Treaty accountability until it meets the requirements of paragraph 4 of this Section.

Paragraph 4 of Section IV states that SLBM launchers undergoing the process of elimination shall be considered to contain deployed SLBMs, and thus to be subject to the limitations provided for in Article II of the Treaty, until all the missile launch-tube hatches and their associated superstructure fairings are removed from the ballistic missile submarine. The sides understand "associated superstructure fairings" to be the part of the superstructure situated over the missile sections. It further provides that notification of the completion of those procedures shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

Paragraph 5 of Section IV sets forth the elimination process for SLBM launchers. Two methods of complying with the requirements for elimination are presented: (a) removing the missile section from the submarine; or (b) removing from the submarine the missile launch tubes, and all elements of their reinforcement, including hull liners and segments of circular structural members between the missile launch tubes, as well as the entire portion of the pressure hull, the entire portion of the outer hull, and the entire portion of the superstructure through which all the missile launch tubes pass and that contain all the missile launch-tube penetrations. Under this option, the United States received an assurance that the Soviet Union would cut the hull and superstructure well outside the outermost launch tubes. Also, with respect to the second option, missile launch tubes that have been removed must be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size and must remain in the open in the vicinity of the submarine until completion of the elimination procedures, after which they may be removed from the conversion or elimination facility.

Paragraph 6 of Section IV requires that the elimination process for SLBM launchers carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraphs 5(a) and 5(b) of this Section must be completed no later than 270 days and 180 days, respectively, after initiation. That paragraph also provides that notification of the completion of the elimination process must be provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol.

Paragraph 7 of Section IV provides that a ballistic missile submarine must remain visible to national technical means of verification during the entire elimination process. That paragraph further provides that, upon the completion of the elimination process carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph 5(b) of this Section, the submarine must continue to be visible to national technical means of verification for an additional ten days following the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol, in order to aid verification of the completion of the elimination process and to ensure that a side could not retain ribs in the missile compartment or begin the refurbishment of the dismantled missile compartment before the end of the observation period.

Paragraph 8 of Section IV describes the permitted refurbishment of submarines following completion of the elimination procedures for SLBM launchers, as long as the submarine is used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty: a section can be installed without SLBM missile launch tubes and penetrations for them, and without SLBM missile launch-tube reinforcements; or the entire portions of the pressure hull, of the outer hull, and of the superstructure that were removed can be replaced with portions without SLBM missile launch tubes and penetrations for them, and without SLBM missile launch-tube reinforcements. That paragraph stipulates that such refurbished submarines must differ from ballistic missile submarines on the basis of external differences observable by national technical means of verification, and that submarines that have been modified shall not have vertical launch tubes with a diameter large enough to accommodate that side's smallest-diameter SLBM. This latter provision was included to allow retired ballistic missile submarines to be converted for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty, including conversion to cruise missile submarines, without allowing for redeployment of SLBMs.

SECTION V PROCEDURES FOR ELIMINATION OF SOFT-SITE LAUNCHERS

Section V consists of six paragraphs and sets forth procedures for the elimination of soft-site launchers, i.e., fixed land-based launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs other than silo launchers.

Paragraph 1 of Section V states that elimination of soft-site launchers shall be carried out in situ and shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification.

Paragraph 2 of Section V requires that, prior to the initiation of the elimination process for soft-site launchers, all missiles, launch canisters, and shipping containers for ICBMs or SLBMs or for their stages shall be removed at least 1000 meters from each soft-site launcher to be eliminated. The purpose of these steps is to aid monitoring of the elimination process.

Paragraph 3 of Section V specifies the action that constitutes initiation of the elimination process for soft-site launchers, i.e., when the eliminating Party has begun implementation of the procedures provided for in subparagraph 4(a) of this Section. Notification of this action is provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol, and is used to begin the period of time allowed for the completion of the elimination, which is specified in paragraph 5 of this Section. The launcher remains subject to the limitations provided for in subparagraph 2(d) of Article IV and paragraph 9 of Article V of the Treaty until the procedures provided for in subparagraphs 4(a) and 4(b) of this Section have been carried out. Notification of the completion of both procedures shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

Paragraph 4 of Section V sets forth the elimination process for soft-site launchers. That paragraph requires that (a) all fixed launch and propellant-handling equipment, as well as erecting and handling equipment, and fuel tanks, associated with such a launcher shall be removed at least 1000 meters from the soft-site launcher to be eliminated; and (b) the entire area, at least 20 meters in diameter and centered on the soft-site launcher, shall be excavated or exploded to a depth of no less than two meters. The paragraph further states that, to enhance safety, following completion of the procedures provided for in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph, the resultant hole may be graded during the 180-day period that began with initiation of the elimination process. The hole may be filled with earth 90 days after that 180-day period.

Paragraph 5 of Section V requires that the elimination process for a soft-site launcher be completed no later than 180 days after its initiation. That paragraph further states that, if grading was performed during the elimination process, notification of the completion of such elimination process shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol.

Paragraph 6 of Section V requires that soft-site launchers remain visible to national technical means of verification during the entire elimination process and for the following 90-day period. That paragraph also permits the resultant hole to be filled with earth after the 90-day period has elapsed.

SECTION VI PROCEDURES FOR CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION OF HEAVY BOMBERS AND ELIMINATION OF FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS

Section VI consists of 15 paragraphs and sets forth procedures for the conversion or elimination of heavy bombers and the elimination of former heavy bombers.

Paragraph 1 of Section VI states that the elimination of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in this Section shall be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers. That paragraph also states that such elimination shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification and by inspection pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Section.

Paragraph 2 of Section VI establishes the right of each Party to verify by inspection the initiation of the elimination process of heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. This right is provided because such bombers count toward the aggregate limits on warheads as ten or eight warheads (or, as equipped, under the specialized counting rules given in Article III for those heavy bombers above 150/180) for the U.S. and USSR, respectively. The inspecting Party needs to confirm that the heavy bombers being eliminated are actually of the type and category declared and not a category or type with one or no attributed warheads. The inspection team arrives at the conversion or elimination facility after having provided notification, at least 72 hours in advance, of its arrival at the point of entry of the Party eliminating the heavy bombers or former heavy bombers; this notification is provided in accordance with paragraph 5 of Section III of the Inspection Protocol. Paragraph 2 also establishes the right of each Party to verify by inspection the completion of the elimination process of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, except for those cases when the initiation of the elimination process of heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs was verified by inspection. The paragraph further provides that, if an inspection is conducted, the inspectors shall make the observations and measurements necessary to confirm the type and category of the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber that is to be eliminated or that has been eliminated, as applicable. The entire elimination process is not observed because the length of time involved makes on-site inspections impractical, and because national technical means can observe the remainder of the procedures once the type of the heavy bomber has been confirmed.

Paragraph 3 of Section VI provides the steps that may be carried out prior to the arrival of inspectors and prior to the initiation of the elimination process of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber: engines and equipment that are not part of the airframe may be removed except for the equipment that is necessary for the inspectors to confirm the type and category of the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber to be eliminated.

Paragraph 4 of Section VI specifies the action that constitutes initiation of the elimination process for a heavy bomber or a former heavy bomber, i.e., as soon as the tail section with tail surfaces has been severed from the fuselage at a location obviously not an assembly joint. The Eleventh Agreed Statement provides that procedures for the elimination of heavy bombers that have no tail sections, e.g., the B-2, shall be agreed within the framework of the JCIC prior to the initiation of elimination of such airplanes. Paragraph 4 further states that a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after the completion of such action. It also provides that notification of the completion of the relevant procedures shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. This notification serves both to change the accountability of the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber and to begin the permitted period of time for completion of the elimination, i.e., 60 days.

Paragraph 5 of Section VI sets forth the elimination process for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, and requires that the tail section with tail surfaces be severed from the fuselage at a location obviously not an assembly joint; the wings be separated from the fuselage at any location by any method; and the remainder of the fuselage be severed into two pieces, within the area of attachment of the wings to the fuselage, at a location obviously not an assembly joint.

Paragraph 6 of Section VI requires that a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber remain visible to national technical means of verification during the entire elimination process. That paragraph also states that the elimination process for a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber shall be completed no later than 60 days after initiation. This is to make certain that, once a side has initiated elimination and the item has been removed from accountability, the elimination procedures will be completed within a set period, and there will not be a large number of items around that are not accountable but have not met elimination requirements. Notification of the completion shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol. This notification has several purposes: (1) to establish that the 60-day period for completing the elimination process was met, (2) to begin the 90-day period during which the remains must be displayed in the open, and (3) to alert the other Party that it may send inspectors to verify the elimination of the heavy bombers. The other Party has 90 days in order to exercise this right, pursuant to paragraph 10 of Section XI of the Inspection Protocol.

Paragraph 7 of Section VI requires that, upon completion of the elimination process for a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, the remains of its airframe shall remain visible to national technical means of verification at the elimination site for a 90-day period, after which they may be removed. That paragraph also states that, in the case of an inspection conducted to confirm that the elimination of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber has been completed, the remains of its airframe may be removed after the completion of such an inspection.

Paragraph 8 of Section VI provides that, if an inspection was conducted, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall fill out the inspection report provided for in Section XVIII of the Inspection Protocol. This report, which attests to the inspection team's observation of the elimination, includes the measurements and observations that the team made prior to the elimination. The report does not constitute the official judgment of the inspecting side that the other side has fully complied with its obligations; rather, such determination is made after the report has been analyzed in capitals.

Paragraph 9 of Section VI establishes the various modes of conversion of heavy bombers, which shall be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, subject to paragraph 10, 11, and 12 of this Section:

(a) Heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs converted into heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, or into training heavy bombers or former heavy bombers.

(b) Heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs converted into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments or into training heavy bombers or former heavy bombers.

(c) Heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments converted into training heavy bombers or former heavy bombers.

There are no procedures for converting a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs into a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, but such a conversion is permitted so long as the specific heavy bomber was not previously equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. No conversion procedures were required, and no on-site inspection was necessary, because there is no cheating scenario that makes sense in this situation. Procedures for conversion are involved only when a side reduces the accountability of a heavy bomber against the limits provided for in subparagraph 1(a) or 1(b) of Article II of the Treaty.

Paragraph 10 of Section VI sets forth the procedures for converting a heavy bomber so that it is no longer equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs: all weapons bays equipped to carry long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be modified so as to render them incapable of carrying long-range nuclear ALCMs, and all external attachment joints for long-range nuclear ALCMs and all external attachment joints for pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be removed or modified so as to render them incapable of carrying long-range nuclear ALCMs.

Paragraph 11 of Section VI sets forth the procedures for converting a heavy bomber so that it is no longer equipped for nuclear armaments: all weapons bays equipped to carry nuclear armaments shall be modified so as to render them incapable of carrying nuclear armaments, and all external attachment joints for nuclear armaments and all external attachment joints for pylons for nuclear armaments shall be removed or modified so as to render them incapable of carrying nuclear armaments.

Paragraph 12 of Section VI sets forth the procedures for converting a heavy bomber so that it is no longer equipped for non-nuclear air-to-surface armaments: all weapons bays equipped for non-nuclear air-to-surface armaments shall be modified so as to render them incapable of carrying any air-to-surface armaments, and all external attachment joints for such armaments and all external attachment joints for pylons for such armaments shall be removed or modified so as to render them incapable of carrying any air-to-surface armaments.

Paragraph 13 of Section VI states that, upon completion of the requirements contained in paragraphs 10, 11, and 12 of this Section, the converted heavy bomber shall not be flown, but shall be moved directly to the viewing site at the conversion or elimination facility. That paragraph also provides that notification of the completion of the relevant procedures shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol. The paragraph further states that the converting Party may provide an additional notification regarding the planned date of arrival of such a heavy bomber at the viewing site. The purpose of this voluntary notification is to allow the inspecting side the opportunity to prepare for an early inspection of the converted heavy bomber, so that the converting side may expeditiously move it from the viewing site. The Party receiving such notification or notifications shall have the right, within the 20-day period beginning on the date the converted heavy bomber arrives at the viewing site, to inspect it to confirm that the procedures provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, and 12 of this Section, whichever are applicable, have been completed. Upon completion of such inspection, or, if an inspection was not conducted, upon expiration of the 20-day period, the inspected Party shall have the right to remove the converted heavy bomber or former heavy bomber from the viewing site.

Paragraph 14 of Section VI provides that, if an inspection was conducted, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall fill out the inspection report provided for in Section XVIII of the Inspection Protocol. This report, which attests to the inspection team's observation of the conversion, includes the measurements and observations that the team made. The report does not constitute the official judgment of the inspecting side that the other side has fully complied with its obligations; rather, such determination is made after the report has analyzed in capitals.

Paragraph 15 of Section VI states that, upon completion of the inspection provided for in paragraph 13 of this Section or, if an inspection was not conducted, upon expiration of the 20-day period, the converted heavy bomber shall begin to be considered to be a heavy bomber of a different category or to be a former heavy bomber, depending on the conversion procedures that have been carried out. It also provides that notification of the change of accountability of the converted heavy bomber shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

SECTION VII PROCEDURES FOR REMOVAL FROM ACCOUNTABILITY OF ICBMs FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs AS A RESULT OF FLIGHT TESTS OR STATIC TESTING

Section VII consists of three paragraphs and sets forth procedures for removal from accountability of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs as a result of flight tests or static testing.

Paragraph 1 of Section VII states that removal of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs from accountability as a result of flight tests shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification. The term "flight test" is defined in the Definitions Annex and means the launch and subsequent flight of a missile.

Paragraph 2 of Section VII sets forth procedures for removal from accountability as a result of flight tests: advance notification shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol, and the ICBM shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after the flight test. Notification of the removal from accountability shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. The fact that the ICBM shall cease to be subject to Treaty limitations after the flight test does not mean that the missile is no longer subject to the Treaty during the flight test, in particular, with provisions dealing with data denial contained in Article X of the Treaty and in the Telemetry Protocol. Rather, this provision means that, once the missile has been launched and its flight has terminated with its destruction, the ICBM will no longer count under the Treaty.

Paragraph 3 of Section VII sets forth procedures for removal from accountability, as a result of static testing, of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Static testing includes the ground-based firing of first stages as well as other means of destructive ground-based testing of missiles or first stages. Such testing is required for necessary R&D and force reliability purposes. That paragraph also states that the Party that has accomplished static testing of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs or a first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall provide notification of that static testing in accordance with paragraph 5 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol. The paragraph further provides that, if static testing is accomplished through dissection, that is, removal of propellant segments for testing, each time the Party removes such a segment it shall provide notification thereof in accordance with paragraph 5 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol. Finally, the paragraph states that the remains of the ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs or of the first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be eliminated in accordance with applicable procedures provided for in Section I of this Protocol, which include inspection of the remains prior to elimination. The inspection team arrives at the conversion or elimination facility after having provided notification, at least 72 hours in advance, of its arrival at the point of entry of the Party eliminating the ICBM or first stage; this notification is provided in accordance with paragraph 5 of Section III of the Inspection Protocol.

SECTION VIII OTHER PROCEDURES FOR REMOVAL FROM OR CHANGES IN ACCOUNTABILITY

Section VIII consists of eight paragraphs and sets forth other procedures for removal from or changes in accountability, such as accidental loss, disablement beyond repair, static display, conversion for use as ground trainers.

Paragraph 1 of Section VIII states that ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, their launch canisters, silo launchers of ICBMs, silo training launchers, silo test launchers, mobile launchers of ICBMs, mobile training launchers, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, SLBM launchers, soft-site launchers, heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, static display items, and heavy bombers and former heavy bombers converted for use as ground trainers shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after the completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 2, 3, 6, or 8 of this Section, as applicable.

Paragraph 2 of Section VIII sets forth procedures on removal from accountability as the result of accidental loss: if, in the judgment of the Party possessing an item subject to limitations provided for in the Treaty, that item is lost as a result of an accident, notification of such loss shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, and the item shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty as of the date or assumed date of the accidental loss specified in such a notification. If an item that is not one of those listed in this paragraph is lost as a result of an accident, i.e., an item of support equipment listed in the Memorandum of Understanding, it would also be notified in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

Paragraph 3 of Section VIII sets forth procedures on removal from accountability as a result of disablement beyond repair: if, in the judgment of the Party possessing an item accountable under the provisions of the Treaty, that item is disabled beyond repair, notification of such disablement shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. That paragraph further provides that the disabled item shall be eliminated at the site of disablement, or at a conversion or elimination facility, in accordance with applicable procedures provided for in this Protocol, including inspection.

Paragraph 4 of Section VIII states that procedures provided for in paragraph 5 of this Section shall be used to change the accountability, as a result of static display, of ICBMs, SLBMs, launch canisters, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers.

Paragraph 5 of Section VIII sets forth procedures for changing the accountability of items as a result of static display: prior to being placed on static display, the item shall be rendered inoperable and unusable so that it cannot be used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty, and, after being rendered inoperable and unusable, the item to be placed on static display, except for silo launchers of ICBMs, shall be transported to a location where it could be inspected. There are no procedures for making specific items "inoperable and unusable." The paragraph provides that notification of the completion of the procedures for making the item a static display shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol. This paragraph further states that a Party shall have the right, within the 30-day period beginning on the date of receipt of the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol, to conduct an inspection of such an item, and, if an inspection is conducted, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall fill out the inspection report provided for in Section XVIII of the Inspection Protocol. This report, which attests to the inspection team's observation of the item specified for static display, includes the measurements and observations that the team made. Finally, this paragraph states that, upon completion of the inspection, or, if an inspection was not conducted, upon expiration of the 30-day period, and after the item to be placed on static display, except for silo launchers of ICBMs, has been transported to and installed at its static display location, the item shall be considered to be on static display, and notification of that fact shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

Paragraph 6 of Section VIII states that, if the Party possessing the item removes it from static display, that item shall be eliminated at the site of static display, or at a conversion or elimination facility, in accordance with applicable procedures provided for in this Protocol. This paragraph further provides that, upon completion of such procedures, the eliminated item shall cease to be subject to the limitations on static displays provided for in paragraph 7(a) of Article IV of the Treaty and notification of the removal from accountability shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

Paragraph 7 of Section VIII sets forth procedures for changing accountability of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers as a result of conversion for use as ground trainers: at least one third of each wing or the entire vertical stabilizer of the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber shall be removed, and the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber so converted shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in Article II and in subparagraphs 3(a) and 3(b) of Article IV of the Treaty. The paragraph also states that notification of the change in accountability of the converted heavy bomber or former heavy bomber shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. The paragraph further requires that, upon the completion of the conversion process, a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber converted for use as a ground trainer remain visible to national technical means of verification for a 90-day period.

Paragraph 8 of Section VIII states that a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber converted for use as a ground trainer that is no longer used for such purposes shall be eliminated in situ or at a conversion or elimination facility for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, in accordance with applicable procedures provided for in Section VI of this Protocol. That paragraph also provides that, upon the completion of the appropriate elimination procedures, the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber converted for use as a ground trainer shall cease to be subject to the numerical limitations on ground trainers provided for in paragraph 28 of Article IV of the Treaty, and notification of the removal from accountability of the converted heavy bomber or former heavy bomber shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

SECTION IX PROCEDURES FOR ELIMINATION OF FACILITIES

Section IX consists of two paragraphs and sets forth procedures for the elimination of facilities.

Paragraph 1 of Section IX states that each Party shall have the right to verify by inspection that the elimination of facilities provided for in paragraph 2 of Section XII of the Inspection Protocol has been completed, i.e., ICBM bases; submarine bases; ICBM loading facilities; SLBM loading facilities; repair facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs; storage facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, heavy bombers, or former heavy bombers; training facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or heavy bombers; conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs; test ranges; air bases for heavy bombers; and air bases for former heavy bombers. The paragraph further states that the completion of elimination of all other declared facilities shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification.

Paragraph 2 of Section IX specifies that any declared facility shall be considered to be eliminated for the purposes of the Treaty as soon as all strategic offensive arms specified for such a facility, and all support equipment, have been removed and all silo launchers and fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs are eliminated in accordance with the procedures provided for in this Protocol. The paragraph also provides that notification of the elimination of a facility shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol .

A final provision, like those in the other Protocols, provides that, pursuant to subparagraph (b) of Article XV of the Treaty, additional measures can be agreed upon by the Parties with respect to this Protocol to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if changes need to be made in the Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, then such changes as are agreed upon shall be made within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), without resorting to the amendment procedures set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty. Pursuant to Article XVII of the Treaty, the Protocol is deemed to be an integral part of the Treaty.

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOL ON INSPECTIONS AND CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE PROTOCOL

The Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities (Inspection Protocol) consists of a preamble, 18 Sections, and 12 Annexes.

Pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty, the Protocol provides detailed procedures for implementing the Treaty's on-site inspection and continuous monitoring procedures. These extensive and intrusive on-site procedures will work in conjunction with national technical means of verification provided for in Articles IX, X, and XII, and the information exchanges provided for in Article VIII, to assist in verification of compliance.

The Protocol provides details on the facilities and systems that are subject to inspection and sets forth procedures for continuous monitoring activities and the 12 types of on-site inspections that are permitted by different paragraphs of Article XI. These types of inspections and activities are as follows, with the corresponding paragraph from Article XI of the Treaty shown in parenthesis: baseline data inspections (paragraph 2); data update inspections (paragraph 3); new facility inspections (paragraph 4); suspect-site inspections (paragraph 5); reentry vehicle inspections (paragraph 6); post-exercise dispersal inspections of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles (paragraph 7); conversion or elimination inspections (paragraph 8); close-out inspections (paragraph 9); formerly declared facility inspections (paragraph 10); technical characteristics exhibitions (paragraph 11); distinguishability exhibitions (paragraph 12); baseline exhibitions (paragraph 13); and continuous monitoring activities (paragraph 14).

Baseline data inspections may be conducted between 45 and 165 days after entry into force of the Treaty. These inspections will be carried out at inspectable declared facilities to help confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified for such facilities as of entry into force. Such numbers and types of items, as of September 1, 1990, were specified in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and will be updated in the initial exchange of data to be provided 30 days after entry into force, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

Data update inspections may be conducted beginning 165 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter. Each Party will have a combined quota of 15 data update and suspect site inspections each year for the duration of the Treaty, with a maximum of two per year at any one facility. Data update inspections will be carried out to help confirm the numbers and types of items specified for such facilities in the notifications and regular exchanges of updated data that are required by paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

New facility inspections may begin 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty. These inspections are essentially baseline data inspections for inspectable facilities that come into being after the entry into force of the Treaty. Each Party will have up to 60 days to conduct such an inspection after notification of a new facility.

Suspect-site inspections may be conducted, beginning 165 days after entry into force of the Treaty, to help confirm that covert assembly of mobile ICBMs or covert assembly of first stages of such ICBMs is not occurring at facilities on an agreed list (see paragraph 12 of Annex I of the Memorandum of Understanding). These inspections count against the quota for data update inspections.

Reentry vehicle inspections may be conducted, beginning 165 days after the entry into force of the Treaty, on ICBMs that are deployed in silos, on road-mobile launchers in restricted areas, on rail-mobile launchers in rail garrisons, and on SLBMs that are deployed on submarines at submarine bases to help confirm that they are not deployed with more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads that are attributed to them. The inspected Party is required to demonstrate that the number of reentry vehicles does not exceed the number of warheads attributed to that missile. There is an annual quota of 10 reentry vehicle inspections, with a maximum of two per year at any one base.

Post-exercise dispersal inspections (referred to for convenience as post-dispersal inspections in the Inspection Protocol) may be conducted to help confirm that mobile launchers of ICBMs and their missiles have returned to their bases after completion of an exercise dispersal or are otherwise accounted for. Up to forty percent of the bases involved in an exercise dispersal may be selected at random by the inspecting Party for inspection, with a minimum of one base of each type of mobile missile that took part in the dispersal.

Conversion or elimination inspections are conducted to help confirm that the procedures specified in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol for conversion or elimination of strategic systems -- mobile ICBMs and their launch canisters, mobile ICBM launchers, heavy bombers, or former heavy bombers -- were followed. The right, or in some cases the obligation, to conduct these inspections begins 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty.

Close-out inspections are conducted to help confirm that the standards for elimination of inspectable facilities have been met. The other Party has 60 days after notification of the elimination of the facility to conduct a close-out inspection, if it chooses to do so. These inspections may also be conducted during the baseline period at facilities that existed at the time of Treaty signature, but not at the time of entry into force.

Formerly declared facility inspections may be conducted, beginning 165 days after entry into force, to help confirm that eliminated facilities continue to meet the elimination standards. These inspections may be conducted after a close-out inspection is conducted or after the 60-day period for conducting a close-out inspection has expired. Each Party has the right to conduct a total of three formerly declared facility inspections each year, with no more than two per year at any one facility.

Technical characteristics exhibitions provide each Party the opportunity to inspect each type and variant of ICBM and SLBM and each version of mobile launcher of ICBMs of the other Party. The purpose is to help confirm the dimensions and certain other data given in the Memorandum of Understanding for these systems. Exhibitions of existing systems are to be completed no later than 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty. Under the terms of the Agreement on Early Exhibitions, the exhibitions will be carried out within 240 days after Treaty signature, but any item or characteristic not exhibited prior to entry into force under that Agreement must be exhibited after entry into force.

Distinguishability exhibitions provide each Party with the opportunity to inspect one of each type, category, and variant (as applicable) of heavy bomber (except heavy bombers of a type that has never been tested with long-range nuclear ALCMs, such as the B-2), former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs of the other Party. At these exhibitions, the inspecting Party will observe the technical characteristics specified in the Memorandum of Understanding for heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs (including equipment for ALCMs), confirm the features that distinguish categories of heavy bombers (except test heavy bombers) from one another and from former heavy bombers, and observe the features that distinguish variants of heavy bombers and long-range nuclear ALCMs, respectively, from one another. This will prepare the inspecting Party so that during future inspections it can confirm the identity of these systems and the number of them that are declared to be present. Exhibitions of existing systems are to be completed no later than 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty. Under the terms of the Agreement on Early Exhibitions, the exhibitions will be carried out within 240 days after Treaty signature, but any item or characteristic not exhibited prior to entry into force under that Agreement must be exhibited after entry into force.

Baseline exhibitions, to be conducted during the period for baseline inspections, are required of each heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments, each training heavy bomber, and each former heavy bomber declared as of entry into force of the Treaty. These exhibitions allow the other Party to confirm that such airplanes meet the standards of conversion provided in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Subsequent baseline exhibitions are also required when a long-range nuclear ALCM is first flight-tested from a deployed type of bomber from which no long-range nuclear ALCM has previously been flight-tested.

Continuous monitoring will be conducted at final assembly facilities for mobile ICBMs (for missiles in canisters) or assembly facilities for the first stage of mobile ICBMs (for missiles that exist as stages). Such monitoring will assist in counting the number of mobile ICBMs that are produced. For the purposes of continuous monitoring under the Treaty, the U.S. Peacekeeper is treated as a mobile ICBM; it is subject to non-deployed limits, its production is monitored, and each missile must have a unique identifier.

In addition to specific provisions for each type of inspection and for continuous monitoring, the Inspection Protocol provides for: the legal status of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members; notifications concerning inspections and continuous monitoring activities; arrangements for air transportation; activities beginning upon arrival at the point of entry; general rules for the conduct of the inspection and continuous monitoring activities; the cancellation of inspections; and the preparation of inspection reports and continuous monitoring reports.

The 12 Annexes to the Inspection Protocol contain detailed procedures on: (1) how to inspect covered objects, containers, launch canisters, vehicles, and structures; (2) how to inspect silo launchers of ICBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, and SLBM launchers; (3) how to conduct reentry vehicle inspections; (4) how to conduct exhibitions and inspections of heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, long-range ALCMs, and their facilities; (5) how to conduct continuous monitoring; (6) how to inspect unique identifiers; (7) how to deliver and examine equipment and supplies; (8) types of equipment for inspections and continuous monitoring activities and methods of use; (9) characteristics and methods of use of equipment for the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system; (10) types of inspection airplanes; (11) how to conduct technical characteristic exhibitions and inspections of ICBMs and SLBMs; and (12) the size criteria to be used during inspections and continuous monitoring.

This analysis refers to short-notice" types of inspections. These are baseline data, data update, new facility, suspect-site, reentry vehicle, post-exercise dispersal, and formerly declared facility inspections. Scheduled" types of inspections include conversion or elimination and close-out inspections, as well as technical characteristics, distinguishability, and baseline exhibitions.

PREAMBLE

The preamble links the Inspection Protocol to the basic rights concerning inspection and continuous monitoring that are provided by Article XI of the Treaty.

SECTION I - GENERAL OBLIGATIONS

Section I establishes the overarching principle that each Party is obliged to facilitate the conduct of inspections and continuous monitoring activities by the other Party. An obligation to facilitate includes an obligation not to hinder or interfere with an activity. Thus, there is no need for a separate provision on non-interference with inspections that would be analogous to the prohibition on noninterference with national technical means, set forth in paragraph 2 of Article IX of the Treaty.

SECTION II - PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE LEGAL STATUS OF INSPECTORS, MONITORS, AND AIRCREW MEMBERS

Section II deals with two issues: development and maintenance of the agreed lists of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members, and the privileges and immunities enjoyed by these inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members. The Agreement on the Early Exchange of Lists provides for exchanging the initially proposed names before the entry into force of the Treaty.

Paragraph 1 of Section II establishes the basic ground rules for inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members. Individuals on each list are agreed upon in accordance with provisions of this Section and the Agreement on the Early Exchange of Lists. Paragraph 1 provides that only inspectors may conduct inspections, and that only monitors may conduct continuous monitoring activities (which include not only monitoring, but also construction and maintenance of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system). Inspectors and monitors will arrive in the territory of the other Party only on inspection airplanes that are operated by specified aircrew members or on regularly-scheduled commercial flights to the point of entry.

Paragraph 2 of Section II sets limits on the number of inspectors (400) and monitors (300) on the current lists; these numbers may be changed by mutual agreement. These levels were selected to provide a sufficient pool of individuals, while keeping at a manageable level the job of checking the background and identity of proposed individuals. The number of individuals on the list of aircrew members is not limited, so that the high rate of personnel turnover in the US Military Airlift Command can be accommodated. With respect to the content of the list, "blast" is an administrative subdivision used within the Soviet Union.

Paragraph 3 of Section II provides each Party with the basic right to agree with or object to the designation of each inspector, monitor, and aircrew member proposed by the other Party; it also refers to the appropriate notification to be used in such circumstances. The acceptable grounds for objections are set forth in paragraph 6 of Section II.

Paragraph 4 of Section II limits the frequency with which the lists may be changed, limits the number of new names that may be added during a change, and refers to the appropriate notification. There are two reasons for these limits: First, they ease the burden on the FBI, which is responsible for conducting background checks on proposed Soviet inspectors and monitors. Second, these limits bound the administrative burden of keeping the list updated. A response to a proposed change is required within a limited time, just as in the case of the initially proposed names.

Paragraph 5 of Section II requires that each Party provide visas to the individuals that it has agreed to allow to enter. These individuals are to use such visas in accordance with the Treaty. Under the provisions of the Twenty-second Agreed Statement, the Parties may also agree to use such visas for conducting continuous monitoring inspections under the INF Treaty.

Paragraph 6 of Section II provides the grounds for objecting to proposed or already-agreed inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members. While proposed monitors and aircrew members may be objected to for any reason, specific and serious reasons (i.e., being under indictment for a criminal offense on the territory of the inspected Party, having been convicted in a criminal prosecution, or having been expelled by the inspected Party) are required to object to proposed inspectors or to object to any individual once that individual has been agreed to by the Parties. The stricter standard in the latter case recognizes the fact that there are lesser counter-intelligence concerns in the case of inspectors than monitors, since inspectors will spend less time in the inspected country and their movements are more restricted.

Paragraph 7 of Section II entitles inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members to various privileges and immunities. Proceeding from the basis of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, paragraph 7 provides inviolability to individual inspectors and monitors, and to their work spaces, living spaces, and papers. Subparagraph 7(h) sets forth the approach for dealing with any abuses. During the negotiations, the Parties agreed that attics and basements adjacent to office and living spaces are inherently part of these spaces and thus are accorded inviolability and protection; the operations center is excluded because the inspected Party has the right to be escorted into the operations center when it desires, pursuant to paragraph 28 of Section XVI of the Protocol. The provisions on privileges and immunities are drawn from, and substantially identical with, those found in the Annex to the Protocol on Inspections of the INF Treaty. There are two small differences, however. The START provisions are explicit that the immunity of individuals and the inviolability of airplanes does not apply to regularly scheduled commercial flights; INF is silent on the subject. In addition, under INF the responsibility to prevent repetition of an abuse is the subject of joint consultations; in START, if the inspected Party considers that there has been an abuse of privileges and immunities, consultations will be held to determine whether such an abuse has occurred. If it is determined that such an abuse has occurred, the inspecting Party is responsible for taking the necessary measures to prevent a repetition of such an abuse.

SECTION III - NOTIFICATIONS CONCERNING INSPECTIONS AND CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES

Section III contains all notifications dealing exclusively with inspections and monitoring. There are notifications that are integrated with the sequence of events associated with an inspection (see paragraphs 3 through 9 of this Section) or with continuous monitoring (paragraphs 10 through 19), and there are notifications dealing exclusively with the administrative aspects of inspections and continuous monitoring (paragraphs 2 and 20 through 25). These notifications were put in the Inspection Protocol, rather than the Notification Protocol, for ease of use by those persons who will be responsible for implementing the inspection and continuous monitoring provisions. The timing and sequence of events are similar for all the short-notice" types of inspections. Similarly, the timing and sequence of events are similar for the scheduled" types of inspections.

Paragraph 1 of Section III provides that the notifications sent pursuant to this Section will follow the general provisions for notifications in Article VIII of the Treaty. Thus, the notifications will be sent through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers.

Paragraph 2 of Section III sets the times for providing and updating the diplomatic clearance numbers for inspection airplanes.

Paragraph 3 of Section III is the notification that alerts the other Party to an impending short-notice" type of inspection. Such notifications will include a statement of when, after arrival at the point of entry, the named inspectors will reveal what type of inspection will be conducted at which inspection site.

Paragraph 4 of Section III specifies the amount of time the inspecting Party has to reveal the type of inspection and inspection site. For baseline data and new facility inspections, there is more flexibility than for other short-notice" inspections; this recognizes the scheduling difficulties associated with the large number of baseline data inspections to be completed between 45 and 165 days after entry into force of the Treaty. The special provisions for post-exercise dispersal inspections balance the inspected Party's need to complete the inspections in a timely manner, so the bases can return to normal operations, with the inspecting Party's need for sufficient time to assemble the inspection teams and transport them to the site.

Paragraph 5 of Section III provides for the notification that will alert the inspected Party that inspectors will be arriving for a scheduled" type of inspection (i.e., conversion or elimination inspection, close-out inspection, or one of the three kinds of exhibitions); such notification must specify the inspection site and the type of inspection.

Paragraph 6 of Section III provides for the notification of the arrival of replacement inspectors to relieve those already on duty at an elimination site, as provided for in paragraph 4 of Section XI of the Inspection Protocol. Such replacements would be allowed if the eliminations continued for more than three weeks at that elimination site.

Paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 of Section III provide for the set of notifications for a sequential inspection -- one that is to be carried out at a different site by an inspection team already in the country to carry out an inspection. These notifications are designed not only to provide the same amount of warning to the facility designated for inspection as that facility would have had if the inspectors were arriving from outside the country, but also to preserve the surprise element for short-notice" types of inspections. Paragraph 7 alerts the inspected Party that there will be a sequential inspection. If the sequential inspection is of the scheduled" type, the inspection team simply provides the name of the next site. For an inspection of the short-notice" type, paragraph 7 requires the inspection team to state whether it intends to go directly to the next site or to go first to the point of entry; paragraph 8 provides for the notification of when the type of inspection and site will be revealed, and paragraph 9 gives the time window for revealing that information. Paragraph 33 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol limits sequential inspections to those associated with the same point of entry.

Paragraphs 10 through 13 of Section III are the notifications associated with setting up the equipment for continuous monitoring and starting to monitor the production of mobile ICBMs. They provide timelines both for notifying the start of monitoring production and for entering the country to conduct the engineering survey to prepare for building construction and equipment installation as early as 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty. For this to be accomplished, the paragraph 10 and 11 notifications would have to be given immediately upon entry into force since they are 30-day pre-notifications.

Paragraph 10 of Section III provides for the notification of the intention to establish a monitoring system and to bring in a team to conduct the engineering site survey. This notification precedes any other notification regarding a given facility subject to continuous monitoring.

Paragraph 11 of Section III provides for setting the date at which continuous monitoring will commence and alerting the other Party of the arrival of the initial team of monitors who will actually carry out continuous monitoring at a particular facility. Beginning on the specified date, all vehicles and containers large enough to contain an item of continuous monitoring (as defined in paragraph 20 of Section VI) may exit from the facility only through the designated portal under the surveillance of the monitors.

Paragraph 12 of Section III provides for the notification that starts the six-month period for the host country to provide the logistic support that is requested, taking into account the findings of the engineering site survey of the site.

Paragraph 13 of Section III provides for the notification alerting a Party of the planned first arrival of monitors to set up the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system at a facility.

Paragraph 14 of Section III provides for notification of the intention to replace monitors; it applies to monitors setting up equipment or monitoring a facility. Paragraph 28 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol permits temporary increases in the number of monitors present at a facility to accommodate changeovers of monitors to take place at the facility.

Paragraph 15 of Section III provides for the notification of the intended entry of monitors to maintain a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system. The flexible limits provided for in Paragraph 28 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol permit temporary increases in the number of monitors present at a facility.

Paragraph 16 of Section III provides for notification to be provided when monitors intend to leave a facility -- either to leave the country or to move to another facility.

Paragraphs 17, 18, and 19 of Section III address the notifications associated with the use of special cargo flights for facilities subject to continuous monitoring and for monitored facilities. A notification pursuant to paragraph 17 alerts the other Party at least 20 days in advance of the planned use of a special cargo flight and provides sufficient information on the amount and destination of the cargo for transportation within the territory of the inspected Party to be arranged. A notification pursuant to paragraph 18 confirms the paragraph 17 notification and provides additional information at least 7 days in advance of the flight. The permission of the inspected Party is required before the flight may land at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility rather than the point of entry. If the paragraph 17 and 18 notifications indicate a desire to land at the airport associated with the facility, the inspected Party must, pursuant to paragraph 19 provide a notification either granting or denying permission. If the inspected Party grants permission to land at the airport associated with the facility, it has the right to have an aircrew escort on-board the aircraft.

Paragraphs 20, 21, and 22 of Section III address the lists of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members. Pursuant to paragraph 20, notifications are used to provide proposed changes to the lists. Pursuant to paragraph 21, notifications are used to convey the agreement with or objection to inclusion of the proposed names. Pursuant to paragraph 22, notifications are used to object to a name to which the Parties had previously agreed.

Paragraph 23 of Section III provides for the notification to be used by a Party to change the points of entry to its territory; such a change does not require agreement by the other Party. However, the number of points of entry must be two or three as required by paragraph 1 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol, and the time limits for transporting inspectors to an inspection site require a Party to select points of entry well-situated with respect to inspectable facilities.

Paragraph 24 of Section III provides for the notification of the flight plan of an inspection airplane prior to departure to the inspected Party's territory.

Paragraph 25 of Section III provides for the notification acknowledging and approving the flight plan of an inspection airplane in response to a paragraph 24 notification.

SECTION IV - ARRANGEMENTS FOR AIR TRANSPORTATION

Paragraph 1 of Section IV bounds the number of points of entry on the territory of each Party: two or three at each Party's discretion. Access to each inspectable facility may be made only through the point of entry with which it is associated. The associations between points of entry and inspection sites are set forth in paragraph 9 of Annex I of the Memorandum of Understanding.

Paragraph 2 of Section IV provides for identification of a nearby airport for each facility subject to continuous monitoring and each monitored facility to be used by special cargo flights if so requested by the inspecting Party and agreed by the inspected Party. Many, but not all, of the general rules governing points of entry also apply at such airports when used by special cargo flights.

Paragraph 3 of Section IV establishes the inspecting Party's general right to use inspection airplanes of specified types for the transportation of inspectors or monitors and their equipment to points of entry. The notifications that must be made, as appropriate, are cited.

Paragraph 4 of Section IV establishes the inspecting Party's right to use inspection airplanes of specified types for the transportation of cargo to points of entry. With the consent of the other Party, such cargo flights may land at the airport associated with a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. These airplanes are also allowed to carry monitors and, if landing at a point of entry, inspectors. The inspected Party has the right to provide an escort crew because the flight will not necessarily be on established international airways. The notifications that must be made, as appropriate, are cited.

Paragraph 5 of Section IV provides that during an operational dispersal conducted by one of the Parties, flights to transport monitors and to transport cargo to the territory of the Party that has declared an operational dispersal and to the territory of the Party that has declared the suspension of inspections in connection with such a dispersal conducted by the other Party, must be agreed through diplomatic channels. During operational dispersals, continuous monitoring activities continue and cannot be suspended. Suspending monitoring would decrease confidence that the inspected Party had not exceeded the non-deployed limits on mobile ICBMs.

Paragraph 6 of Section IV provides the option to use regularly scheduled commercial flights, rather than inspection airplanes, to transport inspectors and monitors and their equipment to points of entry having such service.

Paragraph 7 of Section IV provides the right to use special cargo flights (see paragraph 4 of this Section) to transport equipment and supplies for more than one monitored facility if all these facilities are associated with the same point of entry and the flight is made to that point of entry.

Paragraphs 8 through 11 of Section IV provide administrative procedures for dealing with inspection airplanes, including procedures for issuing diplomatic clearance numbers, flight plan filing and approval in accordance with recognized international rules, and assignment of call signs.

Paragraph 12 of Section IV establishes the general limit of ten aircrew members for inspection airplanes, but allows up to 25 to be on the special cargo flights provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section. Additional aircrew members could also be brought into the country, with permission of the host, to deal with the breakdown of an inspection airplane.

Paragraph 13 of Section IV spells out the services to be provided for the inspection airplanes of the inspecting Party and specifies which Party pays for each type of service. Allocating the cost of parking and security protection to the inspected Party is intended to avoid a problem that arose in INF when the Soviets billed the US for such services, and the US did not charge the Soviets for the equivalent service.

Paragraph 14 of Section IV requires agreement in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) on the maximum weight of equipment and supplies that may be carried on a routine flight of an inspection airplane bringing in monitors. Having such a limit assists the inspected Party in arranging adequate transportation to deliver the equipment to the monitored facility. The agreement on the actual number was deferred to the JCIC because a similar limit was being negotiated in the Special Verification Commission (SVC) for INF, and the Parties wanted the START number to be consistent with the INF number.

SECTION V - ACTIVITIES BEGINNING UPON ARRIVAL AT THE POINT OF ENTRY

Section V contains provisions for activities that are carried out at the point of entry (POE) and obligations that apply throughout the in-country period, which begins with arrival at the POE. These provisions deal primarily with the duties of escorts for the inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members; examination, clearance, impoundment, and storage of equipment; designation of the inspection site and type of inspection; services to be provided and allocation of costs; and mass media. They draw on, and elaborate upon, similar provisions contained in the INF Treaty and Memorandum of Agreement.

Paragraph 1 of Section V requires the in-country escort (which may consist of several individuals representing the inspected Party) to meet inspectors or monitors and aircrew members when they arrive at the point of entry and to assist them throughout their stay in the country. The escort is required to accompany inspectors throughout their stay; the escort has the right to accompany the monitors throughout their stay, but is not required to do so continuously.

Paragraph 2 of Section V requires personnel from the inspecting Party's embassy or consulate to meet inspectors or monitors and aircrew members when they arrive at the point of entry. These personnel may accompany inspectors and monitors only during their stay at the POE, but may accompany aircrew members throughout the in-country period.

Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Section V address the case of Soviet inspectors or monitors arriving at the San Francisco point of entry and incorporate procedures from our INF experience. Paragraph 3 deals with Soviet inspection airplanes, which are required to land at Travis Air Force Base; paragraph 4 provides for transportation of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members to Travis if they arrive on a commercial flight at San Francisco International Airport. Detailed procedures are provided for Soviet diplomatic personnel who are assigned to the San Francisco consulate to travel between San Francisco and Travis Air Force Base to meet and accompany Soviet inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members who have arrived at the Base, as required in paragraph 2 of this Section. Such procedures are required since the normal free movement zones for such diplomats do not include Travis Air Force Base.

Paragraph 5 of Section V makes clear that the provisions of the Treaty dealing with the rights and obligations of inspectors and monitors apply only to those who have arrived and are still in the territory of the other Party.

Paragraph 6 of Section V sets the standards for clothing (civilian) and identification (unique badges provided by the inspecting Party) of inspectors and monitors during their time in the country.

Paragraphs 7 through 14 of Section V deal with equipment and supplies brought by inspectors and monitors and how the items are cleared upon entry into the country. Paragraph 7 exempts such equipment and supplies from customs duties and requires that they be expeditiously processed at the point of entry.

Paragraph 8 of Section V establishes the right of the host Party to examine, in the presence of representatives of the inspecting Party, equipment and supplies each time that they are brought into the country. Permitted equipment will be that listed in Annexes 8 or 9 of the Inspection Protocol. The purpose of such examination is to ascertain, to the satisfaction of each Party, that the equipment or supplies cannot perform functions unconnected with the requirements of inspections or continuous monitoring activities. There is a presumption that, if the equipment is a model listed in Annex 8 or 9, it cannot perform functions unconnected with these requirements. However, this does not affect the right of the Parties to challenge such equipment on the grounds that it has been modified to perform such functions.

Paragraph 9 of Section V provides for equipment and supplies brought on commercial flights or inspection airplanes other than special cargo flights to be examined at the POE.

Paragraph 10 of Section V refers to Annex 7 of the Inspection Protocol for provisions on the procedures and locations for examining equipment and supplies brought on special cargo flights.

Paragraph 11 of Section V gives the inspected Party the right to impound at the location of the examination any equipment or supplies found to be capable of performing functions unconnected with inspection or monitoring requirements. Equipment and supplies impounded at the POE or the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility cannot be brought to such a facility or inspection site unless the inspected Party informs the inspecting Party otherwise. Note that Annex 7 of the Inspection Protocol contains procedures related to examination and impoundment at the monitored facility.

Paragraph 12 of Section V outlines procedures for on-the-spot resolution of disagreements on whether equipment or supplies should be cleared for entry into the country. If the disagreement cannot be resolved during the examination, the Parties would record their views in a joint document and refer the matter for resolution in diplomatic channels, in the JCIC, or by another agreed method.

Paragraph 13 of Section V provides for removal of impounded equipment or supplies and for any necessary storage pending removal to be under dual control. Unless the inspected Party expressly states that impounded items need not be removed from its territory, such items must be removed no later than the departure of the inspection team that brought them, or no later than the next departure of monitors from the country.

Paragraph 14 of Section V provides for secure storage, under dual control, of cleared inspection and monitoring equipment and supplies at the POE.

Paragraph 15 of Section V requires that, for a short-notice" type of inspection, the inspection site and type of inspection be revealed in writing at or before the time specified for designation of the site and inspection type in the notification of intent to conduct an inspection.

Paragraphs 16 and 17 of Section V provide for certain situations in which the escort informs the inspection team that the facility it has selected for inspection has few or no items of inspection present. The team can then choose to carry out the inspection anyway, or choose to start over" and designate an inspection type and an inspection site associated with the same POE, or choose not to conduct the inspection (without penalty).Paragraph 16 deals with reentry vehicle inspections and the case when a designated base has no deployed SLBMs or mobile ICBMS. Paragraph 17 deals with heavy bomber facilities, where airplanes are inspectable, that have been designated for data update inspections, and from which more than 30 percent of the inspectable aircraft based at that facility would be absent during the first 20 hours of the period of inspection. If there is no issue regarding the number of airplanes to be present or if the inspection team leader decides to conduct the inspection, paragraph 17 also requires the escort, before the team leaves for the facility, to inform the team of the airfields within national territory at which each absent heavy bomber and former heavy bomber based at that facility will be located. Note that no locational information is provided until it is definite that the inspection will take place at a particular facility. Note also that this information is required only for absent airplanes that are in national territory. (General locations of absent airplanes outside national territory are provided during pre-inspection briefings at the air base.) Note finally that the number and type of test heavy bombers at the facility to be inspected are also provided at the point of entry. This approach strikes a balance that preserves both operational flexibility for bomber activities and efficient utilization of inspection rights.

Paragraphs 18 through 21 of Section V specify the services (food, lodging, transportation, etc.) the inspected Party is required to provide for the inspectors, monitors, aircrew, and their equipment and supplies and allocates the costs for these services. Paragraph 18 is for inspectors and aircrew members; paragraph 19 is for monitors; and paragraph 21 is for the escort crew for special cargo flights landing at airports other than the POE. The inspected Party pays for all in-country services connected with inspections. Such services provided by each government are expected to be roughly in balance. In contrast, the inspecting Party pays for almost all in-country services connected with monitoring, since the cumulative services needed to support monitoring may be greater for one Party than the other. Paragraph 20 sets the standards for the meals, lodging, and transportation at inspection sites and monitored facilities to be provided by the inspected Party.

Paragraph 22 of Section V sets the conditions for representatives of the mass media to cover the activities of inspection teams and monitoring teams. At the POE the inspected Party provides such representatives an opportunity to photograph and televise the arrival and departure of inspection and monitoring teams. The Parties must agree, on a case-by-case basis through diplomatic channels, on any arrangements to provide representatives of the mass media an opportunity to interview inspectors and monitors, or, in conjunction with such interviews, an opportunity to take photographs and make audio-visual recordings. The activities of representatives of the mass media must be arranged so that such activities do not interfere with the conduct of inspections, continuous monitoring activities, or the process of elimination. Representatives of the mass media are not allowed to accompany inspectors during inspections or monitors during continuous monitoring activities.

SECTION VI - GENERAL RULES FOR THE CONDUCT OF INSPECTIONS AND CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES

Section VI provides the general rules that apply to inspections and to continuous monitoring activities. These rules govern the behavior of the inspectors and monitors; the behavior of the in-country escort; activities in the inspectable area at an inspection site; the time limits for transporting inspectors from the POE to an inspection site; the use of equipment, recording of measurements, and handling of ambiguities; the size thresholds for inspections and monitoring; the limits on inspection and monitoring team size; the general sequence of events in an inspection; and the frequency of monitor replacement. These provisions build on lessons learned from INF experience. Additional rules applicable only to certain types of inspection are set forth in Sections VII through XVI.

Paragraph 1 of Section VI declares the fundamental obligation that inspectors and monitors are to discharge their functions in accordance with this Protocol.

Paragraph 2 of Section VI requires that inspectors and monitors not disclose information obtained during inspections or continuous monitoring activities unless their own government permits it. The assumption is that the Parties will only permit disclosure in accordance with paragraph 6 of Article VIII of the Treaty.

Paragraph 3 of Section VI establishes the principle that the boundaries of an inspection site are the boundaries of the facility shown on the site diagram provided for that facility. For those types of inspections that are carried out using the Annex 1 procedures for inspecting objects, containers, launch canisters, vehicles, and structures, these boundaries define the area or areas within which those procedures may be carried out.

Paragraph 4 of Section VI deals with facilities that have non-contiguous areas and roads joining those areas. For the provisions of this paragraph to apply, the roads joining the noncontiguous areas must be shown on site diagrams. During an inspection, no item is inspectable while it is on one of those roads, but will be inspectable if it enters one of the noncontiguous areas during the period of inspection. Furthermore, Treaty-limited items moving on those roads from one noncontiguous area of the facility to another are not considered to be in transit; otherwise a notification would be required every time a Treaty-limited item was moved to different parts of the same facility. See the discussion of subparagraph 6(c) of Section VII for pre-inspection movement restrictions as they apply to such a site.

Paragraph 5 of Section VI requires that, in discharging their functions, inspectors and monitors communicate with personnel of the inspected Party only through the in-country escorts. This provision is intended to prevent a situation in which inspectors or monitors make requests directly to personnel of the inspected Party who are not part of the in-country escort; such personnel might not be in a position to know whether the request was legitimate under terms of the Treaty.

Paragraph 6 of Section VI establishes the principle that the activities of inspectors and monitors should only interfere with the ongoing activities at an inspection site to the extent necessary to carry out the agreed procedures, and not hamper or delay the operation of the facility nor compromise safety.

Paragraph 7 of Section VI requires that the inspectors or monitors comply with regulations communicated by the in-country escort for safety and for protecting equipment and controlled environments. The hosts will provide protective gear as they deem necessary for these purposes. For example, inspectors must obey instructions, such as not to touch an item, or to wear gloves while inspecting it. The hosts, however, remain bound by the requirement to facilitate the inspection.

Paragraph 8 of Section VI requires that appropriate lighting must be provided, not only for photographs, but to enable the inspectors or monitors to carry out the procedures provided for in the Inspection Protocol.

Paragraphs 9 and 10 of Section VI are mirror images of one another and provide the mechanism for dealing with personnel of either Party who are not following the provisions of the Inspection Protocol. If the personnel take actions that are not in accordance with the rules...," the team leader or a representative and the in-country escort may consult. This means that only in the case when the team leader and in-country escort have discussed the matter and are in agreement that an inappropriate action has occurred would it be necessary to take measures on the spot to prevent a repetition of the action. If questions or ambiguities are not resolved at the site, the inspection or monitoring team leader or the in-country escort may include a statement in the inspection or continuous monitoring report concerning such actions; the in-country escort or team chief or monitoring chief may include its response to such a statement in the report.

Paragraph 11 of Section VI establishes the principle that the host country controls the routes and means of travel of inspecting Party personnel within its territory. Special provisions are made for emergency travel. The inspected Party has the right to examine the personal baggage of inspectors or monitors, except papers, during any travel.

Paragraph 12 of Section VI provides that some members of the in-country escort at a facility must be representatives of the inspected facility to ensure that the escort is familiar with local conditions. Further, the inspected Party is required to provide full-time access of monitors to a member of the in-country escort at facilities subject to continuous monitoring and at monitored facilities, although this person need not be associated with the facility being monitored.

Paragraph 13 of Section VI requires the hosts to provide means of communication with the embassy of the inspecting Party in the inspected country at any time that the inspectors or monitors are at the point of entry, at the inspection site, or at the monitored area. This provision also establishes the right of monitors to communicate with their country from the monitored facility, using satellite communications when facsimile communications via the embassy cannot be achieved within 20 minutes. The inspected Party must also provide for communication between inspection team subgroups. Such means of communication are under the control of the inspected Party.

Paragraph 14 of Section VI requires the inspected Party to transport the inspection team to the inspection site for short-notice" types of inspections within nine hours after the time specified for naming the inspection site at the point of entry. If the team chooses to name the inspection site and type of inspection earlier than the scheduled site designation time, the nine hours will still begin at the scheduled time. An exception is made for data update inspections at road-mobile ICBM bases. Because the road-mobile launchers must return to their restricted areas within 24 hours after the base is designated for a data update inspection, the inspection team does not need to arrive at the inspection site until the 24-hour period for the return of mobile launchers has elapsed.

If an inspection is conducted after completion of a previous inspection and the team returns to the point of entry to name the next site, the same times apply; if the team chooses to go directly to the next inspection site, the host Party has 18 hours to transport the team. The rationale for providing a longer time frame for going directly to the next inspection site is that the distance from the first inspected site to the second inspected site may be greater than the distance from the point of entry to the second inspected site; the longer time frame also allows the aircrew to rest.

Paragraph 15 of Section VI establishes the right of the inspection team to bring cleared equipment and supplies as well as necessary documentation to an inspection site. Furthermore, for any specific item of equipment, the inspectors can bring the maximum number permitted for any type of inspection (but may only use, at any one time, the number permitted for the type of inspection being conducted). This allows the team to have at its disposal the necessary equipment, and thus preserves the option to conduct a sequential inspection of a different type. Provisions for storage of equipment at the inspection site and observation by the in-country escort are included.

Paragraph 16 of Section VI establishes the right of the monitors to have cleared equipment and supplies as well as necessary documentation at a monitored facility. Provisions are included for observation of equipment and supplies by the in-country escort, except cleared equipment or supplies when they are located in inviolable living or office space.

Paragraph 17 of Section VI provides for completing the information on manufacturer's numbers and model numbers required to be included in the equipment lists of Annexes 8 or 9 . It also provides for reaching expeditious final agreement on the equipment specifications. Provisions are made for replacement equipment. If an item of replacement equipment has the same purpose and similar characteristics as the equipment provided for in Annex 8 or 9, agreement on that replacement equipment can be reached in advance through diplomatic channels or later at the time of the examination. If the Parties have not reached agreement on an item of replacement equipment or if the purpose or characteristics of that replacement equipment differ from the purpose and characteristics provided for in Annex 9 , the JCIC will resolve the question.

Paragraph 18 of Section VI establishes the right of inspectors or monitors to use cleared equipment during inspections or continuous monitoring. Inspectors and monitors have the right to use any cleared equipment, except that cameras are to be used only by the in-country escort. At the request of inspectors or monitors, a member of the in-country escort will take two photographs of each object or building, within the inspection site or perimeter continuous monitoring area, about which questions or ambiguities have arisen. Each Party shall retain one photograph of each item.

Paragraph 19 of Section VI establishes two basic principles regarding any measurements taken during inspections or continuous monitoring activities. First, all measurements recorded during inspections or continuous monitoring activities must be in the report and certified by personnel of both Parties. Note that measurements taken by inspectors that they do not wish to record officially are not subject to this procedure. Second, any measurement of Treaty-limited items that deviates by no more than three percent of the value specified in the Memorandum of Understanding is considered to be consistent with the specified value. The latter rule is meant to account for manufacturing tolerances and deviations due to the process of field measurement.

Paragraphs 20 through 25 of Section VI set forth the principles concerning items and size criteria for inspection and continuous monitoring. These principles call for searching for and counting items of inspection" and items of continuous monitoring." They are based on examining and comparing any containers, canisters, vehicles or structures, within the boundaries of the site to determine whether they could contain an item of inspection or item of continuous monitoring. However, for continuous monitoring, such examination occurs at the portal, since monitors may not enter the production plant. The specific items of inspection" are defined in the combined context of the type of inspection (e.g., data update, suspect site, or post-exercise dispersal) and the type of facility or site of the inspection (e.g., an inspection at heavy bomber facilities, ICBM or SLBM facilities, or weapons storage areas at heavy bomber bases). In a suspect site inspection, for example, the items of inspection involve mobile missiles, solid rocket motors for first stages of mobile missiles, and first stages of mobile missiles at the inspection site. Items of continuous monitoring" involve mobile missiles (or their first stages if the missiles are maintained, stored, and transported in stages) that exit from a monitored facility.

The size criteria are related in each context to the dimensions of items of inspection" and items of continuous monitoring." For those types of inspections for which size criteria are applicable, inspectors are told where the Treaty-limited items are located and the number and types of items at each location. The inspected Party is required to satisfy the inspectors that the information that they have been given is accurate. By virtue of being told where all the items of inspection are located, the inspectors are also told that there are no other Treaty-limited items at the site. The inspected Party is also required to satisfy the inspectors of this fact. Items of inspection could be in containers, canisters, vehicles, or structures. Inspectors have the right to determine whether such containers, canisters, vehicles, and structures contain one or more items of inspection. If an inspected container, canister, vehicle, or structure is not large enough to contain" any item of inspection meeting the size criteria of that inspection, it is not subject to further inspection. Thus, the size criteria for a specific type of inspection establish a threshold that can be used to demonstrate that the dimensions of a container, canister, vehicle, or structure are insufficient to contain an item of inspection.

Alternate procedures for demonstrating whether a container, canister, vehicle, or structure contains an item of inspection are set forth in Annex 1 of the Inspection Protocol. Similar rules and procedures apply to objects, containers, and vehicles when inspecting for items of continuous monitoring at a monitored facility. In the case of monitoring, the Inspecting Party examines such objects only as they are exiting from the monitored facility.

It is important to note that there is not necessarily a single smallest" item of inspection such that, if a given container is not large enough to contain that specific item of inspection, the container could be considered not large enough to contain any other item of inspection. If there is, for example, a short-wide item of inspection and a long-thin item of inspection, a container's dimensions must be compared with the dimensions of both items to be sure neither they nor any other item of inspection specified for that category of inspection could fit. Thus, the Treaty essentially uses a template" approach to size criteria at inspections. Accordingly, one, two, or potentially more items of inspection will be considered in the determination by inspectors that a given container is not large enough to contain any of the items of inspection for a particular type of inspection.

During the negotiations, the Parties agreed to one exception to this principle related to solid rocket motors for mobile missiles. Because solid rocket motors could be built into partial stages and then be shipped to covert assembly sites, and due to the stated Soviet practice of only producing mobile missiles as one integrated unit including the launch canister when they leave the production facility, the Parties agreed that there would be specific restrictions placed on the location of such solid rocket motors. The Parties also agreed that, when inspecting Soviet ballistic missile facilities, a template would be used that was based upon the size of the smallest solid rocket motor for a Soviet mobile ICBM system, currently the SS-25.

Although the Soviet Union agreed to list solid rocket motors for first stages of mobile ICBMs as items of inspection, it claimed it could not agree, for political reasons, to specifically state in the Treaty that the Parties were actually inspecting for solid rocket motors. The stated Soviet rationale was that solid rocket motors were not specifically numerically limited under the Treaty. Therefore, an agreement was reached whereby the term agreed percentage" was used to indicate that the size criteria for Soviet ballistic missile facilities would be less than that derived from measuring the first stage. The Soviet delegation would not confirm what percentage was sufficient to capture the solid rocket motor; consequently, a percentage was never listed. Instead, the Parties agreed to exhibit the first stage of the SS-25 and the Peacekeeper in a configuration that allows inspectors to make an end-dome to end-dome measurement. This exhibition, done as a part of the technical characteristics exhibition, is intended to help ensure that the dimensions of the solid rocket motor are captured. This is the only case, other than in the determination of a new type, where an end dome-to-end dome measurement of an existing system is required. In addition, the Parties agreed to list the dimensions in Annex 12 of the appropriate items that set the size criteria, subject to the confirmation of the sizes at the exhibition. Consequently, the phrase the agreed percentage of the length of that stage" in subparagraph 23(a)(i) is a euphemism for a mobile missile solid rocket motor.

Paragraph 20 of Section VI lists the items of inspection for all types of inspections that use the procedures of Annex 1 of the Inspection Protocol. These are the actual objects for which inspectors are allowed to search, and are specific to the type of inspection and the type of facility.

Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 20 lists not only ICBMs and SLBMs, but also first stages. This is because, for missiles maintained, stored, and transported in stages, the first stage counts as the missile, whereas for missiles maintained, stored, and transported as fully assembled missiles, first stages are not allowed to exist separately from other stages of such a missile at facilities subject to short-notice" inspections. Likewise, solid rocket motors for the first stage of mobile ICBMs are listed because of the prohibition on locating them at such facilities.

Subparagraphs (b) and (c) of paragraph 20 establish heavy bombers and former heavy bombers as the items of inspection at heavy bomber-related facilities, except at inspectable weapons storage areas, where the item of inspection is a long-range nuclear ALCM. For heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, any structure within the site diagram of the air base large enough to contain a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, as determined by the inspecting Party, would be subject to inspection. For long-range nuclear ALCMs, the actual dimensions listed in the Memorandum of Understanding would determine the inspection size criteria.

Subparagraph (d) of paragraph 20 pertains to suspect-site inspections and establishes mobile ICBMs, their first stages, and the solid rocket motors of their first stages as the items of inspection. The purpose of suspect-site inspections is to detect and deter covert assembly of mobile ICBMs at facilities subject to such inspections. Such covert assembly could not take place in the absence of any of these items.

Subparagraph (e) of paragraph 20 pertains to post-exercise dispersal inspections. It establishes mobile launchers with their associated ICBMs of the types based at the facility as the items of inspection in the restricted areas or rail garrisons, and it establishes the mobile launchers as the items of inspection at the maintenance facilities. The purpose of post-exercise dispersal inspections is to account for the mobile launchers and missiles after an exercise dispersal, and this purpose can be accomplished without searching for smaller items. Alternatively, the facility could be designated for a data update inspection, in which smaller items are included among the items of inspection. The launcher itself is the item of inspection at the maintenance facility to allow for the possibility that the missile can be removed from the launcher in the maintenance facility. The actual dimensions of the launcher or launcher-plus-missile, as appropriate, would be taken from the Memorandum of Understanding.

Paragraph 21 of Section VI pertains to items of continuous monitoring and establishes mobile ICBMs (for mobile ICBMs that exit from assembly facilities fully assembled, as in current Soviet practice) and first stages of a mobile ICBM (for mobile ICBMs that exit from the assembly facility in stages, as in current US practice) as items of continuous monitoring.

Paragraph 22 establishes that items are large enough to be" and large enough to contain" an item of inspection or item of continuous monitoring if the measured linear dimensions (length, width, height, and diameter) of a structure, container, launch canister, covered or environmentally protected object, vehicle, or other object are 97 percent or more of the corresponding linear dimensions of the items of inspection or continuous monitoring as specified in the Memorandum of Understanding.

Paragraph 23 of Section VI establishes the principle that the size criteria are determined on the basis of all relevant items of inspection or their reference cylinders. For baseline data, data update, new facility, close-out and formerly declared facility inspections at ballistic missile facilities, subparagraph (a)(i) establishes the reference cylinder for mobile ICBMs in terms of the diameter of the first stage and an agreed percentage" of the length of the first stage. The phrase agreed percentage" was negotiated in the context of capturing the solid rocket motor, but this is not explicitly stated in the Treaty. The concept is to confirm the dimension listed in Annex 12, which should be based on an end dome-to-end dome measurement (i.e., the solid rocket motor). Since this measurement for mobile ICBMs establishes the size criteria for baseline and data update inspections, the Parties have the right to confirm this length on all new types of mobile ICBMs, regardless of whether the new type was declared on the basis of a change in the first stage length.

The reference to the SS-25 means that the SS-N-6 is excluded, even though it is smaller in at least one dimension than the SS-25 solid rocket motor. Strict application of the size criteria rules would result in listing the SS-N-6 as the size criteria for inspections. However, the sides had agreed during the July 1991 Ministerial in Washington and in subsequent negotiations in Geneva that the dimensions of the SS-25 solid rocket motor would be the inspection size criteria, so these are the dimensions listed in Annex 12. After entry into force, the general principle would apply, and a new type of missile or missile stage smaller than the SS-25 would set the size threshold.

Subparagraphs (a)(ii) and (iii) establish the size criteria for non-mobile ballistic missiles. In Subparagraphs (a)(ii) , for ICBMs other than mobile ICBMs and for SLBMs, reference cylinders are based on 90 percent of the length of the first stage for ballistic missiles transported, maintained, and stored in stages. In subparagraph (a)(iii), the size criteria are based on the length of the shortest configuration used for shipment for ICBMs maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles. (Note: The United States intended this subparagraph to cover also SLBMs maintained, stored and transported as assembled missiles, and believes that the Soviet Union had the same intent. The United States will seek Soviet agreement within the framework of the JCIC to correct this omission.) Subparagraph (b) establishes the size criteria for suspect-site inspections, which relate to the "reduced" length of the first stage of a mobile ICBM, just as in subparagraph (a)(i) .

Paragraph 24 of Section VI requires that the size criteria used in continuous monitoring, that is, at all monitored facilities of a Party, shall be determined on the basis of the diameters and lengths of all the reference cylinders for the items of continuous monitoring of that Party. The Parties agreed, for existing systems, to use a reference cylinder at Soviet final assembly facilities based on the canister for the SS-25. Although the reference cylinder for the SS-24 is shorter, the reduction to 90 percent of the SS-25 canister effectively makes inspectable any container that could hold either an SS-25 or SS-24. The reduction to 90 percent in length and diameter for canisterized missiles is intended to capture the assembled missile out of a canister, so that such a missile could not exit from a monitored facility without being detected. For missiles that are transported, maintained, and stored in stages, because it is only necessary to verify that no undeclared stages are exiting, the reference cylinder has the actual stage dimensions. Because, currently, there are no mobile missiles of the fully-assembled-but-not- canisterized type, the Parties would have to agree in the JCIC on appropriate reference cylinder dimensions if such a system were ever developed.

Paragraph 25 of Section VI provides a size criterion for quota inspections, pursuant to paragraph 15 of Annex 5 to this Protocol, of vehicles, containers, etc., exiting monitored production facilities for MIRVed mobile missiles. This criterion is based on the size of the solid rocket motor for the first stage of such missiles with the nozzle attached. That is the reason the reference cylinder is based on the diameter of the first stage, and a length of the distance from the lower edge of the nozzle to the upper end of the forward end dome of the motor case of the first stage. Both of these dimensions are reduced to 97 percent. The intent of these inspections is to deter the exit from such a facility of partially-assembled first stages of MIRVed mobile missiles.

Paragraph 26 of Section VI provides that, if the escort has the option to use a certain procedure to demonstrate the absence of an item of inspection or monitoring, but through no fault of the inspected Party the necessary equipment is not available or the equipment cannot function, there is no obligation for the inspected Party to choose another method for such a demonstration.

Paragraph 27 of Section VI provides for clarifications to be given by the escort to inspectors or monitors on questions or ambiguities that arise during an inspection or during continuous monitoring activities. If questions or ambiguities remain, they are to be documented by photographs and explained in the report. This paragraph, like the corresponding paragraph in the INF Treaty, establishes the general principle that the inspected Party has an obligation to attempt to satisfy concerns raised by inspectors or monitors during inspection or monitoring activities.

Paragraph 28 of Section VI provides the size limits for inspection and monitoring teams. The exemptions for a limited number of days in the case of monitoring teams is intended to allow replacement of monitors at the facility and to permit bringing in additional monitors for construction or maintenance. At least two monitors or inspectors on each monitoring or inspection team must speak the language of the inspected Party. An inspection or monitoring team shall operate under the direction of a team leader and deputy team leader. No more than one team may be at the same facility. Subgroups are allowed, but must consist of at least two members. Unlike other inspection teams, which are generally limited to ten inspectors, inspection teams for exhibitions during the baseline period allow for 15 inspectors because of the numbers and diversity of systems that might be exhibited.

Paragraph 29 of Section VI states that pre-inspection procedures, including safety briefings and information on how the inspection will be conducted and information on the inspection site, will begin upon arrival at the inspection site or perimeter continuous monitoring area and shall be completed within one hour. The inspection team will begin the inspection immediately upon completion of the pre-inspection procedures.

Paragraph 30 of Section VI provides that, for on-site inspections, the inspection team may designate one sub-group to inspect vehicles leaving the site. If a subgroup is not designated, vehicles are free to leave the site without being inspected. See paragraph 35 of this Section. Note that this paragraph does not apply to continuous monitoring.

Paragraph 31 of Section VI establishes the standard that, for most types of inspections, the period of inspection (the time beginning with the end of pre-inspection procedures and ending with the beginning of post-inspection procedures) is 24 hours, and may be extended by 8 hours upon agreement between the escort and inspection team leader. However, certain types of inspections must be extended as long as required to permit them to be completed: baseline data and new facility inspections and all the types of exhibitions. Reentry vehicle inspections and conversion or elimination inspections do not have a specified time limit because of their complexity.

Paragraph 32 of Section VI establishes post-inspection procedures, which include completing the inspection report in accordance with the provisions of Section XVIII of this Protocol. Post-inspection procedures will begin when the period of inspection expires and will be carried out at the location designated by the inspected Party. They will be completed no later than four hours after the arrival of the inspection team at that location, or no later than three hours after the arrival of all subgroups of the inspection team at that location, whichever is later. The second alternative is included primarily for inspection of road-mobile ICBM bases that have distant restricted areas.

Paragraph 33 of Section VI explains that a sequential inspection is understood to mean an inspection conducted by an inspection team after the completion of an inspection and prior to the departure of the team from the territory of the inspected Party. Sequential inspections will be conducted only at facilities associated with the same point of entry by an inspection team that has not left the territory of the inspected Party.

Paragraph 34 provides for inspectors during short-notice" inspections to have the right to be present at exits of structures whose entrances and exits are large enough to permit passage of an item of inspection while the structure is being inspected. During an inspection of such a structure, no object, container or vehicle may leave the structure until inspected or until an inspector declares that he or she has no intention to inspect it.

Paragraph 35 gives inspectors the right during short-notice" inspections to patrol the perimeter of an inspection site and to be present at the exits of the site. No vehicle may leave the inspection site during the period of inspection until inspected or until an inspector declares that he or she does not intend to inspect it.

Paragraph 36 of Section VI specifies that if the inspection team intends to conduct a sequential "short-notice" inspection, the inspection team leader, prior to completion of the pre-inspection procedures, shall provide a notification of the intent to conduct another inspection and whether the team plans to go directly to the next site. Then, prior to completion of post-inspection procedures or no later than one hour after the return of the inspection team to the point of entry, the team leader specifies when the type of inspection and site will be revealed. A team cannot return to the same inspection site during the same sequence of inspections.

Paragraph 37 of Section VI specifies that if the inspection team intends to conduct a sequential scheduled" inspection, the inspection team leader, prior to completion of the post-inspection procedures but no less than 24 hours before the planned commencement of the sequential inspection, shall provide a notification of the intent, type of inspection, and inspection site.

Paragraph 38 of Section VI provides that if the inspection team does not intend to conduct another inspection upon completion of post-inspection procedures, they must return to the point of entry and leave the territory of the inspected Party within 24 hours.

Paragraph 39 of Section VI provides limits on frequency of monitor replacements for each monitored facility. These replacements must adhere to the team size limits of paragraph 28 of this Section. Replacement directly at the monitored facility itself may take place only once in any three-week period. The total number of times that a Party can replace the monitors for a facility, whether the replacements occur directly at the facility or at its associated airport, are limited to 34 each year. These limits were negotiated to provide the replacement flexibility that the United States needed, and to provide the predictability of arrivals that the Soviet Union needed.

Paragraph 40 of Section VI provides for the possibility that monitors arriving on the territory of the inspected Party for the purpose of maintaining the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system at a facility may arrive separately from other monitors.

SECTION VII - BASELINE DATA INSPECTIONS, DATA UPDATE INSPECTIONS, AND NEW FACILITY INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPHS 2, 3, AND 4 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

Section VII addresses rights and obligations of the Parties during baseline data, data update, and new facility inspections.

Paragraph 1 states that baseline data inspections shall be conducted between 45 and 165 days after entry into force.

Paragraph 2 states that the Parties may conduct data update inspections after the end of the period for baseline data inspections. In each year, a Party is entitled to conduct no more than 15 such inspections, and no more than two can be conducted at any single facility. In accordance with Paragraph 1 of Section VIII of this Protocol, suspect site inspections also count toward the data update inspection quota.

Paragraph 3 provides for an absolute right to exempt air bases temporarily from data update inspections. The Parties agreed that such exemptions would be infrequent and not related to actions of one Party in relation to the other (i.e., for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty"). This provision stems from intensive negotiations on heavy bomber contingency operations. Because US heavy bombers are used for conventional missions outside the context of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship, as they were in the Gulf War, the United States insisted that the period of preparation for such operations not be interruptable by START inspections. Although the United States offered restrictions on the frequency and duration of exemptions from inspection, the Soviet Union refused to accept implementing language, claiming that it would be tantamount to Soviet concurrence, before the fact, on US military operations involving third states. The agreed language, while requiring an explanation of the reason for exemption, does not require a specific description of planned operations, thereby protecting operational security.

Paragraph 4 states that when a Party notifies the other Party that a facility is subject to the limitations of the Treaty, the other Party has 60 days to conduct a new facility inspection of that facility. Such an inspection may not be conducted sooner than 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty, and no other inspection may be conducted at that facility until the new facility inspection is completed, or until the 60 days allowed for conducting such an inspection expires, whichever comes first.

Paragraph 5 lists inspectable facilities under baseline data, data update, and new facility inspections. Note that until a long-range nuclear ALCM is tested from a B-2 heavy bomber, B-2 bases are not inspectable, except for weapons storage areas at those bases. Weapons storage areas are inspectable to help enforce the ban on long-range nuclear ALCMs at bases for heavy bombers not equipped for such weapons.

Paragraph 6 defines pre-inspection restrictions. It states that they go into effect one hour after the time for designation of the inspection site as specified in the notification of inspection, and remain in effect until the inspection team completes the pre-inspection procedures. For inspections at road-mobile ICBM bases, pre-inspection restrictions remain in effect at each restricted area designated for inspection until the inspectors arrive at that restricted area. For a data update inspection at road mobile ICBM bases, only one restricted area may be inspected; for those restricted areas not designated for inspection, the restrictions remain in effect until six hours after the completion of the pre-inspection procedures.

At facilities other than those associated with heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, no item of inspection and no object large enough to be or to contain an item of inspection may leave the site while the pre-inspection procedures are in effect. With regard to inspections of facilities associated with heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, pre-inspection restrictions allow heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, of types not based at the facility, to depart; only airplanes of types based at the facility are inspectable.

During the July, 1991, Washington Ministerial, the Parties agreed that visiting test heavy bombers, notified at the point of entry in accordance with subparagraph 17(b) of Section V of the Inspection Protocol, and heavy bombers of a type from which long-range nuclear ALCMs have never been flight-tested (e.g., B-2 heavy bombers) would also be exempt from pre-inspection restrictions, since such heavy bombers are not subject to inspection. Language implementing this agreement was inadvertently omitted from subparagraph 5(c) of this Section. This omission will be corrected in the JCIC.

For facilities at which the weapons storage area is inspectable, pre-inspection restrictions are imposed on the weapons storage area based on the size of the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM.

Subparagraph 6(c) provides that, if a facility is broken up such that several noncontiguous areas are inspectable, a container, launch canister, or vehicle that departed an inspectable area prior to pre-inspection restrictions taking effect is not subject to pre-inspection restrictions until it reenters an inspectable area.

Paragraph 7 limits to ten the total number of baseline and new facility inspections a Party may conduct at one time. Additionally, a Party may not conduct more than one such inspection at a specified inspection site. This paragraph also limits the number of data update inspections a Party may conduct at one time to one. (Note that in certain cases more than one inspection site is specified at the same geographical location. For inspection purposes, these are treated as separate, distinct facilities. The Thirty-sixth Agreed Statement, however, prevents simultaneous inspections at the dual-designated or dual-use facilities at four specific US Air Force bases.)

Paragraph 8 states that when the inspection team arrives at the site, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the numbers and, if applicable, type, category, variant, and version of each item of inspection located at the site. Additionally, the in-country escort must provide an annotated site diagram showing the location of the items of inspection. Subparagraph 8(a) provides that, at air bases where only the weapons storage area is inspectable (in accordance with paragraph 5 above), such information and site diagram shall not be provided by the in-country escort. This information does not have to be provided for B-2 air bases until long-range nuclear ALCMs are flight-tested from B-2's.

The number of non-deployed missiles that can be at an ICBM base's maintenance facility is limited. If the in-country escort informs the inspection team that there are more ICBMs at the maintenance facility than the allowable number of non-deployed missiles because some ICBMs have been removed from their silos, subparagraph 8(b) requires the identification of those silos that do not contain ICBMs but are considered and counted as containing them.

Because there is a separate quota on the numbers of alert heavy bombers subject to inspection, subparagraph 8(c) requires that, at nuclear air bases (except B-2 bases, until long-range nuclear ALCMs are tested from B-2 bombers), the in-country escort must provide information, including identification and location, of alert heavy bombers. Subparagraph 14(d) of this Section limits alert heavy bombers to those actually armed with nuclear weapons. The location provided for alert heavy bombers is wherever they happen to be; there is no designation of any particular area of a base as a permanent alert area. Additionally, data will be provided on how many heavy bombers based at the facility are in excess of the 150/180 U.S.-USSR thresholds, above which the as-equipped" warhead counting rules of subparagraphs 4(e) and 4(f) of Article III apply.

Subparagraph 8(d) provides that, if any of the items associated with the site are absent when the inspection team arrives at the inspection site, the in-country escort must inform the inspection team of such items and the reason for their absence. For heavy bomber and former heavy bomber facilities, this entails the repetition and amplification of information provided at the point of entry. The categories of absent airplanes must be provided, and, in the case of heavy bombers that are outside the national territory of the inspected Party, the in-country escort must also give the general location of such airplanes. General location" can be as broad as the area of the world (e.g., Middle East).

For facilities containing noncontiguous parts of an inspection site, subparagraph 8(e) requires that the in-country escort must inform the inspection team of any items of inspection on roads between noncontiguous areas, their approximate location, the reason for the absence of each item from the inspection site, and the estimated time of arrival at an inspection site. Additionally, such items must return to the inspection site no later than 18 hours after the inspection begins.

Paragraph 9 provides the right for inspectors to read the unique identifier data on mobile ICBMs unless they are deployed in silos or located on road-mobile launchers which cannot return to their restricted area due to force majeure and for which the in-country escort has specified geographic coordinates. Although paragraph 9 refers only to data update and new facility inspections, paragraph 5 of Annex 6 to the Inspection Protocol extends this right to baseline data inspections as well.

Paragraph 10 allows inspectors to confirm that items declared to be training models of missiles are, in fact, training models of missiles and not actual ICBMs or SLBMs. Such training models must have external and functional differences to allow inspectors to differentiate them from actual ICBMs and SLBMs, as provided for in the definition of "training model of a missile" in the Definitions Annex.

Paragraph 11 gives inspectors the right to inspect the maintenance facility of an ICBM base in accordance with the procedures set forth in Annex 1 of the Inspection Protocol. This means that for all structures, containers, and other objects that are large enough to contain or to be an object of inspection, but that are declared not to contain such an item, the inspected Party must demonstrate that such structures, containers, or objects do not contain such an item. The number of non-deployed missiles that can be at a silo ICBM base is limited. If the in-country escort informs the inspection team (pursuant to paragraph 8(b) of this Section) that there are more ICBMs at the maintenance facility than the allowable number of non-deployed missiles, paragraph 11 gives inspectors the right to inspect the empty silos to confirm that they do not contain ICBMs, in accordance with Annex 2 of the Inspection Protocol. If the inspection team leader chooses to inspect these silos, he must designate one or more subgroups of no more than four inspectors to perform the inspection, and must designate the launchers to be inspected prior to the end of the pre-inspection procedures. The inspected Party has eight hours from the time the pre-inspection procedures end to transport the subgroup to the designated launcher.

Paragraph 12 requires that, for road-mobile ICBM bases, all the launchers associated with that base must return to their restricted areas unless the launchers are at the maintenance facility, engaged in relocation, or cannot return due to force majeure. The return of the launchers must be completed within 18 hours after the period of inspection begins for baseline and new facility inspections, and within 24 hours after the designation of the inspection site for data update inspections. The in-country escort must inform the inspectors of the launchers that cannot return within these periods. For launchers that cannot return to their restricted areas due to force majeure, the in-country escort must either designate the geographic coordinates of such launchers or transport the inspectors to the launchers.

Subparagraph 12(c) requires that, prior to the completion of the pre-inspection procedures, the inspection team leader must designate which restricted area or areas are to be inspected. For baseline and new facility inspections, all the restricted areas and the maintenance facility may be inspected. For data update inspections, only one restricted area and the maintenance facility may be inspected. In all cases, these inspections are conducted in accordance with Annexes 1 and 2 of the Inspection Protocol. For baseline data and new facility inspections, at the discretion of the inspecting Party, the inspection team may divide into at least two subgroups (of two or more inspectors), each of which may independently inspect the designated locations. (This provision is redundant with paragraph 28 of Section V of this Protocol.) There is a right to conduct an inspection of road-mobile launchers that have not returned to their restricted areas due to circumstances brought about by force majeure in cases where the geographic coordinates of such launchers have not been provided. In this case, the inspection team leader must indicate whether the inspection team intends to inspect those road-mobile launchers and the team leader must also indicate the subgroup assigned for this purpose.

For baseline and new facility inspections, pre-inspection restrictions remain in effect at each designated restricted area until the inspectors arrive at that area. For data update inspections, the restricted areas not chosen for inspection shall have the restrictions remain in effect until six hours after the completion of the pre-inspection procedures.

The inspected Party must transport the inspectors to the designated restricted area without undue delay, and within the following time periods: no later than 5 hours after the completion of pre-inspection procedures if the restricted area is located at a straight line distance of less than 100 kilometers from the maintenance facility; no later than 8 hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures if the restricted area is located at a straight line distance of 100 kilometers or more from the maintenance facility. Since the pre-inspection restrictions expire when the inspectors arrive at the restricted area, subparagraph 12(e) also adds that, during the period of inspection, the launchers may not leave the restricted areas without the consent of the inspectors.

Paragraph 13 addresses rail-mobile ICBM bases. Inspectors may inspect the maintenance facility, the rail garrison, including all rail lines, rail entrances and exits, parking sites, and associated structures that are part of the base. Such inspections are required to be conducted in accordance with Annexes 1 and 2 of the Inspection Protocol. Structures where reentry vehicles are stored are specifically exempt from inspection. For the baseline and new facility inspections, all the associated launchers must concentrate at the base no later than 18 hours after the beginning of the period of inspection. Since the time to conduct a baseline inspection and a new facility inspection can be extended as long as is necessary to complete the inspection, the time to concentrate the launchers does not detract from the time to conduct the inspection. Launchers may not leave the ICBM base during the period of inspection without the consent of the inspectors. Inspectors have the right to inspect all the rail lines during daylight hours. The in-country escort must provide the necessary transportation to accomplish this.

Paragraph 14 lays out rights and responsibilities with regard to inspections at inspectable heavy bomber and former heavy bomber facilities. With the exception of alert heavy bombers, test heavy bombers, and types never tested with long-range nuclear ALCMs, all airplanes at the base that are of types specified in the Memorandum of Understanding as based at the base, are inspectable. Visiting heavy bombers of types not so based (e.g., a B-1 at a B-52 base) are not inspectable. This provision was included since equipment needed to support the inspection of a different type of heavy bomber may not be present. The purpose of the inspection is to confirm reported data on numbers, by type and, if applicable, category and variant, as well as to verify weapon equipage, including the maximum equipage for long-range nuclear ALCMs. For a data update inspection, in accordance with paragraph 17 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol, the inspectors for a data update inspection will be told at the point of entry if less than 70% of the assigned bombers are present. For baseline data and new facility inspections (but not for data update inspections) there is a call-back requirement for airplanes based at the inspected facilities: the airplanes have 20 hours from the beginning of the inspection to return. Exceptions are provided for force majeure, mechanical incapability (including that due to planned maintenance at another facility), and temporary stationing outside national territory (as long as that stationing is for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty). Procedures for the inspection of individual airplanes are laid out in Annex 4 to the Inspection Protocol.

Subparagraph 14(d) limits alert heavy bombers to those actually loaded with nuclear weapons, and imposes a limit on the number of alert heavy bomber inspections. This restriction was included to preclude avoiding inspection by arbitrarily declaring all heavy bombers at an air base as alert". On September 27, 1991, the President announced the termination of the practice of maintaining heavy bombers on alert. Since the Soviets do not maintain bombers on alert, and have announced they will not do so in the future, this subparagraph is moot unless alert operations resume in the future. Only one airplane of each classification (i.e., category/type/variant combination) of alert heavy bomber is inspectable each year. For the United States, this means that, should alert operations resume, the Soviets each year can inspect one alert B-52H equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, one alert B-52G so equipped, one alert B-52G not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, one alert B-1, and, after deployment, (and once a single B-2 has been tested with long-range nuclear ALCMs) one alert B-2.

Subparagraph 14(e) establishes that the purpose of the inspections is to count and inspect airplanes; it makes the item of inspection a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber. Note that until the United States tests a long-range nuclear ALCM from a B-2, B-2 bases cannot be inspected at all, with the exception of their weapons storage areas. Such weapon storage area inspections are governed by subparagraph (f). Weapons storage areas at air bases for ALCM-equipped bombers are not inspectable because there is no need: long-range nuclear ALCMs are allowed there. At bases where long-range nuclear ALCMs are not allowed, the size criteria for inspecting the weapons storage areas is the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM of the inspected Party.

Paragraph 15 provides for the inspection of test ranges. The entire site may be inspected, except that the inspection team may inspect only one silo that is declared not to contain an ICBM. Inspections of test ranges are required to be conducted in accordance with Annexes 1 and 2 of the Inspection Protocol.

Paragraph 16 states that, for facilities other than ICBM bases, facilities associated with heavy bombers, and test ranges, the entire facility is considered inspectable, using the procedures of Annexes 1 and 2 of the Inspection Protocol, for baseline data, new facility, and data update inspections. For ICBM bases, facilities associated with heavy bombers, and test ranges, inspection procedures are limited in some cases, as provided for in paragraphs 11 to 15 of this Section.

Paragraph 17 gives inspectors the right to inspect all launch canisters declared to be empty at test ranges, conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs, and ICBM bases. The purpose of this inspection is to confirm that the canisters are, in fact, empty. Launch canisters located at any other inspectable facility are assumed to contain a missile.

SECTION VIII - SUSPECT-SITE INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 5 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

Section VIII deals with suspect-site inspections -- inspections of locations believed to be capable of covert assembly of mobile ICBMs or first stages of mobile ICBMs. These inspections may be conducted at facilities listed in paragraph 12 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding. If suspicious activities were detected at other locations, the matter could be dealt with within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. One of the possible responses would be to allow a special access visit.

Paragraph 1 of Section VIII establishes the right to conduct suspect-site inspections as soon as the period for baseline data inspections is over. The combined quota for suspect-site inspections and data update inspections is 15 per year.

Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section VIII establish the facilities subject to suspect-site inspections. Paragraph 1 refers to the initial list in paragraph 12 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding. Paragraph 3 establishes the criteria for adding facilities to the list after entry into force of the Treaty: a production facility not subject to continuous monitoring that begins to produce ballistic missiles as large as or larger than any mobile ICBM, unless otherwise agreed, or a previously-monitored production facility that did produce mobile ICBMs, but ceased production.

Paragraph 4 of Section VIII limits each Party to no more than one suspect-site inspection at a time and to no more than two inspections each year at any one facility.

Paragraph 5 of Section VIII indicates the intent to allow facilities to be removed from the list. This paragraph is superfluous in a legal sense; the right already exists for the Parties to agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to remove a facility from the list of facilities subject to suspect-site inspection. This language was included at the request of the United States to emphasize that the intent was not to 'lock' facilities on the list forever. If the criteria for being on the suspect site inspection list are no longer met, the site should be removed from the list.

Paragraph 6 of Section VIII provides for pre-inspection restrictions similar to other types of short-notice" inspections. Because none of the items of inspection are supposed to be present, the restrictions apply to vehicles, containers, and launch canisters that would be large enough to conceal any item of inspection.

Paragraph 7 of Section VIII gives inspectors the right to inspect the entire inspection site using the procedures of Annex 1 to the Inspection Protocol. The provision unless the Parties otherwise agreed" indicates the understanding that modifications might be appropriate for unusual situations.

SECTION IX - REENTRY VEHICLE INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 6 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

The rights and obligations of the Parties during reentry vehicle on-site inspections are specified in Section IX of the Protocol. The specific procedures for the conduct of such inspections are found in Annex 3 of the Protocol.

Paragraph 1 of Section IX states the right of each Party to conduct up to ten such inspections each year beginning at the end of the period of baseline data inspections, with a further limit of no more than two such inspections each year at any one facility. The limit of ten inspections applies whether or not one or both Parties elects to download some of its deployed ballistic missiles; downloading conveys no additional inspection rights.

Paragraph 2 of Section IX establishes the right to carry out reentry vehicle inspections at ICBM bases (for both mobile and silo-based ICBMs) and submarine bases. These are the locations of deployed ballistic missiles, which are the subject of reentry vehicle inspections. Note that test ranges are not included; the missiles located there are not considered to be deployed.

Paragraph 3 of Section IX further limits the ways in which reentry vehicle on-site inspections may be conducted, by specifying: that there may not be more than one reentry vehicle inspection at any one time; that a reentry vehicle on-site inspection may not be conducted at the same time as any other type of inspection at the same facility; and that no more than one ICBM or SLBM may be inspected during each reentry vehicle inspection. For this last limit, however, the Parties recognized that if the situation arose in which a launcher declared to be empty were to be found with a deployed ballistic missile, the inspection team could choose to conduct a reentry vehicle inspection at both the launcher declared to be empty and at the launcher that was subsequently designated for the reentry vehicle inspection. (See paragraph 18 of this Section.) Note that during a reentry vehicle inspection, inspectors may also confirm the elimination of a fixed structure pursuant to paragraph 9 of Section XI of the Inspection Protocol.

Paragraph 4 of Section IX details the pre-inspection procedures to be in effect at the ICBM base or submarine base that was designated for the reentry vehicle inspection. Because the waters in which any ballistic missile submarine assigned to the base would be found are not part of that base, the waters within five kilometers of the boundary of the submarine base are included for the purpose of designating the geographic areas to which pre-inspection restrictions apply. The Parties agreed that the 5 kilometer distance is measured from the boundary of the site diagram.

Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 4 prohibits the inspected Party from opening ICBM silo doors or SLBM launcher hatches that are closed when pre-inspection procedures go into effect. This preserves the integrity of the contents of all launchers that had been closed, removing any concern the inspecting Party might otherwise have about the possibility that the front sections on the deployed missiles could have been altered before inspectors arrived at the launcher for the inspection. Note that, since the Treaty is a bilateral agreement, pre-inspection restrictions apply only to US and Soviet ballistic missile submarines. Other submarines (e.g., British SSBNs in US ports) are not subject to Treaty restrictions.

Subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), and (e) of paragraph 4 prohibit the inspected Party from initiating any work associated with the removal of missiles from launchers or removing or installing front sections on missiles in launchers, for those silo launchers and submarine launchers (and for all mobile launchers) that are open when the pre-inspection procedures go into effect.

Subparagraph (f) of paragraph 4 prohibits the inspected Party from removing mobile launchers of ICBMs from restricted areas or from rail garrisons when the pre-inspection procedures go into effect.

Subparagraph (g) of paragraph 4 prohibits the inspected Party from moving rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs into the maintenance facility when the pre-inspection procedures go into effect. Because rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs at the maintenance facility may not be designated for a reentry vehicle on-site inspection, in accordance with subparagraph 12 (b) of this Section, this prohibition ensures that such launchers are not taken out of consideration for such inspections.

Subparagraph (h) of paragraph 4 prohibits the inspected Party from moving any ballistic missile submarine any farther than five kilometers from the boundary of the submarine base, and from dry docking such submarines. These prohibitions on ballistic missile submarines are required because the inspecting Party may not designate any submarine for a reentry vehicle on-site inspection that is outside the five kilometer limit or that is in dry dock.

In addition to all of the pre-inspection procedures that are specified in paragraph 4 of this Section, paragraph 5 of Section IX states that the inspected Party will not move mobile launchers of ICBMs that are located in restricted areas or rail garrisons, or ballistic missile submarines to which pre-inspection restrictions apply. The conditions for the release from all of these pre-inspection procedures are given in paragraph 7 of this Section.

Paragraph 6 of Section IX provides that, all of the pre-inspection restrictions notwithstanding, the inspected Party has the right to undertake any and all work necessary to deal with an emergency involving a launcher, missile, or submarine. If the inspected Party exercises this right, the inspecting Party may elect to cancel the inspection in accordance with paragraph 4 or 5 of Section XVII of the Inspection Protocol.

Paragraph 7 of Section IX specifies the conditions under which the pre-inspection restrictions outlined in paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Section can be lifted. In general, pre-inspection procedures are in effect until the inspection team leader designates all launchers that are subject to inspection during the reentry vehicle on-site inspection, including those launchers that had been declared empty when designated for the reentry vehicle on-site inspection, and the inspection team or subgroup has arrived at each of those locations.

Paragraph 8 of Section IX specifies the information that the in-country escort must provide the inspection team leader when the inspection team arrives at the inspection site.

Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 8 refers to inspections at ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs. A member of the in-country escort must provide a copy of the simplified site diagram that indicates the location of each launcher, the type of missile if there is more than one type of ICBM at the base, and the designator for each of the launchers. The geographic coordinates for each of the silo launchers must either be provided with the simplified site diagram, or the designators for each of the launchers must be the same as those provided under the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams related to the Treaty.

Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 8 refers to inspections at ICBM bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. A member of the in-country escort must provide a copy of the simplified site diagram of the ICBM base that indicates the type of ICBM for each of the restricted areas of the base.

Subparagraph (c) of paragraph 8 refers to inspections at ICBM bases for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. A member of the in-country escort must provide a copy of the simplified site diagram of the base, if such a diagram exists, and a site diagram of the rail garrison of the base that shows the location of each launcher that is parked outside any of the fixed structures at the garrison, and that identifies the ICBM type for each of the launchers, if more than one type is attributed to the base. Because rail-mobile launchers that are at the maintenance facility of the base are not subject to reentry vehicle on-site inspection, the simplified site diagram need not indicate any such launchers.

Subparagraph (d) of paragraph 8 refers to inspections of SLBMs. For such inspections, the submarines containing the SLBM launchers are not actually at the base but in the waters within five kilometers of the boundary of the base. The submarines within that zone were subject to pre-inspection procedures, and a member of the in-country escort must provide a map of the base annotated to show, in addition to the coastline, these waters, the location in these waters of each ballistic missile submarine to which the pre-inspection procedures applied, and the number of launchers on each of these submarines. The in-country escort must inform the inspection team leader of the type of each ballistic missile submarine to which pre-inspection restrictions apply and of the type of SLBM for each such submarine.

Paragraph 9 of Section IX states that upon the completion of pre-inspection procedures the inspection team leader will designate in writing the launcher or fixed structure for mobile launchers containing the ICBM or SLBM to be inspected. The inspection team leader may also designate one of the launchers, one of the fixed structures for mobile launchers, or one of the restricted areas declared not to contain a deployed ICBM or deployed SLBM, and dispatch a subgroup of up to four inspectors to confirm that such a launcher, fixed structure, or restricted area is empty. The inspection of a launcher declared to be empty is to follow the procedures provided for in Annex 2 to this Protocol, and the inspection of a fixed structure is to follow the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol. A member of the in-country escort is to inform the inspectors of the route they will travel to reach the launcher or fixed structure designated for the reentry vehicle on-site inspection.

Paragraph 10 of Section IX outlines the steps for selecting launchers for inspections at ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs.

Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 10 requires that, in the event that no silo launcher of ICBMs at the inspected ICBM base contains a deployed ICBM, a member of the in-country escort must so inform the inspection team leader.

Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 10 explains that unless a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that no silo launcher of ICBMs at the inspected ICBM base contains a deployed ICBM, the inspection team leader designates the silo launcher containing the ICBM to be inspected.

Subparagraph (c) of paragraph 10 states that if the designated silo launcher does not contain a deployed ICBM, a member of the in-country escort must so inform the inspection team leader, who designates another silo launcher containing the ICBM to be inspected.

Subparagraph (d) of paragraph 10 conveys to the inspection team leader the right to designate for inspection one of the silo launchers of ICBMs declared by a member of the in-country escort not to contain deployed ICBMs.

Paragraph 11 of Section IX outlines the steps for selecting launchers for inspections at road-mobile ICBM bases.

Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 11 states that if no road-mobile launcher of ICBMs at the inspected ICBM base contains a deployed ICBM, a member of the in-country escort must inform the inspection team leader.

Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 11 explains that unless a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that no road-mobile launcher at the base contains a deployed ICBM, the inspection team leader designates the restricted area in which the ICBM to be inspected is located.

Subparagraph (c) of paragraph 11 states that if no road-mobile launcher in the designated restricted area contains a deployed ICBM, a member of the in-country escort must inform the inspection team leader, who designates another restricted area in which the ICBM to be inspected is located.

Subparagraph (d) of paragraph 11 requires that a member of the in-country escort must provide the inspection team leader with a copy of the site diagram of the restricted area designated for the inspection, annotated to show the location of each of the road-mobile launchers located outside of fixed structures in that restricted area. The inspection team leader designates either a road-mobile launcher of ICBMs outside a fixed structure, or a fixed structure in which the ICBM to be inspected is located.

Subparagraph (e) of paragraph 11 explains that if a designated fixed structure contains more than one launcher, a member of the in-country escort must inform the inspection team leader of their locations. The inspection team leader then designates the road-mobile launcher that contains the ICBM to be inspected.

Subparagraph (f) of paragraph 11 explains that if a designated fixed structure or road-mobile launcher does not contain a deployed ICBM, a member of the in-country escort must inform the inspection team leader, who designates another fixed structure or another launcher in the same restricted area containing the ICBM to be inspected.

Subparagraph (g) of paragraph 11 and its subparagraphs convey to the inspection team leader the right to designate for inspection fixed structures or launchers that a member of the in-country escort has declared not to contain deployed ICBMs. The inspection team leader may make the designations as follows:

  • all fixed structures for road-mobile launchers and all launchers located in one of the restricted areas of the inspected ICBM base, if a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that the ICBM base does not contain deployed ICBMs;
  • one of the fixed structures for road-mobile launchers or one of the launchers that a member of the in-country escort has declared not to contain a deployed ICBM.

Paragraph 12 of Section IX outlines the steps to be taken for selecting launchers for inspections at rail-mobile ICBM bases.

Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 12 states that if no rail-mobile launcher at the inspected rail garrison contains a deployed ICBM, a member of the in-country escort must inform the inspection team leader.

Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 12 states that unless a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that no rail-mobile launcher at the inspected rail garrison contains a deployed ICBM, the inspection team leader designates the launcher or fixed structure to be inspected. The prohibition from designating rail-mobile launchers located at the maintenance facility is found in this subparagraph.

Subparagraph (c) of paragraph 12 states that if a designated fixed structure contains more than one launcher, a member of the in-country escort must inform the inspection team leader of their locations so the inspection team leader can designate the launcher to be inspected.

Subparagraph (d) of paragraph 12 states that if a designated fixed structure or a designated launcher does not contain a deployed ICBM, a member of the in-country escort must inform the inspection team leader who will then designate another fixed structure or another launcher to be inspected.

Subparagraph (e) of paragraph 12 conveys to the inspection team leader the right to designate for inspection one of the fixed structures or one of the launchers declared by a member of the in-country escort not to contain deployed ICBMs.

Paragraph 13 of Section IX outlines the steps to be taken in selecting an SLBM for inspection at a submarine base.

Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 13 explains that if no launcher of SLBMs at the submarine base contains a deployed SLBM, a member of the in-country escort must inform the inspection team leader. The phrase "at the submarine base" excludes submarines in dry dock, as specified in subparagraph (g) of this paragraph.

Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 13 states that unless a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that no SLBM launcher at the base contains a deployed SLBM, the inspection team leader designates the ballistic missile submarine containing the SLBM to be inspected.

Subparagraph (c) of paragraph 13 states that if no launcher on the designated submarine contains an SLBM, a member of the in-country escort must inform the inspection team leader, who shall designate another ballistic missile submarine for inspection.

Subparagraph (d) of paragraph 13 states that unless a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that no SLBM launcher on the designated submarine contains a deployed SLBM, the inspection team leader designates the launcher containing the SLBM to be inspected.

Subparagraph (e) of paragraph 13 states that if the designated SLBM launcher does not contain a deployed SLBM, a member of the in-country escort must inform the inspection team leader, who then designates another launcher from among those SLBM launchers on the same ballistic missile submarine.

Subparagraph (f) of paragraph 13 conveys to the inspection team leader the right to designate for inspection one of the SLBM launchers declared by a member of the in-country escort not to contain deployed SLBMs.

Subparagraph (g) of paragraph 13 states the prohibition from designating submarines in dry dock for a reentry vehicle inspection.

Paragraph 14 of Section IX provides the time limits within which the inspected Party is to transport the inspection team, without undue delay, to the designated launcher, the designated restricted area, or the designated fixed structure that contains the deployed ICBM or SLBM to be inspected.

Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 14 allows for no more than three hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures for transport to a rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs.

Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 14 allows for no more than three hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures for transport to an SLBM launcher.

Subparagraph (c) of paragraph 14 allows for no more than five hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures for transport to a restricted area located at a straight line distance of less than 100 kilometers from the maintenance facility.

Subparagraph (d) of paragraph 14 allows for no more than eight hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures for transport to a restricted area located at a straight line distance of 100 kilometers or more from the maintenance facility.

Subparagraph (e) of paragraph 14 allows for no more than eight hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures for transport to a silo launcher of ICBMs.

At the end of paragraph 14 is a statement that the time limits listed for the transport of an inspection team also apply to the transport of subgroups of the team sent to confirm that launchers, restricted areas or fixed structures do not contain a deployed ICBM or SLBM.

Paragraph 15 of Section IX states that, if a designated launcher contains an ICBM or SLBM without a front section, the launcher is to be considered empty. An inspection of such a launcher would be in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph 7(c) of Annex 3 to this Protocol for inspecting to confirm that a front section is not installed on a missile in its launcher during reentry vehicle on-site inspections.

Paragraph 16 of Section IX states that reentry vehicle inspections are to be conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 3.

If the inspected Party chooses to remove the front section of a designated ICBM or SLBM and conduct the reentry vehicle inspection at a specially allocated site that is outside the site boundary of the base, paragraph 17 of Section IX states that the provisions of section VI pertaining to an inspection site apply to that location, except for paragraph 3 of Section VI, which concerns boundaries on site diagrams.

Paragraph 18 of Section IX explains that if an inspection team subgroup conducting an inspection of a launcher or a fixed structure declared not to contain a deployed ICBM or SLBM discovers that such a launcher or fixed structure contains an ICBM or SLBM, the inspection team may inspect that ICBM or SLBM in addition to the ICBM or SLBM previously designated for inspection, without the inspection of such a newly discovered ICBM or SLBM being counted against the quota for reentry vehicle inspections.

Paragraph 19 of Section IX deals with the situation when an entire ICBM base or an entire submarine base has been reported by a member of the in-country escort as being empty of deployed ballistic missiles. The inspection team leader has several options.

Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 19 states that the inspection team leader may designate any inspection site associated with the same point of entry for any type of inspection. This includes the option of designating the same base for a different type of inspection.

Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 19 states that the inspection team leader may designate a launcher, restricted area, or fixed structure to confirm the absence of a deployed ICBM or SLBM at the designated base.

Subparagraph (c) of paragraph 19 states that the inspection team leader may decline to conduct any inspection and to leave the territory of the inspected Party.

If the inspection team leader chooses not to conduct an inspection, there is no reduction in the quota of inspections allowed the inspecting Party. If the inspection team leader chooses to inspect one of the empty launchers, restricted areas or fixed structures at the empty base, such an inspection shall count against the quota of reentry vehicle inspections of the inspecting Party.

SECTION X - POST-DISPERSAL INSPECTIONS OF DEPLOYED MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs AND THEIR ASSOCIATED MISSILES CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 7 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

Section X sets out the rules for inspections triggered by exercise dispersals of mobile ICBMs. These inspections would have the purpose of helping to confirm that the exercise dispersal is indeed over and that all the mobile launchers and missiles are accounted for and are in compliance with the Treaty's locational restrictions.

Paragraph 1 of Section X establishes the notification of the end of an exercise dispersal (paragraph 13 of Section II of the Notification Protocol) as the event that triggers the right of the other Party to conduct post-exercise dispersal inspections. If road-mobile ICBM bases participated, at least one, but up to 40 percent of the bases that participate may be inspected. (If four or fewer bases participated, one of them could be inspected; if 5, 6, or 7 participated, two could be inspected; etc.) Identical provisions hold for rail-mobile ICBM bases participating in an exercise dispersal. If both road- and rail-mobile launchers were involved in an exercise dispersal, the inspecting Party has the right to inspect at least one or up to 40 percent of the total number of ICBM bases of road-mobile launchers that participated, and at least one or up to 40 percent of the total number of ICBM bases of rail-mobile launchers that participated.

Paragraph 2 of Section X denies the inspecting Party the right to conduct any other type of inspection at an ICBM base while it is undergoing a post-exercise dispersal inspection. Paragraph 2 also denies the inspecting Party the right to request cooperative measures to enhance national technical means of verification at a base while it is being inspected after an exercise dispersal. Cooperative measures at other bases would not be affected.

Paragraph 3 of Section X imposes movement restrictions on mobile launchers and missiles at bases that participated in an exercise dispersal. Beginning with completion of the dispersal, they must remain in restricted areas, rail garrisons or maintenance facilities. The only place missiles may be removed from launchers is the maintenance facility, hence the only place where the inspected Party may begin work to remove an ICBM from its launcher is at the maintenance facility. However, if there is an emergency involving a launcher or a missile, pre-inspection restrictions do not apply to any work carried out to deal with that emergency.

Paragraph 4 of Section X, in conjunction with the referenced provisions of Sections III and V, requires that the inspection teams be at the appropriate point or points of entry and have designated the bases to be inspected within 48 hours after the notification of the end of the dispersal is provided. The inspecting Party will have been notified of the beginning of the dispersal (paragraph 11 of Section II of the Notification Protocol), and will be ready to move quickly upon notification of the end of the dispersal. The host Party is assured of having at least four hours for clearing equipment and supplies brought by inspectors, if it is required. There is a nine-hour time period for getting the inspection teams to the bases designated for inspection, which will begin upon completion of the equipment examination, but no later than four hours after the designation of an inspection site. Both Parties are motivated to expedite the commencement of the inspections -- the inspecting Party in order to take stock as soon as possible after completion of the inspection, and the host Party in order to return to normal operations as soon as possible.

Paragraph 5 of Section X releases from movement restrictions the bases that are not designated for inspection. Pre-inspection restrictions remain in effect for those that will be inspected, until inspectors arrive and pre-inspection procedures have been completed.

Paragraph 6 of Section X requires that a member of the in-country escort inform the inspection team upon its arrival at the inspection site of the number of mobile launchers and missiles at the base, and provide an annotated site diagram indicating the current location at the inspection site of such items and the structures in which they are located. For road-mobile bases, a member of the in-country escort must also inform the inspection team leader, for each restricted area, of each road-mobile launcher within the deployment area that has not returned to the restricted area of the inspected base, except for road-mobile launchers that are on relocation outside the deployment area, or are being transported by air, rail, or by waterborne vehicles within the deployment area.

Paragraph 7 states that, for each road-mobile launcher that has not returned to the restricted area, and of which the inspection team leader was informed in accordance with paragraph 6, the escort, at its discretion, must either supply the geographic coordinates of its location or the escort must provide transportation to enable an inspection team subgroup to inspect the launcher.

Paragraph 8 of Section X requires that for an ICBM base for road-mobile launchers, the inspection team leader designate before the end of the pre-inspection procedures which restricted areas of the ICBM base will be inspected. The inspected Party must transport inspectors to the designated restricted areas no later than five hours after completion of the pre-inspection procedures, if they are less than 100 kilometers from the maintenance facility (where, presumably, the pre-inspection briefing would occur) or no less than eight hours after completion of the pre-inspection procedures, for restricted areas 100 kilometers or more away.

Paragraph 9 of Section X establishes the right of the inspection team to inspect all restricted areas and the maintenance facility at a road-mobile ICBM base, or the rail garrison and maintenance facility at a rail-mobile ICBM base.

Paragraph 10 of Section X keeps pre-inspection restrictions in effect in each restricted area, rail garrison, or maintenance facility until inspectors arrive there.

Paragraph 11 of Section X establishes the right of inspectors to read the tag on each ICBM in a restricted area, rail garrison, or maintenance facility, except for ICBMs deployed on mobile launchers that have not returned to restricted areas, and whose geographic coordinates have been designated by a member of the in-country escort in accordance with paragraph 7 of this Section.

Paragraph 12 of Section X requires that during the period of inspection, mobile launchers located within restricted areas designated to be inspected or within a rail garrison to be inspected may leave only with the consent of the inspectors.

Paragraph 13 of Section X makes explicit that inspectors have the right to ascertain that the aggregate number of mobile launchers and their associated missiles located at the inspection site and the number of such items that have not returned there following the completion of the dispersal does not exceed the number specified for the inspected ICBM base. For that purpose, inspectors have the right to inspect the entire inspection site, subject to the procedures of Annexes 1 and 2 of the Inspection Protocol.

SECTION XI - CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 8 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

Section XI provides for inspections required or permitted for conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

Paragraph 1 of Section XI establishes the right to conduct conversion or elimination inspections beginning with the start of the period for baseline data inspections.

Paragraph 2 of Section XI provides for the inspection team to be provided with a schedule of conversion or elimination activities upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site.

Paragraph 3 of Section XI effectively limits the number of conversion or elimination procedures to no more than two sites at a time, if such procedures provide for conversion or elimination inspections during the period when baseline data inspections are conducted. The intent is to keep the number of inspectors required at any one time to a manageable number, particularly during the baseline period when up to 10 baseline data inspections may be conducted simultaneously.

Paragraph 4 of Section XI provides for the possibility of replacing inspectors conducting conversion or elimination inspections.

Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 4 states that replacements can be no more frequent than once every three weeks and requires that at least half of the inspectors be replaced.

Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 4 requires that the replacement of inspectors takes place on-site, unless doing so will exceed the limit of 20 inspectors. In that case, the changeover must occur at the airport closest to the inspection site, which is understood to be an airport capable of handling the inspection airplane.

Subparagraph (c) of paragraph 4 provides for a clean transition when the team leader is being replaced. Each team leader is obliged to see through to completion any item's conversion or elimination that was begun under that team leader's surveillance.

Subparagraph (d) of paragraph 4 provides for a hiatus of up to three hours in the elimination procedures during which pre-inspection procedures for the newly arrived inspectors must be completed.

Paragraph 5 of Section XI deals with a delay in the initiation of conversion or elimination activities beyond the scheduled date when the team has already left its territory to carry out the inspection. In case of a short delay (five days or less), at the choice of the inspected Party, the team will wait either at the POE or at the inspection site; for a longer delay (more than five days), the team will return home, unless the Parties agree otherwise.

Paragraphs 6 and 8 through 12 of Section XI reference the Sections of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol that provide for on-site inspection.

Paragraph 6 of Section XI deals with the elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers and their launch canisters as provided for in Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Inspectors are required to confirm the items being eliminated as part of the elimination process.

Paragraph 7 of Section XI stipulates that binoculars must be provided, so that inspectors can remain at a safe distance when mobile ICBM elimination involves burning, explosive demolition or explosion.

Paragraph 8 of Section XI deals with the elimination of road-mobile launchers, road-mobile training launchers, rail-mobile launchers, and rail-mobile training launchers, as provided for in Section III of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Inspectors are required to confirm the item being eliminated as part of the elimination process.

Paragraph 9 deals with eliminated fixed structures for mobile launchers, as provided for in Section III of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. If the other Party carries out a baseline data, data update, reentry vehicle, post-exercise dispersal, or close-out inspection at the facility at which the fixed structure was located during the period when the fixed structure's remains are required to be visible to national technical means, the inspectors have the right to inspect the eliminated fixed structure. (The exercise of this right constitutes part of the inspection that is underway, and not a separate inspection. Thus, for example, there is no conflict with the ban on other inspections during a reentry vehicle inspection found in paragraph 3 of Section IX of the Inspection Protocol or the ban on other inspections during a post-exercise dispersal inspection found in paragraph 2 of Section X of the Inspection Protocol.) The host Party is then no longer obliged to keep the eliminated fixed structure visible to national technical means.

Paragraph 10 of Section XI deals with the elimination of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, as provided for in Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. The inspecting Party has the option of confirming that a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs to be eliminated is actually an ALCM heavy bomber prior to initiation of the elimination process. Except for those cases when the initiation of the process of elimination of a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs was verified by inspection, the inspecting Party has the right to conduct an inspection within 90 days after completion of the elimination of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber.

Paragraph 11 of Section XI deals with the conversion of heavy bombers, as provided for in Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. The inspecting Party has the right to inspect the converted heavy bomber within 20 days after it arrives at the viewing site following conversion.

Paragraph 12 of Section XI deals with changing the accountability of ICBMs, SLBMs, launch canisters, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers by placing them on static display, as provided for in Section VIII of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. The inspecting Party has the right to inspect the item being placed on static display within 30 days after being notified that the item has been rendered inoperable.

SECTION XII - CLOSE-OUT INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 9 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

A facility at which Treaty-limited items are located must be listed in the Memorandum of Understanding along with information on the Treaty-limited items located there. Most of these facilities are subject to some kind of inspection or monitoring. A facility of a category that is subject to baseline data and data update inspections may be eliminated and cease to be subject to data update inspections, but it will then be subject to a close-out inspection to confirm that the criteria for eliminating the facility have been met. After a close-out inspection, the eliminated facility will be subject to formerly declared facility inspections. Section XII provides the rules for close-out inspections.

Paragraph 1 of Section XII establishes the right of a Party to conduct a close-out inspection at the facilities of categories listed in paragraph 2 of this Section (the same facilities that are subject to baseline data or new facility inspections and thereafter to data update inspections) within 60 days after being notified that the facility has been eliminated. In addition, any facilities of these categories that were specified in the Memorandum of Understanding at Treaty signature, but were not specified in the first Memorandum of Understanding update 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty will be subject to a close-out inspection rather than a baseline data inspection during the period for baseline data inspections.

Paragraph 2 of Section XII lists the categories of facilities that are subject to close-out inspections.

Paragraph 3 of Section XII requires that the inspection team be transported to the eliminated facility within 48 hours after its arrival at the point of entry. Because a close-out inspection has the purpose of confirming that the facility elimination criteria have been met and the inspected Party has announced the elimination of the facility, the short-notice" aspect is not as important as for other types of inspections, and the nine-hour transportation requirement is not imposed.

Paragraph 4 of Section XII limits each Party to two simultaneous close-out inspections and no more than one at a time at facilities associated with the same point of entry.

Paragraph 5 of Section XII prevents a facility from being designated as the inspection site for any type of inspection other than a close-out inspection, beginning with notification of its elimination. Once a close-out inspection is completed, the eliminated facility is subject to formerly declared facility inspections. If the other Party declines to conduct a close-out inspection, the facility becomes subject to formerly declared facility inspections 60 days after the notification of its elimination.

Paragraph 6 of Section XII references the facility elimination criteria of Section IX of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol -- essentially the absence of strategic offensive arms and support equipment. The procedures of Annex 1 of the Inspection Protocol are used to verify the absence of strategic offensive arms and support equipment. Inspectors have the right to inspect the entire inspection site.

SECTION XIII - FORMERLY DECLARED FACILITY INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 10 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

Section XIII provides the rules for formerly declared facility inspections. Formerly declared facility inspections are carried out to help confirm that the eliminated facility is no longer being used in connection with Treaty-limited items. Such inspections belong to the short-notice" family of inspections.

Paragraph 1 of Section XIII establishes the right to conduct three formerly declared facility inspections per year, with no more than two at any one facility, beginning with the end of the baseline period. Formerly declared facility inspections may be carried out at an eliminated facility once a close-out inspection had been conducted, or 60 days after notification of the elimination of the facility, whichever is sooner.

Paragraph 2 of Section XIII lists the categories of facilities subject to formerly declared facility inspections. It is the same list as for close-out inspections.

Paragraph 3 of Section XIII provides for pre-inspection restrictions to begin no later than one hour after the time for the designation of the inspection site and remaining in effect until the inspection team completes the pre-inspection procedures. Because there should be no items of inspection at the site, containers, launch canisters, and enclosed vehicles large enough to conceal an item of inspection of the inspected Party, and covered or environmentally protected objects large enough to contain or to be such items shall not be removed from the site.

Paragraph 4 of Section XIII limits each Party to two simultaneous formerly declared facility inspections and no more than one at a time at facilities associated with the same point of entry.

Paragraph 5 of Section XIII establishes the right of inspectors to inspect the entire inspection site using the procedures of Annex 1 of the Inspection Protocol.

SECTION XIV - TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS EXHIBITIONS AND INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 11 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

Section XIV consists of 15 paragraphs and deals with the rights and obligations of the Parties during technical characteristics exhibitions conducted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty. The specific procedures for confirming the dimensions of ICBMs and SLBMs during such exhibitions are specified in Annex 11 to the Inspection Protocol.

Paragraph 1 specifies that technical characteristics exhibitions must take place between 3 days after the first full update of Memorandum of Understanding data (which, as specified in Paragraph 1 of Section 1 of the Notification Protocol, is due no later than 30 days after entry into force) and no later than 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty. Therefore, at least 12 days are available for these exhibitions. This short period is sufficient because most or all of the existing types of ICBMs, SLBMs, and mobile launchers required to be exhibited will have already been exhibited during the early technical characteristics exhibitions conducted pursuant to the Agreement on Early Exhibitions. (See analysis of the Related Agreements.) Paragraph 3 of this Section specifies that items existing as of entry into force that have already been exhibited during an early technical characteristics exhibition need not be exhibited again if the purpose of the exhibition was met. Paragraphs 5(c) and 5(d) of Annex 11 stipulate that the SS-N-17 is not subject to a technical exhibition and that the SS-11, SS-17, and SS-19 ICBMs must be exhibited within one year of Treaty signature during the first elimination of such systems. Pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty, each Party must exhibit an ICBM and SLBM of each type and variant and each version of a mobile launcher of ICBMs for each type of mobile ICBM. The Parties are required to exhibit the assembled missile of the ICBM or the SLBM, the separate first stage of the ICBM or SLBM, the launch canister, if the system uses one, and the self-contained dispensing mechanism, if the system has one, in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 11. The Parties understand that these items need not be displayed at the same exhibition and need not be in close proximity. The exhibitions are pre-scheduled by agreement between the Parties. Paragraph 2 requires that exhibitions of each new type and variant of ICBM or SLBM, and each new version of mobile launchers of ICBMs, take place no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after the relevant notification, at the time and place specified in the notification.

Paragraph 2 requires that the technical characteristics exhibitions of mobile launchers of ICBMs for each new type of mobile ICBM take place at the same time as the exhibition of the new type of mobile ICBM. In addition, paragraph 2 requires that for new types, the ICBM or SLBM, the first stage of the ICBM or SLBM, the launch canister, if the system uses one, and the self-contained dispensing mechanism, if the system has one, must be exhibited in close proximity. The technical characteristics exhibitions are to be conducted separately from, and in addition to, baseline data and data update inspections.

Paragraph 3 provides that technical characteristics exhibitions after entry into force will not be performed if the early exhibitions have fulfilled all of the requirements of technical characteristics exhibitions. The only technical characteristics exhibitions that would be required during the time period specified in paragraph 1 would be those concerned with data on characteristics that had not previously been exhibited. Note that technical characteristics exhibitions are applicable to systems that exist at entry into force. For early exhibitions, the Parties are, in effect, encouraged to anticipate what they would exhibit after entry into force. Since early exhibitions must take place within 240 days after signature, there is a hypothetical possibility that some new system might emerge, or some previously exhibited characteristic might change, after the early exhibition. For such situations or any other circumstance under which a required exhibition was not conducted early", paragraph 3 underscores the obligation that such requirements be met during the time period set forth in paragraph 1.

Paragraph 4 gives the inspected Party the right to choose the site for each technical characteristics exhibition.

Paragraph 5 requires that the inspection team arrive on the territory of the inspected Party between one and three days before the exhibition date. The inspected Party is obligated to transport the inspection team to the exhibition site so that the inspection team arrives at the site in a timely manner. Since technical characteristics exhibitions do not have a short notice character, no more precise requirements are needed.

Paragraph 6 specifies that during the pre-inspection procedures, exhibited items must be identified to the inspectors by type, variant, and version, as applicable. When appropriate, a member of the in-country escort must use photographs, slides, or drawings to point out the distinguishing features or external differences of exhibited items.

Paragraph 7 establishes that it is the inspected Party that designates where on an exhibited item measurements may be made. This paragraph in effect limits measurements to those necessary to confirm the specified technical data and to obtain the dimensions for the length and diameter as specified in paragraphs 13, 14, 16, and if applicable, 15, of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. For measurements of the first stage of a solid propellant mobile ICBM, the inspected Party is required to exhibit the first stage of such an ICBM in a configuration that permits inspectors to confirm the dimensions of the reference cylinder for such a stage. The reference cylinder definition for mobile ICBMs was negotiated with the understanding that it captured the solid rocket motor, but this is not explicitly stated in the Treaty. A member of the in-country escort must point out the places on a first stage of a solid propellant mobile ICBM that permit measurement of the distance from the point where the aft end dome of the motor case joins with the nozzle to the upper point of the forward end dome of the motor case, (i.e. the new types" length specified in paragraph 15 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, which is also the size criterion pursuant to subparagraphs 23(a)(i) and 23(b) of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol) and the maximum diameter of such a stage, excluding protruding elements. Sketches or diagrams can be used to indicate such places.

Inspectors have the right to take such measurements and the measurements must be certified by the signatures of an inspector and a member of the in-country escort immediately after they are taken. In accordance with paragraph 14 of Section VI of the Protocol, such certified data must be recorded in the inspection report. Measurement data must normally be within three percent of the relevant data in the Memorandum of Understanding to be acceptable. However, measurement of the reference cylinder or of a stage in a configuration that permits a new types measurement in accordance with paragraph 15 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding would be recorded by inspectors but may not have been previously recorded in the Memorandum of Understanding.

Paragraph 8 gives the inspectors the right to confirm the length and diameter of the first stage of an ICBM and SLBM of each type and variant, as well as the diameter of the second or third stage if that diameter differs from the diameter of the first stage. Inspectors also have the right to confirm the length and diameter of the assembled ICBM or SLBM.

Paragraph 9 deals with a new type of ICBM or SLBM that is declared on the basis of a change in the first stage length used for confirming a new type" (which is understood to mean the solid rocket motor for solid propellant systems and the fuel tank for liquid propellant systems, as is specified in paragraph 15 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding), with or without a change in throw-weight. The inspected Party must exhibit the first stage of the ICBM or SLBM of the new type for the purpose of confirming this first stage length, and must also exhibit the first stage of the ICBM or SLBM of appropriate existing or previously declared new types, used as the basis for the declaration of the new type, for the purpose of confirming the first stage length used for confirming new types, if such a length has not been previously confirmed on such ICBMs or SLBMs. The final element of this paragraph states that when necessary, specific procedures for measuring the first stage length used for confirming a new type of an ICBM or SLBM" shall be agreed in the JCIC. Such agreement would be a prerequisite for deployment.

Paragraph 10 deals with a new type of ICBM or SLBM that is declared on the basis of a change in the launch weight of an ICBM or SLBM of appropriate existing and previously declared new types. The inspecting Party has the right to weigh, or to determine the weight by other agreed means, of the ICBM or SLBM of the new type and of ICBMs or SLBMs of types used as the basis for declaring the new type, in order to verify their launch weights. Procedures for weighing, or for determining weight by other means, must be agreed in the JCIC before the beginning of the deployment of an ICBM or SLBM of such a new type. On July 29, 1991, at the final START plenary, the Parties made a joint statement that confirmed their understanding of the obligation to agree within the JCIC on procedures for confirming launch weight before deployment could begin. The Parties also agreed to negotiate such procedures in good faith and not to artificially delay agreement on such procedures so as not to delay the deployment of a new type declared on the basis of launch weight.

Paragraph 11 states that if one Party declares a new type of ICBM or SLBM that the other Party believes has demonstrated a launch weight greater than 106,000 kilograms (the criteria for a heavy ICBM or SLBM), the other Party has the right to raise its concern in the JCIC. Such a launch weight would violate the prohibitions contained in subparagraphs 2(a) and (b) of Article V banning new types of heavy ICBMs and against producing, testing, and deploying heavy SLBMs, respectively. Resolution of the issue could, but is not required to, include, among other things, an agreement to weigh, or to determine by other agreed means the weight of, the ICBM or SLBM in question in order to assist in the verification of its launch weight.

Paragraph 12 requires the Parties to agree on procedures for weighing and for other means of determining the weight of ICBMs and SLBMs in the JCIC no later than two years after entry into force of the Treaty. Note that, in the event a Party developed an ICBM or SLBM declared to be a new type on the basis of launch weight before the deadline specified in this paragraph, procedures would have to be agreed prior to deployment, as specified in paragraph 10.

Paragraph 13 deals with exhibitions of mobile ICBMs of a new type. This paragraph contains requirements for two types of technical exhibitions -- a regular exhibition and an exhibition with additional procedures. Exhibitions of mobile ICBMs of a new type and their associated launchers are important because the new type might be attributed with a different number of RVs than an existing type of mobile ICBM. In addition, these exhibitions help confirm that the new type of mobile ICBM could not be launched from the existing type of mobile launcher and that a mobile launcher for a new type of ICBM cannot launch an existing type of ICBM.

Subparagraph 9(g) of Article III of the Treaty text requires mobile launchers of ICBMs of each new type to be distinguishable from mobile launchers of existing and previously declared new types both with and without their associated missiles installed. Subparagraph 9(h) establishes similar distinguishability requirements for converted mobile launchers. During the technical characteristics exhibition, the inspected Party must demonstrate those distinguishing features. If a mobile ICBM of a new type is larger either in length or diameter than the launch canister for a mobile ICBM of each existing or previously declared new type, then only a regular technical characteristics exhibition is required.

If, however, a mobile ICBM of a new type has both a length and diameter less than or equal to the length and diameter, respectively, of the launch canister for a mobile ICBM of any existing or previously declared new type, and if either Party believes that additional procedures during the exhibition are necessary to confirm the distinguishability, based on the information that is contained in the notification of the new type of mobile ICBM, with respect to the adequacy of features (specified below) that distinguish the mobile system of a new type from the mobile system of an existing or previously declared new type, then the Party that has developed the new type of mobile ICBM must conduct an exhibition with additional procedures.

The following elements must be distinguished during such a technical characteristics exhibition of a new type of mobile ICBM: (1) the launch canister for mobile ICBMs of the new type from the launch canister for mobile ICBMs of each existing or previously declared new type; (2) the mobile launcher of the new type from the mobile launcher of each existing or previously declared new type; (3) the mobile launcher with the associated missile of the new type installed from the mobile launcher with the associated missile of each existing and previously declared new type installed. These distinguishing features must be demonstrated by means of the following additional exhibition procedures:

(i) The mobile ICBM of the new type must be exhibited in close proximity to the launch canister for such an ICBM, a launch canister for a mobile ICBM of each existing or previously declared new type, and a mobile launcher of ICBMs of each existing or previously declared new type. Launch canisters may be empty, but, if they are not, an ICBM in a launch canister will not have a front section.

(ii) The inspected Party must demonstrate the functionally related and external differences that distinguish the launch canister for the new type of mobile ICBM from the launch canister of each existing or previously declared new type of mobile ICBM.

(iii) The inspected Party must demonstrate that the launch of a mobile ICBM of each existing or previously declared new type cannot be carried out from the launch canister for the new type of mobile ICBM, and that a launch of the new type of mobile ICBM cannot be carried out from the launch canister for the mobile ICBM of each existing or previously declared new type. If the incapability to carry out such launches has not been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the inspecting Party, the inspecting Party may raise the issue in the JCIC.

Paragraph 14 states that the technical characteristics exhibitions will be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annexes 8 and 11 to the Inspection Protocol. Annex 8 contains the lists of equipment and the method of use of the equipment and Annex 11 contains the procedures for confirming the dimensions of ICBMs and SLBMs.

Paragraph 15 allows inspectors to obtain three photographs of each exhibited item, in addition to photographs required in ambiguous situations, that satisfy the requirements of paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. Paragraph 10 of Annex J not only specifies quality requirements for photographs, but, in subparagraph 10(e), also mandates that photographs of objects other than heavy bombers be photographed with the camera placed perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the item being photographed. The inspected Party takes the photographs using its own camera equipment. As is the case with other types of inspections, in ambiguous situations, photographs will be taken by the inspected Party using the inspectors' camera equipment.

SECTION XV - DISTINGUISHABILITY EXHIBITIONS AND INSPECTIONS AND BASELINE EXHIBITIONS AND INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPHS 12 AND 13, RESPECTIVELY, OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY, AND EXHIBITIONS OF LONG-RANGE NON-NUCLEAR ALCMs CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO NOTIFICATIONS PROVIDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION VII OF THE NOTIFICATION PROTOCOL

Section XV of the Inspection Protocol establishes the rights and obligations of the Parties regarding exhibitions of heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs. There are two kinds of exhibitions: distinguishability and baseline. Distinguishability exhibitions provide for demonstration of an example of each of the items required to be displayed by paragraph 12 of Article XI (i.e., heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs) in order to confirm technical characteristics, demonstrate distinguishability, and demonstrate maximum equipage for long-range nuclear ALCMs. Baseline exhibitions are exhaustive exhibitions of all items of the classifications called for by paragraph 13 of Article XI in order to establish that, as of entry into force, all existing heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, all existing former heavy bombers, and all existing training heavy bombers are in fact equipped as they are supposed to be. A special baseline exhibition must also be conducted of 30 percent of all existing nuclear-armed heavy bombers of a type that are declared not to be equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, when a long-range ALCM is first flight-tested from that type, to demonstrate specified distinguishing features.

Paragraphs 1 and 6 concern the timing of initial distinguishability exhibitions. The fundamental timing requirement is that these exhibitions must take place no later than 45 days after entry into force, and no earlier than three days after the first full update of the Memorandum of Understanding (which, as specified in paragraph l of Section I of the Notification Protocol, is due no later than 30 days after entry into force). Therefore, at least 12 days are available for these exhibitions.

This short period is sufficient because most or all of the existing types of heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs required to be exhibited will have already been exhibited during the early distinguishability exhibitions conducted pursuant to the Agreement on Early Exhibitions (see analysis of the four selected agreements). Paragraph 6 provides that distinguishability exhibitions after entry into force will not be performed if the early exhibitions have fulfilled all requirements of distinguishability exhibitions. Note that distinguishability exhibitions are applicable to systems that exist at entry into force. For early exhibitions, the Parties are, in effect, encouraged to anticipate what they would exhibit after entry into force. Since early exhibitions must take place within 240 days after signature, there is a hypothetical possibility that some new system might emerge, or some previously exhibited characteristic might change, after the early exhibition. For such situations or any other circumstance under which a required exhibition was not conducted early," paragraph 6 underscores the obligation that such requirements be met during the time period set forth in paragraph 1.

Paragraph 2 requires that the one-time" baseline exhibition of all heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments (neither Party has such a bomber), former heavy bombers (Soviets only), and training heavy bombers (Soviets only) existing at entry into force be conducted no later than the period provided for baseline inspections (i.e., the period from 45 days to 165 days after entry into force). These exhibitions can begin only after the completion of distinguishability exhibitions, where examples of these systems have been exhibited. These exhibitions are unique, one-time" events because all such items created after entry into force are individually subject to on-site Conversion or Elimination inspections. The timing of these exhibitions will be agreed by the Parties. These exhibitions may be conducted concurrently with baseline inspections. It was made clear during negotiation of this provision that the Party receiving notification of a baseline exhibition at a particular facility could elect to conduct its baseline inspection of that facility during the same visit.

Paragraph 3 addresses subsequent distinguishability exhibitions for new items notified under Section VII of the Notification Protocol. New items not previously exhibited must be exhibited between 15 and 30 days after they are notified. This paragraph also establishes the principle that an item of the same type displayed previously does not necessarily have to be exhibited again, along with the new items, although a Party may choose to do so in order to better demonstrate the distinguishability of the new item. The notification of the new item is required to set forth the date and location for its distinguishability exhibition. Exhibitions conducted pursuant to this paragraph may not be combined with a baseline data or data update inspection.

Baseline exhibitions are required in only one circumstance after the period for baseline inspections. As specified in paragraph 4, when a particular aircraft type is first used to flight-test a long-range nuclear ALCM and there are deployed heavy bombers of that type (e.g., the B-2 at some time in the future), a baseline exhibition is required of 30 percent of all heavy bombers of that type that are equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs to demonstrate that they are not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. This is required because the other Party up until that time will never have had an opportunity to inspect heavy bombers of that type, and it needs to assure itself that heavy bombers not supposed to be equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs are in fact not so equipped. The baseline exhibition at each base where such heavy bombers are based will be conducted during the 120-day period starting 15 days after the first ALCM flight test is notified. Pre-inspection procedures for the exhibitions will be conducted as if they were data update inspections, but only to the extent that these procedures pertain to the heavy bombers to be exhibited (e.g., no information must be provided on other types of heavy bombers, or on weapons storage areas). At each base, up to 30 percent of bombers, specified in the Memorandum of Understanding both as equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs and as based there, may be inspected, but the 30 percent must be chosen by the inspectors from among the non-alert heavy bombers at the base. There is no requirement to return absent heavy bombers for the purposes of this inspection. The 30-percent figure was chosen in part because US operational practice ensures that at least 30 percent of assigned heavy bombers are present during normal peacetime operations.

Long-range non-nuclear ALCMs are not required to be exhibited pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI because they are non-strategic systems. They are exhibited, however, pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Section. These exhibitions may not be combined with or counted as baseline data or data update inspections.

Paragraphs 7 through 9 apply to all distinguishability and baseline exhibitions, as well as exhibitions of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs. The sites will be chosen by the Party conducting the exhibitions. The inspectors may arrive one to three days in advance, and it is the responsibility of the exhibiting Party to get them to the site on time. The procedures in Annex 4 to the Inspection Protocol apply to these exhibitions.

Paragraph l0 applies to distinguishability exhibitions and exhibitions of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs, but not to baseline exhibitions. Inspectors may request up to three photographs of each exhibited item, that satisfy the requirements for quality provided for in Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. Paragraph 10 of Annex J not only specifies quality requirements for photographs, but, in subparagraph 10(e), also mandates that photographs of objects other than heavy bombers be photographed with the camera placed perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the item being photographed. The inspected Party will take these photographs using its equipment. Additionally, as in other inspections, in ambiguous situations photographs will be taken by the inspected Party using the inspecting Party's camera equipment.

SECTION XVI - CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH l4 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

Section XVI codifies the right of the Parties to conduct continuous monitoring and specifies the rights and obligations of the Parties in implementing those activities.

Paragraph 1 specifies that the inspecting Party has the right to begin monitoring 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty.

Under paragraph 2, the United States may conduct continuous monitoring at Pavlograd, Ukrainian SSR and Votkinsk, RSFSR; the Soviet Union may conduct continuous monitoring at Promontory, Utah. (These facilities subject to continuous monitoring are listed in paragraph 3 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding). When monitoring begins, these facilities become monitored facilities" and will be listed in paragraph 4 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding. The Soviet facilities are mobile missile final assembly facilities and the US facility is the first stage assembly facility of the Peacekeeper missile. The US facility at Magna, Utah, subject to monitoring under the INF Treaty, will not be subject to continuous monitoring under the START Treaty, while the Soviet facility at Votkinsk will be subject to monitoring under both Treaties. The Twenty-second Agreed Statement provides for harmonizing the provisions of the two treaties at Votkinsk.

Paragraph 3 specifies the minimum amount of time during which the Parties have the right to conduct continuous monitoring at a facility that has terminated assembly of the monitored mobile missile or first stage, and the conditions under which the Parties will no longer enjoy that right at such a facility. Continuous monitoring activities will cease at a monitored facility at which production of mobile ICBMs or first stages for mobile ICBMs has ceased, no later than one year after the inspected Party notifies the cessation of production. The exception to this provision is, if such production ceases prior to May 31, 1994, continuous monitoring activities will be permitted to continue until May 31, 1995. The facilities subject to continuous monitoring will become subject to inspection once continuous monitoring ends. If they are converted into a category of facility subject to data update and new facility inspections, they will be subject to such inspections. In all other cases they will be subject to suspect-site inspections.

Paragraph 4 sets forth provisions to guard against a Party's declaring a mobile missile, or first stage for such a missile, as a missile or first stage of a non-mobile system when it exits from the portal. Neither Party currently produces such a non-NDM limited system at a monitored facility. If the inspected Party intends to produce at a monitored facility ICBMs or SLBMs or first stages for such ICBMs or SLBMs that are not subject to non-deployed missile limits and that are as large as or larger than the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring size criteria, the inspected Party must notify the inspecting Party no less than 180 days in advance of the planned exit of the first such ICBM, SLBM, or first stage. It also provides a requirement for agreement within the framework of the JCIC on additional verification procedures. Such additional procedures might include the use of non-damaging imaging. The Parties must agree on additional verification in an expeditious manner so as not to delay the exit of the first ICBM, SLBM or first stage of such an ICBM or SLBM.

Under paragraph 5 the inspected Party is obligated to determine a perimeter for each facility for which the inspecting Party has notified it that continuous monitoring will be conducted. Thereafter the inspected Party will not change the perimeter without advance notification to the inspecting Party. The determination of the perimeter, however, may be made independently by the inspected Party. The inspected Party must construct and maintain a fence around the perimeter of each facility subject to continuous monitoring. This provision is linked to those of the next two paragraphs.

Paragraph 6 complements paragraph 5 and specifies that the inspected Party is obligated to designate a perimeter continuous monitoring area" around the perimeter within which the inspecting Party has the right to install its monitoring equipment and conduct continuous monitoring activities. The boundaries of the perimeter continuous monitoring area are subject to agreement by the inspecting Party. The continuous monitoring area is outside the perimeter referred to in paragraph 5.

Paragraph 7 provides for the conditions under which the perimeter and the perimeter continuous monitoring area may be changed after monitoring begins. If the inspected Party intends to change the perimeter of a facility at which work on establishing a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system has begun or at which such a system has already been established, it must inform the inspecting Party, in advance, of its intention to carry out such work. The inspected Party must also indicate the date on which such work is planned to begin, and provide through diplomatic channels a site diagram of that facility annotated to indicate the proposed changes in the boundaries of the perimeter continuous monitoring area. Before work to change the perimeter is begun, the Parties must agree upon new boundaries of the perimeter continuous monitoring area as well as on the procedure for relocating the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring equipment. The procedure for relocating the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring equipment must be agreed so as to allow monitors to continue their continuous monitoring activities while work on changing the perimeter is in progress. The inspected Party is responsible for the costs associated with the relocation of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring equipment resulting from changing the perimeter.

Under paragraph 8 the inspected Party is obligated to define a zone within which monitors can travel and conduct leisure activities with the permission of the in-country escort, and, as considered necessary by the inspected Party, accompanied by escorts. There are no parameters for defining that zone, and the Parties will define them on the basis of reciprocity. The paragraph also provides for defining areas within that zone from which monitors will be excluded. Finally, the paragraph provides that for each facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, the inspected Party will define, if possible, a free movement zone within which monitors will have the right to move between their place of duty and their living quarters without the permission of the in-country escort.

Paragraph 9 gives the inspecting Party the right to conduct an engineering site survey beginning 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty. This is the same date on which continuous monitoring may commence. The purpose of the site survey is for the inspected Party to become familiar with the geographical and topographical conditions and available logistical resources for establishing a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system. The Soviets rejected the US proposal to conduct site surveys prior to entry into force. Instead, in an exchange of letters signed by the Heads of Delegation on July 31, 1991, the Parties agreed to exchange engineering survey data no later than 60 days after signature, to facilitate the prompt establishment of a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system. In the Twenty-second Agreed Statement the Parties agreed that the United States would not conduct an engineering site survey at Votkinsk.

Paragraph 10 establishes the right to install, operate, and maintain a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system and references Annex 9 for the equipment comprising that system.

Because the continuous monitoring system will be located within the perimeter continuous monitoring area, and because that area surrounds the perimeter of the monitored facility, paragraph 11 provides monitors unrestricted access to the monitoring equipment and to the perimeter in order to inspect the perimeter. Monitors must inform the in-country escort any time they intend to examine the perimeter continuous monitoring area. The paragraph also obligates the inspected Party to keep a member of the in-country escort on duty at the monitored facility on a 24-hour basis to accompany monitors to any portion of the perimeter continuous monitoring area. For this purpose, a member of the in-country escort must promptly provide monitors with a vehicle upon request. The final provision of paragraph 11 imposes an obligation on the inspected Party to make whatever changes are necessary to the perimeter continuous monitoring area in order to enable the monitors to move around the entire facility.

Paragraph 12 establishes the right of the monitors to use their own radios within the perimeter continuous monitoring area for communication with the operations center. It restricts those radios to a power level and a single frequency to be agreed by the Parties prior to the use of such systems in the perimeter continuous monitoring area, and further dictates that radios cannot be capable of operating on other than the agreed frequency. The in-country escort may check compliance with that agreed frequency at any time.

Paragraph 13 obligates the inspected Party to designate a portal with not more than one rail line when the inspecting Party notifies its intention to establish a continuous monitoring system at a facility subject to such monitoring. The inspecting Party notifies the date when the continuous monitoring is to commence, and on that date the inspected Party is obligated to begin using a portal for all items large enough to be, or to contain, an item of continuous monitoring that leave the monitored facility.

Paragraph 14 restricts the inspected Party to two additional road exits from the monitored facility. There must be no other rail exits and the inspecting Party has the right to monitor the road exits with equipment specified in Annex 9. The inspecting Party has the right to construct an environmental structure, with limited floor space, for its monitors at each such exit.

Paragraph 15 allows the inspected Party to have four additional personnel exits. Those exits are to be of limited width, so as to preclude the possibility of the inspected Party covertly removing mobile ICBMs or first stages for such ICBMs through such exits.

Paragraph 16 obligates the inspected Party, at the request of the inspecting Party, to provide specific types of communication equipment for the monitoring team. Under subparagraph (a), the inspected Party must provide two dedicated telephone lines providing direct communications between the monitoring team and the Embassy of the inspecting Party with a single termination point, specified by the inspecting Party, at each end of a telephone line. Subparagraph (b) calls for one non-dedicated commercial phone line for local and long distance communications throughout the existing telephone network within the territory of the inspected Party. Subparagraph (c) also permits the use of satellite communications equipment that permits telephonic communications between the monitoring team and the territory of the inspecting Party.

Paragraph 17 apportions the cost for the provision, installation, operation, maintenance, and use of communications equipment. All expenses associated with the installation and operation of the dedicated direct telephone lines must be borne by the inspected Party. All expenses associated with the installation and operation of the non-dedicated commercial telephone line are the responsibility of the inspecting Party. All expenses associated with the provision, installation and maintenance of satellite communications equipment are the responsibility of the inspected Party. If requested by the inspected Party, the inspecting Party may provide the satellite communication equipment. In such a situation, the inspecting Party is responsible for all expenses associated with the provision, installation and maintenance of the satellite communication equipment. In any case, all expenses associated with the use of the satellite communication system are the responsibility of the inspecting Party.

Paragraph 18 relegates the use of satellite communications equipment to a backup role and establishes the conditions under which it may be used. The satellite communications equipment will be under the control of the inspected Party, unless it is provided by the inspecting Party, in which case it will be under the control of both Parties. Monitors will have the right to use satellite communications anytime a monitor and a member of the in-country escort conclude that facsimile communications with the territory of the inspecting Party via the dedicated direct telephone lines to its Embassy cannot be established within 20 minutes.

The inspected Party is obligated by paragraph l9 to provide the logistic support necessary for the inspecting Party to establish a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system no later than six months after such a request is made. Examples of such logistical support include utilities, construction materials and site preparation.

Paragraph 20 obligates the inspected Party to provide for the shipment of continuous monitoring equipment and supplies to the monitored facility without undue delay.

By paragraph 21, if the inspecting Party requests, the inspected Party is obligated to provide the monitors with structures at the portal and road exits during the period when the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring is being constructed. The costs for those temporary structures shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

Paragraph 22 gives the right to the inspecting Party, within the perimeter continuous monitoring area, to construct, operate, and maintain an operations center for receiving and storing data. Paragraph 22 also gives the inspecting Party the right to construct at the portal no more than three buildings with a total floor space of up to 150 square meters to house the operations center and monitoring team headquarters. This paragraph also gives the inspecting Party the right to install at the portal and road exits the equipment for the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system that is specified in Annex 9.

Paragraph 23 obligates the inspected Party to construct a storage building for the inspecting Party at the inspecting Party's request and expense. The inspecting Party can request one building with a total floor space of no more than 500 square meters for use by the monitors for storage of equipment for continuous monitoring activities and of supplies.

Under paragraph 24, the inspected Party has the right to construct one building, at an agreed location within the perimeter continuous monitoring area, for conducting viewing procedures specified in Annex 5 to the Inspection Protocol. This building could be used for other purposes only by the agreement of the Parties.

Paragraph 25 requires the monitoring team leader to provide the in-country escort with installation drawings, manuals, and other documentation, including any changes to such documentation to be used by the monitors to test or install equipment for the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system. The documentation must be provided to and discussed with the inspected Party prior to work commencing on such equipment. Subparagraph (b) requires a similar exchange of documentation for use by monitors in operating and maintaining the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring equipment. In both instances, monitors must provide clarification concerning the documentation during the discussions with the in-country escort.

Paragraph 26 applies restrictions to the physical condition of the perimeter continuous monitoring area so as to reduce possible ambiguities that might arise during the monitoring of the facility. Examples include a ban on unobstructed tunnels or culverts, as well as on waterways and canals that cross the perimeter continuous monitoring area. Monitors must be given advance notice of an aircraft landing within the perimeter of the facility unless it is an emergency. In the case of an emergency, monitors must be informed immediately after such an arrival.

Paragraph 27 obligates the inspecting Party not to impede the access of the inspected Party to any structures or security systems during the establishment, operation, or maintenance of the monitoring system.

The inspecting Party is obligated by paragraph 28 to provide access to its operations center, exit shelters, and storage building wherever the inspected Party desires such access, but only with the provision of escorts of the inspecting Party.

Paragraph 29 establishes the right of the monitoring team to send any two monitors to its embassy or consulate on the territory of the inspected Party one time per week, and obligates the inspected Party to make the travel arrangements for such a trip.

Paragraph 30 provides the conditions under which members of the inspecting Party's embassy staff are permitted to travel to the monitored facility. The right for such travel is restricted to members of the embassy's treaty implementation unit. The right to travel is limited to no more than two times per year to each facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, with no more than two persons traveling each time and staying at such a facility for no more than two days. Although such diplomatic personnel have diplomatic immunity, when they travel under this paragraph, they waive that immunity with respect to any article carried (other than papers). This waiver does not apply to any other privileges and immunities accorded diplomatic personnel.

Members of the monitoring team have the right under paragraph 31 to travel between facilities subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facilities. When they do, they are subject to the same types of escort and equipment examination procedures as those who arrive at the point of entry.

Paragraph 32 specifies that the inspecting Party must not take any actions with respect to structures of the inspected Party at the monitored facility unless there is agreement otherwise. If the Parties agree that structures of the inspected Party are to be rebuilt or demolished, the inspecting Party must compensate the inspected Party.

Paragraph 33 prohibits interference by the inspected Party with installed monitoring equipment or with monitors' access to it, but provides for observation of this equipment by the in-country escort during installation, testing, operation, and maintenance of that equipment.

Paragraph 34 bans interference with continuous monitoring activities. Since the obligation in Section I of the Inspection Protocol to facilitate" inspection and continuous monitoring inherently includes an obligation not to interfere with such activities, this paragraph is legally redundant and included only for completeness.

Paragraph 35 establishes the standards for sufficient lighting in the perimeter continuous monitoring area. It obligates the inspected Party to provide that lighting if requested by the inspecting Party. In any event, the cost of lighting the perimeter continuous monitoring area is borne by the inspecting Party.

Paragraph 36 refers the reader to Annex 5 to the Inspection Protocol for the details of the inspection procedures for containers, launch canisters, and vehicles that depart the monitored facility.

SECTION XVII - CANCELLATION OF INSPECTIONS

Section XVII contains five paragraphs and addresses the rights and responsibilities of the Parties with respect to the cancellation of inspections. In all cases, if an inspection is canceled, it does not count against the appropriate inspection quotas.

Paragraph l provides for the cancellation of an inspection if it cannot be conducted due to circumstances brought about by force majeure. Here, as elsewhere in the Treaty, force majeure has no formal definition. Force majeure is generally understood to mean forces beyond one's control.

Paragraph 2 allows the inspecting Party, at its option, to cancel or conduct a short-notice inspection, other than a post-exercise dispersal inspection, in the event that force majeure delays arrival of the inspectors at the inspection site beyond the time provided for in paragraph 14 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol (nine or 18 hours, depending on whether the inspection site was designated at the point of entry or at a previous inspection site, respectively; or 24 hours in the case of a baseline data inspection at a road-mobile base).

Paragraph 3 similarly allows cancellation at the inspecting Party's option in four additional circumstances of delay beyond Treaty prescribed time limits: (a) if more than eight hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures are required to transport inspectors to an empty silo declared to be associated with an ICBM at the maintenance facility, as provided for in paragraph 11 of Section VII of this Protocol; (b) if more than five or eight hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures are required to transport inspectors to a restricted area designated for inspection that is less than l00 kilometers, or l00 kilometers or more, respectively, from the maintenance facility, as provided for in subparagraph 12(e) of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol; (c) if more than the appropriate time limit (three hours to a rail-mobile launcher or to an SLBM launcher, eight hours to a silo launcher, five hours to a restricted area less than 100 km from the maintenance facility, or eight hours to a restricted area located 100 km or more from the maintenance facility) provided for in paragraph 14 in Section IX of the Inspection Protocol is required to transport inspectors to the ICBM or SLBM designated for reentry vehicle inspection; or (d) if more than five or eight hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures is required to transport inspectors to a restricted area less than l00 kilometers, or l00 kilometers or more, respectively, from the maintenance facility in connection with the inspection of the restricted area as part of a post-exercise dispersal inspection, as provided for in paragraph 8 of Section X of the Inspection Protocol.

Paragraph 4 provides for the cancellation of pre-inspection restrictions associated with short-notice inspections, other than a post-exercise dispersal inspection, in cases where force majeure requires removal from an inspection site of any item subject to pre-inspection restrictions. An example might be when a dangerous storm forces departure of a ballistic missile submarine from port. If pre-inspection restrictions are canceled, the inspecting Party has the right to cancel the inspection itself.

Paragraph 5 allows the inspecting Party to cancel a reentry vehicle inspection if the inspected Party interrupts the inspection procedures for personnel or equipment safety considerations. Such an interruption would not be considered a violation of the Treaty. The provision was included specifically to deal with situations where the inspecting Party was unable due to safety considerations to maintain continuous observation of the involved ICBM or SLBM, ICBM or SLBM launcher, or front section of an ICBM or SLBM.

SECTION XVIII - INSPECTION REPORTS AND CONTINUOUS MONITORING REPORTS

Section XVIII contains four paragraphs that address reports of inspection and continuous monitoring. Paragraph 1 concerns inspections, paragraph 2 concerns continuous monitoring, and paragraphs 3 and 4 address both. These provisions are similar to the corresponding provisions of the INF Treaty.

Paragraph 1 provides that, no later than two hours after the beginning of post-inspection procedures (or no later than one hour after the arrival of the last subgroup of inspectors at the location for post-inspection procedures, whichever is later), inspectors will provide an inspection report in two languages. The report in the language of the inspected Party is an unofficial translation. The report must be factual; that is, the report must contain statements of fact that lead to opinions or conclusions, rather than the opinions or conclusions themselves. This provision was included, in part, to support the US view that compliance judgments are not made in the field, but are formal, fully considered acts of the respective governments. Paragraph 1 lists specific facts that must be included in the report, and states that photographs, site diagrams, or maps provided in accordance with inspection procedures are considered to be part of the report. The report must be signed by representatives of both Parties, with at least one copy retained by each.

Paragraph 2 provides that the continuous monitoring report shall be provided in writing, in two languages (an unofficial translation in the language of the inspected Party), no later than three days after the end of each month. The report must be factual, and this paragraph lists specific facts that must be included. Photographs that are taken during continuous monitoring are part of the report. Again, representatives of both Parties must sign, and each Party retains a copy.

Paragraph 3 establishes the right of the inspected Party to include comments in the inspection and continuous monitoring reports. Note that language requirements are not addressed, but it is understood that the official version of comments is in the language of the inspected Party.

Paragraph 4 obligates the Parties to attempt to clarify any on-site ambiguity regarding reported facts. Such clarifications must also be included in reports. Paragraph 27 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol requires that clarifications to help resolve questions and ambiguities that arise during the inspection or continuous monitoring activities be included in reports.

A final provision, like those in the other Protocols, provides that, pursuant to subparagraph (b) of Article XV of the Treaty, additional measures can be agreed upon by the Parties with respect to this Protocol to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if changes need to be made in the Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, then such changes as are agreed upon shall be made within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), without resorting to the amendment procedures set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty.

Pursuant to Article XVII of the Treaty, the Protocol is deemed to be an integral part of the Treaty.

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE INSPECTION PROTOCOL ANNEXES

ANNEX 1 - PROCEDURES FOR THE INSPECTION OF COVERED OBJECTS, CONTAINERS, LAUNCH CANISTERS, VEHICLES, AND STRUCTURES

This Annex sets forth the procedures that may be used for the inspection of covered objects, containers, launch canisters, vehicles and structures.

Paragraph 1 of Annex 1 specifies that, during baseline data, data update, new facility, and post-exercise dispersal inspections, inspectors have the right to confirm the numbers, types, variants or versions of items of inspection (as defined for such inspections in paragraph 20 of Section VI of the Protocol) that are specified for the facility to be inspected. For these types of inspections and for suspect-site, close-out and formerly declared facility inspections, inspectors also have the right to confirm the absence of any other item of inspection at the inspection site. This paragraph states that the size criteria of paragraph 23 of Section VI of this Protocol are to be used during such inspections for making decisions about whether the size of any covered object, container, launch canister, vehicle, or structure, and the accesses to their interiors, could make them subject to further inspections as outlined in this Annex.

Paragraph 2 of Annex 1 contains procedures for inspecting items of inspection that are not contained in a container or launch canister (i.e., that are out in the open) and that are not covered or environmentally protected, either initially or after the completion of procedures in other paragraphs in this Annex. There is no substantive difference between being covered and being environmentally protected; this analysis will use the term covered" for both. As described in this paragraph, in the case of an item of inspection that is directly visible, the inspectors have the right to confirm that it is an item of inspection of the declared type, variant, or version by viewing it, and by taking measurements of its external dimensions at points designated by a member of the in-country escort (that are the same locations at which measurements were taken in establishing the dimensions for the technical characteristics of the item of inspection).

Paragraph 3 of Annex 1 contains procedures for inspecting an object" that is outside a container or launch canister and that is not covered, but that has not been declared as an item of inspection. In this case, inspectors have the right to view the object and to take measurements of its external dimensions at points designated by a member of the in-country escort to confirm that it is not an item of inspection.

Paragraph 4 of Annex 1 addresses the case of a covered object. For such an object, the inspected Party bears the burden of proving to the satisfaction of inspectors that the object is an item of inspection of the declared type, variant or version, or that the object is not an item of inspection. To accomplish this task of convincing inspectors, the in-country escort can choose among several optional procedures, which involve: (1) viewing it after a member of the in-country escort has partially or, if necessary, completely removed the cover or environmental protection, with additional procedures possible depending on the results of viewing; or (2) measuring.

Paragraph 5 of Annex 1 addresses the case of a container. As with the case of a covered object, the in-country escort has a choice of procedures that can be used to convince inspectors that the container contains an item of inspection of the declared type and, if applicable, variant of that type, or that it does not contain an item of inspection. Among the procedures that the in-country escort can choose from are the following: measuring the dimensions of the container, viewing the interior after a member of the in-country escort has opened the container, and, as necessary, measure the dimensions of its contents, or viewing and measuring, if necessary, the contents of the container after a member of the in-country escort has removed the contents from the container.

Paragraph 6 of Annex 1 refers to a launch canister that is declared to contain an item of inspection. Inspectors may view and measure the dimensions of the launch canister to be sure it is of the declared type. Upon completion of the viewing and the measurements, the launch canister shall not be subject to further inspection.

Paragraph 7 of Annex 1 refers to a launch canister declared not to contain an item of inspection. A member of the in-country escort must convince inspectors that this is true using one or more of the following procedures: viewing the interior of the launch canister after a member of the in-country escort has opened the launch canister by removing at least one of the end caps from the launch canister and, as necessary, measuring the dimensions of its contents; or viewing and, if necessary, measuring the contents after the contents have been removed by a member of the in-country escort.

If a launch canister is declared to contain a training model of a missile, paragraph 8 of Annex 1 requires that a member of the in-country escort demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors the features that confirm that such a launch canister contains a training model of a missile. How this is to be demonstrated is not specified in the Treaty.

Paragraph 9 of Annex 1 addresses obligations related to vehicles. The inspected Party is required to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the inspecting Party whether the vehicle contains one or more items of inspection of the declared type and, if applicable, variant or version, or that it does not contain an item of inspection, by allowing inspectors to carry out one or more of the following procedures: make measurements of the dimensions of the enclosed space of the vehicle or the accesses into such a space; make measurements of the dimensions of a partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle or of the dimensions of the accesses into such a space; or view the interior of the vehicle or the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle or the open bed of a vehicle from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort that allows inspectors to view the entire interior. Upon completion of these procedures, an inspected vehicle may depart the inspection site.

Paragraph 10 of Annex 1 addresses structures other than fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs ("fixed structure" is a defined term involving unique structures at restricted areas or rail garrisons), e.g., buildings, sheds, or other construction at a site that could contain an item of inspection. A member of the in-country escort must demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that such a structure either contains one or more items of inspection of the declared type that it was declared to contain, or that it does not contain an item of inspection, by allowing inspectors to carry out one or more of the following procedures: make measurements of the dimensions of the structure or of the dimensions of the accesses into the structure; make measurements of the dimensions of the partitioned enclosed space within the structure or the dimensions of the accesses into such a space; or view the interior of the structure or partitioned enclosed space within the structure from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort that allows inspectors to view the entire interior. This location need not be within the structure.

Paragraph 11 of Annex 1 addresses fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs. A member of the in-country escort must demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors, using the listed procedures, that a fixed structure contains the declared items of inspection and no other item of inspection, or it does not contain items of inspection. The Parties must limit the number of fixed structures for road-mobile launchers at a restricted area so that they cannot contain more than the number of launchers specified for that site. Inspectors have the right to confirm that fixed structures in a restricted area cannot contain more than the number specified. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article VI and paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty, inspectors have the right to make measurements of all fixed structures in a restricted area to confirm that such fixed structures cannot contain more than the number of road-mobile launchers specified for that restricted area. Inspectors also have the right to measure all fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers to confirm the specified dimensions of these structures. Note that, under all procedures in this paragraph, inspectors have the right to read the data from unique identifiers of mobile ICBMs. Note also that the total number of inspectors allowed in a fixed structure that actually contains a mobile launcher is four -- not at any one time, but rather throughout the inspection of that structure. The subparagraph 11(c) right of the inspectors to view the entire interior of the structure, if the escorts choose viewing as the means of proof of the contents of the structure, is intended to ensure that the inspector can see fully into very long or oddly configured structures, and can view covered objects. Subparagraph 11(c) grants a right to enter structures for viewing in the event that it is impossible to obtain a complete view from outside.

ANNEX 2 - PROCEDURES FOR INSPECTION OF SILO LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs, MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs, AND SLBM LAUNCHERS

This Annex provides procedures that may be used in conducting inspections of silo launchers, mobile launchers, and SLBM launchers. The following situations permit such inspections: when inspectors discover more ICBMs at the maintenance facility of an ICBM base than the number of non-deployed ICBMs allowed pursuant to paragraph l(b) or 1(e) of Article IV of the Treaty, they have the right to inspect the silo launchers or the mobile launchers that a member of the in-country escort declares are associated with the extra missiles at the maintenance facility to confirm that those launchers do not contain ICBMs; in accordance with subparagraph 10(d), 11(g), 12(e), 13(f), or 19(b) of Section IX of the Inspection Protocol, inspectors have the right to inspect one launcher or one fixed structure declared to be empty when designated for a reentry vehicle inspection; and, in accordance with paragraph 15 of Section VII, inspectors have the right to inspect one silo declared to be empty at test ranges.

Because many silo launchers look similar from ground level, paragraph 1 of Annex 2 confirms the right of the inspection team subgroup to determine that the silo being inspected is the designated silo launcher of ICBMs by comparing its geographic coordinates using satellite system receivers as described in Section IV of Annex 8 to this Protocol. After confirmation of the coordinates, the inspected Party shall open the silo door and inspectors have the right to view the interior of the silo launcher from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort to confirm that it does not contain an ICBM or first stage.

Paragraph 2 of Annex 2 states that in the event that inspectors are unable to confirm by viewing the exterior of the launcher that a road-mobile launcher declared not to contain a deployed ICBM actually does not contain an ICBM, they must be allowed to view the interior of the launcher through a maintenance hatch. This procedure is not required for any system existing as of Treaty signature, but could be required in the future.

Paragraph 3 of Annex 2 states that in the event that inspectors are unable to confirm by viewing the exterior of the launcher that a rail-mobile launcher does not contain an ICBM, they must be allowed to view the interior of the railcar of the launcher through a maintenance hatch or from the entry compartment of the railcar. This procedure is necessary because, for the Soviet rail-mobile launcher, the canister is completely enclosed within the launcher.

The procedures of paragraph 4 of Annex 2 for inspecting SLBM launchers are the same as those for silo launchers of ICBMs except that there is no right to use a satellite system receiver to identify the specific location.

Paragraph 5 of Annex 2 indicates where the inspection team subgroups are to go at the conclusion of the inspections mentioned in this Annex. For baseline data, data update, and new facility inspections, after the viewing has been completed in accordance with paragraph 1, the inspection team subgroup shall return to the maintenance facility of the inspected ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs, or, for a reentry vehicle inspection, after the viewing in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 has been completed, the inspection team subgroup shall have the right, at its choice, to rejoin the inspection team or to go to the designated location where post-inspection procedures will be carried out.

ANNEX 3 - PROCEDURES FOR REENTRY VEHICLE INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 6 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

This Annex provides procedures that may be used in conducting reentry vehicle inspections of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs. Such inspections assist in confirming that the actual number of reentry vehicles carried on a deployed missile does not exceed the number of warheads attributed to that missile.

Paragraph 1 of Annex 3 states that for reentry vehicle (RV) inspections, the inspected Party has the right to prepare the front section for viewing in the launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs, in close proximity to the launcher, in a vehicle, or at a specially allocated site. The procedures for viewing the front section of a missile in the launcher are less complex than in the other cases, because in those other cases there are requirements to inspect the other sites before and after the movement of the front section there, and to maintain surveillance of RV transport or other vehicles while the inspected Party is moving the front section from the launcher to the other site. In addition, for mobile launchers and submarines that may need to be taken to a specially allocated site, the launcher or submarine must be kept under surveillance while it is traveling to this other site.

Paragraph 2 of Annex 3 provides the generic procedures for the preparation for viewing of the front section of an ICBM in its silo or of an SLBM in its launcher, and the preparation for removal of the front section of such missiles for inspections at a specially allocated site.

Subparagraph 2(a) provides that, for silo launchers, inspectors have the right to confirm that the silo launcher to which the in-country escort has taken them is the launcher that was designated by the inspection team leader. This is accomplished by using a satellite system receiver.

Subparagraph 2(b) provides that, for both silo and SLBM launchers, a member of the in-country escort must designate positions that are not greater than 50 meters from the launcher from which inspectors may observe the activities that are associated with preparing the front section for viewing in the launcher or for removing the front section for viewing at a specially allocated site. These positions must be chosen so that inspectors can have a clear and unobstructed view of the upper edge of the launcher and any vehicles, containers, or objects that enter or leave in the vicinity of the launcher. If there are no positions within the prescribed 50 meters that offer a clear and unobstructed view of the launcher, a member of the in-country escort and the inspection team leader may agree on positions that could be farther from the launcher but that do offer such a view.

Subparagraph 2(c) provides that inspectors may, at the request of the inspection team leader upon arrival at the launcher, have the opportunity to familiarize themselves with this area so as to orient themselves and have an understanding of the relative positions of the launcher and vehicles and structures that may be in the vicinity.

Subparagraphs 2(d) and 2(e) provide that the inspectors will be informed of when the silo door or SLBM launcher hatch is to be opened. Inspectors have the right to observe the opening of the ICBM silo door or SLBM launcher hatch; the time of the opening is at the discretion of the inspected Party. Inspectors also have the right to maintain continuous visual observation of the upper silo or tube edge of such an ICBM or SLBM launcher and of vehicles, devices, or temporary structures used for the removal of the missile or front section from the launcher or for the preparation of the front section for viewing. A member of the in-country escort will demonstrate to the satisfaction of the inspectors that any vehicles, containers, or objects that enter or leave the vicinity of the ICBM or SLBM launcher do not contain reentry vehicles.

Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Annex 3 permit the inspected Party to move mobile ICBM launchers and submarines, respectively, to a specially allocated site where the viewing of the front section will be carried out, or where the front section will be separated from the missile, or the missile from its launcher. In the case of a submarine, the submarine must proceed on the surface to that site. In both instances, the inspection team has the right to maintain uninterrupted visual contact with the mobile launcher and submarine.

Paragraph 5 of Annex 3 prohibits removing reentry vehicles from the front section, from the time of the designation of the launcher for inspection until the completion of viewing of the front section.

Paragraph 6 of Annex 3 provides the specific procedures for viewing of the front section in the launcher, including examining the interior of the vehicles and devices that were used in the preparation of the front section for viewing.

Paragraph 7 of Annex 3 provides the generic procedures to be used to prepare the front section outside an ICBM or SLBM launcher for viewing. This paragraph stipulates rights of the inspecting Party to ensure that the front section that ultimately is viewed is not tampered with. Inspectors have the right to view the interior of the vehicles or devices used to remove a missile or front section from an ICBM or SLBM launcher prior to their use. If the inspected Party separates the front section in the ICBM or SLBM launcher and then removes it, no more than two inspectors have the right to view the interior of the launcher for no more than one minute. If, in the process of preparing for the demonstration, the front section or missile with its front section is placed into a vehicle, inspectors have the right to view the interior of the vehicle before the missile or front section is placed in it. If the front section is viewed at a specially allocated site, inspectors will have the right to follow the vehicle during the transportation of the missile with its front section or the front section in the vehicle to the site, in such a way as to maintain uninterrupted visual contact with the vehicle; after the missile with its front section or the front section has been unloaded from that vehicle, inspectors have the right to view the vehicle again.

Paragraph 8 of Annex 3 stipulates that preparation of the front section for viewing requires the removal of any shroud (missile ascent aeroshell) or portions of any shroud, as necessary. The preparation may be carried out outside the field of view of inspectors as long as inspectors can ascertain that no reentry vehicles are removed from the front section.

Paragraph 9 of Annex 3 refers to viewing the front section in a vehicle (a procedure to be used for some U.S. systems), and states that inspectors have the right to keep the vehicle under observation from the time that the front section is brought up into the vehicle until the viewing of the front section is completed. This complements the right to keep that vehicle under observation from the time that the launcher was opened, in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Annex.

Paragraph 10 of Annex 3 pertains to procedures when the front section is viewed at a specially allocated site. The procedures include assuring, before the shroud is removed, that no front sections or reentry vehicles are within the area that will be used for the direct viewing of the front section. This examination of the viewing area is required because, in accordance with paragraphs 8 and 11 of Annex 3, the inspected Party may prepare the front section for viewing and may install reentry vehicle covers outside the direct view of the inspectors.

Paragraph 11 of Annex 3 allows the inspected Party to cover reentry vehicles and the mounting platform with either hard or soft covers that have been viewed (and, in the case of hard covers, measured) by the inspectors. The covers are installed before the inspectors view the front section. Such covers must not hamper inspectors in ascertaining that the front section contains no more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to missiles of that type. The area in which this preparation is done must be free of other front sections or reentry vehicles. For the same reason, inspectors have the right to either seal the exits or observe all exits. During the process of preparation of the front section for viewing, no vehicle, container, launch canister, or object shall leave the site until inspected or until an inspector declares that he or she does not intend to inspect it.

Paragraph 12 of Annex 3 limits the viewing of the prepared front section by inspectors to 15 minutes, for their confirmation that the front section contains no more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to missiles of that type deployed at that location. It also requires that the location provide a clear unobstructed view of the front section. If the inspectors observe more objects on the front section than the number of warheads attributed to missiles of that type deployed at that location, and this situation is not resolved in accordance with paragraph 13 of this Annex, an ambiguity exists.

Paragraph 13 of Annex 3 addresses the situation when a member of the in-country escort declares that an object contained in the front section is not a reentry vehicle. In this case, the inspected Party must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the inspectors that this object is not a reentry vehicle. The definition of reentry vehicle" does not require the presence of a nuclear weapon, so demonstrating the absence of nuclear radiation would not by itself be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of this paragraph.

Paragraph 14 of Annex 3 confirms the right to view the vehicle or specially allocated site where the front section was viewed, including the space under the shroud, upon completion of viewing the front section and prior to the reinstallation of the shroud, in order to confirm that there are no reentry vehicles outside the front section.

Paragraphs 15 and 16 address the administrative details of providing sufficient lighting in the vicinity of the ICBM and SLBM launcher and at the site where the viewing of the front section will be carried out, and transportation to a site where the inspection report can be written.

ANNEX 4 - PROCEDURES FOR INSPECTIONS OF HEAVY BOMBERS, FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS, LONG-RANGE ALCMs, AND THEIR FACILITIES

Annex 4 to the Inspection Protocol consists of five sections. Section I addresses the procedures for inspections of individual airplanes and long-range ALCMs during exhibitions, while Section V addresses overall procedures for such exhibitions. Section II addresses general procedures for airplane inspections during short-notice inspections, with Section III providing special procedures for alert heavy bombers. Section IV addresses the procedures for confirming the absence of long-range nuclear ALCMs from weapons storage areas at heavy bomber facilities.

Section I

Section I provides procedures for the inspection of heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range ALCMs during exhibitions scheduled by the exhibiting Party. Paragraph l establishes the right to confirm distinguishing features. It specifically provides for linear measurement (i.e., length, width) to confirm the presence of the distinguishing features that have been specified for a particular classification (i.e., category, type, and variant) of heavy bomber in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding for the heavy bomber itself, and in Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding for data about long-range nuclear ALCMs if that data pertains to the distinguishing features specified for the heavy bomber. If the exhibiting Party has specified no distinguishing feature in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding that relates to data in Annex H, then the data in Annex H is not relevant to the exhibition. (The specific issue underlying the relationship between Annexes G and H is the question of attachment joints for long-range nuclear ALCMs, which the Soviet Union uses as a distinguishing feature, but the United States does not. In separate statements during the final START plenary, the United States asserted that attachment joints are inappropriate to be used as distinguishing features for US systems; the Soviet Union considers attachment joints to be non-mandatory" distinguishing features.) Paragraph 1 also provides that there is no right to inspect areas of the interior of the heavy bomber during exhibitions unless the exhibiting Party specifies technical data or distinguishing features there.

Paragraph 2 provides similar procedures for former heavy bombers. Because all former heavy bombers are unarmed, there is no reference to Annex H on long-range nuclear ALCMs.

Paragraph 3 provides the right to make linear measurements to confirm technical data specified for each type of long-range nuclear ALCM, and any variants thereof.

Paragraph 4 concerns the exhibition of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs. Inspectors may use radiation detection equipment to confirm that an exhibited ALCM is non-nuclear, and may make linear measurements to confirm distinguishing features. Because it is anticipated that future long-range non-nuclear ALCMs may be containerized, this paragraph also provides procedures for inspecting such a container and the missile after it is removed from the container. Because stealth technology may be used in future long-range non-nuclear ALCMs, the inspectors do not have the right to view the removal. This allows shrouding to be installed, as specified in paragraph 5 of this Section, prior to access. Inspectors may also confirm that such a container is unable to shield radiation. This lays the foundation for procedures during data update inspections where inspectors may use radiation detection equipment on an unopened container declared to contain a long-range non-nuclear ALCM, to indicate that it does not contain a long-range nuclear ALCM.

Paragraph 5 applies to all exhibitions made under the preceding paragraphs, while paragraph 6 amplifies paragraph 4 for long-range non-nuclear ALCMs. It is the exhibiting Party that designates where linear measurements are made. The exhibiting Party has the right to use shrouding on any item so long as technical characteristics and distinguishing features are not obscured. There must be sufficient lighting to facilitate the inspection. Also, references are given to the appropriate provisions on photography and the use of radiation detection equipment.

Section II

Section II provides specific procedures for inspections of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers during baseline data, data update, and new facility inspections, and also during baseline exhibitions. Paragraph l states the purpose of such inspections.

Paragraph 2 addresses the confirmation of distinguishing features. Inspectors may make linear measurements to confirm distinguishing features, as long as they can be made without changing the configuration of the airplane by adding any equipment to or removing any equipment from the airplane as it is found. There is one exception, in that inspectors may request the removal of one pylon from one non-alert heavy bomber. This heavy bomber either must be a heavy bomber that is both equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs and of a type that does not carry long range nuclear ALCMs externally, or must be a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. This provision, therefore, does not apply to any current types of US heavy bombers. The particular aircraft pylon is chosen by the inspectors. This paragraph also precludes the inspection of interiors unless something about the interior has been specified to be a distinguishing feature.

Paragraph 3 provides that, having been informed during pre-inspection procedures of what airplanes are present at a base, the inspectors will identify which airplanes they intend to inspect. All others are free to depart the base. For an airplane that arrives during the inspection, the inspection team leader must, immediately after its arrival, designate an intention to inspect it, or the airplane is free to leave. If a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber is selected for inspection, it is free to leave after it has been inspected.

Paragraph 4 repeats the general provisions from the previous Section regarding the designation of where measurements may be made, shrouding, and lighting.

Section III

Section III provides special procedures for the inspection of alert heavy bombers at nuclear heavy bomber bases, as introduced in paragraph l. On September 27, 1991, President Bush announced the termination of the practice of maintaining such bombers on alert. (The Soviet Union has not routinely maintained heavy bombers on daily alert and does not do so now.)

Paragraph 2 provides that the location of alert heavy bombers will be provided to inspectors during pre-inspection procedures. If an alert heavy bomber is designated for inspection under the quota provided for in subparagraph 14(d) of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol, it may be prepared for inspection by the inspected Party. Preparation, which may include moving the heavy bomber, must be viewable by inspectors. Shrouding is allowed so long as it does not prevent inspectors from counting the number of ALCMs for which the aircraft is equipped. No distance is specified for viewing the preparation; there is no requirement that inspectors be close enough to see in detail whatever it is that the inspected Party chooses to shroud. Paragraph 2 also clarifies that an area where alert heavy bombers are located is subject to no other inspection other than that provided for in this Section. In other words, unless the inspected Party elects to have the chosen alert heavy bomber inspected in the area where alert heavy bombers are located, it is possible that the inspectors would have no right to enter this area. Although not stated explicitly, the Parties intend that no non-alert heavy bombers would be in such an area.

Paragraph 3 provides the details of special procedures that apply to the inspection of alert heavy bombers. Total elapsed time during which any one or more inspectors may view a particular alert heavy bomber is thirty minutes. No more than four inspectors may inspect any airplane. This does not mean four at a time, but a total of four during the 30-minute inspection period. Measurements are forbidden except for closed weapons bay doors. Weapons bay doors will be opened only for a heavy bomber whose internal weapons bay doors are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding to be large enough to contain a long-range nuclear ALCM. The inspected Party will direct inspectors to a position outside the weapons bay where they can view the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the weapons bay is equipped. The purpose for these constraints is safety and lack of space.

Section IV

Section IV contains procedures for the inspection of weapons storage areas. The purpose of such inspections is to verify the absence of long-range nuclear ALCMs. Paragraph l provides that the procedures in this Section apply only to those facilities where long-range nuclear ALCMs are banned, as listed in Paragraph 22 of Article V.

Paragraph 2 provides that during pre-inspection procedures at such facilities, the inspected Party will identify the location of weapons storage areas and provide site diagrams showing all structures in weapons storage areas large enough to contain the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM of the inspected Party.

Paragraph 3 provides that searches for long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be conducted using the general procedures for items of inspection in Annex l, with one exception. This exception is that containers large enough to contain a long-range nuclear ALCM of the inspected Party will be inspected only in accordance with the remaining paragraphs of this Section. Further, except as provided for in this Section, linear measurements are restricted to covered objects, containers, vehicles, and structures, i.e., where long-range nuclear ALCMs might be contained. Finally, the maximum number of inspectors allowed in any structure is four; again, this does not mean that inspectors can be rotated in and out under this quota, but rather that a total of four inspectors can have entered the structure during its inspection. The reasons for this number are safety and lack of space.

The procedures for initial exhibitions for long-range non-nuclear ALCMs include confirmation of the distinguishing features of the ALCM, confirmation of the fact that such missiles are non-nuclear, as well as confirmation that containers do not shield radiation sources that may be inside. The purpose of this extra effort during exhibitions is to allow confidence, without having to open every container during subsequent data update inspections, that long-range nuclear ALCMs are not being presented as long-range non-nuclear ALCMs. Paragraph 4 establishes a quota of three objects that are subject to special procedures during the inspection of weapons storage areas at each inspectable facility. (In other words, three per base, not three per distinct weapons storage area.) An object can be either a container of any sort large enough to contain the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM, or an object can be an ALCM stored outside of a container.

Subparagraph 4(a) details the special procedures if the object inspected is a container. Inspectors may measure the container and use radiation detection equipment on its exterior. If a radiation source is detected, then the container must be opened. If simple viewing of the contents of the container does not allow inspectors to confirm the absence of a long-range nuclear ALCM, then the contents of the container must be removed. The contents may be removed in such a way that they are not viewed by the inspectors, so long as the inspectors can know that the contents and the original container have not been removed and replaced by some others. Shrouding is allowed. The contents can then be viewed and measured to confirm distinguishability. Radiation detection equipment may not be used on the contents. (The foregoing inspection has already demonstrated the container to be a source of radioactivity). If inspectors still have doubts, they can request photographs of the ambiguity, and they will record the ambiguity in their inspection report. No further redress is provided for during the inspection.

Subparagraph 4(b) provides specific procedures if a selected object is an ALCM stored outside a container. Beyond viewing, there is no obligation on the part of the inspected Party to allow inspectors to make measurements, to allow inspectors to use radiation detection equipment, or to allow any other measure to resolve an apparent ambiguity. The procedures recognize that the inspected Party may wish to allow such measures, however. If the inspected Party believes that such measures would result in unacceptable technology transfer, then it need not offer these measures. Unresolved ambiguities may be photographed, and will be included in the inspection report. Differences between the Parties may be pursued in the JCIC.

Paragraph 5 establishes a separate and additional quota for opening containers that are declared to be containers for long-range non-nuclear ALCMs, which will have been exhibited in accordance with one of the provisions of Section VII of the Notification Protocol. Three such containers that are large enough to contain the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM of the inspected Party may be opened during any three-year period in order to confirm that they do not contain long-range nuclear ALCMs. Rather than a single annual quota, three openings in a three-year period allows the inspecting Party to manage the use of its quotas to ensure that there is no period of time during which the inspected Party knows that containers cannot be requested to be opened. Special procedures call for the container to be opened and, if viewing alone does not confirm that the contents are not a long-range nuclear ALCM, then the contents will be removed from the container. In this case, linear measurements and radiation detection equipment may be used. The removal operation may be hidden from the inspectors so long as the inspectors can know that the selected container and its contents are not removed and replaced by others. Further, a radiation source may be used to reconfirm the results of the initial exhibition of this type of long-range non-nuclear ALCM, that the container does not shield radiation. Again, if ambiguities remain, photographs may be taken and the ambiguities will be recorded.

Paragraphs 6 and 7 contain provisions that are applicable to all the procedures detailed in this Section: these paragraphs specify that where linear measurements are taken is directed by the inspected Party, that shrouding is allowed, that lighting must be sufficient, and that the procedures for using radiation detection equipment specified in Section VI of Annex 8 to this Protocol will be followed.

Section V

Section V details additional procedures for the overall conduct of distinguishability exhibitions, baseline exhibitions, and long-range non-nuclear ALCM exhibitions. Paragraphs l and 2 address distinguishability exhibitions for heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs.

For initial distinguishability exhibitions, conducted before entry into force under the Early Exhibitions Agreement or shortly after entry into force, the exhibiting Party is required to exhibit together all possible classifications (i.e., categories and variants) of each type of heavy bomber from which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested. Along with the bombers, one of each classification (i.e., type and variant) of long-range nuclear ALCM must be exhibited. US early distinguishability exhibitions were conducted 17-19 September, l99l; Soviet early distinguishability exhibitions were conducted September 26-27, l99l. The requirement for the United States was as follows: for the B-2, no exhibition (because a long-range nuclear ALCM has never been tested from a B-2); for the B-l, one deployed (i.e., operational) heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, and one test heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs; and, for the B-52, a B-52H and a B-52G equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, and a B-52G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. Although the B-ls could have been exhibited at a separate site from the B-52s under subparagraph 1(a), they were not. The Soviets also chose a single site, Uzin, at which they displayed a total of nine airplanes: a Blackjack equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs; Bear H's equipped for six and 16 long-range nuclear ALCMs; a Bear B and a Bear G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs; a Bear A and a Bear B training heavy bomber; a Bison former heavy bomber; and a Bear D naval airplane, which is not accountable under Treaty central limits, and which must be exhibited, pursuant to the exchange of letters between Heads of Delegation on Bear D airplanes.

Subparagraph 1(b) addresses subsequent distinguishability exhibitions for new types, categories, or variants.

-- For a new classification (i.e., type, variant, category) of heavy bomber subject to exhibition, a bomber of that classification must be exhibited; other categories or variants of the same type of heavy bomber need be exhibited only if newly-identified distinguishing features associated with the new classification of bomber were not exhibited previously on these other bombers.

-- If a long-range nuclear ALCM is flight-tested for the first time from a type of heavy bomber, the minimum requirement is that a heavy bomber of the type and one of each variant of heavy bomber of that type equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs must be exhibited.

-- In the case of a new type of long-range nuclear ALCM, only the ALCM itself must be exhibited. Heavy bombers must be exhibited only if distinguishing features associated with the new ALCM were not previously displayed when the heavy bombers themselves were previously exhibited.

Paragraph 2 details pre-inspection procedures for distinguishability exhibitions. The exhibiting Party has to identify what is going to be displayed. Using both photographs and drawings, or using both slides and drawings, the exhibiting Party must identify all the distinguishing features that make the airplanes to be exhibited different from all other classifications of airplanes of the same type. Photographs of the distinguishing features must be given to the inspectors. If long-range nuclear ALCMs are to be exhibited, these same procedures regarding photographs, slides, and drawings apply. Additionally, inspectors must identify where long-range nuclear ALCMs are carried on all heavy bombers so equipped.

Paragraph 3 addresses long-range non-nuclear ALCM exhibitions. Using both photographs and drawings, or using both slides and drawings, the exhibiting Party must identify the distinguishing features from its long-range nuclear ALCMs. Photographs demonstrating these features must be provided.

Paragraphs 4 and 5 concern baseline exhibitions. Paragraph 4 provides that the required baseline exhibitions of all heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers that exist as of entry into force may be held at more than one exhibition site. This provision is written in such a way that the inspecting Party may choose to conduct baseline inspections at facilities simultaneously with the baseline exhibitions that may be scheduled by the inspected Party at these facilities.

Paragraph 5 details pre-inspection procedures for baseline exhibitions, including initial baseline exhibitions for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers, as well as subsequent baseline exhibitions for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range ALCMs when a long-range nuclear ALCM is first tested from that type. The inspected Party must inform inspectors of the number of aircraft of each classification to be inspected. Distinguishing features of heavy bombers (or recognition features of Bison former heavy bombers) must be identified using photographs and drawings, or using slides and drawings.

ANNEX 5 - PROCEDURES FOR CONTINUOUS MONITORING

This Annex sets forth the procedures that may be used during continuous monitoring.

Paragraph 1 of Annex 5 specifies that the objectives during continuous monitoring are to confirm the numbers, types, and, if applicable, variants of types of items of continuous monitoring (defined in paragraph 24 of Section VI of the Protocol) that are declared to exit from the monitored facility, and to confirm that no other items of continuous monitoring exit from the monitored facility. The paragraph states that the size criteria as defined in paragraph 24 of Section VI of the Protocol is to be used for making decisions about whether the size of any observed object, container, launch canister, or vehicle, and the accesses to their interiors, make them subject to further inspections as outlined in this Annex.

Paragraph 2 of Annex 5 stipulates that if the inspected Party intends to pass anything through the portal that is large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort must inform the monitors of that intention no less than 30 minutes before it appears at the portal, must declare whether or not it is or contains an item of continuous monitoring, must declare the estimated time of arrival at the portal, and must identify the numbers, types, and, if applicable, variants of types of items of continuous monitoring. This paragraph also limits the number of items of continuous monitoring per container or launch canister to one.

Paragraph 3 of Annex 5 states that monitors have the right to read the data from unique identifiers at the portal on each launch canister declared to contain an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

Paragraphs 4 and 9 of Annex 5 refer to vehicles exiting from the monitored facility. The procedures to be used for inspecting such vehicles are comparable to those of paragraph 9 of Annex 1 of the Protocol, with weighing of a vehicle declared not to contain an item of continuous monitoring as an added option for the inspected Party to choose for inspecting a vehicle declared not to contain an item of continuous monitoring.

Paragraphs 5 and 12 of Annex 5 refer to covered or environmentally protected objects exiting from the monitored facility. The procedures to be used for inspecting such objects are identical to those of paragraph 4 of Annex 1 of the Protocol.

Paragraphs 6 and 10 of Annex 5 refer to containers other than launch canisters exiting from the monitored facility. The procedures to be used for inspecting such containers are comparable to those of paragraph 5 of Annex 1, with the additional right to image the contents of containers declared not to contain an item of continuous monitoring. Because installing non-damaging imaging equipment is a time-consuming process, if the inspected Party prefers this method of inspecting containers declared not to contain an item of continuous monitoring, subparagraph 10(d) requires a notification of such a preference at least six months in advance of the planned exit of a container to be imaged.

Paragraphs 7 and 11 of Annex 5 refer to launch canisters exiting from the monitored facility. The procedures to be used for inspecting such launch canisters are comparable to those of paragraph 7 of Annex 1, with the added measure of imaging the contents of a launch canister that is declared not to contain an item of continuous monitoring. Again, for imaging, a notification must be provided to the monitoring Party at least six months in advance of the planned exit of the first launch canister that the inspected Party prefers to have imaged.

Paragraph 8 of Annex 5 refers to an item of continuous monitoring that is exiting from the monitored facility and that is outside a container or launch canister and that is not covered or environmentally protected, either initially or after the accomplishment of procedures in other paragraphs of this Annex. The procedures to be used for external viewing of such items of continuous monitoring and measurements of their dimensions are identical to those of paragraph 2 of Annex 1.

Paragraph 13 of Annex 5 refers to objects outside a container or launch canister and not covered or environmentally protected. Monitors have the right to confirm by external viewing and by making measurements of its dimensions that the object is not an item of continuous monitoring. These procedures are identical to those of paragraph 3 of Annex 1.

Paragraph 14 of Annex 5 refers to vehicles exiting from the monitored facility through a road exit other than the portal. Monitors may make measurements of any such vehicle to determine whether it is large enough to contain an item of continuous monitoring, and if it is, the vehicle must proceed to the portal, where the procedures for vehicles exiting the portal pertain.

Paragraph 15 of Annex 5 provides for an annual quota of up to five opportunities, spread across all the monitored facilities where MIRVed mobile ICBMs are produced, to inspect containers or vehicles to confirm that no solid rocket motors for the first stages of mobile ICBMs with nozzles attached exit the monitored facility. The size criterion for these inspections is as defined in paragraph 25 of Section VI of this Protocol. These inspections are conducted at the portal of the monitored facilities. While paragraph 15 refers explicitly to the procedures in paragraphs 9 and 10 of this Annex, in specific cases monitors also have the right to carry out procedures in paragraph 11, 12, or 13 of this Annex, since these are incorporated by reference in paragraphs 9 and 10.

ANNEX 6 - PROCEDURES RELATING TO UNIQUE IDENTIFIERS

The Parties have agreed in paragraph 4 of Article IX of the Treaty that there will be a missile identification regime established for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Annex 6 provides for the procedures to be used in the application and reading of such identifiers.

Paragraph 1 of Annex 6 defines a unique identifier as a non-repeating, alpha-numeric production number, or a copy thereof, that has been applied by the inspected Party using its own technology to mobile ICBMs. Because unique identifier is defined in this paragraph, it is not found in the Definitions Annex. Production number" is intended to be a factory serial number normally used by the inspected Party. During the negotiations, Soviet negotiators said that their unique indicators might be embedded in a longer number and that the non-relevant portions of the longer number would be masked out. Provided that the unique identifier itself was readable, such a practice would not be inconsistent with the Treaty.

Paragraph 2 of Annex 6 cross-references the provisions of the Notification Protocol that specify when the data from unique identifiers must be provided by the Party possessing the mobile ICBMs. Those notifications require that a Party provide the unique identifier data for all mobile ICBMs that exist at Treaty signature not later than 30 days after the Treaty enters into force, and for those produced after Treaty signature, no later than five days after production.

Paragraph 3 establishes that for canisterized mobile ICBMs unique identifiers shall be applied to the launch canister for those ICBMs that exist as of Treaty signature, and to both the canister and the first stage of such ICBMs that leave the production facility after Treaty signature. In the latter case, there shall be a permanent relationship between the data from the unique identifier on the launch canister and the data from the unique identifier on the first stage. In the former case, Soviet negotiators stated that the data from the unique identifiers on the first stages of canisterized missiles is not known with great certainty, and that opening the canisters of such missiles for the purpose of reading the data from the unique identifier was an unacceptable burden. Therefore, only the data from the unique identifier on the canister must be provided, but such unique identifiers may not be changed. These provisions apply to both the SS-24 and SS-25. The United States has no ICBMs existing as of Treaty signature that employ launch canisters. The Small ICBM would not fall under the provisions of this paragraph, even if it were declared as a mobile ICBM, unless it was maintained, transported, and stored in a launch canister.

Paragraph 4 of Annex 6 establishes that for mobile ICBMs that are not canisterized, the unique identifiers shall be applied on the first stage. The provisions of paragraph 4 apply to the US Peacekeeper ICBM and would apply to the Small ICBM if it were declared as a mobile ICBM and not maintained, transported, and stored in a launch canister.

Paragraph 5 of Annex 6 lists the inspections during which the data from unique identifiers may be read, and states that they may also be read during the conduct of continuous monitoring. It specifies that they are to be read on the launch canister for canisterized systems, on the first stage for non-canisterized systems, and, as the circumstances permit, on the first stage of canisterized systems (e.g., if the missile is removed from its launch canister during an elimination). It also stipulates that the data from unique identifiers will not be read on mobile ICBMs that are deployed in silo launchers, since such reading would be impossible without removing the ICBMs from their silos.

Paragraph 6 of Annex 6 states that a member of the in-country escort will specify the position from which inspectors or monitors may read the data from the unique identifier and requires that the position ensure a correct reading of such data. It further states that the inspected Party must replicate the unique identifier on a place accessible for reading its data if the original is not accessible for reading. This is necessary since the design of some mobile ICBM launchers may limit access.

Paragraph 7 of Annex 6 requires that for a newly-produced mobile ICBM the inspected Party will inform the monitors of the data from its unique identifier before the item exits through the portal of the monitored facility, and also will provide this data to the inspecting Party in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

ANNEX 7 - PROCEDURES FOR DELIVERING AND EXAMINING EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES TRANSPORTED BY INSPECTION AIRPLANES USED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 4 OF SECTION IV OF THE INSPECTION PROTOCOL

This Annex provides procedures for the unique requirements of handling bulk cargoes of equipment and supplies used for continuous monitoring activities. It parallels the provisions of paragraphs 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol for the examination and impoundment of equipment and supplies that are hand-carried by monitors to the point of entry aboard airplanes transporting them in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol. This Annex provides for the transportation of cargoes of monitoring equipment and supplies, as well as hand-carried items, aboard cargo airplanes used in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol. It further provides for the examination of the equipment and supplies at the point of entry, at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, or at the facility itself.

The Annex obligates the Parties to agree within the JCIC on the timelines for providing an inventory of bulk cargo in advance of its arrival and on the provisions for any repacking of equipment and supplies that may be required as a result of examination of the cargo at the point of entry or airport associated with the monitored facility.

Paragraph 1 describes the information concerning the contents of the cargo that is to be provided in the inventory documents by the sender. These documents are to be delivered through the inspecting Party's embassy in advance of the arrival of the cargo on the territory of the inspected Party. The timeline for providing that inventory will be agreed by the Parties within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

Paragraph 2 requires the inclusion in the inventory documents of a packing list on each shipping container on a pallet.

Paragraph 3 provides for the location of the examination of cargoes to be at the point of entry, at the airport associated with the monitored facility, or at the monitored facility itself, at the option of the inspected Party. It also allows for the examination of monitoring equipment and supplies to be conducted in the presence of the aircrew, rather than monitors, at the discretion of the inspecting Party, if the location of the examination is either the point of entry or airport associated with a facility subject to continuous monitoring. Finally, it refers to Section V of the Inspection Protocol for the examination of hand-carried items of equipment or supplies that are not contained in the cargo and not listed in the inventory documents.

Paragraph 4 calls for a separate joint inventory to be completed by the in-country escort and the monitoring team leader. This joint inventory records the items of equipment and supplies actually delivered. The procedures recognize that errors in the original inventory documents may be discovered and provide for agreed corrections on the spot. Completion of the joint inventory also initiates authority to begin using the equipment and supplies, once these items have arrived at the facility, provided that the manuals and installation drawings for the equipment have been provided in accordance with paragraph 25 of Section XVI.

Paragraph 5 obligates the inspected Party to assist the inspecting Party in providing security and protection from inclement weather for unloaded cargoes until the joint inventory is signed. The inspected Party must supply storage areas. Access to cargo when it is placed in such areas is to be under joint control, and the inspecting Party must be allowed access to such areas.

Paragraph 6 provides procedures for the handling of cargoes that are unloaded and examined at the point of entry or airport associated with a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. It states the Parties' responsibilities concerning the security, handling, protection, and integrity of the shipment, and refers the issue of provisions for repacking to the JCIC.

Paragraph 7 gives the inspecting Party the right to observe its cargo during its handling and transits or during any delays.

Paragraph 8 provides procedures for equipment and supplies shipped as cargo. These procedures are parallel to those for examination and impoundment of hand-carried items in paragraphs 11, 12, and 13 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol. Paragraph 8 gives the in-country escort the right to impound items that the escort believes can perform functions unconnected with the requirements of continuous monitoring activities. In addition, it requires discontinuing the use of items of equipment or supplies that have already arrived or been installed at a monitored facility if the inspected Party concludes that they perform functions unconnected with the requirements. The paragraph includes a mechanism for resolving disputes concerning equipment and supplies by discussion in the JCIC or in other channels if agreed by the Parties. Paragraph 8 also obligates the inspecting Party to remove impounded equipment from the territory of the inspected Party. It also obligates the inspected Party to assist in transporting impounded equipment or supplies back to the point of entry or back to the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. Unless the inspected Party says otherwise, the inspecting Party's obligation to remove equipment or supplies impounded at the point of entry or associated airport from the host country no later than the next departure of monitors is set forth in paragraph 13 of Section V in the Inspection Protocol. Paragraph 8 of the Annex does not specify a timeframe for the removal of equipment or supplies impounded at the monitored facility itself. This is because such removal from the site may not be required, depending on the decision of the inspected Party. The Treaty allows impounded equipment and supplies to be stored at the POE, at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, or at such a facility itself, at the choice of the inspected Party.

ANNEX 8 - EQUIPMENT FOR INSPECTIONS AND CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES

Sections I through V of Annex 8 list the portable equipment used by inspectors and monitors for each of the types of inspections and for perimeter and portal continuous monitoring conducted under provisions of the Treaty and the Inspection Protocol. Each of the sections separately lists US and Soviet equipment. The equipment list for the United States is very similar to that used in INF. The equipment is essentially the same for each type of inspection and for monitoring, with the exceptions detailed below. Section VI contains the agreed methods of use of the equipment listed in the first five sections.

For each of the items of equipment in Annex 8, with the exception of monitoring equipment, the United States listed the manufacturer, model, and quantity. Such detail expedites examination of the equipment at the point of entry when it is brought to the territory of the inspected Party. The United States did not include that detail for monitoring equipment, since the requirements for the quantities and specific makes and models of equipment are dependent on the characteristics of the particular site at which monitoring will occur and upon the ability of the monitors to repair or replace such equipment when it breaks.

The Soviet Union listed quantities for all its equipment in Annex 8, including its monitoring equipment, but it included the manufacturer and model for virtually none of its equipment. Soviet negotiators explained that it did not have that level of detail available at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty. The Parties agreed instead to include the provision in paragraph 17 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol that obligates the inspecting Party to provide the manufacturer and model number of any equipment listed without that detail in Annex 8, prior to the first time that equipment is brought to the territory of the inspected Party. That same provision obligates the Parties to agree on the technical specifications" of such equipment (i.e., equipment for which the manufacturer and model number is not included in Annex 8) without undue delay and prior to the first time that equipment is brought to the territory of the inspected Party.

In accordance with paragraph 15 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol, inspectors may bring with them from the point of entry to the inspection site, as a kind of toolbox," the maximum number of items listed in Annex 8 for any type of inspection, but they may use, as specified in Annex 8, only the number of items of equipment from the toolbox listed for that type of inspection. This permits the inspection team to conduct sequential inspections without telegraphing" the type of inspection it will do next.

Section I lists the basic inspector toolbox" and is the list that is agreed for use during baseline data, data update, new facility, suspect-site, post-exercise dispersal, conversion or elimination, close-out, and formerly declared facility inspections. It includes the radiation detection equipment agreed for use during inspections of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs in accordance with Annex 4 of the Inspection Protocol.

The camera equipment and film will be used in accordance with paragraph B of section VI, of Annex 8 (Methods of Use).

The satellite system receivers specified in paragraph 4 of Section I, for both the United States and the Soviet Union, are to be used by inspectors during inspections other than reentry vehicle inspections to determine the position of a specific silo declared not to contain an ICBM in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol. (The provision of such receivers for reentry vehicle inspections is governed by Section II of this Annex.) These systems will be provided by the inspected Party to the inspection team under the provisions of Section VI, of Annex 8 (Methods of Use) -- i.e., Global Positioning System (or GPS) by the US and GLONASS by the Soviet Union. In deference to Soviet security concerns, the Parties agreed during the negotiations that such receivers could be modified to display coordinates only to the nearest minute. In accordance with Section VI of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol, the Parties also agreed that procedures for using the satellite system receivers are subject to agreement in the JCIC.

Section II lists the equipment for reentry vehicle inspections. It limits the number and types of linear measurement devices and deletes, as unnecessary for the inspection, the camera equipment specified in Section I. The inspecting Party will have the right to use satellite system receivers during reentry vehicles inspections at an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs to confirm that inspectors are at the silo they designated; use of such receivers is subject to the conditions previously discussed.

Section III lists, in addition to those in Section I, linear measurement tools needed for technical characteristics exhibitions. The list excludes the radiation detection equipment listed in Section I, but adds weighing devices. The type of weighing devices to be used are to be agreed within the framework of the JCIC, and used for the purpose of confirming the launch weight of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type, and of the existing type to which it is compared. The measuring tapes that are used by the United States are calibrated by the National Bureau of Standards; to achieve very accurate measurements the United States uses equipment such as measuring tape clamps, hand levels, calipers, and string line levels.

The US list of photographic equipment for technical characteristics exhibitions lists a type of Polaroid film that will produce a photograph that meets the requirements of paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, but does not specify a quantity of film for the inspection. The Soviet equipment specifies a quantity of film and lists three types of Polaroid film, two of which will not provide the required quality. For technical characteristics exhibitions, such equipment will be used in the event there is an ambiguity; the Parties agreed during the negotiations that this would include the situation where the inspected Party cannot provide the quantity and quality of photographs required by paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding.

In Section IV, the list of inspection equipment for heavy bomber distinguishability and baseline exhibitions is the same as the list in Section III, except that it excludes weighing devices. Note that no specific list of equipment is provided for the exhibitions of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs pursuant to Section VII of the Notification Protocol. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Section I of Annex 4 to this Protocol, however, do provide for making linear measurements, using radiation detection equipment, and taking photographs during such exhibitions.

Section V lists portable equipment for perimeter and portal continuous monitoring. It also includes the equipment which the Parties may use during the engineering site survey, which the Parties have the right to conduct commencing 30 days after entry into force, in accordance with paragraph 9 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol. The Soviet list of site survey equipment differs from the US list by including equipment to measure the tension of the chain link fence at the US facility subject to continuous monitoring by the Soviet Union. That tension measuring equipment coincides with the Soviet plan to use a perimeter fence integrity monitoring system listed in Annex 9 to the Inspection Protocol. The Soviet equipment list excludes portable computers, facsimile machines, and copiers planned for use by US monitors during the survey.

Section VI provides the detailed methods of use for the equipment of either Party listed in Annex 8. Subsections A, B, and C are for linear measurement devices, camera equipment, and engineering site survey equipment, respectively. Subsections A and B are very similar to methods of use of equipment in INF. Subsection C provides for joint access to the structure or room where the portable facsimile machine will be stored. The fax machine will be operated by a member of the monitoring team in the presence of a member of the in-country escort. The inspected Party has the right to examine the information to be transmitted prior to the use of the fax machine in order to assure itself that it does not contain images that are not connected with the purposes of the engineering site survey. Subsection D records the obligation of the Parties to agree within the framework of the JCIC on the methods of use of weighing devices used to confirm the launch weight of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type.

Subsection E provides for the methods of use of the satellite system receivers. In deference to Soviet security concerns, these methods are designed to simultaneously ensure accurate position determination at the silo of concern, while precluding determination of any other geographic positions. There is no difference between the words "functional" in paragraph 1 and "functioning" in paragraph 2 of this subsection. Paragraph 8 of this subsection obligates the Parties to agree within the framework of the JCIC on procedures for using the satellite system receivers.

Subsection F contains the methods of use for the radiation detection equipment of the Parties. Such equipment is provided by the inspecting Party. The references to agreed procedures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this subsection mean that the Parties will agree on such procedures within the framework of the JCIC.

ANNEX 9 - CHARACTERISTICS AND METHODS OF USE OF EQUIPMENT FOR THE PERIMETER AND PORTAL CONTINUOUS MONITORING SYSTEM

Section I of Annex 9 lists the equipment the Parties have agreed to use for perimeter and portal continuous monitoring -- Part A containing Soviet equipment for use at the US facility subject to continuous monitoring by the USSR, and Part B containing US equipment for use at the Soviet facility. Section II of the Annex records the methods of use for the respective suites of equipment in the same order.

The equipment of each Party is similar to that of the other Party and to that which it has installed at the facility it currently monitors under provisions of the INF Treaty. However, no equipment is listed for non-damaging imaging of a vehicle or container. (Non-damaging imaging equipment could be agreed for use at a monitored facility under the provisions of subparagraphs 10(d) or 11(c) of Annex 5 to the Inspection Protocol .) Weighing equipment may be used if it is provided by the inspected Party and used in accordance with paragraph 9 of Annex 5 to the Inspection Protocol. Both Parties have provided for the use of remote (Soviet) or automatic (US) dimensional screening equipment, by which monitors identify vehicles or cargoes that leave the monitored facility and fall within the size criteria specified in paragraphs 24 and 25 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol. Manual dimensional measurement may also be used by monitors.

Both Parties have provided for the installation of traffic control equipment to alert monitors to the approach of vehicles leaving the monitored facility and to direct those vehicles through the monitoring equipment in a manner that allows dimensional screening to occur. Both Parties list surveillance equipment to observe the areas within the perimeter continuous monitoring area at the portal and at each of the road exits. Both Parties have provided for using that equipment to take video snapshots (single-frame video images) of vehicles leaving the monitored facility, and of activity at the portal and road exits. The United States has provided for using the same surveillance equipment in conjunction with video motion detection equipment to monitor the perimeter of the facility. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has provided for installing a perimeter fence integrity system, which alerts Soviet monitors to changes in fence tension that might indicate a breach of the perimeter. Both Parties have provided for the use of other sensors as might be agreed between them, and both have provided for a system to record the activities that are monitored within the perimeter continuous monitoring area.

The detailed procedures for examining items that leave the monitored facility are contained in Annex 5 to this Protocol.

Annex 9 does not address items of supply that are required to support the continuous monitoring activities or needed to operate, maintain, and sustain the monitoring site and the monitoring team on a continuous basis. The right to bring in such supplies is provided for in Sections V and VI of the Inspection Protocol.

The United States did not include that detail for monitoring equipment, since the requirements for the quantities and specific makes and models of equipment are dependent on the characteristics of the particular site at which monitoring will occur and upon the ability of the monitors to repair or replace such equipment when it breaks.

Section I -- Equipment: The chapeau to the Section reaffirms the right of the Parties to install equipment at each facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, and to store sufficient spare parts and equipment to keep the system operating on a continuous basis.

Part A - Soviet Equipment:

Subparagraph 1(b) provides for magnetometric sensors which the US system does not use, but for which there is a functional equivalent (i.e., induction loop sensors).

Subparagraph 1(c) provides for gate position sensors which would be placed on gates belonging to the United States. The US system uses no equivalent.

Subparagraph 1(d) provides for floodlights to be used with the remote measuring and video snapshot equipment. The US system has no equivalent.

Subparagraph 2(e) includes infrared arrays and doppler sensors for the exits. Neither of these items is listed for the portal.

Paragraph 3 lists the equipment for the perimeter fence integrity monitoring system for which there is no US equivalent.

Part B - US Equipment

Paragraph 1 includes dimensional screening equipment, a surveillance system, and vehicle sensors and control equipment that are the functional equivalent to those currently employed at the US continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk, USSR under the INF Treaty.

Subparagraph 2(g) provides for the use of gate seals at the exits when there is no traffic and the exits are to be monitored from the operations center at the portal.

Paragraph 3 provides for the use of video motion detection equipment in conjunction with the video surveillance system around the perimeter of the monitored facility. There is no functional equivalent in either the Soviet system or in the system employed by the United States under the INF Treaty.

Paragraph 4 provides for the use of a personal (micro)computer" (i.e., desktop workstation) for selecting and processing video snapshots. There is a functional equivalent in the US INF system.

Section II -- Methods of Use:

Part A - Soviet Equipment:

Subparagraph 1(a) provides for initial comparison of the size of vehicles and cargoes leaving the portal with the size criteria specified in paragraph 24 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol. Note that, in accordance with paragraph 15 of Annex 5, inspectors also have a right to inspect a quota of vehicles and containers smaller than that size criteria.

Subparagraph 1(b)(i) describes the Soviet remote measurement system. The Soviet remote measuring and surveillance system requires cameras that are installed up to 50 meters from the road and perpendicular to it, and also up to 30 meters from the center of the screening area and facing in the direction of traffic. The subparagraph specifies that the field of view of surveillance and measurement cameras will be agreed by the Parties and fixed. There is a reciprocal provision for fixed field of view cameras in methods of use for US surveillance equipment.

Subparagraph 1(b)(ii) describes the use of the magnetometric sensors.

Subparagraph 1(b)(iv) describes the use of the floodlights for contrast lighting.

Paragraph 2 includes essentially the same equipment for the exits as for the portal. Subparagraph 2(b)(iii), however, describes the use of a Doppler sensor, which is not listed with portal equipment, and infrared arrays to produce a computer-generated profile of a vehicle leaving the facility via an exit. US INF equipment functions in the same manner, but without a Doppler sensor.

Paragraph 3 describes the perimeter fence integrity system and its installation on an existing US fence. It provides for the installation of the system in sections, each of which must also have a means of communication with the operations center. There is no US equivalent.

Subparagraph 4(a) provides for installing the Soviet operations center building in a location with an unobstructed view of the portal. There is a reciprocal provision for the US operations center.

Subparagraph 4(b)(x) provides for the use of communications devices in the operations center, but prohibits the use of the non-dedicated telephone line for the transmission of Treaty information obtained during monitoring of the facility. This provision was inserted at Soviet request to preclude giving commercial operators access to Treaty information. The methods of use section for US equipment contains a reciprocal provision.

Part B - US Equipment:

Paragraph 1 describes the functioning of the screening, traffic control, and surveillance system at the portal. Note that although subparagraph 1(a) provides for vehicles smaller than the size criteria to not be subject to inspection, such vehicles at monitored facilities where MIRVed mobile ICBMs are produced may nevertheless be subject to inspection if they meet the smaller size criteria specified in paragraph 15 of Annex 5 to the Inspection Protocol.

Subparagraph 1(b)(i) provides for the use of in-road or above-ground induction loop sensors, which are the functional equivalent of the Soviet magnetometric sensors.

Subparagraph 1(b)(vii) describes the use of data authentication devices, which are included in the list of US equipment in Section I but for which there is no Soviet equivalent.

Paragraph 2 describes the functioning of the US equipment at the road exit, which is essentially the same as the equipment used at the portal, except that are no weight scales at an exit. If the inspected Party chooses to use weight scales, they will be used only at portals.

Subparagraph 2(b)(vii) describes the use of gate seals by the US There is no equivalent provision in the Soviet equipment.

Subparagraph 2(b)(viii) provides for the use of data authentication devices at the exits.

Paragraph 3 describes the use of the surveillance and video motion-detection equipment, which may be installed along the entire perimeter.

Subparagraph 3(b)(i) provides for the installation of cameras as close as necessary to each other to obtain a complete view of the corresponding sector of the perimeter. It limits their height, however, to eight meters. There is no functional equivalent to this system in the Soviet equipment.

Paragraph 4 describes the use of the operations center equipment. It contains the reciprocal provisions for placement of the operations center building and use of the communications equipment.

Subparagraph 4(b)(iii) provides for the remote control of all exit equipment from the operations center at times when the exit gate is sealed and no monitors are present at the exits.

Subparagraph 4(c) provides for a backup power generator in the event of an interruption of power provided by the Soviets.

ANNEX 10 - TYPES OF INSPECTION AIRPLANES

Annex 10 lists the airplanes of each Party which are to be used for transporting inspectors and monitors (paragraph 2) or cargoes (paragraph 3). Paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol provides for the transportation of inspectors and monitors aboard the cargo airplanes listed in this Annex.

Paragraph 1 permits the use of military transport aircraft in their operational paint schemes, which applies particularly to the US aircraft, all of which are US Air Force airplanes. Paragraphs 2 and 3 list specific authorized airplanes. The US airplanes include the C-9 medical evacuation airplane for emergencies. The Soviet airplanes are principally Aeroflot passenger airplanes, except for the cargo aircraft which include the giant AN-124.

Paragraph 4 provides for replacing or adding to the types of aircraft listed for one of the Parties, which is accomplished by simple notification. Such changes take effect three months after the notification of the new aircraft type, unless the Parties agree otherwise.

ANNEX 11 - PROCEDURES FOR CONFIRMING THE DIMENSIONS OF ICBMs AND SLBMs

Annex 11 consists of seven paragraphs that specify the procedures to be used during exhibitions for confirming the missile and stage dimensions of existing and new types of ICBMs and SLBMs. In addition to providing procedures that are generally applicable to US and Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs, Annex 11 also provides various exemptions and modifications to those procedures for certain missile types, taking account of limitations imposed by specific missile designs.

Paragraph 1 specifies that during exhibitions, inspectors shall have the right to make measurements on exhibited items at the locations on such items designated by the in-country escort. It should be noted in this regard, however, that in designating such locations, the in-country escort must follow the rules specified in Annex 11 and elsewhere in the Treaty.

Paragraph 2 provides that for existing and new types of liquid fueled ICBMs and SLBMs, the assembled missile and the separate first stage may be exhibited with or without fuel. This provision was adopted to address the fact that, due to the difficulty and hazards of the fueling process, liquid missiles are not normally fueled outside of their launchers. Thus, such missiles would not normally be available in a fueled configuration during an exhibition.

The assembled missile and first stage of existing solid propellant ICBMs or SLBMs, however, generally shall be exhibited with propellant. This requirement is dictated by the fact that, unlike liquid fueled missiles, solid propellant missiles contain their propellant at all times, not just when they are placed in a launcher. This requirement is intended to enhance confidence that the dimensions being confirmed reflect those of actual missiles. Paragraph 2 specifies two exemptions from this general rule: the assembled missile of the Soviet SS-25 ICBM and the US Trident II SLBM need not be exhibited with propellant. The SS-25 was exempted because of Soviet claims that it could not be exhibited outside a production facility without incurring significant safety risks and imposing substantial technical difficulties. In exchange for this exemption, the Trident II also was exempted. This exemption reduces the technical burden of the Trident II exhibition. However, in the case of both the SS-25 and the Trident II, the separate first stage must be exhibited with propellant.

For new types of solid propellant ICBMs and SLBMs, a general right to exhibit the assembled missile with or without propellant is provided, except where the new type is declared on the basis of missile length. In such a case, the assembled missile must be exhibited with propellant. This provision is intended to account for the possibility that new types may have similar safety and technical problems as the SS-25. However, in the interest of enhancing confidence of the inspecting Party that the exhibited item fully reflects the dimensions and characteristics of the operational missile, no exemption is made in the case where an ICBM or SLBM is declared to be a new type on the basis of a change in missile length. As with existing types of solid propellant ICBMs, the separate first stage of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs must be exhibited with propellant.

Paragraph 3 specifies that for ICBMs or SLBMs maintained, stored, or transported in stages, the self-contained dispensing mechanism must be exhibited either separately or attached to the third stage for the purpose of confirming missile length. If the self-contained dispensing mechanism is exhibited separately, the inspectors shall have the right to measure its length. Paragraph 13 of Annex J of the Memorandum of Understanding specifies that the length of an assembled missile excludes the front section; thus, the self-contained dispensing mechanism is included in the length of an assembled missile. Because existing missiles that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages do not incorporate a self-contained dispensing mechanism until they are deployed, Paragraph 3 of Annex 11 clarifies that the self-contained dispensing mechanism must be displayed for confirmation of assembled missile length during exhibitions. For missiles maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles, with or without a launch canister, such clarification is not necessary.

Paragraph 4 specifies that for exhibitions of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, the inspected Party may exhibit either a launch canister containing the ICBM without front section, or an empty launch canister associated with such ICBM. Such an exhibition would be in addition to the exhibition of the assembled missile outside its launch canister and the separate first stage. This provision is designed to permit the inspecting Party to establish the relationship between a particular ICBM and a particular launch canister -- a relationship important for subsequent on-site inspection procedures.

Paragraph 5 specifies the procedures by which Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs of each existing type shall be exhibited. These procedures, which vary by missile type, are provided in four subparagraphs. Subparagraph 5(a) states that for the SS-25, SS-24, and SS-18 ICBMs, and each variant thereof, the separate first stage and the assembled missile outside its launch canister shall be exhibited. It also reiterates stipulations made in paragraphs 2 and 4 that the SS-25 assembled missile may be exhibited without propellant and that the Soviet Union may either exhibit an assembled SS-25, an SS-24, and an SS-18 in their respective launch canisters, without front section, or an empty launch canister associated with each of these ICBMs.

Subparagraph 5(b) specifies that the first stage of the SS-13 ICBM shall be exhibited and measured separately and that the second and third stages shall be exhibited and measured as a unit. In recognition of the unique configuration of the SS-13 (unlike all other Soviet ICBMs, the SS-13 is maintained, stored, and transported in stages) it is exempted from the general requirement that assembled missiles be exhibited.

Subparagraph 5(c) addresses the SS-11, SS-17, and SS-19 ICBMs. The exhibition provisions that apply to the SS-24 and SS-18 above also apply to these missiles, except that the SS-11, SS-17, and SS-19 shall be exhibited no later than one year after Treaty signature, during an elimination of an ICBM of each type. This change in the exhibition procedure reflects a compromise that takes account of the fact that these missiles are generally older systems that are in the process of elimination. Thus, the Soviet Union may take advantage of the convenience of exhibiting these missiles during elimination.

Subparagraph 5(d) deals with Soviet SLBMs. It provides that such missiles will be exhibited as assembled missiles only; a separate first stage will not be exhibited. Thus, to confirm the length and diameter of the first stage, measurements will be made on the assembled missile. This exception to the procedure that applies to ICBMs is due to the fact that Soviet SLBMs are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles and the Soviet claim that once these missiles leave the production facility, they are not and cannot be separated into separate stages. Because confirming the length of the first stage on an assembled missile may result in ambiguities (i.e., uncertainty concerning where the first stage ends and the second stage begins), the subparagraph stipulates that the United States may request additional confirmation of the dimensions of the first stage of a particular SLBM. After the United States designates what it seeks to confirm regarding the dimensions of the first stage, the Soviet Union must exhibit the SLBM during its first elimination. Procedures for such an exhibition shall be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission prior to entry into force of the Treaty. During the negotiations, the United States made it clear that the only logical way to remove such an ambiguity, should one arise, would be to separate the first stage from the assembled missile so that its length could be measured independently.

Subparagraph 5(d) also exempts the SS-N-17 from exhibitions, since it was retired prior to Treaty signature, and specifies that the diameter of the third stage of the SS-N-20 shall be confirmed during the first elimination of a missile of that type. With respect to the SS-N-20, this provision is an exemption to paragraph 8 of Section XIV of the Inspection Protocol which specifies that during exhibitions the inspecting Party may confirm the diameter of the second and third stage of an ICBM or SLBM when different from the diameter of the first stage. Although the SS-N-20 third stage is slightly smaller in diameter than its first stage, the missile design incorporates a cap that is placed over the third stage which the Soviets stated remains on the missile at all times until it is launched. Because the Soviets also stated that this cap can be removed only with great difficulty, the United States agreed that confirmation of the third stage diameter would occur during the missile's first elimination, rather than during exhibitions.

Paragraph 6 addresses exhibition procedures for existing types of US ICBMs and SLBMs. As in the case of Soviet exhibition procedures, US procedures are tailored to specific missile types in three subparagraphs.

Subparagraph 6(a) specifies that for all US ICBMs and SLBMs, except the Peacekeeper ICBM, both the separate first stage and the assembled missile shall be exhibited. The self-contained dispensing mechanism of the Minuteman III shall be exhibited separately. For purposes of clarity, the subparagraph also specifies that the guidance ring and forward spacer ring of the Minuteman II will be exhibited separately (such elements are included in the length of an assembled missile). The Minuteman II has no self-contained dispensing mechanism.

Subparagraph 6(b) provides that all stages of the Peacekeeper ICBM shall be exhibited and measured separately. Because the Peacekeeper ICBM is maintained, stored, and transported in stages and cannot be assembled outside its launcher, it will not be exhibited as an assembled missile. This exemption is similar to that provided the Soviet SS-13.

Subparagraph 6(c) reiterates the exemption for the Trident II SLBM made in paragraph 2 from the general requirement that the assembled missile of solid propellant ICBMs and SLBMs be exhibited with propellant. The assembled missile of the Trident II may be exhibited without propellant or as an inert missile. The separate first stage of the Trident II will be exhibited with propellant.

Paragraph 7 of Annex 11 addresses exhibition procedures for ICBMs and SLBMs of a new type and their variants not addressed in paragraph 2. For such missiles, the assembled missile outside its launch canister, and separate first stage will be exhibited. In addition, as applicable, either the launch canister containing the assembled missile without front section or the empty launch canister associated with the missile, at the discretion of the inspected Party, shall be exhibited. If an assembled missile cannot be exhibited, separate stages shall be exhibited. Finally, the paragraph specifies that in the event an ICBM or SLBM is declared to be a new type on the basis of a change in the length of the first stage (with or without an increase in throw-weight), the separate first stage shall be exhibited in a configuration that allows confirmation of the length of such stage as defined in paragraph 15 of Annex J of the Memorandum of Understanding (i.e., for a solid propellant ICBM or SLBM, the solid rocket motor, and for a liquid propellant ICBM or SLBM, the liquid fuel tank). Note that no allowance or exception is made to this requirement for new types of ICBMs or SLBMs.

ANNEX 12 - SIZE CRITERIA TO BE USED DURING INSPECTIONS AND CONTINUOUS MONITORING

Annex 12 lists specific size criteria derived in accordance with rules listed in paragraphs 23, 24, and 25 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol. As specified in paragraph 12 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, dimensions less than 2 meters are given to the nearest centimeter; dimensions greater than 2 meters, to the nearest tenth of a meter.

Paragraph 1 lists the actual size criteria to be used in determining whether an object is large enough to be, or to contain, an item of inspection; it pertains to baseline data, data update, new facility, close-out and formerly declared facility inspections at facilities other than heavy bomber facilities. Note that the length values for ICBMs and SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages are 90 percent of the values listed in the Memorandum of Understanding as specified by subparagraph 23(a)(ii) of Section VI to the Inspection Protocol. This reduction in length ensures that the fundamental unit of the stage is captured.

For the United States, both the Trident I/Poseidon and the Minuteman II/III are listed because Minuteman II/III first stages share the smallest diameter and Trident I/Poseidon first stages share the smallest length. For an item to be inspectable, it must be large enough to be an item of inspection. Thus, if something were at least as long as a Poseidon first stage but not as long as a Minuteman first stage, it would have to be at least as wide as the diameter of the Poseidon first stage to be inspectable. Conversely, an object that is at least as wide as the diameter of Minuteman, but not as wide as the diameter of Poseidon, would have to be at least as long as a Minuteman first stage. The critical point is that an object could be longer than a Poseidon first stage and wider than the diameter of a Minuteman, but still not be inspectable because it could not be either missile.

For the Soviet Union, strict application of the size criteria rules in Section VI of the Inspection Protocol would result in listing the SS-N-6 as the size criteria for inspections. However, the sides had agreed during the July l99l Ministerial in Washington and in subsequent negotiations in Geneva that the dimensions of the SS-25 solid rocket motor would be the inspection size criteria, so these are the dimensions listed in Annex 12 although it is not specifically stated as such. This specific exception is noted in paragraph 23 of Section VI.

The SS-25 first stage length is said to be reduced by an agreed percentage" from the value listed for the first stage of the SS-25 in the Memorandum of Understanding, in accordance with subparagraph 23(a)(i) of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol. The language was negotiated for the purpose of capturing the solid rocket motor, but without explicitly stating this in the Treaty. An agreed percentage" is not explicitly listed. (See the analysis of Section VI for a discussion of agreed percentage.") The Parties will have the opportunity, by measuring both the first stage and the solid rocket motor during the technical characteristics exhibitions, to confirm the reference cylinder dimensions in accordance with paragraph 5 of this Annex and paragraph 7 of Section XIV. As a practical matter, this permits inspectors to confirm that the size criteria (first-stage dimensions, minus an agreed percentage" in length) capture the solid rocket motor.

Paragraph 2 lists the specific size criteria to be used for suspect site inspections. For the United States, Peacekeeper is the only mobile ICBM, so the size criteria for suspect site inspections in the United States are the length of the Peacekeeper first stage, measured end-dome to end-dome, and the diameter of that stage. The same method is used for the Soviet Union in relation to the SS-25. The phrase agreed percentage" is used in Section VI of the Inspection Protocol to describe the calculation of the size criteria, although a percentage is not listed in the Treaty.

Paragraph 3 lists the specific size criteria for continuous monitoring. A strict interpretation of the size criteria rules of Section VI would require listing both the SS-24 and SS-25 reference cylinders for the size criterion at Soviet facilities. As with the inspection criteria, however, the sides had agreed at the July l99l Washington Ministerial that the criteria would be based on the SS-25. This exception is noted in paragraph 24 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol. For the United States, the only ICBM considered to be a mobile ICBM for Treaty purposes is Peacekeeper, so the Peacekeeper reference cylinder provides the size criteria in accordance with subparagraph 24(b) of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol. Since the Peacekeeper is maintained, stored, and transported in stages, when the reference cylinder is determined there is no reduction in the length or diameter in accordance with subparagraph 24(b) of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol.

Since Soviet mobile missiles are maintained, transported, and stored as assembled missiles in launch canisters, the Soviet criteria is based on the SS-25 reference cylinder associated with the assembled missile in its launch canister. The length and diameter of the canister is then reduced by ten percent, in accordance with paragraph 24(a) of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol, in order to reflect the missile's dimensions outside of its canister. It is important to note that, if a separate stage of a SS-25 is ever found outside allowed locations, the missile will be considered to be maintained, transported and stored in stages and the size criteria will change accordingly.

The size criteria in paragraph 4 for the quota inspections at the portal of a monitored facility where MIRVed mobile missiles are produced, in accordance with paragraph 15 of Annex 5 to this Protocol, are based on a reference cylinder whose diameter is 97 percent of the diameter of the first stage of a MIRVed mobile ICBM (the Peacekeeper for the United States and the SS-24 for the Soviet Union) and whose length is 97 percent of the distance from the lower edge of the nozzle to the upper point of the forward end dome of the motor case of that stage. These two points, combined with the three percent reduction in length and diameter, were selected to capture Soviet production units" or unfinished stages, should one exit the portal.

The specific size criteria values listed in Annex 12 are based on the general rules of Section VI of this Protocol applied to the current forces of each Party. If a Party were to deploy a new ICBM or SLBM, this could affect size criteria. Paragraph 5 states that the Parties shall change the size criteria, if necessary, when such a new system is deployed. Paragraph 7 of Section XIV of the Inspection Protocol requires the inspected Party to exhibit the first stage of a new mobile ICBM in a configuration that allows inspectors to make an end-dome to end-dome measurement.

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOL ON NOTIFICATIONS STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE PROTOCOL

The Protocol on Notifications (the Protocol) consists of a Preamble and ten Sections. Pursuant to Article VIII of the Treaty, the Protocol sets forth the requirements for notifications of certain activities involving strategic offensive arms (SOA) and their related facilities subject to the Treaty. The information contained in the notifications is designed to facilitate the understanding of these activities as they are detected by National Technical Means of Verification (NTM), and to assist in the preparations for on-site inspections. The Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRC) are responsible for the transmission and receipt of these notifications.

In addition to the notifications in the Protocol, additional notifications relating to inspections and continuous monitoring are specified in Section III of the Inspection Protocol.

Each of the Sections of the Protocol corresponds to one of the subparagraphs of paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the Treaty. Section I specifies the requirements for notifications concerning data with respect to items subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty, according to data categories in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), and corresponds to subparagraph 3(a) of Article VIII. Section II specifies the requirements for notifications concerning movements of items subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty, and corresponds to subparagraph 3(b) of Article VIII. Section III specifies the requirements for notifications concerning data on ICBM and SLBM throw-weight in connection with the Throw-Weight Protocol, and corresponds to subparagraph 3(c) of Article VIII. Section IV specifies the requirements for notifications concerning conversion or elimination of items subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty and elimination of facilities subject to the Treaty, and corresponds to subparagraph 3(d) of Article VIII. Section V specifies the requirements for notifications concerning cooperative measures to enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification and corresponds to subparagraph 3(e) of Article VIII. Section VI specifies the requirements for notifications concerning flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs and for notifications concerning telemetric information, and corresponds to subparagraph 3(f) of Article VIII. Section VII specifies the requirements for notifications concerning strategic offensive arms of new types and new kinds, and corresponds to subparagraph 3(g) of Article VIII. Section VIII specifies the requirements for notifications concerning changes in the content of information provided in other notifications, and corresponds to subparagraph 3(h) of Article VIII. Section IX specifies the requirements for notifications concerning inspections and continuous monitoring, and corresponds to subparagraph 3(i) of Article VIII. Section X specifies the requirements for notifications concerning operational dispersals, and corresponds to subparagraph 3(j) of Article VIII.

The obligation to provide notifications may be suspended during an operational dispersal pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article XIV of the Treaty. However, as stipulated in that paragraph, the separate obligations of the Agreement on Ballistic Missile Launch Notification are not suspended during an operational dispersal. In addition, if conversions or eliminations continue during an operational dispersal, the relevant notifications from Section IV of this Protocol must be given.

PREAMBLE

The Preamble states that the Parties have agreed upon provisions that establish the procedures for, and the content of, the notifications provided for in Article VIII of the Treaty.

SECTION I. NOTIFICATIONS CONCERNING DATA WITH RESPECT TO ITEMS SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THE TREATY, ACCORDING TO CATEGORIES OF DATA CONTAINED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AND OTHER AGREED CATEGORIES OF DATA

Section I consists of 18 so-called paragraphs (these are not strictly paragraphs in the grammatical sense but are referenced as paragraphs throughout the Treaty.) This Section sets forth the obligation of each Party to provide to the other Party notifications concerning data with respect to items for which data are contained in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and in other agreed categories of data.

Paragraph 1 of Section I requires that each Party provide its data current as of the date of entry into force (EIF) of the Treaty for each category of data contained in the MOU, and each Party must provide that data no later than 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty. This is the initial update of the MOU data and is provided only once. In essence, all the MOU data must be revised, as necessary, to provide data accurate as of the date of EIF. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article VIII of the Treaty, the MOU updates will be transmitted through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers.

Paragraph 2 of Section I requires that each Party provide its updated data for each category of data contained in the MOU no later than 30 days after the expiration of each six-month period following EIF. The first of these six-month periods begins the first day of the calendar month following the month of EIF. Data accurate as of the expiration of the preceding six-month period must be provided.

Geographic coordinates are not provided as part of the notifications in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section I. Such coordinates must be provided if required; they may be transmitted and handled separately. Geographic coordinates are provided as part of the more numerous notifications in paragraph 3 of Section I.

Paragraph 3 of Section I requires that notification of an event be provided no later than five days after the occurrence of the event if such an event results in a change in data in the MOU or in other agreed categories of data. This paragraph also exempts a Party from providing such a notification if notification of the data change has been provided in accordance with another paragraph of the Protocol. The information provided in the notification of paragraph 3 is to be sufficient for the receiving Party to make all the requisite changes in the relevant MOU categories. The Twenty-first Agreed Statement makes it clear that a Party need provide only one notification for a given event, although there may be a large number of data categories affected and although the event may fall under several different paragraphs of the Protocol. The information that must be provided in the notification of the event includes the change in data, by number, and, as applicable, type, category, variant, and version of the items; the location of the items; the date on which such a change occurred; and, for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, the data from the unique identifier. In addition, the geographic coordinates must be specified for the location that relates to the occurrence of the event. Some events require additional information as specified in the subparagraphs:

Subparagraph (a) requires that, in the event of the loss of an item accountable under the terms of the Treaty as the result of an accident, the Party experiencing the loss provide the approximate or assumed location and assumed date of the accidental loss and the circumstances of the loss, if such circumstances are known.

Similarly, subparagraph (b) requires that for disablement beyond repair of an item accountable under the provisions of the Treaty, the circumstances of the disablement be described.

Subparagraph (c) covers the special requirements for the notification of the elimination of a silo launcher of ICBMs, silo training launcher, silo test launcher, or soft site launcher at which grading of the site is not to be performed. Paragraph 8 of Section II of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol requires that a notification of elimination be provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of this Protocol if grading was performed as part of the elimination process. If grading was not performed, then notification of completion is to be given in accordance with this subparagraph, where the date specified is the date of completion of the elimination process.

Subparagraph (d) is an affirmation by the notifying Party that it will abide by its obligation to provide site diagrams for new facilities, and photographs of new items, pursuant to Annex J to the MOU, through diplomatic channels no later than 48 hours after the notification of an event provided for in this paragraph that involves new facilities or new items.

Subparagraph (e) requires the notifying Party to specify the date and location for technical characteristics exhibitions conducted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty for new variants of ICBMs and SLBMs and new versions of mobile launchers of ICBMs. The date for the exhibition may be no earlier than 15 days after the notification has been provided in order to allow the other Party sufficient time to form and dispatch an inspection team. The exhibition must be conducted no later than 30 days after the notification has been provided.

Paragraph 4 of 1.4 Section I requires that notification be provided no less than 30 days in advance of the completion of a reduction in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs at an ICBM base or to SLBMs on ballistic missile submarines at submarine bases. This so-called downloading" of reentry vehicles must be done for ICBMs on a base-by-base basis and for SLBMs on an ocean-by-ocean basis pursuant to subparagraphs 5(c)(iv) and 5(c)(v) of Article III of the Treaty, respectively. Paragraph 5 of Article III provides the specific limits on downloading and details other restrictions on downloading deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs of an existing type. The planned date on which the reduced number of warheads is to be attributed must be given. Because there is a prohibition on attributing different warhead loads to deployed missiles of the same type at a given base, the date for the attribution of a different number of warheads must be the date the final missile with the reduced number of warheads is deployed. By the time of the planned date, all other missiles at that base that previously had been attributed with a larger number of warheads must have been similarly downloaded, removed, or placed in non-deployed status.

Paragraph 5 of Section I is a confidence building measure that requires each Party to provide an annual notification of planned (but non-binding) changes in the number of listed deployed strategic offensive arms during that year and the manner in which those changes are planned. This notification implements an agreement reached by President Bush and President Gorbachev at the June 1990 Summit. This notification provides the receiving Party an opportunity to assess how the notifying Party is drawing down its inventory of strategic offensive arms towards the central limits of the Treaty during the first seven years after entry into force, and it also assists a Party in monitoring the strategic force activities of the other Party after the reductions have been completed. If the expected number of deployed strategic offensive arms of any type will be greater at the end of a year than the earlier planned number specified in the notification, a corrected notification of the larger figure must be provided no less than 30 days in advance of the change in activities that would result in the planned number being exceeded. Although this provision does not address the point, where such a change in activities is not something that can be anticipated (e.g., a fire at a conversion or elimination facility), the Party would give notice as soon as possible.

Paragraph 6 of Section I provides a mechanism for a Party receiving data on locations of facilities that are considered by that Party to have the same appearance, to request clarification or more precise geographic coordinates. This notification and the subsequent one implement paragraphs 2 and 3 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding which, while specifying coordinates be given to the nearest minute, include provisions requiring additional clarifications in cases where two facilities or locations have the same appearance and the same geographic coordinates within the one minute of precision that is otherwise required.

Paragraph 7 of Section I is the response that must be given to a request for clarification regarding locations of facilities that are considered to have the same appearance. The requested Party must either provide sufficient information for the other Party to differentiate between the specified locations, for example, by giving detailed descriptions of each facility, or provide the geographic coordinates of the locations with sufficient accuracy as is appropriate to that location so that it can be distinguished from other locations (e.g., to express a location in seconds, but not necessarily to the nearest second).

Paragraph 8 of Section I requires notification of the transfer of items to or from a third State in accordance with a pattern of cooperation existing at the time of signature of the Treaty, as referred to in Article XVI of the Treaty and the First Agreed Statement in the Annex to the Treaty on Agreed Statements. The only such pattern of cooperation is that between the United States and the United Kingdom. The number, type, date and location of the transfer must be provided. While not defined, items" means items listed in the Memorandum of Understanding.

Paragraph 9 of Section I requires a notification of a new facility or of a change of MOU category of a facility no less than 30 days in advance of an activity, not previously declared, that is associated with listed strategic offensive arms. If the facility is a new production facility, notification may be required in accordance with paragraph 10 of this Section instead of paragraph 9.

Paragraph 10 of Section I requires a 90-day advance notification of the location of a production facility at which production of ICBMs or SLBMs or first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs is planned. The 90-day lead time provides time for the receiving Party to prepare for the possibility of setting up a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system (PPCMS) and establishing continuous monitoring activities (CMA). To assist such planning for PPCMS and CMA, if the production facility is a production facility for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or first stages of such ICBMs or if the ICBMs or SLBMs or first stages of the ICBMs or SLBMs that will be produced at the facility are as large as or larger than the smallest ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, the notifying Party must affirm that, pursuant to Annex J to the MOU, the site diagram of the facility will be provided through diplomatic channels no later than 48 hours after the notification provided for in this paragraph. Site diagrams are required for facilities producing ICBMs or SLBMs as large or larger than the smallest ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs since such facilities are subject to mandatory suspect site inspection.

Paragraph 11 of Section I requires the notification of the beginning of construction of a new silo launcher of ICBMs. The type of ICBM for the silo launcher, the name of the ICBM base, the geographic coordinates of the silo launcher of ICBMs under construction, and the date on which excavation began must be provided. Paragraph 6(c) of Article III of the Treaty specifies that such a silo launcher will begin to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty when excavation and pouring concrete for the silo have been completed or 12 months after the date on which excavation began, whichever occurs earlier.

The notification of Paragraph 12 of Section I provides a Party the opportunity, for a specified monitored facility, to be relieved of mobile missile production-related provisions of the Treaty for specific mobile missiles no longer in production if a notification of the cessation of production of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or first stages of such ICBMs at that facility is provided. In accordance with paragraph 3 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol, continuous monitoring activities shall cease one year after this notification (but no sooner than May 31, 1995).

Because the data from unique identifiers is not a category of data of the MOU, there must be another mechanism, besides a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Section, for providing this data on mobile missiles existing at the time of entry into force of the Treaty. Paragraph 13 of Section I requires a Party to provide the data from the unique identifier for each ICBM for mobile launchers existing as of the date of EIF of the Treaty. In addition to the data from the unique identifiers, the locations of each such ICBM must be identified. If the ICBM for mobile launchers is in transit or relocation, its destination must be identified.

Paragraph 14 of Section I provides for a Party to declare that ICBMs or SLBMs of a type shall be considered to be ICBMs or SLBMs of a retired type. In so declaring, the type, number, and location for each such ICBM or SLBM must be provided. All launchers for the particular ICBM and SLBM, except those at test ranges, space launch facilities, and on special purpose submarines, must be eliminated before such a notification can be given.

Because retired types of ICBMs or SLBMs are not included in data categories of the MOU, except for their technical characteristics, which, as required by Agreed Statement 37, are listed in Annex F of the MOU, maintenance of knowledge of a Party's inventory of retired types of missiles must occur in some way other than through MOU updates. Paragraph 15 of Section I is the required notification of the inventories of retired ICBMs and the location of each, by facility name, that begins three months after the notification that a type of mobile ICBM shall be considered to be retired and repeats each three-month period thereafter, for as long as the Party has such retired types. In the event that a Party has more than one type of retired ICBMs, the reporting of inventories of all types shall be done with a single notification.

For ICBMs other than mobile ICBMs and for SLBMs of retired types, paragraph 16 of Section I requires that notification of inventories and location (although not by facility) of such missiles be provided beginning six months after the notification of retirement and at each six-month period thereafter for as long as the Party has such missiles. In the event that a Party has more than one type of such missiles, the reporting of inventories of all types shall be done with a single notification.

Former types of ICBMs and SLBMs are not included in data categories of the MOU either, so maintenance of knowledge of a Party's inventory of former types of missiles must occur in some way other than through MOU updates. Paragraph 17 of Section I is the required initial notification of the inventory of each missile of former types and their location (although not by facility) at EIF, while paragraph 18 of Section I provides for the notification, for each six-month period following EIF of the Treaty, of updated inventory data for missiles of former types. The only former types of ICBMs and SLBMs are the U.S. Minuteman I and Polaris (A3); thus, this notification applies only to the United States.

SECTION II. NOTIFICATIONS CONCERNING MOVEMENT OF ITEMS SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THE TREATY

Section II consists of 17 paragraphs that set forth the obligation of each Party to provide to the other Party notifications concerning movement of items subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty.

Paragraph 1 of Section II is the notification of a transit, as defined in the Definitions Annex, required no later than 48 hours after completion of the transit. In addition to the expected information: the number and type of items involved; the facility from which the items departed; the date of departure; the facility at which the items have arrived; the date of arrival; and the mode of transport; the notifying Party must also provide the data from the unique identifier for each ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs. The paragraph repeats all of the items for which transit is a defined term in the Definitions Annex and adds mobile training launchers.

Paragraph 2 of Section II is the notification required when a visit of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber to a specified or eliminated facility at which they are not based, has exceeded 24 hours in duration. The information provided in the notification must include the identity of the facility being visited, the description of each heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, the identity of the facility at which each is based, and the date and time of arrival.

Paragraph 3 of Section II is the notification of the conclusion of the visit notified in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Section, of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber at a visited facility at which it is not based. The information in the notification is essentially the same as that in the notification of paragraph 2 of this Section. Note that notifications provided in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Section are not required if the visit does not exceed 24 hours in duration.

Paragraph 4 of Section II is the advance notification of the impending departure of a train with rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs from a rail garrison for routine movement. Notification of rail-mobile launchers departing on routine movement relates to the limit on the number of rail-mobile launchers (50%) allowed to be on routine movement at any one time, pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article VI of the Treaty. Consequently, the notification includes the number of deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs departing the rail garrison. In addition, the notification must identify the rail garrison and indicate the date of departure.

Paragraph 5 of Section II is the advance notification of the departure of a train with rail-mobile test launchers from a test range. Because mobile test launchers are limited pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article IV of the Treaty, and the number of movements of rail-mobile test launchers outside of test ranges is limited pursuant to paragraph 9(c) of Article IV of the Treaty, keeping track of these assets requires that the notification include the number of rail-mobile test launchers and the number of launch-associated railcars departing the test range, the identity of the test range, and the date of departure. A train leaving the test range may be in any configuration chosen by the Party owning the train, provided it does not exceed three launchers, but the configuration must be described. The number of launchers and number of launch-associated railcars establishes the configuration.

Paragraph 6 of Section II is the notification of the return of a train with deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles to the rail garrison from which they departed for routine movement. As previously stated, the number of deployed rail-mobile launchers allowed in routine movement is limited to 50% of all such launchers, and this notification is required to verify that this limit is not exceeded. The information that must be provided is the number of deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs that have returned to the rail garrison, the identity of the rail garrison, and the date of return.

Paragraph 7 of Section II is the notification of the return of a train with rail-mobile test launchers to the test range from which it departed and whose departure was pre-notified in accordance with paragraph 5 of this Section. The information required in the notification is the date of return and the test range.

Paragraph 8 of Section II is the notification that must be provided if there was any change in the configuration of the train that left the test range with rail-mobile test launchers and launch-associated railcars during the time that train was outside the test range. For the purpose of identifying trains by NTM, the information that must be provided includes, for each variation, the dates, the portions of the route, and the number of launchers and launch-associated railcars in the train. Because configurations are expected to change only under extraordinary circumstances," which is not a defined term, those circumstances that required a variation from the configuration of the train must be described.

Paragraph 9 of Section II is the advance notification of a relocation. ("Relocation" is a defined term meaning a one-way movement of a deployed mobile ICBM launcher and its associated missile.) This notification is intended to provide information to assist in determining compliance with limits and locational restrictions in Articles IV and VI of the Treaty. It must include the point of departure or the facility of origin, the destination, and the date of departure. Pursuant to paragraph 10 of Article VI of the Treaty, relocations have a time limit of 25 days for completion and a limit on the number of launchers involved (the greater of 15% of the total number of deployed road-mobile launchers or 5 such launchers, or 20% of the total number of deployed rail-mobile launchers or 5 such launchers) that may be outside restricted areas and rail garrisons at any one time for the purpose of relocation.

Paragraph 10 of Section II is the notification of the completion of a relocation that was notified in accordance with paragraph 9 of this Section. In addition to information comparable to that provided in the paragraph 9 notification, the reporting Party must provide the data from the unique identifier for the mobile ICBMs and, for road-mobile launchers, specify the location, date, and time at that location for each launcher at least once every four days while outside the deployment area.

Paragraph 11 of Section II is the notification of the beginning of an exercise dispersal of deployed mobile launchers being conducted pursuant to Article XIII of the Treaty. Accordingly, the notification must include the identity of the ICBM bases for mobile launchers that are involved in such a dispersal and the date and time of the beginning of the dispersal. Subparagraphs 1(d), (e), and (f) of Article XIII of the Treaty describe the understanding of the status of mobile launchers and missiles associated with the identified ICBM base that are engaged in routine movements or relocations when the exercise dispersal is notified.

Paragraph 12 of Section II is the notification of the completion of an exercise dispersal that was notified in accordance with paragraph 11 of this Section. In addition to identifying the ICBM base and specifying the date and time of the completion of the dispersal, information about all launchers that have not returned to their restricted area or rail garrison must be given. The notifying Party must identify the specific facility or the geographic coordinates of the location at which each such mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile is located and the reason for its location there, unless, for road-mobile launchers, the notifying Party intends to transport inspectors to the locations of the launchers for an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty if such an inspection were to be requested by the other Party.

Paragraph 13 of Section II is the advance notification of a variation from standard configuration of a train with deployed rail-mobile launchers that is to travel between the rail garrison and the maintenance facility associated with the rail garrison. This notification is required only if the return of that train to standard configuration cannot take place within the 12-hour period provided for preparation for the implementation of a cooperative measure in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Treaty. Providing this notification does not exempt trains from being displayed; the notification is designed to avoid any confusion should the other Party request a cooperative display.

Paragraph 14 of Section II is the notification of any variation from the standard configuration of trains with deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs during routine movements and relocations. Again, this disclosure facilitates the analysis of NTM imagery.

Paragraph 15 of Section II is the notification of the return to standard configuration of a train with deployed rail-mobile launchers that left the rail garrison for the maintenance facility and left portions of the train in the garrison as pre-notified in accordance with paragraph 13 of this Section.

Under the Agreement on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises, the Parties are required to provide notification, 14 days in advance, of one major strategic exercise involving heavy bomber aircraft each calendar year. START requires that additional details be provided 48 hours before the beginning of the exercise. Paragraph 16 of Section II requires the notifying Party to identify the air bases for heavy bombers and air bases for former heavy bombers that are involved in the exercise and the date and time of the beginning of the exercise. The air bases that are specified in this notification are not subject to inspection during the major strategic exercise, pursuant to subparagraph 2(f) of Article XIII of the Treaty.

Paragraph 17 of Section II is the notification of the date and time of the completion of a major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers that was pre-notified in accordance with paragraph 16 of this Section. Within the 30-day period following the receipt of this notification, the receiving Party may make a request for a cooperative measure at one of the air bases that participated in the exercise, pursuant to subparagraph 2(g) of Article XIII of the Treaty. This notification triggers the start of the period during which special cooperative measures pursuant to subparagraph 2(g) of Article XIII may be requested, and makes the involved bases again subject to inspection (after three days).

SECTION III. NOTIFICATIONS CONCERNING DATA ON ICBM AND SLBM THROW-WEIGHT IN CONNECTION WITH THE THROW-WEIGHT PROTOCOL

Section III consists of four paragraphs that set forth the obligations of each Party to provide to the other Party notifications concerning data on ICBM and SLBM throw-weight in connection with the Throw-weight Protocol.

Paragraph 1 of Section III is the notification of throw-weight data for a new type of ICBM or SLBM that must be given no less than seven days in advance of the eighth flight test of such a missile. (The Parties recognized the remote possibility that deployment of a new type of ICBM or SLBM could occur prior to the eighth flight test and have agreed, in the Thirty-second Agreed Statement, that procedures for determining the accountability shall be agreed within the framework of the JCIC.) The notifying Party must provide the value of the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in the course of the first seven flight tests and the value of the maximum calculated throw-weight that a missile of the new type could deliver to specified distances. The maximum calculated throw-weight values are derived using several parameters specified in paragraph 4 of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol. Residual propellant in each stage and the descending flight path angle used in deriving the maximum throw-weight values must be specified. The Throw-weight Protocol provides that in determining maximum calculated throw-weight, the residual propellant in each stage shall not exceed one percent for solid propellant ballistic missiles and two percent for liquid fuel ballistic missiles.

Paragraph 2 of Section III is the advance notification required for each of the two flight tests of a new type of ICBM or SLBM that are to be conducted to satisfy the requirements of paragraph 2 of Section II of the Throw-weight Protocol. To assist the other Party in verifying disclosures made about the new missile, which is the purpose of the two pre-notified flight tests, the notifying Party must provide certain data about such a flight test, including the designation of the type of missile and the planned date of the flight test. Under the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988 (the Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement), specification of the launch area and the planned reentry vehicle impact area are also required.

Paragraph 3 of Section III is the notification of data about a new type of ICBM or SLBM required to be provided no later than five days after the new type first becomes subject to the central limits of the Treaty. The notifying Party must again provide the maximum calculated throw-weight to specified distances and other data, as was provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Section. The notification must also specify the accountable throw-weight and the date on which the flight test with the accountable throw-weight was conducted.

Paragraph 4 of Section III is the notification required if a flight test of a missile demonstrates a throw-weight greater than its accountable throw-weight. The notification must provide the new value of the accountable throw-weight and the date on which the flight test with the new value of the accountable throw-weight was conducted. For a missile of a new type, the notification shall also include the maximum calculated throw-weight that such a missile could deliver to the distances specified in paragraph 1 of this Section, and other data specified in paragraph 1. However, if the calculated data have not changed from those data previously declared for that type of missile, these data need not be included, but the number of the earlier notification containing such data shall be specified. The phrase number of the earlier notification" is not defined, but is based on the practice of both Parties of numbering all notifications sent via the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers.

SECTION IV. NOTIFICATIONS CONCERNING CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION OF ITEMS SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THE TREATY AND ELIMINATION OF FACILITIES SUBJECT TO THE TREATY

Section IV consists of seven paragraphs that set forth the obligations of each Party to provide notifications concerning conversion or elimination of items subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty and elimination of facilities subject to the Treaty. For heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, mobile ICBMs, mobile ICBM launchers, mobile training launchers, fixed structures for mobile launchers, SLBM launchers, silo launchers, soft-site launchers, silo training launchers, and silo test launchers, there are specific conversion or elimination procedures set forth in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, and there is a requirement for both an advance notification and a post-process notification for such conversions or eliminations. For non-NDM limited ICBMs, for SLBMs, and for support equipment (other than that listed above), post-notifications of eliminations and elimination procedures are required.

Paragraph 1 of Section IV is the advance notification of a process of conversion or elimination of items accountable under the Treaty. The information to be provided for these notifications must include: a description of the item to be converted, or eliminated, or placed on static display; the data from the unique identifier for mobile ICBMs; the location of the item; the location at which the conversion or elimination processes will take place; the specific procedures to be carried out; and in each case the scheduled date of the initiation of such processes.

Paragraph 2 of Section IV is the post-notification of the date on which a conversion or elimination process began. The content of this notification is comparable to that required in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Section. Notification in accordance with this paragraph is not required if the initiation of the conversion or elimination process was subjected to inspection.

Paragraph 3 of Section IV is the advance notification of the intention to install either an ICBM of a different type or a training model of an ICBM of a different type in a silo launcher of ICBMs. This notification is required if the silo door was not removed for the conversion. The content of the notification must include the type of ICBM or type of training model of a missile to be installed in the silo, the location of that silo, and the date on which the change is to occur. If the silo door was removed, this notification is not required because the conversion is notified in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of this Protocol.

Paragraph 4 of Section IV is the notification of the completion of various conversion or elimination processes.

Subparagraph (a) was mentioned in connection with subparagraph 3(c) of Section I. This notification is for the elimination of a silo launcher of ICBMs, silo test launcher, silo training launcher, or soft site launcher, if grading was performed during the process of its elimination, whereas the notification of subparagraph 3(c) of Section I is for the elimination of such a launcher when grading of the site is not performed. The same information is required in both notifications.

Subparagraph (b) is the notification of the elimination of SLBM launchers. The information that must be provided includes the number and type of SLBM launchers eliminated, the elimination facility, the date of completion of elimination, and the elimination procedures that were carried out.

Subparagraph (c) is the notification of the elimination of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers. The information that must be provided includes the number and description of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, the elimination facility, and the date of completion of elimination.

Subparagraph (d) is the notification of the conversion of a heavy bomber and its arrival at a viewing site for inspection pursuant to paragraph 11 of Section XI of the Inspection Protocol. The date of arrival of the heavy bomber at a viewing site must be provided in the notification, in addition to information comparable to that of the subparagraph (c) notification. Pursuant toparagraph 13 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, the Parties also have the option of giving an advance notification of the planned date of arrival of a heavy bomber at a viewing site.

Subparagraph (e) is the notification of the elimination of an ICBM or SLBM, other than an ICBM for mobile launchers. Because there is no requirement for inspections of such eliminations and there are no prescribed methods for such eliminations in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, this notification contains only the declaration of the method of elimination in addition to what would normally be required under a notification given in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I.

Subparagraph (f) is the notification of the procedures associated with making an item a static display. The notifying Party must provide several elements of information because the number of items placed on static display after Treaty signature is limited by type of item, pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article IV of the Treaty. Because inspections of items placed on static display are permitted pursuant to paragraph 12 of Section XI of the Inspection Protocol, the date of arrival of the item at an inspection site and the location of such inspection site must be given in the notification. For the purpose of identifying the location of the static display in the MOU, the name and coordinates of the location at which such an item is to be on static display must be provided.

Paragraph 5 of Section IV is the notification of the completion of static testing of a mobile ICBM, including testing by the removal of propellant segments by dissection. The information in the notification must include the ICBM type, the data from the unique identifier, the length of the remaining portion of the stage after segment removal, and the location and date of the static testing.

Paragraph 6 of Section IV is the notification of the annual non-binding schedule for the first seven years for conversion or elimination of listed strategic offensive arms and fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs subject to the provisions of the Treaty. Because such conversion or elimination may require inspection, this notification serves as an aid to planning for such inspections. This notification requires some of the same information that is required in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 5 of Section I, and is, in that sense, duplicative with that notification. However, the requirement for providing notifications in accordance with paragraph 6 of Section IV ceases after the period of reductions to the central limits of the Treaty, whereas the requirement for providing notifications in accordance with paragraph 5 of Section I persists for the life of the Treaty.

Paragraph 7 of Section IV is the advance notification of data to be used by the inspecting Party to identify the type of ICBM for mobile launchers within its launch canister prior to the initiation of the elimination of the first canisterized missile of a particular type of ICBM for mobile launchers. Note that, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section I of the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination, prior to the elimination of a mobile ICBM and its launch canister, inspectors will confirm the type and number of the missile and canister by making the observations and measurements necessary for such confirmation.

SECTION V. NOTIFICATIONS CONCERNING COOPERATIVE MEASURES TO ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION

Section V consists of five paragraphs that set forth the obligation of each Party to provide notifications concerning cooperative measures to enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification.

Paragraph 1 of Section V is the request for a display in the open of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within specified restricted areas, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at specified parking sites, or all heavy bombers located within a specified air base pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article XII of the Treaty. The request must specify the restricted areas, parking sites, or the air base at which the display is requested.

Paragraph 2 of Section V is the notification that some identified heavy bombers cannot be displayed on request for a cooperative display because they are not readily movable due to maintenance or operations. Heavy bombers are the only type of strategic offensive arms that may be exempted from a cooperative display for such a reason.

Paragraph 3 of Section V is the notification that the Party from whom a cooperative display had been requested is canceling the display due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, a term which is not defined in this Treaty. force majeure is generally understood to mean forces beyond one's control. The notifying Party must give the reasons for the cancellation of the display and the approximate date when conditions will permit the display.

Paragraph 4 of Section V is the notification of the exit of a ballistic missile submarine from a covered facility in which conversion of its SLBM launchers was carried out. Because NTM may not necessarily detect such an exit, the notifying Party must specify the date of exit, the facility where the conversion was carried out, the type of submarine, and the type of SLBM before and after conversion. Note that this notification does not change the type of SLBMs considered to be contained in the SLBM launchers. In accordance with paragraph 7(c) of Article III of the Treaty, accountability changes when the submarine begins sea trials; this is notified in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of this Protocol.

Paragraph 5 of Section V is the request for a display in the open of one of the two U.S. swimmer delivery vehicle submarines (called a special-purpose submarine in the Treaty) located at a specified port. According to the Thirty-third Agreed Statement, these ports must be specified in Annex I of the MOU, and the Soviet Union may make two such requests per submarine per year. The Thirty-third Agreed Statement also provides for notification if the submarine is absent from the port at which the display was requested; the content of that notification is not specified in the Treaty.

SECTION VI. NOTIFICATIONS CONCERNING FLIGHT TESTS OF ICBMs OR SLBMs AND NOTIFICATIONS CONCERNING TELEMETRIC INFORMATION

Section VI consists of five paragraphs that set forth the obligation of each Party to provide notifications concerning flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs and notifications concerning telemetric information.

Paragraph 1 of Section VI is the notification of any flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, including those used to launch objects into the upper atmosphere or space. This notification is required by the provisions of the Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement. In addition to the requirement under that agreement to provide the proposed launch date, launch area, and reentry vehicle impact area, the notifying Party must also specify the telemetry broadcast frequencies to be used, modulation types, and information as to whether the flight test is to employ encapsulation or encryption. All launchers of START accountable ICBMs and SLBMs, regardless of the purpose or intent of the launch, must be notified in accordance with this paragraph.

Paragraph 2 of Section VI is the advance notification of the proposed date and place of the demonstration of tapes, conducted pursuant to paragraph 4(b) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol. These are the tapes used for recording of telemetric information that is broadcast from the missile (or is recorded on board the missile and later recovered). The purpose of the demonstration is also to demonstrate the appropriate equipment to play back the telemetric information recorded on those tapes.

Paragraph 3 of Section VI is the request for acquiring the playback equipment necessary for playing back the information recorded on the other Party's data tapes pursuant to paragraph 4(c) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol.

Paragraph 4 of Section VI is the notification of the determination by the Party that has received data tapes, of the inability of that Party to recover from those tapes the telemetric information recorded on the tapes to allow for processing of such information pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol. The tapes must be identified by the type of missile, the date of flight test, and the tape number, and the notifying Party must specify the time periods during which incomplete or low-quality recordings of telemetric information were received and give a description of the difficulties that were encountered during the processing of the data tapes.

Paragraph 5 of Section VI is the advance notification of the first flight test after entry info force of an ICBM or SLBM of one existing type on which encryption of telemetric information will be carried out pursuant to paragraph 2(a) of Section III of the Telemetry Protocol. Since this paragraph allows only one existing type to be used for encryption at any one time, a subsequent notification pursuant to paragraph 5 of Section VI can be given only when the type initially notified has been retired.

SECTION VII. NOTIFICATIONS CONCERNING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF NEW TYPES AND NEW KINDS

Section VII consists of sixteen paragraphs that set forth the obligation of each Party to provide notifications concerning strategic offensive arms of new types and new kinds.

Paragraph 1 of Section VII is the advance notification of the planned departure from a production facility of the first prototype ICBM or prototype SLBM. Considerable information must be provided in the notification to assist the other Party in differentiating the prototype from existing missiles and to prepare to observe the prototype when it exits the production facility.

Paragraph 2 of Section VII is the basing-mode notification for prototypes. A Party must make such a basing-mode declaration after the first flight test from a mobile launcher or after the eighth flight test from a fixed launcher or after the exit of the twentieth prototype from a production facility, whichever is earliest. If the prototype is declared to be a mobile ICBM, data on its technical characteristics according to the categories of data in Annex F to the MOU must be provided. This notification is important because if a prototype is declared to be a mobile ICBM, the Treaty provisions dealing with mobile ICBMs, such as those relating to continuous monitoring, non-deployed missile limits, and unique identifiers, come into effect.

Paragraph 3 of Section VII is the notification of a decision to forego deployment of a new type of ICBM as a mobile ICBM if that ICBM had been declared to be a mobile ICBM in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Section, but it had not been flight-tested from a mobile launcher of ICBMs. This notification also states that such an ICBM is no longer to be subject to the provisions for mobile ICBMs. While this notification refers only to not having been flight-tested from a mobile launcher of ICBMs, as a practical matter, one could not provide such a notification for any missile of a type that had been contained in a mobile launcher, since paragraph 4 of Article V of the Treaty provides that a new type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs may cease to be considered to be a type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs if no ICBM of that type has been contained on, or flight-tested from, a mobile launcher of ICBMs. It follows that only if the new type of mobile ICBM has neither been contained on nor tested from a mobile launcher could this notification be given. Types of ICBMs declared not to be mobile ICBMs cannot later be declared to be mobile.

Paragraph 4 of Section VII is the notification that a prototype ICBM or SLBM has reached a critical stage in its development (that is, after the 20th flight test) and shall be considered a new type and accountable for the purposes of warhead and throw-weight attribution. The notifying Party must then provide a considerable amount of information about the new type of missile, including, if the first stage length or launch weight used as a basis for declaring a missile to be a new type, a statement whether the ICBM or SLBM of the new type differs from an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of each existing and previously declared new type in terms of the length of the first stage or in terms of launch weight. In addition, the location and date for the exhibitions conducted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty must be provided.

Paragraph 5 of Section VII is the notification of the cessation of development of a new type of missile and of the intention not to deploy such missiles. The information that must be provided includes the inventory of the prototypes of the new type of missile and where they will be eliminated if they are prototypes of mobile ICBMs.

Paragraph 6 of Section VII is the advance notification of the departure of a mobile launcher of prototype ICBMs from its production facility. The developing Party has an obligation to exhibit mobile launchers of new types of ICBMs pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty. Paragraph 2 of Section XIV of the Inspection Protocol specifies that such an exhibition be conducted in conjunction with the exhibition of the new mobile ICBM as notified in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Section.

Paragraph 7 of Section VII is the notification of the exit of the first heavy bomber of a new type from the building where it was assembled. The notification must identify the type and category of the heavy bomber and provide the name and location of the production facility and the date of exit. The exit of other heavy bombers of the type must also be notified under paragraph 3 of Section I of this Protocol.

Paragraph 8 of Section VII is the notification of the arrival of the first heavy bomber of a new type, new category, or new variant at the first air base at which any such heavy bomber has begun to be based. This notification is intended mainly for providing the technical data for such heavy bombers for Annex G to the MOU and for announcing the location and date for the distinguishability exhibition pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty. If long-range nuclear ALCMs have not been flight-tested from the type, no exhibition is required under paragraph 12 of Article XI.

Paragraph 9 of Section VII is the notification to be given, at the choice of the notifying Party, either not later than five days after the exit of the first long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) of a new type from the production facility or at least six months in advance of the arrival (i.e., deployment) of the first such ALCM at the first air base for heavy bombers at which it is to be located. This notification is intended to alert the other Party to the fact that a new long-range nuclear ALCM will appear on the territory of the notifying Party. Note that the identity of the air base is not required.

Paragraph 10 of Section VII is the notification that the first flight test of a long-range nuclear ALCM has taken place from a bomber type from which a long-range nuclear ALCM has not previously been flight-tested. With this notification, the notifying Party must announce the date and location for the exhibition of the now long-range nuclear ALCM-capable heavy bomber pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty, and provide relevant MOU data. The fact of this flight test makes this airplane type a heavy bomber under the definition thereof, and also requires the establishment of distinguishing features for any airplane of the type declared not to be equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

Paragraph 11 of Section VII is the notification of the arrival of the first long-range nuclear ALCM of a new type at the first air base for heavy bombers. With this notification, the notifying Party must provide the technical data for a long-range nuclear ALCM of the new type provided for in Annex H to the MOU, and the date and location for the exhibition of such an ALCM. Note that the identity of the air base is not required.

Paragraphs 12 through 15 concern long-range non-nuclear ALCMs. The underlying principle is that long-range non-nuclear ALCMs must be distinguishable in order not to be considered to be long-range nuclear ALCMs, and that once exhibited to be distinguishable, they are no longer subject to exhibition. The only Treaty provision that applies to an exhibited type of long-range non-nuclear ALCM is the notification in paragraph 11 above.

Paragraph 12 of Section VII is the notification, at the choice of the notifying Party, either not later than five days after the exit of the first long-range non-nuclear ALCM of a new type from the production facility or not later than six months in advance of the arrival (i.e., deployment) of the first long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type at the first air base for heavy bombers, which need not be identified, at which it is to be located. If the long-range non-nuclear ALCM has been previously exhibited under paragraph 13, 14, or 15 below, the notification six months before deployment is considered to have been made and no additional notification is required. With this notification, the notifying Party must identify the features that make such an ALCM distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. Within 18 hours after this notification, the developing Party must provide one photograph of such an ALCM through diplomatic channels.

Only if the long-range non-nuclear ALCM type has not already been exhibited, paragraph 13 of Section VII requires the advance notification of the arrival of the first long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type at the first air base for heavy bombers, which need not be identified, at which it is to be located. In order that such an ALCM not be counted as a long-range nuclear ALCM, an exhibition of features that make it distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs must be conducted. The notification must announce the date and location for the exhibition.

Only if the long-range non-nuclear ALCM type has not already been exhibited, paragraph 14 of Section VII requires the advance notification of the first flight test of a new type of long-range non-nuclear ALCM from an airplane of a type from which no long-range nuclear ALCM has been previously flight tested. The purpose of the notification is to avoid ambiguity over whether the airplane should be considered to be a heavy bomber. Note that this notification applies to tests from any airplane, not just heavy bombers. The type of airplane must be identified only if it is a heavy bomber. The notification must identify the features that make such an ALCM distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs and must announce the date and location for the exhibition of an ALCM of the new type to demonstrate such features. Within 48 hours after this notification, the developing Party must provide one photograph of such an ALCM through diplomatic channels.

Only if the long-range non-nuclear ALCM has not already been exhibited, paragraph 15 of Section VII requires the advance notification of the first flight test of a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of a new type armed with two or more weapons. This notification is related to the Treaty prohibition on long-range nuclear ALCMs armed with two or more nuclear weapons; the Parties will want to pay particular attention to tests of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. The date of the flight test must be notified, the notifying Party must identify the features that make such an ALCM of the new type distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs and announce the date and location for the exhibition of an ALCM of the new type to demonstrate such features. Within 48 hours after this notification, the developing Party must provide one photograph of such an ALCM through diplomatic channels.

Paragraph 16 of Section VII is the only notification of the development of a new kind of strategic offensive arm and must be provided no later than 30 days after the first flight test of such an arm, unless issues concerning such an arm have been raised earlier within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, as indicated in the Second Agreed Statement. If provided, the notification must merely include a description of the new kind of strategic offensive arm and the date of its first flight test. Proof of concept" or proof of principle" tests do not fall within this notification requirement. The negotiating record makes it clear that first flight test" means first test as a weapon delivery vehicle; testing prior to this point does not require notification.

SECTION VIII. NOTIFICATIONS CONCERNING CHANGES IN THE CONTENT OF INFORMATION PROVIDED PURSUANT TO ARTICLE VIII OF THE TREATY, INCLUDING THE RESCHEDULING OF ACTIVITIES

Section VIII consists of only two paragraphs plus a statement providing the formula for determining the expiration date of the remaining advance notifications in the Protocol not covered by these two paragraphs. The two paragraphs set forth the obligation of each Party to provide notifications concerning changes in the content of information provided in other notifications, including the rescheduling of activities.

Paragraph 1 is the notification to be provided in advance of the scheduled date of the initiation of a routine movement, relocation, or departure of a rail-mobile test launcher from a test range, if information that was provided in the initial notification has changed. This new notification must provide the changed information referenced to the original notification. If the change in the scheduled date is more than four days, an entirely new notification of the movement is required.

Paragraph 2 is the notification to be provided in advance of the scheduled date of the initiation of a conversion or elimination process of any change in the information specified in the original notification. If the change in the scheduled date is more than five days, an entirely new notification shall be provided.

The remaining text in Section VIII states that if there is a delay in an activity specified in any other advance notification of the Protocol besides those covered by paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Section (and besides notifications of flight tests provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section VI), and if that delay exceeds the specified amount of time (twice the length of the specified advance), an additional notification is required.

SECTION IX. NOTIFICATIONS CONCERNING INSPECTIONS AND CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES

Section IX restates the obligation of each Party to provide notifications concerning inspections and continuous monitoring activities provided for in Section III of the Inspection Protocol. It adds no new obligations, and is included for completeness.

SECTION X. NOTIFICATIONS CONCERNING OPERATIONAL DISPERSALS

Section X consists of seven paragraphs that set forth the obligation of each Party to provide notifications concerning operational dispersals. Such dispersals are regulated by Article XIV of the Treaty.

Paragraph 1 of Section X is the notification of the beginning of the operational dispersal, and must specify the date and time of the beginning of the operational dispersal and the reasons for the operational dispersal. Because certain rights and obligations are suspended during an operational dispersal pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article XIV of the Treaty, the date and time provided in this notification are important for determining when these rights and obligations are suspended and the time from which notifications held in abeyance must be provided in accordance with subparagraph 5(b) of this Section.

Paragraph 2 of Section X is the notification of the completion of the operational dispersal and must specify the date and time of the completion of the operational dispersal, which are important for the same reason as in paragraph 1 of this Section. In accordance with paragraph 1(b) of Article XIV of the Treaty, when to declare a dispersal complete is entirely at the discretion of the dispersing Party, but a Party must ensure, pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article XIV, that it is in compliance with its Treaty obligations when it declares its dispersal ended.

Paragraph 3 of Section X is the notification of the suspension, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article XIV of the Treaty, of the obligation to provide notifications, to carry out cooperative measures, and to allow inspections during the operational dispersal. As paragraph 2 of Article XIV specifies, these obligations may be suspended individually or collectively.

Paragraph 4 of Section X is the notification that a Party will resume its obligation to provide notifications, to carry out cooperative measures, and to allow inspections that had been suspended in accordance withparagraph 3 of this Section. This notification would be provided only if a Party chose to resume its obligation before the completion of the operational dispersal, because the obligation resumes automatically after completion of the dispersal.

Paragraph 5 of Section X is the notification by a Party that has suspended notifications during the operational dispersal, providing information that assists the other Party in assessing the status of all of the notifying Party's strategic offensive arms. This is accomplished by the notifying Party providing either:

(a) that Party's data updated for each category of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding and the notifications of incomplete movements that would have been provided pursuant to the provisions of this Protocol but for the temporary suspension of the obligation to provide such notifications; or

(b) all the notifications that should have been provided but for the temporary suspension of the obligation to provide such notifications.

Paragraph 6 of Section X recognizes that even if a net update of the Memorandum of Understanding is elected in accordance with subparagraph 5(a) of this Section, all the notifications that would have been provided in accordance with Sections III, VI, and VII of this Protocol but for the temporary suspension of notifications must nevertheless be provided. Notifications provided in accordance with these Sections contain information related to throw-weight, flight tests, and new types of strategic offensive arms. Such information is required only once in connection with these notifications.

Paragraph 7 of Section X is the notification of the location of all heavy bombers that were not located at their air bases as of the completion of the operational dispersal. The location is provided either as the name of the airfield within national territory or as the general location outside national territory. Airfield" includes both START facilities listed in the Memorandum of Understanding and other military or civilian airfields. Notifications within national territory are for informational purposes; there are no restrictions on bomber locations. Notification that bombers remain outside national territory trigger the requirement of paragraph 4(c) of Article XIV of the Treaty to initiate diplomatic consultations.

A final provision, like those in the other Protocols, provides that pursuant to subparagraph (b) of Article XV of the Treaty, additional measures can be agreed upon by the Parties with respect to this Protocol to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if changes need to be made in the Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, then such changes as are agreed upon shall be made within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), without resorting to the amendment procedures set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty.

Pursuant to Article XVII of the Treaty, the Protocol is deemed to be an integral part of the Treaty.

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE THROW-WEIGHT PROTOCOL

STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE PROTOCOL

The Throw-weight Protocol consists of a preamble and two Sections and specifies the type of procedures used to determine the accountable throw-weight of each of ICBM and SLBM.

PREAMBLE

The Preamble identifies the United States and the Soviet Union as the Parties to the Protocol and records the Parties' agreement that the procedures governing the determination and accountability of ICBM and SLBM throw-weight set forth in the Protocol are the procedures for such purposes applicable to the Treaty.

SECTION I - DETERMINATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF ICBM AND SLBM THROW-WEIGHT

Section I, consisting of seven paragraphs, sets forth the procedures for determining the accountable throw-weight for existing and new types of ICBMs and SLBMs. Procedures for notification of throw-weight data and resolution of disputes on throw-weight are also provided.

Paragraph 1 consists of two subparagraphs that set forth rules for determining the throw-weight of ICBMs or SLBMs demonstrated during flight tests. These rules are based on two distinct missile design types: those that carry more than one reentry vehicle (RV) and dispense them from the final stage (subparagraph a); and those that do not, i.e., those that carry more than one RV and dispense them from a self-contained dispensing mechanism (commonly referred to as a post-boost vehicle) and those that carry only one RV and dispense it from either the final stage or a self-contained dispensing mechanism (subparagraph b).

The phrase "ICBM or SLBM the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles," used in subparagraph (a), is a defined term. The definition of the term makes it clear that an ICBM or SLBM qualifies as a missile of this design (type a) the first time it conducts a flight test with more than one RV during which the missile's final stage (using either a main or vernier engine of the final stage), rather than a self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM), executes a "procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles."

The phrase "procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles" used in subparagraph (a) also is a defined term. The definition specifies that a simulated release of an RV is considered to be the same as an actual release of an RV. Thus, a missile that carried more than one RV would qualify as a type a" missile even if it released no actual RVs from the final stage, but simulated the release of an RV from the final stage.

The first part of the definition of "ICBM or SLBM the final stage of which . . . ." also incorporates a type rule, the legal effect of which is that once a missile qualifies as a missile of this type during a flight test, it remains a missile of this type, even if on all subsequent flight tests it carries only one RV. The second part of the definition of this term specifies that an individual missile which is of a type that has carried more than one RV and has executed a procedure for dispensing RVs, but does not otherwise qualify as a type a" design (having dispensed such RVs from a SCDM), would be considered to be of such a design for purposes of determining its throw-weight if, during a flight test, it released an RV or penetration aid prior to termination of main engine thrust of the final stage. The purpose of this provision is to make certain that the throw-weight of a multiple-RV missile that incorporates a SCDM includes the weight of the final stage, including its unexpended fuel, for any flight test where such a missile releases an RV or penetration aid during the operation of the final stage, instead of during the operation of the SCDM (see below for discussion of how throw-weight is calculated for "type a" and "b" missiles). If, during that flight test, the missile demonstrates a greater throw-weight than that demonstrated on previous flight tests, then such greater value becomes the accountable throw-weight for all missiles of that type.

Subparagraph (a) specifies that for an ICBM or SLBM whose final stage executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles, its throw-weight shall consist of: (1) the aggregate weight of the final stage, including its propellant and elements that have not separated from the stage, at the time when the first RV or penetration aid is released, whichever occurs first; and (2) the weight of the payload. "Payload" is a defined term. It includes, for a stage, the weight of everything that separates from that stage -- penetration aids, RVs, telemetry package, etc. -- beginning at the time when the velocity of the final stage is equal to 1,000 meters per second less than its velocity at the time of the earlier of two events: termination of main engine thrust of the final stage; or the first release of a reentry vehicle or penetration aid. Specifically excluded from the definition of payload, and hence from throw-weight, is the weight of the front section shroud (also referred to as the aerodynamic shroud) and the propellant burned by the final stage. The front section shroud is excluded, at Soviet insistence, on the grounds that it is designed to provide protection to the elements of the missile's front end during the missile's ascent through the Earth's atmosphere and is not directly related to useful military payload (although the testing of heavy shrouds might be used to validate additional throw-weight capability). The burned propellant of the final stage is excluded because, for "type a" missiles, a specific portion of the propellant already is captured as throw-weight in the language of paragraph 1(a), and for " type b" missiles, the propellant is not used to "execute a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles."

The 1,000 meters per second criterion is incorporated to avoid a specific circumvention scenario. If mass that separates from the final stage is considered to be throw-weight only after thrust termination, then mass could be released just prior to thrust termination and not be captured as throw-weight. This would be true despite the fact that such mass could potentially fly to a militarily useful range and could be used to test the effect of heavier military payloads. Allowing such testing even with inert mass (e.g., mass that is not a reentry vehicle or penetration aid), but not capturing it as throw-weight (which otherwise would be reflected in the missile's accountable throw-weight), could conceivably support a breakout potential (since such inert mass could be converted quickly to useful military payload without having to undergo a time-consuming testing program to gauge the effect of additional throw-weight on missile performance.) Mass released prior to the point when the final stage velocity is 1,000 meters per second less than at thrust termination need not count as throw-weight, since mass released this early in the missile's trajectory could not be used effectively to test a missile's performance characteristics when carrying heavier payloads to a militarily useful range.

In the view of the United States, and we believe in the view of the Soviet Union as well, subparagraph (a) was negotiated for the purpose of determining the throw-weight of a unique missile design represented by only one type of missile, the Soviet SS-N-23. However, late in the negotiations, after the language of this subparagraph and its associated defined terms had been largely agreed, the Soviets declared that they possessed no missiles of "type a" design, including the SS-N-23. In a July 29, 1991 statement, the United States declared that while it would allow the throw-weight of the SS-N-23 to be calculated as if it were not a "type a" missile, it reserved the right to contest in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission the throw-weight values of any new type or modified existing type of ICBM or SLBM that incorporated a design similar to the SS-N-23, if such throw-weight values are based on subparagraph (b). (See the discussion of Other Statements" in this analysis.)

Subparagraph (b) provides that for ICBMs and SLBMs whose final stage does not execute a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles (i.e., those that carry more than one reentry vehicle and dispense them from a self-contained dispensing mechanism, and those that carry only one reentry vehicle and dispense it from either the final stage or a self-contained dispensing mechanism), the throw-weight shall be the weight of the payload of the final stage or final stages. The phrase final stages" is intended to clarify that if in the future a missile were to incorporate a design that utilized more than one final stage, the payload of all such final stages would be included as throw-weight.

Finally, although Paragraph 1 refers to throw-weight in terms of the "weight" of various elements of a ballistic missile, rather than their "mass," the Parties understood that, for purposes of the Throw-weight Protocol, the term "weight" is equivalent to the term "mass." On February 27, 1991, Soviet negotiators made a formal statement for the record that, for the purposes of determining throw-weight, "weight" meant static weight at sea level on the surface of the Earth. This statement was subsequently accepted by U.S. negotiators.

Paragraph 2 provides that for ICBMs and SLBMs of existing types (that is, existing as of entry into force), the accountable throw-weight will be the greatest throw- weight demonstrated in flight tests of an ICBM or SLBM of that type. This means that the rules of paragraph 1 will be applied to existing types and that their accountable throw-weight, for purposes of Treaty limitations, can increase, even after entry into force, above the values specified in Section I of the Memorandum of Understanding, up to a limit described below.

Paragraph 3 provides that for ICBMs and SLBMs of a new type, the accountable throw-weight, like that of existing types pursuant to paragraph 2, will be the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in flight tests of an ICBM or SLBM of that type. However, for new types, the determination of accountable throw-weight is subject to two additional provisions.

First, subparagraph (a) provides that for ICBMs and SLBMs of a new type, the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in flight tests must be no less than the maximum calculated throw-weight (to be determined pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Section) that an ICBM could deliver to 11,000 kilometers and that an SLBM could deliver to 9,500 kilometers. This provision is designed to prevent a Party from establishing an accountable throw-weight for a new missile that is significantly less than its actual throw-weight potential.

Second, subparagraph (b) provides that the first seven flight tests for ICBMs and SLBMs of a new type will not be used to determine the greatest throw-weight demonstrated if none of those seven flight tests exceeds, by more than 20 percent or 250 kilograms, whichever is less, the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in flight tests that are subsequent to the first seven flight tests but prior to an ICBM or SLBM of the type becoming subject to the limitations of Article II of the Treaty. Since design changes can occur early in a missile's flight test program that can affect its performance characteristics, this provision is designed to ensure that the missile's accountable throw-weight reflects the missile's deployed throw-weight. This addresses a Soviet concern that a missile not be accountable for a throw-weight value demonstrated during initial testing, of which it might not actually be capable once deployed. In addition, this provision compensates for Soviet flight test programs that incorporate additional telemetry packages on early tests that are flown to less than operational range. Note that pursuant to the Thirty-second Agreed Statement, if a Party deploys a new type of ICBM or SLBM prior to the eighth flight test, its accountable throw-weight will be subject to discussion and agreement in the JCIC.

Paragraph 4 prescribes the method for determining a missile's maximum calculated throw-weight, i.e., the maximum throw-weight that an ICBM or SLBM of a new type could deliver to a specified distance under a specific set of assumptions. It provides that the Party developing such a missile will use its own methods for such calculation, subject to five assumptions that decrease computational complexity and standardize the results. These five assumptions are:

First, the distance to which the throw-weight is delivered will be measured along the missile's flight trajectory projected onto the Earth's surface from the launch point to the point that a reentry vehicle is projected to impact on the Earth. For purposes of projecting the reentry vehicle's impact on the Earth, the reentry vehicle shall be considered to have been released immediately after termination of the main engine thrust of the final stage.

Second, the Earth will be considered to be spherical and non-rotating. This assumption standardizes the results of the throw-weight calculation by factoring out irregularities in the Earth's surface and variances in launch site location and launch azimuth.

Third, the reentry vehicle's projected impact on the Earth will be calculated as though that vehicle followed a ballistic trajectory in a vacuum. This assumption eliminates the need to account for relatively minor atmospheric effects during reentry.

Fourth, the distance will be calculated based on each stage having a full propellant load.

Fifth, the propellant in each stage that remains after that stage has terminated its thrust will be no greater than one percent for solid-propellant ICBMs or SLBMs or two percent for liquid-propellant ICBMs or SLBMs. The fourth and fifth assumptions are intended to guard against deliberate undercounting of throw-weight capability.

While not stated as an explicit assumption, the Parties understand that, as a practical matter, maximum calculated throw-weight also implies a launch trajectory that will deliver the maximum throw-weight to the specified range, taking into account the performance characteristics and limitations of the new type of ICBM or SLBM. In other words, for a missile with a given set of performance characteristics and limitations, flown to a given range, there is a single launch trajectory that maximizes the throw-weight the missile is capable of carrying. The Parties did not specify the performance characteristics or limitations that are to be considered in determining the launch trajectory.

Paragraph 5 of Section I prohibits a Party from increasing the accountable throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM of an existing type by more than 21 percent of the initial accountable throw-weight, as reflected in Section I of the Memorandum of Understanding. (If such throw-weight is increased by 21 percent or more and there is a change in the length of the first stage by five percent or more, the ICBM or SLBM in question would become a new type, and would be subject to the warhead counting rules for new types. See Agreed Statement Thirty-four.) This provides some flexibility to increase the throw-weight of an existing type, while strictly limiting the degree to which the warhead-carrying potential of such a missile could be increased. This is important because the Treaty prohibits increasing the number of accountable warheads on existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs.

Paragraph 6 provides that the Parties will exchange ICBM and SLBM throw-weight data in connection with the throw-weight Protocol in accordance with Section III of the Notification Protocol. Paragraph 6 also provides that throw-weight values will be measured in kilograms and will be rounded to the nearest multiple of 50.

Paragraph 7 provides that if a dispute arises concerning the initial value of accountable throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type, or the increased value of accountable throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM of an existing or new type specified in accordance with Section III of the Notification Protocol, then the accountable throw-weight will be the value specified in the notification until the dispute is resolved in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. This provision merely clarifies that a dispute over the throw-weight value of an ICBM or SLBM will neither prevent such value from being recorded in the MOU, nor prevent the deployment of a new type of such ICBM or SLBM. The provision is without prejudice to a Party's right to charge the other Party with non-compliance in connection with a disputed throw-weight value.

SECTION II - VERIFICATION

This Section consists of three paragraphs setting forth procedures for verifying compliance with the Protocol and establishing the Protocol's legal status.

Paragraph 1 provides that national technical means of verification (NTM) will be used by each Party to verify the other Party's compliance with the Protocol.

Paragraph 2 requires a Party to conduct two pre-announced flight tests of an ICBM or SLBM of each new type prior to an ICBM or SLBM of that type becoming subject to the limitations provided for in Article II of the Treaty. These two pre-announced flight tests will be conducted either during the 12-month period prior to an ICBM or SLBM of that type becoming subject to the central limits provided for in Article II of the Treaty or during the last five flight tests prior to an ICBM or SLBM of that type becoming subject to the central limits provided for in Article II of the Treaty. A ballistic missile becomes subject to the Treaty's central limits when its associated launcher is considered to be deployed, pursuant to paragraph 6(c),(d),(f), and (g) of Article III. The alternate (last five flight tests) provision was included so that if initial deployment was delayed, a Party would not be forced to conduct an extra flight test(s) to meet the 12-month rule.

Paragraph 3 requires that no more than one of these pre-announced flight tests may be conducted in any 30-day period. Advanced notification of these flight tests will facilitate the preparation and orientation of NTM assets, thus enhancing verification of throw-weight values.

A final provision, like those in the other Protocols, provides that, pursuant to subparagraph (b) of Article XV of the Treaty, additional measures can be agreed upon by the Parties with respect to this Protocol to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if changes need to be made in the Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, then such changes as are agreed upon shall be made within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), without resorting to the amendment procedures set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty.

Pursuant to Article XVII of the Treaty, the Protocol is deemed to be an integral part of the Treaty.

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOL ON TELEMETRIC INFORMATION

STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE PROTOCOL

The Telemetry Protocol consists of a Preamble and four sections. In the Protocol, the Parties agreed to incorporate the detailed provisions relating to access to telemetric information.

PREAMBLE

The preamble to the Protocol provides the connection with Article X of the Treaty which contains the general requirements concerning this issue.

SECTION I - PROVISION OF TAPES THAT CONTAIN A RECORDING OF TELEMETRIC INFORMATION

Section I consists of four paragraphs that provide for specific implementation of the requirements to exchange telemetry data tapes pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article X of the Treaty. Paragraph 4 of Article X requires the Party conducting the flight test to provide tapes that contain a recording of all telemetric information that is broadcast during the flight test. Paragraph 6 of Article X provides for a limited right to encapsulate and encrypt on-board technical measurements. Whenever the right to encapsulate is exercised, the Party conducting the flight test is obligated to provide tapes that contain a recording of all telemetric information, including information that is encapsulated, if such tapes are recovered following the flight test.

Subparagraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of Section I require both broadcast telemetry tapes and encapsulated telemetry tapes to be provided no later than 50 days after the flight test of an ICBM or SLBM. The obligation can be satisfied by providing copies of tapes rather than the originals. Further, the obligation is to provide tapes that contain a recording of all telemetric information," not all tapes." Thus, if multiple tracking stations make simultaneous recordings of the same telemetric signal, a side could merge the data, thus eliminating redundancy, and provide a tape or tapes containing such data, as long as all the telemetric information obtained is contained on the tapes. Because there is no assurance that an encapsulated telemetry tape will be recovered, subparagraph 1(b) makes clear that the obligation to provide such tapes exists only if they are recovered.

Subparagraph 1(c) of Section I requires that a summary be provided for each tape. This summary is necessary to identify the tape and to assist playing back the tape. Such a summary must include basic information such as the type of ICBM or SLBM, date of flight test, the type of recorder and the recording speed, the track number, record period, record mode and broadcast frequency in megahertz. Also required are the digital data encoding methods employed and digital recording formats. Digital recording formats are directly related to how telemetric information is recorded and represented on tape and are a critical factor in differentiating types of telemetry tapes for the purposes of subparagraphs 4(a) and (b) below. Both sides indicated they use digital recordings. If analog recordings are used, formats for the recording of such data would also be required. Missing or unreadable portions of telemetric information sometimes occur. The Party supplying such a tape must also identify and, where possible, explain the periods during the flight test for which no tape recordings were obtained or for which tape recordings are of inferior quality. Such identifications and explanation must be keyed to a time standard so as to denote the periods during the flight test for which telemetric information may be missing or unreadable.

Paragraph 2 of Section I gives the Party conducting the flight test the right to determine the method of recording the telemetric information on the tapes. This provision makes clear that the obligation to provide telemetry tapes does not prejudice the choice of the recording method as long as the tapes contain a recording of all telemetric information obtained. Such a provision is required since the Parties may employ different recording techniques and equipment. In order to alleviate problems in playing back tapes made using different techniques, paragraph 4 of this Section provides for demonstrations of, and the opportunity to acquire, the appropriate equipment to play back telemetry tapes.

Paragraph 3 of Section I provides the means for a Party receiving telemetry tapes that it determines are incomplete or are of insufficient quality for processing to request an explanation and seek resolution of the problem. This provision complements subparagraph 1(c)(iv) of the same Section which already obligates the Party providing the tapes to identify and explain known gaps or problems with quality. Additional problems, however, might result from the duplicating, handling, or shipping processes. If the Party receiving tapes determines that they are incomplete or that their quality is insufficient for processing, that Party may notify the other Party no later than 45 days after the receipt of the tapes of the nature of the problem, in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol. No later than 30 days after receiving such notification, the Party that had originally provided the tapes must provide either an explanation of the reasons for the incompleteness or insufficient quality, or, if possible, new copies of the tapes. If there are still concerns over the content or quality of the tapes, a Party can raise such concerns in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission under Article XV of the Treaty, or in another appropriate forum.

Paragraph 4 of Section I contains provisions that are designed to allow the Party receiving telemetry tapes to be able to play them back. Subparagraph 4(a) requires that an initial demonstration be conducted of the tapes being used, as well as the appropriate equipment for playback, no later than 120 days after signature of the Treaty.

Subparagraph 4(b) requires demonstrations of those tapes and equipment that differ from tapes and equipment previously demonstrated. Such demonstrations must be conducted no less than 30 days in advance of the first flight test of an ICBM or SLBM during which the different tapes or equipment are to be used. Notification of the date and place of such demonstration must be provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol. The Parties shall agree, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, on the procedures for the initial demonstration and for subsequent demonstrations for different equipment or tapes provided for in subparagraphs 1(a) and 1(b). However, if only the recording format differs and different playback equipment is not required, then a demonstration is not required, and the Party conducting the flight test need only provide information describing the different format. Information describing the format must be provided through diplomatic channels no less than 60 days in advance of the flight test specified in this subparagraph. Recording format means the method of recording the data on the tape.

Subparagraph 4(c) requires that a Party, if requested, provide the opportunity for the other Party to acquire the appropriate equipment to play back the tapes no later than 30 days in advance of the receipt of such tapes. Notification of such a request is provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol. This provision does not require that such equipment will be supplied without compensation, but rather that the equipment will be made available for acquisition without restrictions on such acquisition.

SECTION II - PROVISION OF DATA ASSOCIATED WITH THE ANALYSIS OF TELEMETRIC INFORMATION

Section II of this Protocol provides the specific requirement to provide data for the analysis of telemetric information. This data is known as "interpretive data." No later than 50 days after each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test must provide, through diplomatic channels, a description of the format of the telemetry frame and methods of encoding, for all telemetric information that is broadcast, except for telemetric information that originates in and is broadcast from a reentry vehicle. Subparagraph 1(a) specifies types of interpretive data pertaining to the format of the telemetry frame and to the methods of encoding that must be included. This subparagraph makes it clear, however, that the obligation is not limited to the specific examples given. If other interpretive data is required to describe the format of the telemetry frame or the methods of encoding, it too must be provided.

Telemetry data bits are usually organized into a hierarchy of groupings; a group of individual data bits make up a standard word and a group of standard words make up a frame. The beginning or end of a frame is identified by a unique pattern of bits known as synchronization words or bits. Subparagraphs 1(a)(i) through 1(a)(iv) require that the description include basic formatting information, specifically; the number of bits per standard word, words per frame, frames per second, and the location of synchronization words or bits.

Subparagraph 1(a)(v) requires that the description include the location of information in the frame describing its formatting. For example, specific words may contain information that specifies how or when the frame format has changed from the previous frame.

Subparagraphs 1(a)(vi) and 1(a)(vii) require that the description include information regarding data elements. Data elements are units of information, for example, an onboard technical measurement or a formatting aid within the telemetry frame itself. Data elements may or may not be recorded once each frame, may or may not be in the same location in the frame throughout the flight, and may be represented numerically by one of several possible arrangement of bits. Subparagraphs 1(a)(vi) requires that the description must include a designator and the location of each data element within the frame throughout the flight and, if a given word location is time-shared by two or more data elements, the structure for such time-sharing. The designator called for in this subparagraph is a means of identifying each data element, not necessarily a name or description. Subparagraphs 1(a)(vii) requires that the description include the method of representing each data element, including the location of each bit in each element, the order of the bits from least significant to most significant, and the method for representing negative values.

Subparagraph 1(a)(viii) requires that the testing Party provide all information regarding encoding algorithms. Encoding algorithms are processes that are applied within the telemetry equipment and are known to the testing Party. Encoding algorithms include error detection and correction, data compression, and any conversion processes that are applied in the telemetry equipment to onboard measured parameter values prior to their broadcast.

Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 1 requires the provision, no later than 50 days following the flight test, of the names of parameters and their locations in the telemetry frame, as well as conversion factors or analytic expressions for converting telemetric information to physical values of parameters, for that telemetric information necessary to determine acceleration of the stages and the self-contained dispensing mechanism of the ICBM or SLBM; the separation times of the stages and the self-contained dispensing mechanism; and the times of reentry vehicle separation commands and times of reentry vehicle releases.

Paragraph 2 of this Section requires the provision, no later than 50 days following the flight test, of a missile acceleration profile for all stages of the missile and for the self-contained dispensing mechanism. The acceleration profile will aid in the analysis of throw-weight demonstrated on ballistic missile flight tests and the number of reentry vehicle releases and simulated releases. Paragraph 2 requires that the acceleration profile be calculated on the basis of all relevant onboard and external measurements that are made during the flight test. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article X of the Treaty, however, there is no obligation to make any specific onboard technical measurements, including those necessary to calculate the acceleration profile, nor is there any requirement in the Treaty to make external measurements relevant to the calculation of the acceleration profile. In the unlikely event that no relevant measurements, either onboard or external, were made on a given flight-test, the testing Party would still be obligated to provide an acceleration profile based on its engineering estimates.

Paragraph 2 also specifies that the acceleration profile be calculated to a prescribed precision. Such precision may prove impossible with the measurements taken on a given flight; in such a case, the profile is to be calculated to the greatest precision possible.

Paragraph 3 of this Section requires the provision, no later than 120 days after signature of the Treaty, of an example illustrative of the interpretive data and missile acceleration profile. The content of the interpretive data and missile acceleration profile specified in paragraph 3 are to be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. To ensure that the demonstrations involved a telemetry system relevant to modern systems, the Parties agreed that the United States of America would supply example data for one of its modern missiles (Peacekeeper, Minuteman III, Trident I, or Trident II), and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would supply example data for one of its modern missiles (SS-18, SS-24, SS-25, or SS-N-23).

SECTION III - PROVISIONS CONCERNING ENCAPSULATION AND ENCRYPTION OF TELEMETRIC INFORMATION

Section III of this Protocol provides the specific requirements for a Party that elects to encapsulate or encrypt telemetric information pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article X of the Treaty.

Paragraph 1 of this Section addresses encapsulation. Subparagraph (a) limits encapsulation to reentry vehicle measurements made during the plasma phase. Plasma phase is the period of reentry into the earth's atmosphere in which the increased friction produces plasma of charged particles around the reentry vehicle through which telemetric signals cannot be transmitted. An exception to this rule limiting encapsulation to the plasma phase is provided for the Minuteman II. This is necessary because the Minuteman II has been designed to encapsulate reentry vehicle data throughout its flight and it would be difficult and expensive for the U.S. to redesign this mature system.

Subparagraph (b) requires the Party conducting the flight test, when possible, to broadcast, from the same reentry vehicle on which data are encapsulated, all measurements made before and after the plasma phase, and following the plasma phase, some measurements made and recorded during the plasma phase. The obligation to broadcast after the plasma phase does not apply when reentry vehicle impact occurs during conditions of plasma formation, since such broadcast would be impossible. These broadcasts of measurements help ensure that the Party monitoring the flight test can verify the authenticity of the tapes. There is no obligation to install transmission equipment in a reentry vehicle for the sole purpose of making such broadcasts.

Paragraph 2 of this Section adds to the provisions of paragraph 6 of Article X of the Treaty concerning encryption. (See analysis of main Treaty text above.) Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 2 limits encryption to former and retired types of ICBMs and SLBMs, as well as during not more than two flight tests each year of a single existing type of ICBM or SLBM. If a Party decides to encrypt an existing type it must provide, in accordance with paragraph 5 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol, the notification of the type to be used no less than 30 days in advance of the first flight test during which telemetry encryption will be used. The Party is then locked in" to encryption of only this existing type of missile until that missile is retired. When that existing type is retired, the encryption exemption may be used by another existing type of ICBM or SLBM (that is, an ICBM or SLBM of a type existing as of the entry into force of the Treaty.)

Subparagraph (b) sets out the constraints on what telemetric information may be encrypted. Only telemetric information that pertains to the front section or its elements may be encrypted. (The phrase or its elements" refers to unspecified objects that might be contained on the front section, other than objects listed in the definition of the term front section." Such objects could include cameras and sensors.) Such telemetric information may be encrypted only after that front section or its elements have separated from either:

(i) the self-contained dispensing mechanism, during a flight test of an ICBM or SLBM equipped with a self-contained dispensing mechanism; or

(ii) the final stage, during a flight test of an ICBM or SLBM that is not equipped with a self-contained dispensing mechanism.

Subparagraph (c) prohibits either Party from encrypting telemetric information that pertains to the functioning of the stages or the self-contained dispensing mechanism of an ICBM or SLBM.

SECTION IV - PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

Section IV provides the legal basis for the application of selected provisions prior to entry into force of the Treaty. The Parties have agreed that the Treaty and its associated documents enter into force when the Parties exchange instruments of ratification. Therefore, in accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which the United States recognizes as codifying existing international law on the subject, the Parties need to provide or agree on the provisional application of certain provisions pending entry into force.

The use of this form for provisional application is virtually identical to that used in paragraph 2 of Section VIII of the JCIC Protocol and to the attestation of the Memorandum of Understanding. Moreover, this form follows closely that of the Protocol on the Provisional Application of Certain Provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990.

Paragraph 1 cites the provisions that are to be provisionally applied: paragraph 3 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol (the request for the opportunity to acquire appropriate equipment to play back telemetric information following demonstration); subparagraph 4(a) of Section I of this Protocol (the initial demonstration of tapes and appropriate playback equipment); and paragraph 3 of Section II of this Protocol (provision of sample interpretive data and missile acceleration profile.) (Note: The Parties have each stated their intent to voluntarily cease encryption and jamming of flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs 120 days after Treaty signature. This is not an instance of provisional application, but is a separate, voluntary act with no legal nexus to the Treaty and its Protocols.)

Paragraph 2 provides the time period of provisional application. These provisions apply for a 12-month period, unless, prior to that time a Party informs the other Party of its decision to terminate the provisional application of any of the provisions that are provisionally applied or the Treaty enters into force. Of course, once the Treaty enters into force these provisions are treated the same as all other provisions.

This paragraph makes it clear that there is a continuing legal basis for the Parties to consider questions arising from the execution of the requests or demonstrations cited in paragraph 1 of this Section. The 12-month limit is necessary to ensure that provisional application does not continue in perpetuity. This paragraph also provides the Parties with the option to extend the period of provisional application for additional periods subject to the same limitations that initially apply.

Paragraph 3 of this Section provides that such provisional application occur in light of and in conformity with the other provisions of the Treaty. This means that the Parties need not provisionally apply all other provisions that could have bearing on the provisions cited in paragraph 1. For example, there is no need to provisionally apply the Definitions Annex to the Treaty even though terminology incorporated there may bear on execution of a demonstration of tapes.

A final provision, like those in the other Protocols, provides that, pursuant to subparagraph (b) of Article XV of the Treaty, additional measures can be agreed upon by the Parties with respect to this Protocol to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if changes need to be made in the Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, then such changes as are agreed upon shall be made within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), without resorting to the amendment procedures set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty.

Pursuant to Article XVII of the Treaty, the Protocol is deemed to be an integral part of the Treaty.

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOL ON THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION

STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE PROTOCOL

The Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Protocol (the Protocol) consists of a preamble and eight sections. As with virtually all other recent arms control agreements, the Parties have established by-laws" for the operation of a forum for discussing issues that bear upon compliance with Treaty provisions and their implementation. As the preamble to this Protocol states, the enabling provision for the forum created in START, the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), is Article XV of the Treaty.

The JCIC Protocol is modeled on other arms control for a, most directly on the by-laws for the Special Verification Commission (SVC) as set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding to the INF Treaty Regarding Procedures for the Operation of the Special Verification Commission ("the SVC Memorandum"). However, the Parties have learned from their experience in the SVC and other arms control compliance bodies and have introduced several innovations designed to enhance the responsiveness and efficiency of the JCIC. In addition, recognizing the complexity of START implementation and the need to provide for procedures so that the Treaty implementation can begin as soon as the Treaty enters into force, the Parties agreed in the Protocol that the JCIC will meet prior to entry into force. The tasks before the JCIC in this period of provisional application are discussed in the analysis of Article XV of the Treaty.

SECTION I - COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION

Section I provides for the composition of the delegations sent to represent each Party in the JCIC. Paragraph 1 requires the naming of the Commissioner and the deputy Commissioner within 30 days following signature of the Treaty: the U.S. Commissioner is Ambassador Steven E. Steiner; his deputy is Mr. T.R. Koncher from the Department of Defense. The USSR has named Gennadiy Shabannikov as its Commissioner; his deputy is Colonel Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov. Although there are no special provisions for the convening of the first session of the JCIC, this paragraph, together with the provisional application provisions contained in paragraph 2 of Section VIII, indicate that the JCIC needs to meet as soon as possible to consider the range of issues for consideration by the Parties before entry into force. Paragraph 1 of Section I is similar to Section II of the SVC Memorandum, except that Memorandum had no 30-day time requirement.

Paragraph 2 of this Section sets out the right of each Party to be represented by the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, or their alternates, as well as members, advisors, and experts. This paragraph follows closely Section IV of the SVC Memorandum, and like the SVC Memorandum, it also explicitly provides for the convening of the JCIC without the participation of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner. For the United States, the term members" means those officials designated to represent an agency of the federal government.

Paragraph 3 of this Section follows the precedent of the second sentence of Section VI of the SVC Memorandum in that it provides for the head representative of each of the Parties alternately to preside over" or lead the meetings during a round of the Commission. In practice, this will mean that the Party hosting the meeting at its mission will preside over the meeting.

Paragraph 4 of this Section follows the precedent of the second paragraph of Section IV of the SVC Memorandum which allows the Commission to constitute working groups.

SECTION II - CONVENING A SESSION OF THE COMMISSION

Section II of the Protocol provides the mechanism for convening a session of the Commission. Paragraph 1 sets out the fundamental rule, also contained in Section III of the SVC Memorandum, that the Commission meets upon request of either Party. This requires that a Party attend a meeting if the other Party requests one, and thus makes it more difficult for a Party to avoid discussion of an issue that is important to the other Party. Paragraph 1 introduces a 14-day deadline to respond to such a request. This innovation is intended to contribute to JCIC responsiveness.

Paragraph 1 also defines the content of requests and responses for a meeting of the JCIC: the questions that a Party intends to raise; the name of its head representative; and the proposed or accepted date and location for the convening of the session. Because of the strict two-week deadline for responding to a request to convene, paragraph 1 permits the Parties to submit additional questions in the intervening period until the session is convened.

Paragraph 2 of this Section provides that a session be convened as soon as possible after receipt of the response. This is similar to the first sentence of Section VI of the SVC Memorandum.

Paragraph 3 of this Section also is similar to Section VI of the SVC Memorandum in that it provides for the Commission to meet in Geneva, Switzerland, or, as appropriate, in another place agreed by the Parties. The sides agreed in formal statements exchanged during the final START plenary meeting that if the JCIC were to meet on the territory of either Party, the question of settlement of costs for such a session would have to be resolved prior to the convening of the session. (This is because the host Party to such a meeting might provide goods or services for which reimbursement could be appropriate.)

Paragraph 4 of this Section permits the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner to communicate with the Commissioner of the other Party in order to clarify any unclear situations or to resolve questions. This provision is similar to Section VIII of the SVC Memorandum which has been invoked on several occasions to facilitate direct communication of an issue.

SECTION III - CONVENING A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE COMMISSION

Section III of the Protocol has no precedent in recent arms control agreements. This section provides for the convening of a special session of the JCIC to address an urgent concern relating to compliance with the obligations of the Treaty and introduces the concept of a visit with special right of access" to resolve the concern. Such visits are the rough equivalent of what is sometimes referred to as a right-of-refusal suspect site inspection regime.

Paragraph 1 requires the requesting Party to, at a minimum, communicate the nature of the concern, including the kind and type of strategic offensive arm involved, the name of the head representative, and the proposed date and location for the session. The requesting Party may also propose a specific method for resolving the concern. The Parties specifically contemplate that such a method may include, if the Parties agree, a visit with special right of access to the facility or location where, in the opinion of the requesting Party, the activity that caused the concern occurred.

The Party receiving such a request must respond no later than seven days after receiving the request, in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Section. Although the responding Party has the right to propose its own date for the convening of the special session, that date cannot be later than 10 days after the date originally proposed by the requesting Party. The response may also include acceptance of the specific method for resolving the concern, including the special access visit, proposed by the requesting Party, or an alternative proposal by the requested Party designed to resolve the concern. In the case of a special access visit, the requested Party may propose the date, location, and procedures for such a visit.

Procedures for special access visits must be agreed on a visit-by-visit basis. Procedures in the Inspection Protocol may be used during such visits. The US objective, in providing the flexibility to agree on different procedures, was to balance verification concerns against the need to provide special protection for sensitive facilities for which requests for special access visits might be received. Paragraph 3 also permits the Parties to agree not to convene the special session if they agree to a special access visit, including its schedule and procedures, or if they agree on an alternative method for resolving the concern.

Paragraph 4 provides that either Party may request additional information related to the concern and that responses to such a request will be provided within a week. Responses to such requests may not affect, however, the time for convening of the special session.

Paragraph 5 institutes a 30-day time limit for the special session. The intent of this provision is to preclude either side from stalling resolution of an urgent compliance concern" by prolonged JCIC deliberations. There is no time limit on regular JCIC sessions.

SECTION IV - AGENDA

Section IV describes the content of the agenda for JCIC sessions. Paragraph 1 states, as does Section V of the SVC Memorandum, that the agenda of a meeting shall consist of the questions included in the requests and responses for the session. Of course, the agenda for the special session is the urgent concern itself. Paragraph 2 provides, as does Section V of the SVC Memorandum, for the right to raise questions that arise immediately preceding or even during a session of the Commission. This paragraph makes clear that consideration of the questions raised during the current session is subject to agreement of the Parties. In case of such agreement, the Parties shall allow sufficient time prior to consideration of the questions for preparation and any changes in the composition of the delegations that are required.

Paragraph 3 of this Section provides that a session be convened regardless of the number of questions on the agenda. In other words, the Parties can convene even if there is only one question to discuss. This provision will help the JCIC to avoid a situation that has arisen in the context of the SVC, where the Soviets in the past have resisted convening a single-issue session devoted to the question of arms control implementation costs.

SECTION V - WORK OF THE COMMISSION

Section V combines the provisions of Section VII and Section IX of the SVC Memorandum. This Section provides that the work of the Commission shall be confidential, except as otherwise agreed. The results of the work or the agreements of the Commission may be recorded in appropriate documents, which are to be done in both English and Russian. Such documents shall not be confidential, unless otherwise agreed by the Commission.

SECTION VI - COSTS

Section VI repeats virtually verbatim Section X of the SVC Memorandum. This Section provides that each Party bear the cost of its participation in the work of the Commission. As noted above, the sides agreed in the final START plenary to resolve the question of costs for a session of the JCIC convened on the territory of either Party prior to the convening of such a session.

SECTION VII - COMMUNICATIONS

Section VII provides that all communications pursuant to this Protocol be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, established by the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987.

SECTION VIII - ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES AND PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

Section VIII addresses the method of agreement on additional JCIC procedures and provisional application of the JCIC Protocol prior to entry into force of the Treaty. Paragraph 1, like Section XI of the SVC Memorandum, allows the Parties to agree upon additional procedures governing the operation of the Commission.

Paragraph 2 provides for the provisional application of the Protocol so that the JCIC can meet to resolve questions in the period before entry into force of the Treaty. The Parties have agreed that the Treaty and its associated documents enter into force when the Parties exchange instruments of ratification. Therefore, in accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which the United States recognizes as codifying existing international law on the subject, the Parties need to provide or agree on the provisional application of provisions that will be in effect prior to entry into force.

The use of this form for provisional application is virtually identical to that used in Section IV of the Telemetry Protocol and to the attestation of the Memorandum of Understanding. Moreover, this form follows closely that of the Protocol on the Provisional Application of Certain Provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990.

Paragraph 2 states that Article XV of the Treaty (which establishes the JCIC and its charter) and all the provisions of this Protocol will be provisionally applied from the date of signature.

Paragraph 2 also sets forth that these three parts of the Treaty are to apply for a 12-month period, unless prior to that time a Party informs the other Party of its decision to terminate the provisional application of any of these parts, or unless the Treaty enters into force. Of course, once the Treaty enters into force these provisions have the same status as all other provisions. The 12-month limit is necessary to ensure that provisional application not continue in perpetuity. This paragraph also provides the Parties with the option to extend the period of provisional application for additional periods, subject to the same limitations that initially apply.

Paragraph 3 of this Section provides that such provisional application occur in light of and in conformity with the other provisions of the Treaty. The Parties are assured that the conduct of JCIC sessions convened before entry into force will conform with the method in which they will be conducted after entry into force.

A final provision, like those in the other Protocols, provides that, pursuant to subparagraph (b) of Article XV of the Treaty, additional measures can be agreed upon by the Parties with respect to this Protocol to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if changes need to be made in the Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, then such changes as are agreed upon shall be made within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), without resorting to the amendment procedures set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty.

Pursuant to Article XVII of the Treaty, the Protocol is deemed to be an integral part of the Treaty.

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOL TO THE START TREATY

The Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ("START Treaty") consists of the Preamble and six numbered Articles. The purpose of the Protocol is to enable the START Treaty, which was negotiated with the signed by the Soviet Union, to be implemented between, on the one hand, the United States of America and, on the other hand, the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine-the four former Soviet republics, now independent states, within whose territory all strategic offensive arms are based and all declared START-related facilities are located. The Protocol is an integral part of the START Treaty.

Associated with the Protocol and thus with the START Treaty are three separate, legally binding letters signed by, respectively, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Byelarus, the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the President of Ukraine. Each letter obligates the signing state to eliminate all nuclear weapons and strategic offensive arms from its territory within seven years of the date of entry into force of the START Treaty.

The Protocol and the three associated letters are discussed in this analysis.

Title and Preamble

The title of the Protocol is "Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms." The fundamental purpose of the Protocol is to amend the START Treaty to enable the Treaty's implementation under the changed political circumstances resulting from the demise of the Soviet Union.

The Preamble serves as an introduction to the Protocol and sets forth the intentions of the Parties in broad terms. The first paragraph of the Preamble sets forth and defines the "Parties" to the Protocol and, by virtue of Article I, to the START Treaty itself. The parties are the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States of America.

The next two paragraphs of the Preamble reaffirm the support of the Parties for the START Treaty, while recognizing that the altered political situation resulting from the demise of the Soviet Union and its replacement with a number of independent states requires a formal, legal change as to who the START Parties will be. These paragraphs thus express the link between the START Treaty as originally signed and the new political reality brought about by the demise of the Soviet Union.

The fourth preambular paragraph emphasizes the interest of the parties in maintaining the nuclear forces of the former Soviet Union under the safe, secure and reliable control of a single unified authority. The commitment to such single unified control on the part of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States is embodied in "An Agreement Between the Member-States of the Commonwealth of Independent States," signed in Minsk, Byelarus, on December 30, 1991 by Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Russian and Ukraine, among other states. Article II of that Agreement provides that "The Member-States of the Commonwealth recognize the need for joint command of strategic forces and for maintaining unified control of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction of the former USSR." While the commitment to this command and control arrangement is recognized, the Commonwealth of Independent States plays no role in START implementation and is not a Party to the START Treaty.

The final paragraph of the Preamble states the Parties' desire to facilitate implementation of the START Treaty in the altered situation arising from the demise of the Soviet Union.

ARTICLE I

Article I of the Protocol specifies that Byelarus, Kazakhstan' Russia, and Ukraine together, as successor states to the former Soviet Union for the purposes of the START Treaty, will assume the obligations of the former Soviet Union under the START Treaty. This is one element of the Protocol that has the effect of making these four former Soviet republics Parties to the START Treaty. (Similarly, paragraph 1 of Article M of the Protocol provides that, for purposes of START Treaty implementation, the phrase "Union of Soviet Socialist-Republics" means these four independent states. Furthermore, paragraph 1 of Article VI specifies that each of the four states shall ratify the START Treaty and the Protocol.)

The assumption of the former Soviet Union's obligations by the four states means that the limits of the START Treaty will be applied collectively to the holdings of the four states on the territory of the former Soviet Union. No separate quotas are established for individual states. Note, however, that the separate letters from the respective heads of state require the elimination of strategic offensive arms located in Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine within seven years following the date of entry into force of the START Treaty (which is the START period of reductions). This means that no later than seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty, all of the strategic offensive arms that were permitted for the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the START Treaty as originally signed will be located only on the territory of Russia.

Similarly, the collective assumption of obligations in Article I means that inspection quotas will be collective. The United States is, for example, allowed reentry vehicle inspections each year under the START Treaty. The United States could conduct any number of these ten inspections in any of the four states involved. In the same way, there could only be ten such inspections conducted each year in the United States.

Finally, Article I uses the phrase "as successor states of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in connection with the Treaty." The words "in connection with the Treaty" were included to make it clear that the Protocol does not prejudice the consideration of which state or-states succeeds to the rights and obligations of the former Soviet Union with respect to any other agreements or ongoing discussions among the former Soviet republics concerning the division of the rights, obligations, and property of the former Soviet Union.

ARTICLE II

Article II of the Protocol obligates Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine to make arrangements among themselves to implement the START Treaty's limits and restrictions, to allow functioning of the verification provisions of the START Treaty equally and consistently throughout the territory of all four States, and to allocate costs. The obligation of the four states to make arrangements to implement the START Treaty's rights and obligations means that they will decide among themselves on how to reduce the strategic offensive arms of the former Soviet Union so as to meet the START Treaty limits, how to coordinate inspection of U.S. facilities, how to coordinate. START communications, and similar issues.

Article II also requires that verification provisions be consistent throughout the territory of the four states. This means that the same Inspection Protocol procedures will be used, the same privileges and immunities will be granted inspectors, and the same time lines will be adhered to regardless of the state in which an inspection is being conducted. Minor procedural changes to recognize the sovereignty of the states involved, while ensuring procedural uniformity, can, if necessary, be agreed upon within the framework of the Joint Committee and Inspection Commission, established by Article XV by Article XV of the START Treaty.

The final requirement of Article II is that Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine shall make necessary arrangements among themselves to allocate costs. This requirement serves two purposes. First, it makes clear that the Protocol does not alter the division of costs between the United States and the states assuming the obligations of the former Soviet Union, a division found primarily in paragraphs 18 through 21 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol. Second, it indicates that the division of costs among the four relevant states is a matter for the four states themselves to decide and that the United States does not have an does not seek a voice in that decision.

ARTICLE III

Article III of the Protocol consists of five paragraphs providing implementing details necessary to allow the START Treaty to function with five Parties.

Paragraph I of Article III specifies that, for purposes of START Treaty implementation, the Treaty phrase "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" means the Republic of Byrlarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine. Paragraph 2 of the same Article specifies that the phrase "national territory," when used in the Treaty to refer to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, means the combined national territories of the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine.

Taken together, these two paragraphs allow the combined territory and population of Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine to be treated as a single entity for START Treaty purposes. Thus, for example, the requirement of paragraph 2 of Section H of the Inspection Protocol that inspectors and monitors be citizens of the Soviet Union means that they may be citizens of any of the four states. Similarly, when provisions of the Inspection Protocol require inspectors to leave the territory of the inspected Party (for example, at the conclusion of an inspection), U.S. inspectors would be required to depart from the collective territory of the four states.

Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article III of the Protocol clarify how certain rights of inspectors and monitors will be exercised. Paragraph 13 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol requires the inspected Party to provide inspectors with telephone communications to their embassy; paragraph 3 of this Protocol clarifies that, for inspection and continuous monitoring activities on the territory of Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine, this provision refers to the U.S. Embassy in the capital of the state in which the inspection is being conducted. Thus, for example, for inspections conducted in Byelarus, the obligation would be to provide telephonic communications with the U.S. Embassy in Minsk.

Similarly, Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol provides certain rights in connection with perimeter and portal continuous monitoring. For example, under paragraph 16 of Section XVI, the inspected Party is required to provide dedicated telephone lines to the embassy of the inspecting Party. Paragraphs 29 and 30 of Section XVI provide a right for periodic travel from the monitored facility to the Embassy of the inspecting Party and for periodic travel by members of an embassy's Treaty implementation unit to the monitored facility. Paragraph 4 of this Protocol clarifies that, for example, for monitoring conducted at Pavlograd in Ukraine, these rights are to be exercised with respect to the U.S. Embassy in Kiev.

Paragraph 5 of Article III of the Protocol specifies that the working languages for START Treaty purposes shall be English and Russian. This minimizes the burden on the United States in conducting inspections on the territory of the former Soviet Union. For example, inspection reports will be prepared in English and Russian, even for an inspection in Ukraine. Safety briefings required by paragraph 7 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol will be conducted in Russian, even for an inspection which takes place in Byelarus. The obligation in paragraph 28 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol to have at least two members of the inspection team who can speak the language of the inspected Party will be met by the United States by having two Russian speakers, even for an inspection which takes place in Kazakhstan. Implementing documentation prepared in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission will be prepared in two languages, not in five, even though five states are participating.

ARTICLE IV

Article IV of this Protocol alters the procedures established in the START Treaty for participation in the work of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) in order to take account of the fact that there will be five Parties to the START Treaty. The Article specifies that all four of the states assuming the obligations of the former Soviet Union will participate, but provides that the four states themselves shall determine the form of that participation.

ARTICLE V

Article V of this Protocol requires that Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of July 1, 1968,1 as non-nuclear-weapon States Parties "in the shortest possible time" and immediately begin to take appropriate steps toward this end. The phrase "in the shortest possible time" was used in the Protocol in lieu of a specific date when the three states would be required to become Parties to the NPT due to Ukrainian insistence that, because it has an independent Parliament, it could not guarantee when that Parliament would act to join the NPT. This phrase represents a commitment by the three states to act as fast as possible.

This Article is a central part, both politically and legally, of the solution to the problem of START ratification and implementation reflected in this Protocol. At one time, the Parties were considering a formula where only the United States and Russia would be Parties to the START Treaty, with Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine treated as basing countries. One reason prompting consideration of this formula was concern that making Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine Parties to START could imply that these three states had ownership and control of the nuclear weapons on their territory, contrary to the requirements of the NPT. Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, however, were concerned that a solution making Russia the only Party to START from among the stats emerging following the demise of the Soviet Union would not have given appropriate recognition to their independence and sovereignty.

This Protocol and the associated letters reconcile these two considerations by giving Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine equal standing with Russia under the START Treaty, while ensuring that their status as Parties does not impose any bar to their accession to the NPT status as non-nuclear-weapon States Parties. Specifically:

-- The reference in the preamble to single unified control of the strategic and nuclear forces of the former Soviet Union emphasizes that the Parties acknowledge the Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine do not have ownership or independent control over nuclear weapons. (The obligation of Russia to seek another state's agreement prior to Russia's use of nuclear weapons does not give that other state "control" of nuclear weapons for NPT purposes. Thus, participation in such a role by Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine in a single unified authority that controls the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union does not preclude their having a non-nuclear-weapon state status under the NPT.) In addition, the associated letters make it clear that the presence of strategic offensive arms on the territory of Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine is temporary. The mere presence of strategic offensive arms does not constitute ownership or control of nuclear weapons, and thus allows the three states to join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States Parties.

-- Finally, Article V of the Protocol makes it clear that the Parties do not regard adherence to the NPT as non-nuclearweapon States Parties by Byelarus, Kazakhstan, or Ukraine as inconsistent with their START status. On the contrary, this Article makes such adherence an integral part of their START obligations.

1 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London and Moscow July 1, 1968, entered into force March 5, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 7729 U.N.T.S. 162.

ARTICLE VI

Article VI of this Protocol consists of two paragraphs concerning the ratification of the START Treaty as well as the Protocol, and the duration of the Protocol.

Paragraph 1 of Article VI specifies that the Protocol, which is an amendment to the START Treaty, is subject to ratification, as is the Treaty. Paragraph 1 also specifies that each Party Will ratify the START Treaty and the Protocol. This provision serves both a political and a legal purpose. Politically, it stresses the sovereignty and equality of each of the four states that are assuming the obligations of the former Soviet Union. Legally, it makes it clear that each of these states will be a Party to the START Treaty.

Paragraph 1 also provides that the START Treaty and the Protocol will be ratified together, and that the START Treaty, of which the Protocol is an integral part, will enter into force when the instruments of ratification are exchanged. Similarly, paragraph 2 provides that the Protocol will remain in force throughout the duration of the START Treaty. Again, these provisions underscore that the Protocol is an integral part of the START treaty.

The final, unnumbered paragraph provides that the Protocol is signed by the Parties in five copies, each containing the Protocol's text in each of the five national languages of the Parties, and that all of the texts are equally authentic. This serves to stress the equality of the five signatories. This provision applies only to the Protocol; the working languages for the START Treaty are English and Russian, as specified in Article III of the Protocol.

Although the START Treaty was signed by the Presidents of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in 1991, it was decided to sign the Protocol at a meeting of the Secretary of State, the Foreign Ministers of Byelarus, Russia and Ukraine, and the State Counsellor for Strategic Affairs of Kazakhstan in Lisbon on May 23, 1992. These officials were duly authorized by their governments for this purpose.

Article-by-Article Analysis of the Letters Associated with the Protocol

Associated with the Protocols to the START Treaty are letters from the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Byelarus, from the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and from the President of Ukraine. Each letter is addressed to the President of the United States. Copies were formally transmitted by the signatories to the heads of state of all other Parties to the START Treaty. Each letter imposes legally binding obligations.

Although the letters vary somewhat in wording, in each case the signatories undertake an obligation to eliminate all nuclear weapons located on the territory of the particular state; in accordance with the procedures of the START Treaty, all strategic offensive arms located on the territory of the particular state; and to complete these two steps within seven years following the date of entry into force of the Treaty (the period of START reductions).

No new U.S. security assurances or guarantees are associated with any of these letters. In 1968, the United States made a declaration that it would seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide assistance to any non-nuclear-weapons State Party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty that was the victim of aggression or threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons were used. The Soviet Union and the United Kingdom made similar declarations. The United States has made it clear to Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine that we stand by this declaration, which will apply in full to these three states once they have adhered to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States Parties.

These obligations are in the form of letters for political reasons. During the negotiations, the three non-Russian states made it clear that, in order to preserve their equal status as sovereign State successors of the former Soviet Union with regard to the START Treaty, they could not support an outcome that singled out any state for special treatment in the Protocol itself. Having an obligation in the Protocol to eliminate all nuclear weapons and strategic offensive arms from the territories of Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, while allowing such weapons and arms to remain in Russia, would have, in the view of the non-Russian states, given the appearance of unequal treatment. Consequently, Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine agreed to be legally bound to eliminate such weapons and arms in separate letters from their respective heads of State.

Letter from the President of Ukraine

The letter from the President of Ukraine consists of four paragraphs. In the introductory paragraph, the phrase "Ukraine ... shall assume the following obligations" indicates that these are legally binding commitments. This is qualified by the statement that this letter is "in connection with the ratification" of the START Treaty. Thus, the obligations set forth in the letter are legally binding only in the event of ratification of the START Treaty.

The second paragraph of the Ukrainian letter obligates Ukraine to have a non-nuclear status as set forth in the October 24, 1991 statement of the Ukrainian Parliament. The "three non-nuclear principles" referred to are not to accept, not to produce, and not to acquire nuclear weapons; these principles appear in the July 16, 1990 declaration of the Ukrainian Parliament, and derive from Article II of the NPT. Article II of the NPT broadly states those principles as follows: not to receive nuclear weapons, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The "Verkhovna Rada" referred to in this paragraph is the Ukrainian Parliament.

Additional legal obligations undertaken by Ukraine are set forth in the first sentence of the third paragraph. These obligations have two elements. First, Ukraine is obliged to ensure the elimination of all nuclear weapons (i.e., nuclear explosive devices) located on its territory and all strategic offensive arms located on its territory. For strategic offensive arms, this obligation will be met either by physical elimination of the relevant arms or by transfer of such arms to Russia. If strategic offensive arms are to be physically eliminated, the obligation to eliminate such arms requires that they be eliminated using START procedures. As a practical matter, we expect that nuclear weapons will be transferred to and eliminated in Russia.

The obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons applies to, all such weapons physically located within Ukrainian territory. A similar obligation provides that all strategic offensive arms located on Ukrainian territory be eliminated in accordance with the START Treaty. START requires the destruction of silo launchers; it does not require the destruction of ballistic missiles, except as necessary to remain within numerical limits on non-deployed mobile ICBAU. The United States will discuss the details of the ultimate disposition of these ballistic missiles in the JCIC and as part of our response to the request from Ukraine (and other relevant states) for U.S. assistance in eliminating ballistic missiles on their territories. Transfer of such ballistic missiles beyond the confines of Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, or Ukraine is, in any case, prohibited by the START Treaty itself, in conjunction with the May 23, 1992 Protocol.

Second, Ukraine must conduct this elimination both "in accordance with its relevant agreements" and "during the seven year period of time as provided by the START Treaty" (i.e., the seven years allowed by the START Treaty for the Parties to reduce their strategic offensive arms to the levels established by the Treaty). This phrase is intended to make it clear that this letter does not supersede existing agreements (such as the December 30, 1991 "Agreement Between the Member-States of the Commonwealth of Independent States on Strategic Forces," which provides that "until their destruction in full, nuclear weapon located on the territory of Ukraine shall be under the control of the Combined Strategic Forces Command, with the aim that they not be used and be dismantled by the end of 1994.") We would like to see Ukraine honor this Agreement. Since the United States is not a party to these "relevant agreements," however, the letter includes an obligation to the United States, namely, that Ukraine complete the elimination of nuclear weapons and strategic offensive arms within seven years at the latest.

The second sentence of the third paragraph specifies that Ukraine will "take into account" Ukrainian national security interests in conducting "this activity" (i.e., the elimination of all nuclear weapons and strategic offensive arms). This sentence does not provide any relief from the obligations themselves undertaken by Ukraine in this letter. In the event that questions regarding its national security arise, Ukraine is obligated to consult with the other Parties to the Treaty.

The fourth paragraph of the Ukrainian letter expressed Ukraine's view that the elimination of nuclear weapons should be carried out in a manner that involves international oversight so that the nuclear components of the devices eliminated are not reused or exported. This paragraph is not legally binding in that it expresses the desire or belief of Ukraine. While Ukraine advocates the establishment of such a mechanism, its legal obligation is not conditional on the attainment of such a result.

Letter from the President of Kazakhstan

The letter from the President of Kazakhstan is dated May 19, 1992, and consists of two paragraphs. It is based on, although shorter than, the letter from Ukraine. A number of points inserted in the Ukrainian letter at the request of Ukraine were not considered necessary by Kazakhstan.

The introductory paragraph in the Kazakh letter is identical, with minor stylistic exceptions, to that in the Ukrainian letter. In this paragraph, the phrase "Kazakhstan undertakes the following obligations" indicates that these are legally binding commitments. This is qualified by the statement that this letter is "in connection with the ratification" of the START Treaty. Thus, the obligations set forth in the letter are legally binding only in the event of ratification of the START Treaty.

The second paragraph of the Kazakh letter obligates Kazakhstan to eliminate all nuclear weapons including strategic offensive arms located on its territory, and to do so within seven years. The obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons and strategic offensive arms is drawn from the Ukrainian letter and conveys an identical obligation to that undertaken by Ukraine. Unlike the Ukrainian letter, the Kazakh letter contains no reference to "relevant agreements," since no previous agreement to which Kazakhstan is a Party contains any obligation for elimination of nuclear weapons or strategic offensive arms located on Kazakh territory.

The Ukrainian letter obligated Ukraine to have a non-nuclear status as set forth in the October 24, 1991, statement of the Ukrainian Parliament. There is no comparable commitment in the Kazakh letter since, at the time the Kazakh letter was signed, the Parliament of Kazakhstan had made no comparable statement. By signing the Protocol, however, Kazakhstan obligates itself to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State Party and, thus, to have a non-nuclear status comparable to that of Ukraine.

Letter from Byelarus

The letter from the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Byelarus (who is the Byelarusian head of state) is dated May 20, 1992, and consists of five paragraphs plus a complimentary closing. Like the letter from Kazakhstan, the Byelarusian letter is based on the letter from Ukraine. A number of points inserted by Ukraine into its letter were not considered necessary by Byelarus. In addition, the language of the Byelarusian letter differs in some respects from that of the Ukrainian letter. However, the substantive result is the same on the matters of interest to the United States.

The introductory paragraph in the Byelarusian letter differs somewhat in phrasing from the Ukrainian letter, but is the same in substance. Each confirms that the commitments in the letters are legally binding obligations. The Byelarusian Delegation confirmed at the time of signature of the Protocol that this was the meaning and intent of the Byelarusian language, and Secretary of State Baker then formally stated that the United States was proceeding with signature of the Protocol that this was the meaning and intent of the Byelarusian language, and Secretary of State Baker then formally stated that the United States was proceeding with signature of the Protocol on the basis that the Byelarusian, Kazakh, and Ukrainian letters were all legally binding.

As with the Ukrainian and Kazakh letters, the legally binding nature of the Byelarusian letter is qualified by the statement that is letter is made in connection with the impending ratification of e START Treaty. Thus, the obligations set forth in the letter are legally binding only in the event of ratification of the START Treaty.

The second paragraph of the Byelarusian letter obligates Byelarus to achieve a non-nuclear status and notes that tactical nuclear weapons have already been removed. In addition, by signing the Protocol, Byelarus obligates itself to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State Party.

The third paragraph of the Byelarusian letter obligates Byelarus to eliminate "nuclear strategic offensive arms" located on its territory, and to do so within seven years. Although phrased slightly differently than the Ukrainian letter, which uses the words "nuclear weapons, including strategic offensive arms," the obligation is drawn from the Ukrainian letter and, with one exception, conveys an identical obligation to that undertaken by Ukraine. Unlike the Ukrainian letter, the Byelarusian letter qualifies its obligation by providing that the Russian Federation must be prepared to receive the nuclear strategic offensive arms removed from Byelarus; the only strategic offensive arms based in Byelarus are road-mobile SS-25 ICBMs.

The fourth paragraph specifies that "this activity" (i.e. the elimination of nuclear strategic offensive arms) shall be conducted "with due accounts" of Byelarusian national security interests. This paragraph does not provide any relief from the obligations undertaken by Byelarus in this letter.

In the event that questions regarding its national security arise, Byelarus is obligated to consult with the other Parties to the Treaty.

The fifth paragraph of the Byelarusian letter expresses Byelarus' view that the elimination of nuclear weapons should be carried out in a manner that involves international oversight. While in this paragraph Byelarus expresses its desire for the establishment of such a mechanism, legal obligations that Byelarus undertakes in this letter are not conditional on attaining such a mechanism.

[Part 3: ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE RELATED AGREEMENTS STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE RELATED AGREEMENTS]