Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance

[START Treaty Signed July 31, 1991]

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE TREATY TEXT

The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ( START Treaty") consists of the main Treaty text and nine associated documents:

-- the Annex on Agreed Statements ("Agreed Statements Annex");

-- the Annex on Terms and Their Definitions ( "Definitions Annex");

-- the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms; ( "Conversion or Elimination Protocol");

the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Related to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with 12 annexes, ( "Inspection Protocol");

the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms; ( "Notification Protocol");

the Protocol on ICBM and SLBM Throw-weight Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ( "Throw-weight Protocol");

the Protocol on Telemetric Information Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ( "Telemetry Protocol");

the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (" Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) Protocol"); and

the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with 10 annexes ("Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)").

All Protocols, Annexes and the Memorandum of Understanding are integral parts of the Treaty.

Associated with the START Treaty are four related, separate agreements signed by the U.S. Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister. The first three separate agreements, all signed in Moscow on July 31, 1991, include:

The Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Agreement on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms.")

This Agreement will allow extensive exhibitions to confirm the technical characteristics specified in the Memorandum of Understanding for existing ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, mobile launchers of ICBMs, and long-range nuclear ALCMs required under the Treaty to take place prior to entry into force of the Treaty

The Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics On the Early Exchange of Lists of Inspectors, Monitors and Aircrew Members Proposed for Inspection and Continuous Monitoring Activities Conducted Pursuant to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ( Agreement on the Proposed for Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities.")

This Agreement will allow the Parties to exchange and approve the lists of inspectors and monitors before entry into force of the Treaty and thus allow inspections and continuous monitoring to begin promptly upon entry into force of the Treaty.

The Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ( "Agreement on Exchange of Coordinates and Site Diagrams").

This Agreement provides a listing of geographic coordinates of facilities subject to the Treaty and includes the site diagrams. This Agreement is classified and will not be released to the public.

The fourth separate agreement, signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming on September 23, 1989, is:

This Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercise ("Agreement on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises"). This Agreement provides for the advance notification of one major strategic forces exercise that includes the participation of heavy bomber aircraft to be held during each calendar year.

Also associated with the START Treaty are seven legally binding letters, each of which has the status of an executive agreement. Each of these letters was signed by the Heads of Delegation in Moscow on either July 30 or 31, 1991. They include:

An obligation to eliminate at least 22 Soviet heavy ICBM launchers each year during the seven-year reduction period.

Detailed provisions for verifying that silo launch control centers are not converted into silo launchers.

Detailed provisions to provide confidence that the B-1 bomber is not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

An obligation to provide photographs of certain equipment before Treaty signature and a list of the photographs of strategic offensive arms to be provided at and after Treaty signature.

Procedures to deal with expended mobile ICBM launch canisters to help verify that they do not contain ICBMs.

Provisions for dealing with the Soviet naval airplane designated Bear D (Soviet designation TU-95RTs). The 37 existing Bear D airplanes will not be covered by the Treaty. The letters provide Soviet assurances, verified by exhibitions, that they are equipped exclusively for maritime operations; the letters also place basing restrictions on the airplane.

An obligation to provide certain engineering data before Treaty entry into force in order to facilitate establishment of continuous monitoring sites soon after Treaty signature.

There are also a variety of supporting documents related to the Treaty. These include certain correspondence between Ministers on the topics of third-country basing, long-range ALCMs with multiple nuclear warheads, the Tacit Rainbow system, and the relocation of heavy ICBM silos. The supporting documents also include 12 joint statements and 20 other statements made by the Parties. Most of these statements were made at the final plenary meeting of the START Delegations, on July 29, 1991, in Geneva, but the fact that a statement was or was not made at the final plenary does not have any particular significance. The texts of the various statements and correspondence specified above are included herein, and all are analyzed in this analysis.

Finally, also included are two independent, politically binding declarations made by the Parties, one concerning the TU-22 Backfire bomber and the other concerning the planned deployment of long-range nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). The texts of these declarations and an analysis of them are attached.

TITLE AND PREAMBLE

The title of the Treaty is the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms." The phrase reduction and limitation" is significant because the Treaty reduces, and does not merely limit, strategic offensive arms.

The term "strategic offensive arms" is undefined. "Strategic" indicates that, in general, the forces covered are those of intercontinental range, in contrast to shorter-range and intermediate-range weapons which are covered by the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range missiles (INF Treaty)1. During the negotiations the United States rejected proposals by the Soviet Union to treat so-called forward-based systems" (e.g., aircraft based in Europe or on aircraft carriers) as strategic offensive arms. As a result, the Parties agreed not to include constraints on such systems in the Treaty. Offensive" is in contrast to defensive strategic arms, such as anti-ballistic missile systems.

The Preamble serves as an introduction to the Treaty and sets forth the intentions of the Parties in broad terms. The first line of the Preamble sets forth and defines the Parties" to the Treaty, that is, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The next three paragraphs of the Preamble state the Parties' considerations upon entering into the Treaty. These paragraphs state first, that the Parties are conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all humanity. They also state, drawing from a statement by former President Reagan, that such a war cannot be won and must never be fought. Furthermore, these paragraphs state that the Parties are convinced that the measures for the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and the other obligations set forth in the Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen international peace and security, and that the Parties recognize that their interests and the interests of international security require the strengthening of strategic stability.

The final preambular paragraph makes reference to three other commitments of the Parties with regard to strategic offensive arms. These references include, first, Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of July 1, 19682; which provides, in part, that the NPT Parties undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date.

The second reference is to Article XI of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 19723; in that Article the United States and Soviet Union undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms. Note that this is the only direct reference in the START Treaty to the ABM Treaty, and it refers only to Article XI, which is the portion of the ABM Treaty concerned with continued negotiations on strategic offensive arms.

The third reference is to the Washington Summit Joint Statement of June 1, 1990, which includes a joint statement on future negotiations on nuclear and space arms and on further enhancing strategic stability.

Article I

Article I sets forth the general undertaking by each Party to reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, and to carry out the other obligations set forth in the Treaty and its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding. Provisions that are comparable to Article I are found in paragraph 1 of Article I of the ABM Treaty and Article I of the INF Treaty. Note that Article XVII of the START Treaty provides that the Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding are integral parts of the Treaty.

Although the Parties did not agree on a definition of the term "strategic offensive arms," they overcame any need for such a definition by listing the specific types of systems to be limited and by defining those systems so as to capture their modernized replacements. As a practical matter, the strategic offensive arms" constrained by the Treaty are nuclear-capable. If a non-nuclear arm were to fall within a definition established by the Treaty, however, it would be captured. For example, if an ICBM or SLBM were to have a non-nuclear rather than nuclear warhead, it would still be an ICBM or SLBM for purposes of the Treaty.

Regarding "new kinds" of weapons systems, the Parties understand that new kinds of nuclear arms that are comparable to strategic offensive arms would be subject to the Treaty, even though, as new kinds," such arms would not fall within any existing definition established by the Treaty. The Parties did not reach agreement, however, on the applicability of the Treaty to future non-nuclear systems. During the negotiations, the United States stated its view that a future non-nuclear system could not be considered a new kind of strategic offensive arm and, thus, would not be subject to the Treaty. The Soviet Union did not accept this view.

The Parties agreed, in the Second Agreed Statement, that, if "new kinds" of arms emerge in the future and if the Parties disagree about whether they are strategic offensive arms, then such arms would be subject to discussion in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Of course, if one Party deploys a new kind of arm that it asserts is not subject to the Treaty, and the other Party challenges this assertion, the deploying Party would be obligated to attempt to resolve the issue. There is, however, no obligation to delay deployment pending such resolution. (See the discussion of new kinds of strategic offensive arms in the analysis of the Article XV of the Treaty and the Second Agreed Statement.)

ARTICLE II

Article II consists of three paragraphs setting forth the central numerical limits of the Treaty. It specifies the numbers of deployed offensive delivery systems and accountable heavy bomber and ballistic missile warheads allowed to each Party at the end of each of the three phases of the reduction period. It also specifies the aggregate throw-weight of deployed ballistic missiles allowed to each Party at the end of the reduction period.

Paragraph 1 of Article II sets forth the limits that will be reached following the seven-year period of reductions. It provides the following limits, as counted in accordance with Article III of the Treaty:

(a) a total of 1600 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and their associated launchers, deployed submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers. This limit is sometimes referred to as a limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles," SNDVs," deployed strategic offensive systems," or strategic delivery vehicles," although none of those terms is used in the Treaty.

(b) 154 deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers. As a practical matter, this limit applies only to the Soviet Union, since the United States has no heavy ICBMs, and the deployment of new types of heavy ICBMs is prohibited by paragraph 2 of Article V.

(c) a total of 6000 warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers. Within this total of 6000, there are sublimits of:

(i) 4900 warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs;

(ii) 1100 warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs on mobile launchers of ICBMs;

(iii) 1540 warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs.

Note that Article II cross-references Article III; this is significant because that Article, as is discussed below, provides the rules for how the arms subject to reduction and limitation are to be counted. The definitions of these arms are found in the Definitions Annex. Note also that warhead" is not a physical object, but a unit of account under the Treaty. (See analysis of paragraph 4 of Article III, below.)

Due to these counting rules and the fact that the Soviets, because of their larger forces, generally must make greater reductions under the Treaty, no single percentage value can give an accurate representation of the reductions that are required by the Treaty. An examination of percentage reductions is best done on a category-by-category basis.

The following data from the Memorandum of Understanding, based on the agreed Treaty counting rules, are effective as of September 1, 1990, and will be updated 30 days after the Treaty enters into force:

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United States

Soviet Union

Delivery Vehicles

2,246

2,500

Warheads

10,563

10,271

Ballistic Missile Warheads

8,210

9,416

Heavy ICBMs/Warheads

None

308/3080

Throw-weight (metric tons)

2,361.3

6,626.3

As a result of the Treaty, the above values will be reduced by the following percentages:

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United States

Soviet Union

Delivery Vehicles

29 percent

36 percent

Warheads

43 percent

42 percent

Ballistic Missile Warheads

40 percent

48 percent

Heavy ICBMs/Warheads

None

50 percent

Throw-weight (metric tons)

None

46 percent

The table above refers to accountable warheads and accountable ballistic missile warheads. Due to START warhead accountability rules for heavy bombers and ballistic missiles, the actual number of weapons deployed will be different. As regards throw-weight, each Party is limited to 3600 metric tons of throw-weight in paragraph 3 of Article II.

The Treaty prohibits the Parties from producing, flight-testing, or deploying an ICBM or SLBM with more than the number of warheads that are attributed to it; however, in certain cases the attributed number of warheads may be greater than the number actually deployed. (See the discussion of subparagraphs 4(b) and 4(d) of Article III, below). Conversely, because the Treaty's counting rules have the effect of discounting" bomber weapons, the number of heavy bomber weapons actually deployed almost certainly will be higher than the attributed number.

Paragraph 2 of Article II sets forth the three phases whereby the levels listed in paragraph 1 are to be reached. The first phase ends 36 months after entry into force; the second phase ends 60 months after entry into force; while the final levels (those specified in paragraph 1 of this Article) must be attained no later than 7 years (84 months) after entry into force of the Treaty.

Intermediate levels to be achieved at the end of each of the first two phases are provided for total delivery vehicles, for total warheads, and for total ballistic missile warheads. No intermediate levels are provided for ballistic missile warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs on mobile launchers of ICBMs, since neither Party exceeded the ultimate limit at the time of Treaty signature.

Although no intermediate levels are provided for in the Treaty for deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers or for ballistic missile warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs, the phasing of reductions of deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers is provided for in an exchange of letters dated July 30, 1991. These letters, signed by the U.S. and Soviet Heads of Delegation, specify that the deployed heavy ICBMs of the Soviet Union and their associated launchers shall be reduced by no less than 22 each year until the 154 limit is reached. In addition, the letters specify that the reduction of heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers will be through elimination, not conversion. In a separate letter signed on July 31, 1991, Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh confirmed that the Soviet commitments on the phasing of reductions of heavy ICBMs are legally binding. It should be understood that certain other letters in which agreements were made concerning the START Treaty are also legally binding. The reason that a separate letter was needed to confirm this for the Soviet commitment on the phasing of heavy ICBM reductions is that the language of the commitment, which had been negotiated earlier than those other letters, was ambiguous as to whether the commitment was in fact legally binding.

Paragraph 3 of Article II limits the aggregate throw-weight of each Party's deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs. This limit provides that seven years after entry into force of the Treaty, and thereafter, such aggregate throw-weight may not exceed 3600 metric tons (a metric ton is 1000 kilograms). This level would reflect a reduction to approximately 54 percent of the current Soviet level. There are no intermediate limits on aggregate throw-weight during the seven-year reductions period.

ARTICLE III

Article III consists of ten paragraphs that describe how to count the launchers, ballistic missiles, bombers, and warheads that are subject to the Treaty limits set forth in Article II. It establishes when newly-constructed strategic offensive arms become subject to the Treaty. Article III also lists the types of strategic offensive arms that are considered to be existing types as of Treaty signature, and provides limits for reducing the number of warheads on missiles (sometimes referred to as downloading").

Paragraph 1 of Article III provides one of the most fundamental counting rules. It states that each deployed ICBM and its associated launcher shall be counted as one unit, that each deployed SLBM and its associated launcher shall be counted as one unit, and that each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one unit. This rule is the foundation upon which subsequent counting rules operate.

Paragraph 2 of Article III sets forth the rules for counting deployed missiles and launchers. Subparagraph 2(a) states that, for the purposes of counting deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and their associated launchers, each deployed launcher of an ICBM or SLBM shall be considered to contain one deployed ICBM or one deployed SLBM, respectively. This means that when a Party observes a deployed launcher of an ICBM or SLBM of the other Party, the launcher is considered, for counting purposes, to contain a deployed ICBM or SLBM, respectively, even if the missile has been removed from the launcher.

Subparagraph 2(b) of Article III provides a rule to avoid a situation where an ICBM is double-counted as both a deployed and a non-deployed missile while removed from its launcher. Since, under subparagraph (a), the launcher is assumed to contain an ICBM, under subparagraph (b), if a deployed ICBM has been removed from its launcher and another missile has not been installed in that launcher, the ICBM that has been removed from the launcher continues to be considered to be contained in that launcher, provided it is located at that ICBM base. Thus, the combined effect of subparagraphs (a) and (b) is that a Party is precluded from claiming that deployed ICBM launchers should not count as containing an ICBM because they are empty, but at the same time an ICBM that has been removed will not be double counted.

Subparagraph 2(c) of Article III provides a similar rule for a deployed SLBM removed from its launcher. If a deployed SLBM has been removed from its launcher and another missile has not been installed in that launcher, such an SLBM removed from its launcher shall be considered to be contained in that launcher. Subparagraph (c) also contains a locational restriction on such an SLBM removed from its launcher. Such an SLBM may be located only at a facility at which non-deployed SLBMs may be located, as listed in subparagraph 9(a) of Article IV of the Treaty, or be in movement to such a facility.

Paragraph 3 of Article III provides the counting rules for ICBMs, SLBMs, and launch canisters. The rules reflect the fact that, for maintenance, storage, and transportation, some missiles are found in stages, others as assembled missiles without launch canisters, and others as assembled missiles in launch canisters. The Twenty-eighth Agreed Statement, in the Agreed Statements Annex, provides locational restrictions on canisterized ICBMs outside of their launch canisters, and on the first stages of ICBMs and SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles (with or without launch canisters).

Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 3 provides that, for ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type shall be considered to be, for counting purposes, an ICBM or SLBM of that type. Subparagraph (b) provides that, for ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type. Subparagraph (c) provides that, for ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type, in its launch canister, shall be considered to be an ICBM of that type. For the United States, all existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs are considered to be maintained, stored, and transported in stages. For the Soviet Union, all existing types of ICBMs are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, except for the SS-13, which is maintained, stored, and transported in stages. For the Soviet Union, all existing types of SLBMs are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters. (The Soviet SS-N-6 SLBM has only one stage.)

Subparagraph (d) of paragraph 3 provides a counting rule for launch canisters of ICBMs. It provides that each launch canister shall be considered to contain an ICBM from the time it first leaves a facility at which an ICBM is installed in it, until an ICBM has been launched from it or until an ICBM has been removed from it for elimination. It also provides an exception, in that a launch canister shall not be considered to contain an ICBM if it contains a training model of a missile or if it has been placed on static display. Note that training models of missiles are not subject to the same locational restrictions as actual missiles i.e., there is no requirement that they be located only at declared facilities. This raises the possibility that a Party might observe, through national technical means, a launch canister containing a training model of a missile at an undeclared facility. This could lead to compliance concerns, since a Party cannot discriminate by national technical means between canisters with real missiles and canisters with training missiles. Such a situation could be raised in the JCIC. The Party possessing the missile would be expected to make efforts (which could include offering a special access visit) to demonstrate that the canister did not contain a real missile. Note that the definition of a training model of a missile requires that such a missile differ from a real one on the basis of functional and external differences visible during inspections.

Note finally, that subparagraph (d) of paragraph 3 provides a distinguishability rule, by requiring that launch canisters for ICBMs of a particular type shall be distinguishable from launch canisters for ICBMs of a different type. (See the discussion of the term "distinguishable" in the analysis of the Definitions Annex.) Also, subparagraph 13(b)(iii) of Section XIV of the Inspection Protocol obligates the inspected Party to demonstrate, in certain circumstances, that the launch of a mobile ICBM of a new type cannot be carried out from a launch canister for a mobile ICBM of an existing or previously declared new type, and vice versa.

Subparagraphs (c) and (d) reflect Soviet elevation to the level of a fundamental principle the association of a launch canister with its missile. Throughout the negotiations, Soviet negotiators insisted that the launch canister was an inseparable part of an ICBM; they based their negotiating position in a number of areas on this principle. Consequently, the provisions on launch canisters throughout the Treaty and its associated documents were crafted as a compromise between the U.S. desire for effective verification and the Soviet insistence that this principle be preserved.

Paragraph 4 of Article III sets forth rules to be used for the purposes of counting warheads. The term warhead" is used as the unit of account for the purpose of the 6000 limit in subparagraph 1(b) of Article II, whereas the term reentry vehicle" is used elsewhere in the Treaty text to describe the physical object carried by a missile. Each of these terms is defined in the Definitions Annex. Also note that this paragraph is written in terms of attributing" a certain number of warheads to a missile or heavy bomber; it is the number attributed that counts for purposes of Treaty ceilings.

Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 4 provides that the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of each existing type shall be the number specified in the Memorandum of Understanding. This means that the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of existing types (i.e., those types deployed at the time of Treaty signature) is established, and will not need to be further calculated. All warhead attributions for existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs were agreed in the Joint Summit Statement of December 1987, except for the attribution for the SS-N-18 SLBM of the Soviet Union, which, by agreement, was subsequently changed, as is explained in the analysis of subparagraph 5(c) below. By signing the Memorandum of Understanding, the Parties have agreed on the number of warheads that will be attributed to each existing type of ICBM or SLBM. (This agreement is stated in the first unnumbered paragraph in the text above the signature block of the Memorandum of Understanding, and it is discussed in the analysis of that Memorandum.) Note that the Parties have a limited right to "download" or reduce the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs, and are prohibited from increasing the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs. This is discussed below in the analysis of paragraph 5 of Article III and paragraph 12 of Article V, respectively.

Since the number of warheads to be attributed to new types of ICBMs and SLBMs (that is, types of ICBMs and SLBMs that come into existence after Treaty signature) cannot be stipulated now, rules have been agreed for attributing warheads to such types if and when they are created over the life of the Treaty. Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 4 states that the number of warheads that will be attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type shall be the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM of that type has been flight-tested. Subparagraph (b) also contains a rule for warhead attribution for the case in which a Party deploys an ICBM or SLBM of a new type that has been tested with a certain number of warheads but that is capable of carrying more. This rule provides that the number of warheads that will be attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with a front section of an existing design with multiple reentry vehicles (regardless of whether they are independently targetable), or to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with one reentry vehicle, shall be no less than the nearest integer that is smaller than the result of dividing 40 percent of the accountable throw-weight of the ICBM or SLBM by the weight of the lightest reentry vehicle flight-tested on an ICBM or SLBM of that type. This is often referred to informally as the 40 percent rule". (For example, in the hypothetical case of a new type of ICBM with accountable throw-weight of 1100 kilograms, for which the lightest reentry vehicle flight-tested weighed 100 kilograms, the minimum number of warheads attributed would be determined by dividing 100 into 40 percent of 1100. The result would be rounded down to the next lower integer, or 4.) The purpose of the 40 percent rule" is to prevent a side from attributing an unrealistically low number of warheads to a new type of ballistic missile by significantly under-demonstrating its reentry vehicle-carrying capability. For modern ICBM and SLBM designs, roughly half of the missile's throw-weight capability is used for reentry vehicles. The rest is used for fuel, the self-contained dispensing mechanism, guidance devices, and other items. Since some inefficient Soviet missile designs may result in their being able to use less than half their throw-weight for reentry vehicles, the Soviet Union insisted that the Treaty use 40 percent to avoid any possibility of over-attributing warheads.

In the case of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with a front section of a fundamentally new design that carries multiple reentry vehicles, the question of the applicability of the 40 percent rule" to such an ICBM or SLBM shall be subject to agreement within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

In order to avoid a situation in which an ICBM or SLBM of a new type can exist, even temporarily, without an attribution, subparagraph (b) of paragraph 4 also provides that until agreement has been reached regarding the counting rule that will apply to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with a front section of a fundamentally new design, the number of warheads that will be attributed to such an ICBM or SLBM shall be the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM of that type has been flight-tested. This subparagraph also stipulates that the number of new types of ICBMs or SLBMs with a front section of a fundamentally new design shall not exceed two for each Party as long as the Treaty remains in force.

In this regard, it should be noted that the Twenty-fourth Agreed Statement, in the Agreed Statements Annex, provides clarification of what is meant by a front section of a fundamentally new design." Such a front section would not have the essential features that are characteristic of any existing design of a front section with multiple reentry vehicles that has been deployed or tested on any ICBM or SLBM as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty. (See the analysis of Agreed Statement 24 below.)

Subparagraph (c) of paragraph 4 provides the rule that the number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM has been flight-tested shall be considered to be the sum of the number of reentry vehicles actually released during the flight test, plus the number of procedures for dispensing reentry vehicles performed during that same flight test when no reentry vehicle was released. This means that even if no reentry vehicles were actually released, the number of reentry vehicles with which that ICBM or SLBM shall be considered to have been flight-tested shall be equal to the number of such procedures. This rule does not apply to procedures for dispensing penetration aids, provided that the procedure for dispensing penetration aids differs from a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles.

Subparagraph (d) of paragraph 4 provides that each reentry vehicle of an ICBM or SLBM shall be considered to be one warhead. Thus, a reentry vehicle," used to describe the physical object, always counts as a warhead," which is the unit of account. The terms are not equivalent, however, because under rules such as that of subparagraphs (b) and (c) of this paragraph, more warheads may be attributed to an ICBM or SLBM than there are reentry vehicles actually on the ICBM or SLBM. It should also be noted that the Third Agreed Statement, in the Agreed Statements Annex, provides an exception to subparagraph 4(d) for the SS-11 ICBMs of the Soviet Union. The SS-11 is the only existing type of ICBM or SLBM of either Party that is equipped with multiple reentry vehicles that are not independently targetable. Some SS-11 ICBMs are deployed with three such reentry vehicles. But, in light of the fact that the three reentry vehicles cannot be independently targeted, an SS-11 is only attributed with one warhead for purposes of the limits in Article II. If a Party develops a new type of ICBM or SLBM that is equipped with multiple reentry vehicles that are not independently targetable, however, it will be attributed with warheads in accordance with subparagraphs 4(b), 4(c), and 4(d) of Article III.

Subparagraphs (e) and (f) of paragraph 4 provide the counting rules for heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs of the U.S. and U.S.S.R., respectively. The different limits that are applicable to each Party reflect the differing practices of the sides and compromises that were reached in the course of the negotiations.

Subparagraph (e) provides that, for the U.S., each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, up to a total of 150, shall be attributed with ten warheads. Each U.S. heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 150 such bombers shall be attributed with a number of warheads equal to the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of the same type and variant is actually equipped. Taken together, these two provisions mean that 150 U.S. heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will count at ten warheads each, regardless of the number of such ALCMs with which they are equipped, while such bombers in excess of 150 count as having a number of warheads equal to the maximum number of such ALCMs for which that type/variant has actually been equipped. (For example, any B-52G declared to be over the 150 threshold would count as 12 warheads. On the other hand, because some B-52Hs are equipped for 12 long-range nuclear ALCMs and some for 20, any B-52H over the 150 threshold will be attributed with 20 warheads. If the United States declared separate variants of what is now declared simply as B-52H equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, such separate variants over the 150 threshold would then count as 12 or 20 warheads, respectively.)

Subparagraph (e) also provides that the U.S. will specify the heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs that are in excess of 150 such heavy bombers by number, type, variant, and the air bases at which they are based. The as equipped" rule for U.S. heavy bombers in excess of 150 is a compromise intended to ameliorate Soviet concerns that the basic heavy bomber warhead attribution rule undercounts the actual number of long-range nuclear ALCMs carried by a heavy bomber. It should also be noted that in paragraph 20 of Article V of the Treaty, the United States is limited to no more than 20 long-range nuclear ALCMs on an existing or future heavy bomber.

Subparagraph (f) of paragraph 4 sets forth the counting rules for heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs of the Soviet Union. It states that each such heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, up to a total of 180 such heavy bombers, shall be attributed with eight warheads. This is in contrast to the attribution of 10 warheads to each U.S. heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. This difference is due to the fact that Soviet heavy bombers are equipped to carry fewer long-range nuclear ALCMs than U.S. heavy bombers. Subparagraph (f) also provides rules for heavy bombers of the Soviet Union in excess of these 180 bombers. It provides that each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 180 such heavy bombers shall be attributed with a number of warheads equal to the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of that type/variant is actually equipped. Subparagraph (f) requires the Soviet Union to specify its heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs that are in excess of 180 such heavy bombers by number, type, variant, and the air bases at which they are based. It should also be noted that in paragraph 21 of Article V, the Soviet Union is limited to 16 long-range nuclear ALCMs on an existing or future heavy bomber. (Note that the U.S. limit of 20 long-range nuclear ALCMs on 150 existing and future heavy bombers and the Soviet limit of 16 long-range nuclear ALCMs on 180 existing and future heavy bombers result in a roughly comparable number of potentially unaccountable warheads on heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs: 1500 for the United States and 1440 for the Soviet Union.)

Subparagraph (g), the final subparagraph of paragraph 4, addresses "categories" of heavy bombers. (A term defined in the Definitions Annex.) Subparagraph (g) provides that for each Party, each heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be attributed with one warhead. With specified exceptions, subparagraph (g) also provides that all heavy bombers not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be considered to be heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. Thus, the general rule is that heavy bombers will be counted under the Treaty, either as being equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs and having a number of warheads attributed pursuant to the other subparagraphs of paragraph 4, or as being equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs and being attributed with one warhead. The specified exceptions to this general rule, are for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, test heavy bombers, and training heavy bombers. Also, note that former heavy bombers" are not considered to be heavy bombers" and do not count under the central limits. Former heavy bombers are reconnaissance, tanker, or jamming airplanes converted from heavy bombers or initially constructed on the basis of the airframe of an existing heavy bomber. They must not be equipped for air-to-surface armaments.

Paragraph 5 of Article III limits the extent to which a Party can "download" or reduce the number of warheads attributed to its ICBMs and SLBMs of existing types. (No downloading is permitted on new types of ICBMs or SLBMs.) It provides that each Party has the right to be credited with such reductions up to an aggregate number of 1250 at any one time. Subparagraph (a) provides that the 1250 aggregate shall consist, for the United States of America, of the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to the Minuteman III, plus the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of no more than two other existing types. Subparagraph (a) also provides that the 1250 aggregate shall consist, for the Soviet Union, of four multiplied by the number of deployed SLBMs of the SS-N-18 type, plus the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of no more than two other existing types.

As regards the SS-N-18, it should be understood that the United States and the Soviet Union had attributed seven warheads to this missile in the Washington Summit Joint Statement of December 1987. In late 1990, representatives of the Soviet Union stated that they had reduced all SS-N-18s to three warheads and had destroyed all the reentry vehicle platforms for the SS-N-18 that were designed to hold seven reentry vehicles. In addition, in a December 30, 1990, letter from Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to Secretary of State Baker, the Soviet Union offered the explicit assurance that it had retired front ends for the SS-N-18 SLBM with seven reentry vehicles, that the stockpile of such front ends had been destroyed entirely, that the Soviet Union no longer produced and did not intend to produce such front ends, and that all SS-N-18s are equipped with front ends that carry three reentry vehicles and that are designed so that carrying more than three reentry vehicles would be impossible. As part of the overall agreement on downloading, the Parties thereafter agreed to handle the SS-N-18 as a special case. It is attributed with three warheads in the Memorandum of Understanding, which means that it is already listed at the reduced level of warheads for purposes of the Treaty. But the four warheads that have already been reduced on the SS-N-18 count as part of the Soviet Union's 1250 permitted downloading" aggregate, which is why subparagraph 5(a) provides that the 1250 limit will consist, in part, for the Soviet Union, of four times the number of deployed SLBMs of the SS-N-18 type. The Soviet Union is not permitted to take further credit for additional downloading" the SS-N-18, since part (ii) of subparagraph (a) is explicit that downloading is permitted only on two other" existing types.

Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 5 provides three rules for reductions in the number of warheads attributed to Minuteman III ICBM. First, Minuteman III ICBMs to which different numbers of warheads are attributed shall not be deployed at the same ICBM base. Second, any such reductions shall be carried out no later than seven years after entry into force of this Treaty. Third, the reentry vehicle platform of each Minuteman III ICBM to which a reduced number of warheads is attributed shall be destroyed and replaced by a new reentry vehicle platform. (See the analysis of subparagraph 5(c) of this Article for a discussion of the phrase reentry vehicle platform.")

Subparagraph (c) of paragraph 5 provides six rules for reductions in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of types other than Minuteman III, that are to be applied to downloading after entry into force. Since the downloading of the Minuteman III has not yet occurred, the phrase other than the Minuteman III" is necessary. Because the Soviets have said that the downloading of the SS-N-18 has already occurred, no comparable phrase is necessary for that missile. Nevertheless, these rules would never be applied to the SS-N-18, since, as is explained above, subparagraph 5(a)(ii) prohibits further downloading of the SS-N-18.

The first rule of subparagraph (c) of paragraph 5 is that the additional reductions shall not exceed 500 warheads at any one time for each Party. This is a rolling" aggregate, meaning that if ICBMs or SLBMs of two existing types (other than Minuteman III or SS-N-18) that a Party has downloaded to make up all or part of the 500 limit are removed from accountability under the central numerical limits, then additional ICBMs or SLBMs of those two existing types can be downloaded up to the 500 limit, provided that all the other limitations of paragraph 5 are met. The second rule of subparagraph (c) of paragraph 5 is that, after a Party has reduced the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs or SLBMs of two existing types, that Party shall not have the right to reduce the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs or SLBMs of any additional type. Third, the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM shall be reduced by no more than four below the number attributed as of the date of signature of this Treaty.

The fourth rule of subparagraph (c) of paragraph 5 is that ICBMs of the same type, but to which different numbers of warheads are attributed, shall not be deployed at the same ICBM base. Fifth, SLBMs of the same type, but to which different numbers of warheads are attributed, shall not be deployed on submarines based at submarine bases adjacent to the waters of the same ocean. This means, for example, that if the Soviet Union reduces the number of warheads attributed to its SS-N-23 SLBMs, all such SLBMs must be downloaded because they are deployed at bases adjacent to one ocean. If SS-N-23s were deployed at bases adjacent to two oceans, then the Soviets could download a portion of the force. But all downloaded SS-N-23s would have to be based adjacent to one ocean. The sixth and final rule of subparagraph (c) of paragraph 5 is that, if the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type is reduced by more than two, the reentry vehicle platform of each ICBM or SLBM to which such a reduced number of warheads is attributed shall be destroyed and replaced by a new reentry vehicle platform. The phrase reentry vehicle platform" is not defined in the Treaty nor was any attempt made during the negotiations to reach any more detailed understanding of exactly what needed to be destroyed. As a result, each Party is free to determine exactly what to destroy, taking into account the design of the specific ICBM or SLBM to be downloaded. There are no verification measures associated with the destruction of reentry vehicle platforms.

Subparagraph (d) of paragraph 5 provides that a Party shall not have the right to deploy ICBMs of a new type to which is attributed a number of warheads greater than the smallest number of warheads attributed to any ICBM to which that Party has attributed a reduced number of warheads pursuant to subparagraph (c) of paragraph 5. A Party shall not have the right to deploy SLBMs of a new type to which is attributed a number of warheads greater than the smallest number of warheads attributed to any SLBM to which that Party has attributed a reduced number of warheads pursuant to subparagraph (c) of paragraph 5. This subparagraph would thus constrain the number of warheads on future ICBMs or SLBMs of new types should a Party reduce the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of an existing type. It means, for example, that if a Party downloaded an existing type of ICBM so that it was attributed with six warheads, that Party could not deploy any new type of ICBM to which more than six warheads are attributed. A similar ceiling would apply for future types of SLBMs if an existing SLBM were downloaded. Because these ICBM and SLBM warhead ceilings apply only to downloading carried out pursuant to subparagraph (c), the warheads with which the Minuteman III and SS-N-18 are attributed are not relevant to these ceilings.

Paragraph 6 of Article III sets forth the initial accountability" provisions, which stipulate when newly constructed strategic offensive arms shall begin to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty. Note that Section VII of the Notification Protocol requires notification of strategic offensive arms of new types. The phrase subject to limitation" is used in paragraph 6 to mean that once a strategic offensive arm that is in process of being constructed reaches a certain step in this process, it will begin to be subject to numerical and other restrictions on that type of arm. Subparagraph (a) provides that an ICBM will be subject to limitation when it first leaves a production facility. Subparagraph (b) provides that a mobile launcher of ICBMs will be subject to limitation when it first leaves a production facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Subparagraph (c) provides that a silo launcher of ICBMs will be subject to limitation when both the excavation for that launcher and the pouring of concrete for the silo have been completed, or 12 months after the excavation begins, whichever occurs earlier. The Parties understand that the term excavation begins" means the time when ground is first broken.

Subparagraph (d) of paragraph 6 provides that a silo launcher of ICBMs will be subject to limitation, for the purpose of limits on deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, by being considered to contain a deployed ICBM when both excavation for that launcher and the pouring of concrete for the silo have been completed, or 12 months after the excavation begins, whichever occurs earlier. Subparagraph (d) also provides that a mobile launcher of ICBMs will be subject to limitation, for the purpose of limits on deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, by being considered to contain a deployed ICBM when it arrives at a maintenance facility of an ICBM base, except for the non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article IV of the Treaty, or when it leaves an ICBM loading facility. Subparagraph 2(b) of Article IV allows each Party to retain no more than two non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs at the maintenance facility of each ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs, for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.

Subparagraph (e) of paragraph 6 provides that an SLBM will be subject to limitation when it first leaves a production facility. Subparagraph (f) provides that an SLBM launcher will be subject to limitation when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is first launched. Subparagraph (g) provides that an SLBM launcher will be subject to limitations, for the purpose of limits on deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, by being considered to contain a deployed SLBM when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is first launched.

It is possible that a silo launcher or a ballistic missile submarine ultimately intended to hold a new type of ICBM or SLBM could become accountable before the ICBM or SLBM it is intended to hold has been flight-tested. The Treaty does not directly address accountability in such cases. Since the launcher is deployed, it must be considered to contain an ICBM or SLBM. It cannot be considered to contain the new, untested missile, however, since there are no provisions for attributing a number of warheads or for determining accountable ballistic missile throw-weight for a type of ICBM or SLBM that has never been flight-tested. Thus, unless the Parties were to agree otherwise, the only way to meet the requirements of the Treaty would be to declare the launcher to contain an existing type of ICBM or SLBM and subsequently to convert it (which requires only a notification) to a launcher of the new type.

If a silo launcher or a ballistic missile submarine ultimately intended to hold a new type of ICBM or SLBM became accountable after the ICBM or SLBM it is intended to hold has been flight-tested, but before the eighth flight test (when accountable throw-weight is determined), the owning Party could elect to declare that the new missile was deployed. As provided for in the Thirty-second Agreed Statement, the Parties would agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on the procedures for establishing throw-weight accountability in such a case. The warhead attribution in such a case would depend on the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which the new type of ICBM or SLBM had been flight-tested, subject to the 40 percent reentry vehicle counting rule; this number could not subsequently be altered. (If, however, a Party wished to declare that the new launcher was considered to contain an existing type of ICBM or SLBM and subsequently to convert it to a launcher of the new type, the Treaty would not prohibit such an approach.)

Subparagraph (h) of paragraph 6 provides the initial accountability rules for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers. Former heavy bombers" are defined in the Definitions Annex as reconnaissance, tanker, or jamming airplanes that are not equipped for nuclear armaments, or non-nuclear air-to-surface armaments, and that have been converted in accordance with the procedures in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol or that meet the requirements for conversion in accordance with the Protocol. Such airplanes may be newly constructed on the basis of the airframe of an existing type of heavy bomber, or they may be converted from a heavy bomber.

Subparagraph (h) provides that a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber becomes subject to limitations when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which components of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber are assembled to produce complete airframes; or when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which existing bomber airframes are converted to heavy bomber or former heavy bomber airframes. This means that the accountability of a new heavy bomber is tied in all cases to the appearance of the completed airframe. Note that while there is an initial accountability rule for heavy bombers, there is no such rule for long-range nuclear ALCMs. This is because such ALCMs are not directly accountable under the Treaty. Rather, warheads are attributed to heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs under agreed attribution rules, once such heavy bombers become accountable under the Treaty.

Paragraph 7 of Article III first provides the general rule that ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers that have been converted to launch an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of a different type shall not be capable of launching an ICBM or SLBM of the previous type. Apart from this general rule, paragraph 7 also provides the specific rules for accountability of converted launchers; that is, the rules for when launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of one type, which are in the process of conversion to being launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of a different type, shall begin to be considered as being launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of the different type. Such changed accountability for a silo launcher of ICBMs that is in the process of conversion begins when an ICBM of a different type or a training model of a missile of a different type is first installed in that launcher, or when the silo door is reinstalled, whichever occurs first. Such changed accountability for a mobile launcher of ICBMs that is in the process of conversion begins at a point that would be agreed by the Parties, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Such accountability for an SLBM launcher that is in the process of conversion begins when all launchers on the submarine on which that launcher is installed have been converted to launch an SLBM of the different type and the submarine begins sea trials. Subparagraph (c) also clarifies that a submarine begins sea trials when that submarine first operates under its own power away from the harbor or port in which the conversion of launchers was performed.

Paragraph 8 of Article III sets forth the rules for accountability of converted heavy bombers; that is, the rules for when heavy bombers that have been converted into heavy bombers of a different category or into former heavy bombers shall be considered to be heavy bombers of that different category or former heavy bombers. Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 8 states that, for a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs that is converted into a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, the converted bomber is counted as being so equipped when it is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building where it was equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. Subparagraph (b) provides that, for a heavy bomber of one category that is converted into a heavy bomber of another category or into a former heavy bomber, the converted bomber is counted as being of the different category or being a former heavy bomber when the inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 13 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol is completed or, if such an inspection is not conducted, when the 20-day period provided for in paragraph 13 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol expires. Note that the rules for converting a heavy bomber of one category into a heavy bomber of another category are provided for in paragraphs 9-12 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. There are no procedures for converting heavy bombers to heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs; when permitted, such conversion is accomplished by notification in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. No procedures for such a conversion are required, because there is no cheating scenario in such a conversion.

Paragraph 9 of Article III contains the " type rules," which are rules that are necessary to associate an individual item with others of its "type," and to distinguish between types.

Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 9 provides that a ballistic missile of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the Earth shall not be considered to be a ballistic missile to which the limitations provided for in this Treaty apply. Thus, missiles for defense against ballistic missile attack or for air defense are not subject to Treaty limitations provided that they are developed and tested solely for defensive purposes. This provision parallels paragraph 3 of Article VII of the INF Treaty.

Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 9 provides the type rule for ballistic missiles as weapon-delivery vehicles. A weapon delivery vehicle" is defined in the Definitions Annex as meaning, for ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, a missile of a type, any one of which has been flight-tested or deployed to carry or be used as a weapon, that is, as any mechanism or device that, when directed against any target, is designed to damage or destroy it. Subparagraph (b) provides that if a ballistic missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all ballistic missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. Subparagraph (c) provides the type rule for cruise missiles as weapon-delivery vehicles. It provides that if a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all cruise missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

Subparagraph (d) of paragraph 9 contains a two-part type rule for launchers other than soft-site launchers. (Soft-site launchers" are defined as fixed, land-based launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs other than silo launchers.) It provides first that, if a launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, has contained an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type, it shall be considered to be a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs of that type. Note that this provision, as well as the rest of the Treaty, refers to an ICBM or SLBM of a type," but does not use the words a launcher of a type." This was done to avoid suggesting that two dissimilar launchers of the same type of missile would be treated as different types under the Treaty; it was agreed that the type" of a launcher is the type of the missile that is associated with that launcher. Note also that in the Sixteenth Agreed Statement, in the Agreed Statements Annex, the Parties agree that, with respect to this provision, each ICBM launcher or SLBM launcher existing as of the date of signature of the Treaty is capable of launching only an ICBM or SLBM of the type specified for that launcher in the Memorandum of Understanding.

Second, subparagraph (d) of paragraph 9 provides that, if a launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, has been converted into a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs of a different type, it shall be considered to be a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs of the type for which it has been converted. Thus, launchers can be converted from being launchers of one type of missile into launchers for another type. Finally, this provision has the effect of exempting soft-site launchers from the general rule that launchers are associated with only one type of ICBM or SLBM. Thus, soft-site launchers, located only at test ranges or space launch facilities, are permitted by the Treaty to launch several different types of ICBMs or SLBMs.

Subparagraph (e) of paragraph 9 contains the heavy bomber type rule. It provides that, if a heavy bomber is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, all heavy bombers of that type shall be considered to be equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, except those that are not so equipped and are distinguishable from heavy bombers of the same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. The term distinguishable" is defined in the Definitions Annex. In this context, it means that the heavy bombers not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs must be different on the basis of the totality of functional and external differences that are observable by national technical means (NTM) of verification, or, when such observations may be inconclusive in the opinion of the inspecting Party, that are visible during inspection. This means, for example, that although some B-52 bombers of the United States are equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs and some are not, the ones that are not so equipped will not count as being equipped, so long as they are distinguishable." If they are not distinguishable, they will count as if they were equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

Subparagraph (e) also provides that if long-range nuclear ALCMs have not been flight-tested from any heavy bomber of a particular type, no heavy bomber of that type shall be considered to be equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. This means, for example, that, so long as long-range nuclear ALCMs are not flight-tested from the B-2 heavy bomber of the United States, no B-2 bombers will be considered to be heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs for purposes of Treaty limitations. Subparagraph (e) also provides that, within the same type, a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments, a training heavy bomber, and a former heavy bomber shall be distinguishable from one another. (See the discussion of the term "distinguishable" in the analysis of the Definitions Annex.)

Subparagraph (f) of paragraph 9 contains the long-range nuclear ALCM type rule. It provides that any long-range ALCM of a type, any one of which has been initially flight-tested from a heavy bomber on or before December 31, 1988, shall be considered to be a long-range nuclear ALCM. This means that if a long-range ALCM, whether it is a non-nuclear or nuclear-armed ALCM, was first flight-tested from a heavy bomber on or before December 31, 1988, then it will be considered to be a long-range nuclear ALCM. Long-range ALCMs first flight-tested from a heavy bomber after this date are treated differently, however. The second sentence of subparagraph (f) provides that any long-range ALCM of a type, any one of which has been initially flight-tested from a heavy bomber after December 31, 1988, shall not be considered to be a long-range nuclear ALCM if it is a long-range non-nuclear ALCM and is distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. Long-range non-nuclear ALCMs not so distinguishable shall be considered to be long-range nuclear ALCMs. This means that the long-range non-nuclear Tacit Rainbow system of the United States (now cancelled, but which was first flight-tested from a heavy bomber after December 31, 1988), would not be considered to be a long-range nuclear ALCM, provided that it is distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs, according to the distinguishing features that would be provided as part of the notification required by Section VII of the Notification Protocol.

Subparagraph (g) of paragraph 9 sets forth the type rule for mobile launchers of new types of ICBMs. It provides that mobile launchers for each new type of ICBM shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of existing types of ICBMs and from mobile launchers for other new types of ICBMs. Subparagraph (g) also provides that such new launchers, with their associated missiles installed, shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of existing types of ICBMs with their associated missiles installed, and from mobile launchers of ICBMs of other new types of ICBMs with their associated missiles installed.

Subparagraph (h) of paragraph 9 sets forth the type rule for mobile launchers of one type of ICBM that are converted to launch another type of ICBM. This provision parallels subparagraph (g). Subparagraph (h) provides that mobile launchers of one type of ICBM converted into launchers of another type of ICBM shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of the previous type of ICBM. Not only must the converted launchers be distinguishable, they must be distinguishable while their associated missiles are installed. (See the discussion of the term "distinguishable" in the analysis of the Definitions Annex.)

The final provision of subparagraph (h) provides that any conversion of a mobile launcher must be carried out in accordance with procedures that would be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Mobile ICBM launchers may not be converted prior to procedures being agreed in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. This provision amounts to a de facto veto right over the conversion of mobile ICBM launchers.

Paragraph 10 of Article III lists the existing and former types of ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs as of the date of signature of the Treaty. Because a Party may sometimes designate a system of the other Party by a name other than that used by the other Party, the designations used by each Party for various systems are included to avoid any ambiguity. The Parties agree that the lists are complete as of the date of signature. Thus, systems such as the Titan II missile, which is not listed as either an existing or former type, are effectively exempted from all provisions of the START Treaty, provided that they are not subsequently deployed and that they do not subsequently meet the criteria to be considered a new type or a variant of an existing type of ICBM or SLBM. With regard to the Titan II, U.S. negotiators informed their Soviet counterparts on April 26, 1990, that the Titan II had been retired from service and that all launchers for the Titan II had been eliminated except for a single launcher located at Green Valley, Arizona. This single launcher is unable to launch missiles, and is being maintained as a museum display.

Subparagraph (a) lists the Parties' existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs. The technical characteristics for each of these ICBMs and SLBMs are listed in Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding. The list does not include the Soviet SLBM designated as RSM-45, known to the United States as the SS-N-17, even though technical characteristics for this SLBM are listed in Annex F. This is because the data in the Memorandum of Understanding are data effective as of September 1, 1990, and the SS-N-17 was removed from operational service between that date and the date of signature.

Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 10 lists the Parties' existing types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. For the United States of America, this includes the Peacekeeper ICBM. Peacekeeper ICBMs are treated as mobile ICBMs under the Treaty, despite the fact that they have not been tested or deployed in a mobile mode. Peacekeeper ICBMs that are deployed in silos, however, do not count under the limit of 1100 warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs on mobile launchers of ICBMs. The U.S. Small ICBM is not listed in subparagraphs (a) or (b) since it is still a "prototype," as that term is defined in the Definitions Annex. If it becomes accountable, it will fall under those provisions of the Treaty regulating new types of ICBMs.

Subparagraph (c) of paragraph 10 lists the Parties' former types of ICBMs and SLBMS. The purpose of listing former types of ICBMs and SLBMs is to allow them to be used in flight tests involving reentry vehicles, without being treated as new types or variants of existing types of ICBMs or SLBMs. The U.S. Minuteman I and Polaris A-3 are listed. The Soviet Union has no ballistic missiles listed as former types. Note that the Twenty-ninth Agreed Statement specifies that the STARS (Strategic Target System) booster is not the Polaris A-3 SLBM and is thus not subject to any of the provisions of the Treaty. Note also that the Definitions Annex describes retired types" as ICBMs or SLBMs deployed at the time the Treaty enters into force, but that subsequently become non-deployed due to conversion or elimination of all launchers for that type, except those launchers at test ranges and space launch facilities. In comparison, former types" are listed types that were once deployed, but none of which are deployed as of entry into force of the Treaty.

The Polaris A-3 is considered a former type of SLBM, rather than a deployed type, despite the fact that two ex-Polaris submarines, USS John Marshall and USS Sam Houston, each equipped with 16 Polaris A-3 SLBM launchers, were in service during the Treaty negotiation. However, U.S. negotiators informed their Soviet counterparts on April 26, 1990 that these submarines had been converted to special purpose submarines; that the launchers had not been removed for reasons of cost, but that equipment to support launch was removed; that these submarines were unable to launch missiles; and that both submarines would be retired during the seven-year period of reductions under START. The method of retirement was not specified and the United States is not obligated to use START procedures in retiring these submarines.

Subparagraph (d) of paragraph 10 lists the Parties' existing types of heavy bombers. Heavy bombers are also classified by category (based on armament) and variant (based on distinguishable differences within a particular category/type combination). The terms category," variant," and distinguishable" are each defined in the Definitions Annex. For each type of heavy bomber, the Memorandum of Understanding includes data on the numbers of all categories of heavy bombers and the numbers of former heavy bombers. Note that the Twelfth Agreed Statement and the letters exchanged by Heads of Delegation concerning Bear D bombers exempt certain Bear airplanes that might otherwise count under Treaty limits.

Note that two types of Soviet airplanes are not listed: Bison and Backfire. Although, years ago, there were many Soviet Bison (designated by the Soviet Union as M" or Myasishchev") airplanes that would have met the definition of heavy bombers, only limited numbers of Bison airplanes exist today. The Parties' agreement regarding the Bison is recorded in the Sixth Agreed Statement. It excludes from the Treaty three particular Bison airplanes converted to transport oversize cargo (e.g., the Soviet space shuttle), and it specifies that the remaining Bisons will be considered to be former heavy bombers, since these were converted to serve as tankers. The Soviet Tu-22M bomber, known to the United States as the Backfire, is not listed. On July 31, 1991, the Soviet Union provided a politically-binding declaration concerning the Backfire bomber, which provides the basis for the Parties not to limit Backfires as heavy bombers under START. (See discussion below in the "Declarations" section of this analysis.)

Subparagraph (e) of paragraph 10 lists the Parties' existing types of long-range nuclear ALCMs.

In regard to paragraph 10, it should be noted that no sea-launched cruise missiles are listed, nor are such missiles subject to any Treaty limitation. On July 31, 1991, the Parties exchanged politically-binding declarations concerning their long-range nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles. (See discussion below in the Declarations" section of this analysis.)

ARTICLE IV

Article IV of the Treaty text provides a variety of limitations other than the central limitations found in Article II. These limitations include limits on non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, ICBMs and SLBMs at test ranges, non-deployed mobile launchers, test launchers and training launchers, bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, former heavy bombers, training heavy bombers, test heavy bombers, space launch facilities, launchers at space launch facilities, and locational restrictions on non-deployed ICBMs.

Paragraph 1 of Article IV provides a variety of limits for ICBMs and SLBMs other than the central numerical limits of Article II. Such limitations complement the central limits of the Treaty. They are intended either to inhibit rapid reload of deployed launchers or to limit the Parties' ability to augment the deployed force with launchers and associated missiles not counted against the central limits. Thus, for example, since ICBMs at test ranges could be used to augment the deployed force, their numbers are limited to those appropriate for testing purposes.

Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 1 limits the number of non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. It limits each Party to an aggregate of no more than 250 non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, of which no more than 125 may be non-deployed ICBMs for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Subparagraph (a) of the Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement provides that the limitations of subparagraph 1(a) do not apply to retired mobile ICBMs attributed with only one warhead. (Such a "retired type," pursuant to the Definitions Annex, would be ICBMs of a type that is deployed when the Treaty enters into force, but all of which type are subsequently rendered non-deployed by virtue of the conversion or elimination of their launchers, other than test launchers, launchers at space launch facilities, or launchers on special purpose submarines.) Since the SS-25 is the only single- reentry vehicle mobile ICBM that was deployed at the time of signature of the Treaty, this provision applies, in effect, only to it. ICBMs of retired mobile types would be subject to all other Treaty restrictions on non-deployed missiles, such as locational restrictions. Retired mobile ICBMs of types which have ever been attributed with more than one warhead continue to count under the 250/125 limits. Note that the limit in this subparagraph is the only provision in the Treaty which actually requires destruction of any ballistic missile. ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs must be eliminated pursuant to procedures in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol if their retention would cause these limits to be exceeded. Since retired mobile ICBMs attributed with only one warhead are not subject to the 250/125 limits, the Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement also exempts them from the elimination procedures in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

Subparagraphs (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 are designed to limit the potential for rapid reload of ICBM launchers. In the case of mobile ICBMs, the number of non-deployed ICBMs at an ICBM base is limited by subparagraph (b) to no more than two for each type of mobile ICBM deployed at that base. In the case of silo-based ICBMs, subparagraph (c) gives each Party a choice (which can be different for each base) of either two non-deployed ICBMs and six sets of emplacement (silo loading) equipment, or four non-deployed ICBMs and two sets of emplacement equipment. These options for silo-based ICBMS are included to accommodate existing Soviet practices. Current United States' practices are to have only two non-deployed ICBMs of a type at a base. Since rapid reload requires both spare ICBMs and equipment to load them, either option serves to limit the capability to conduct such reload. (See the analysis of paragraph 16 of Article V for a discussion of rapid reload.")

In addition to the numerical limits, subparagraph 1(b) requires separate storage for non-deployed mobile ICBMs and non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs located at that maintenance facility. This provision, along with the numerical limits on non-deployed ICBMs and the companion limit in subparagraph 2(b) of Article IV on the number of non-deployed mobile launchers at an ICBM base, forms a constraint against the rapid augmentation of the deployed force. The provision also ensures that the non-deployed mobile launchers permitted at ICBM bases are genuinely non-deployed.

Subparagraph (d) of paragraph 1 limits ICBMs and SLBMs at test ranges. There is a parallel limit on the number of test launchers in subparagraph (d) of paragraph 2. The test launcher limit is decreased after seven years. The limit on ICBMs and SLBMs at test ranges is reduced in parallel. Note that subparagraph (b) of the Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement provides that the limitations of subparagraph 1(d) of Article IV shall not apply to ICBMs and SLBMs of retired and former types except for retired mobile ICBMs.

Paragraph 2 of Article IV provides a variety of limits for ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers. Like the limits on ICBMs and SLBMs in paragraph 1, these limits are designed to reduce the potential for non-deployed mobile launchers and other launchers to complement the force of deployed launchers.

Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 2 limits each Party to an aggregate of no more than 110 non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs. Within this limit, no more than 18 can be non-deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Included within these aggregate limits are the categories of non-deployed mobile launchers mentioned in subparagraphs (b), (c), and (d) below.

Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 2 limits the number of non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs located at maintenance facilities at ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than two for each type of ICBM at that ICBM base. As noted above (subparagraph 1(b)), these launchers must be stored separately from non-deployed mobile ICBMs.

Subparagraph (c) of paragraph 2 limits non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs at training facilities to no more than 40. Subparagraph (c) also creates an operational restriction on such launchers by providing that each such launcher may contain only a training model of a missile, and by providing that such non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs that contain training models of missiles shall not be located outside the training facility. The Fifteenth Agreed Statement provides an additional numerical limit on such launchers at the Plesetsk ICBM training facility.

Subparagraph (d) of paragraph 2 limits test launchers to 45 (25 fixed and 20 mobile), dropping to 40 (20 fixed and 20 mobile) after seven years. There is a parallel limit on the number of ICBMs and SLBMs at test ranges in subparagraph (d) of paragraph 1, which also decreases after seven years. Note that subparagraphs (h) and (i) of the Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement provide that launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of a former or retired type at test ranges count against these limits, except for a single Minuteman I test launcher located at Vandenberg Air Force Base.

Subparagraph (e) of paragraph 2 limits the combined number of silo training launchers and mobile training launchers to no more than 60. In the Thirteenth Agreed Statement, the Parties agree that no more than four engineering models of silos may be located at the repair facility for ICBMs at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, and that such engineering models of silos will count against the numerical limits of subparagraph (e).

Subparagraph (e) also creates operational restrictions on training launchers by providing that ICBMs shall not be launched from training launchers, and that each such launcher may contain only a training model of a missile. Note that the ban is on silo training launchers containing or launching an actual ICBM, not on having the capability to launch; such launchers could have a launch capability, and we could not verify, even at a high level of intrusiveness, whether in fact an individual launcher has such capability. In contrast, mobile training launchers are prohibited from being capable of launching ICBMs. Such mobile training launchers must differ from mobile launchers of ICBMs and other road vehicles or railcars on the basis of differences that are observable by national technical means of verification.

Paragraph 3 of Article IV limits heavy bombers, other than those counted against the central limits, and former heavy bombers. As in the case of paragraphs 1 and 2, such bombers are limited in order to constrain their potential to undermine the effectiveness of the central Treaty limits. Subparagraph (a) limits each Party to an aggregate of no more than 75 heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, former heavy bombers, and training heavy bombers. (Certain bombers are exempted from this limit, including 3 Bison bombers exempted pursuant to the Sixth Agreed Statement, and certain Bear bombers exempted for maritime operations pursuant to theTwelfth Agreed Statement.) Subparagraph (b) limits each Party to no more than 20 test heavy bombers. The former are subject to restrictions on the weapons they can carry, while test heavy bombers may be capable of delivering nuclear arms.

Paragraph 4 of Article IV provides limits on ICBMs and SLBMs used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space. The Parties recognized that such use of ICBMs and SLBMs is valid and economical, but they also recognized that such use must be limited because such missiles could also be used for their original purpose of weapons delivery. In order to limit the potential for breakout, paragraph 4 limits each Party to no more than five space launch facilities," which are defined as specified facilities from which objects are delivered into the upper atmosphere or space using ICBMs or SLBMs. Paragraph 4 also provides that these facilities may not overlap ICBM bases (subparagraph (a)); limits each Party to a total of no more than 20 ICBM or SLBM launchers at those facilities, of which no more than ten may be silo and mobile launchers, unless otherwise agreed (subparagraph (b)); and limits the number of ICBMs or SLBMs at a given space launch facility to no more than the number of launchers at that facility (subparagraph (c)). Space launch facilities are not subject to inspection.

Since the Parties recognize that their future space launch requirements are difficult to predict, both subparagraphs (a) and (b) provide for increases or decreases if the Parties agree. Such changes would not require an amendment to the Treaty.

Finally, note that, as is discussed above in the analysis of subparagraph 2(d) of Article IV, subparagraph (h) of the Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement provides that launchers of a former or retired type shall be subject to the numerical limits of subparagraph 4(b) of Article IV, except for the single Minuteman I launcher at Vandenberg Air Force Base. Notwithstanding this, subparagraph (b) of the Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement provides that subparagraph 4(c) of Article IV shall not apply to retired and former types of ICBMs and SLBMs, except for retired mobile ICBMs.

Paragraph 5 of Article IV limits the number of transporter-loaders for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Restricting transporter-loaders constrains a Party's ability to reload mobile launchers rapidly after they have been fired. For road-mobile ICBMs with a single warhead, the Treaty allows two transporter-loaders per type per deployment area or test range, and a total of six transporter loaders in other areas, provided that the total does not exceed thirty. Note that paragraph 7 of Article V of the Treaty bans transporter-loaders for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs with multiple warheads and for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

Paragraph 6 of Article IV limits each Party to no more than two ballistic missile submarines in dry dock within five kilometers of the boundary of each submarine base. Since ballistic missile submarines in dry dock are exempted from reentry vehicle inspections by subparagraph 13(g) of Section IX of the Inspection Protocol, this limit is designed to prohibit a Party from circumventing the inspection regime by keeping an excessive number of ballistic missile submarines in dry dock.

Paragraph 7 of Article IV limits ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers that are placed on static display after signature of the Treaty, and the number of heavy and former heavy bombers that are converted to ground trainers after signature of the Treaty. Static displays are essentially museum pieces, while ground trainers are non-flyable aircraft used for training (for example, in weapons loading). Neither term is defined in the Treaty, although procedures for placing items on static display or converting airplanes to ground trainers are provided in Section VIII of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Static displays and ground trainers existing at Treaty signature are not included in the limits, but are listed in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, to avoid ambiguity with later conversions.

Paragraph 8 of Article IV limits each Party to an aggregate of no more than 50 storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs and repair facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs. The numerical limit on ballistic missile storage and repair facilities is to ensure the integrity of quota-based, on-site inspections. If the sides were free to declare an unlimited number of ballistic missile storage sites, there would be no hope that a quota-based inspection regime would provide confidence that non-deployed missile limits were being observed. As of September 1, 1990, neither Party had more than ten such facilities. Storage and repair facilities are listed in Annexes A and B to the Memorandum of Understanding.

Paragraph 9 of Article IV provides a large number of locational and related restrictions on strategic offensive arms. These restrictions are designed to enhance the overall Treaty verification regime by limiting the places where strategic offensive arms are permitted to be located.

Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 9 first lists the only allowed locations for non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs and specifies that such non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs may also be in transit. The transit rule allows the non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs to move between the listed locations. The subparagraph includes three special provisions:

Prototype ICBMs and prototype SLBMs (i.e., those which have not yet become accountable) are banned from maintenance facilities of ICBM bases and from submarine bases. This avoids the suspicion that covert deployment has occurred.

Non-deployed ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs may be transferred within an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs. This allows for the routine replacement of silo-based missiles (since otherwise there would be no legal way for the replacement missile to move from its authorized location at a maintenance facility to the silo without having to issue a transit notification).

Non-deployed SLBMs that are located on missile tenders and storage cranes are considered to be located at the submarine base at which such missile tenders and storage cranes are specified as based, regardless of their actual location. This is a bookkeeping convenience, since such tenders and cranes may be located outside of the base.

Subparagraph (c) of the Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement provides that the locational restrictions of subparagraph 9(a) of Article IV shall not apply to ICBMs or SLBMs of former or retired types except for ICBMs of retired types of mobile ICBMs.

Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 9 provides the locational restrictions for non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs. It also permits such launchers to be in transit, so that they can be moved between the permitted locations. As subparagraph (a) does for prototype ICBMs, subparagraph (b) bans mobile launchers of prototype ICBMs from maintenance facilities of ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs, once again to avoid any implication of unannounced or covert deployment.

Subparagraph (c) of paragraph 9 provides the locational restriction for test launchers. The basic rule is that test launchers may only be located at test ranges. There is an exception allowing rail-mobile test launchers to conduct movements for the purpose of testing outside a test range. Such movements may be conducted, provided that four requirements are met: first, each such movement must be completed no later than 30 days after it begins; second, each such movement must begin and end at the same test range and must not involve movement to any other facility; third, movements of a total of no more than six rail-mobile launchers may be conducted in each calendar year; and fourth, no more than one train containing no more than three rail-mobile test launchers may be located outside test ranges at any one time. Movements count on a one-per-launcher basis; thus, a train moving three launchers counts as three movements.

Subparagraph (d) of paragraph 9 provides a special rule for situations where a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile relocates to a test range. Such a launcher and missile may, at the discretion of the testing Party, either continue to be counted toward the maximum aggregate limits provided for in Article II of this Treaty, or be counted as a mobile test launcher pursuant to paragraph 2(d) of Article IV. In the case where the launcher and missile continue to be counted toward the maximum aggregate limits, they can remain at the test range for an uninterrupted period not to exceed 45 days. Furthermore, a Party may not have more than three such deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles located at a test range at any one time, nor more than three such deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles located at a test range at any one time.

Subparagraph (e) of paragraph 9 restricts the location of silo training launchers to ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs and training facilities for ICBMs. Subparagraph (e) also limits the number of silo training launchers located at each ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs to one for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.

Subparagraph (f) of paragraph 9 restricts the basing of test heavy bombers to heavy bomber flight test centers and production facilities for heavy bombers. It also provides that training heavy bombers shall be based only at training facilities for heavy bombers. These restrictions cover permanent basing, and do not preclude visits to other facilities.

Paragraph 10 provides locational restrictions for solid rocket motors, with or without nozzles attached, for first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. These provisions are designed to aid in assuring that mobile ICBMs or first stages for such ICBMs are not being covertly assembled by limiting the locations where solid rocket motors, with or without nozzles attached, which are essential components of such ICBMs, can legally be located. (Note that paragraph 30 of Article V reaffirms the locational restrictions on solid rocket motors with nozzles attached, which are even closer to being assembled ICBMs, and outlines the limited cases where solid rocket motors with nozzles attached can be removed from the production facility.) The specific locations where solid rocket motors with or without nozzles shall be permitted are listed in paragraphs 5 and 6 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding. Solid rocket motors without nozzles attached also may be moved between these locations. None of these locations is subject to declared facility on-site inspection, although production facilities where ICBMs of mobile launchers of ICBMs are assembled are subject to continuous monitoring. Instead, inspections at other locations help to verify the absence of solid rocket motors with or without nozzles attached for first stages of mobile ICBMs at locations where they are not permitted. Detection of a single solid rocket motor with or without nozzles attached at such a location would constitute a violation of the Treaty.

Paragraph 11 of Article IV sets forth locational restrictions on facilities. (The term facilities" is defined in the Definition Annex.) The bulk of these restrictions are intended to hinder rapid reload by separating non-deployed ICBMs from ICBM launchers.

Subparagraph (a) requires that specified facilities at which ICBMs of a particular type are located be separated by no less than 100 kilometers from other facilities at which launchers for that particular type of ICBM could be present. For existing facilities, the prohibition is type specific; there is no bar, for example, for storage facilities for ICBM type A" being co-located with launchers for ICBM type B". The Fourteenth Agreed Statement grandfathers two existing Soviet storage facilities for ICBMs located at Khrizolitovyy and Surovatikha, thus allowing these existing facilities to be separated by less than 100 kilometers from deployment areas where ICBMs of the same type are deployed.

Subparagraph (a) also requires that specified new facilities, including those at which non-deployed ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs of any type of ICBM may be located and storage facilities for ICBM emplacement equipment, be separated by no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs. This prohibition is not type specific. There is an exception to this rule, concerning existing storage facilities that had previously been used for intermediate-range missiles. (These missiles have now been eliminated pursuant to the INF Treaty.) Such facilities that are located less than 100 kilometers from an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs or from a test range, may be converted into storage facilities for ICBMs not specified for that ICBM base or that test range.

Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 11 stipulates additional locational restrictions that are applicable to specified facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs. It requires that specified facilities, including production facilities, repair facilities, and storage facilities, for mobile launchers of ICBMs of each particular type, be separated by no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM and any test range from which ICBMs of that type are flight-tested.

Subparagraph (c) of paragraph 11 requires that test ranges and space launch facilities be separated by no less than 100 kilometers from ICBM bases and deployment areas. This provision is intended to constrain rapid reload. It is needed since a significant number of ICBMs (i.e., potential reloads) can legally be present at test ranges or space launch facilities. By separating these test ranges and space launch facilities from ICBM bases, these potential reloads are separated from the launchers at the ICBM bases. Without this rule, the utility of numerical limits on non-deployed ICBMs at ICBM bases would be severely undercut.

Subparagraph (d) of paragraph 11 requires that training facilities for ICBMs be separated by no less than 100 kilometers from any test range. This provision restricts the ability to use the 40 non-deployed mobile ICBM launchers allowed at training facilities to launch the ICBMs that are allowed at test ranges. (The 40-launcher limit is in subparagraph 2(c) of Article IV.) The Fifteenth Agreed Statement provides an exception to this locational restriction for the existing training facility for ICBMs at Plesetsk, in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, allowing it to be located less than 100 kilometers from an existing test range.

Subparagraph (e) of paragraph 11 requires that storage areas for heavy bomber nuclear armaments and storage areas for long-range nuclear ALCMs be separated by no less than 100 kilometers from air bases of various categories. Neither storage areas for heavy bomber nuclear armaments nor storage areas for long-range nuclear ALCMs are listed in the Memorandum of Understanding. This provision has little practical effect and was included at Soviet insistence for parallelism with the restrictions on ICBMs. Note that the restrictions on storage areas for heavy bomber nuclear armaments" would not preclude nuclear weapons for other strategic or tactical systems from being stored within the 100 kilometers specified. There is no specific provision in the Treaty for verification of this restriction.

The final paragraph of Article IV, paragraph 12, sets a time limit of 30 days for transits between permitted locations. Transit" is a defined term in the Definitions Annex and refers to one-way movement of non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, launch canisters, or mobile launchers of ICBMs.

ARTICLE V

Article V of the Treaty sets forth the activities and systems that are prohibited by the Treaty. By adhering to these prohibitions, the Parties will channel their future modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms in more stabilizing and predictable directions.

Paragraph 1 of Article V provides the important general rule that, except as prohibited by the provisions of the Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out. This rule is closely based on provisions in earlier arms control agreements. It reflects the standard principle that activities which are not specifically prohibited by the provisions of a treaty are allowed.

Paragraph 2 of Article V sets forth prohibitions in regard to heavy ICBMs or SLBMs. Such ICBMs or SLBMs are defined in the Definitions Annex as those with a launch weight exceeding 106,000 kilograms or a throw-weight exceeding 4350 kilograms; both values are based on the Soviet data for the SS-19 ICBM as listed in the Memorandum of Understanding. Subparagraphs (a) through (d) ban: new types of heavy ICBMs; increases in the launch weight or throw-weight of existing heavy ICBMs (i.e., of the Soviet SS-18, the only existing heavy ICBM); heavy SLBMs; mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs; or additional silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, except for certain permitted replacements.

The Fifth Agreed Statement further clarifies that the replacement of silo launchers pursuant to this subparagraph can only be done in the case that launchers are destroyed by accident or in the case of other extraordinary circumstances. In a December 6, 1990, letter from Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Defense Minister Yazov, it was explained that such extraordinary circumstances could be in particular due to the internal political processes taking place in our country." The Soviet Foreign Minister subsequently communicated with the U.S. Secretary of State again on December 30, 1990, in a letter addressing a series of issues that had arisen out of the Houston Ministerial of December 1990. In that letter, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze reconfirmed the conditions of new heavy ICBM silo construction. Specifically, he reconfirmed that construction of new heavy ICBM silos could be undertaken only to replace heavy ICBM silo launchers destroyed in an accident or to relocate such launchers threatened by internal political emergencies. Consequently, the Soviet Foreign Minister concluded that the replacement of heavy ICBM silo launchers did not include the possibility of extensive new silo construction.

Additional prohibitions in subparagraphs (e)-(g) include a prohibition on converting launchers that are not launchers of heavy ICBMs into launchers of heavy ICBMs; a ban on launchers of heavy SLBMs; and a ban on reducing the ten warheads attributed to the SS-18 existing heavy ICBM. Note that the letter exchanged by the Heads of Delegation on the phased reduction of heavy ICBMs provides a related prohibition by banning the Soviet Union from reducing their heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers to the limits of 154 through conversion; rather, such reductions must be accomplished by means of launcher elimination procedures specified in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. After the central limit on heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers is reached, any additional heavy ICBM launcher reductions may be by either elimination or conversion.

Paragraph 3 of Article V bans deployment modes for ICBMs other than in silos, on road-mobile launchers or on rail-mobile launchers. It also bans the production, testing, or deployment of ICBM launchers other than silo launchers, road-mobile launchers or rail-mobile launchers. This means that movable" ICBM systems other than road-and rail-mobile systems are prohibited, such as systems involving moving an ICBM in a launch canister between a number of vertical emplacement holes. Soft-site launchers also are banned by paragraph 9 of Article V at locations other than test ranges and space launch facilities. The Nineteenth Agreed Statement provides that mobile space launchers and space launch boosters associated with such launchers would be allowed provided that a variety of conditions are met; such boosters would not be considered ICBMs and would not be prohibited by paragraph 3 regardless of their basing mode.

Paragraph 4 of Article V prohibits deploying an ICBM on a mobile launcher of ICBMs if the ICBM was not declared as a type of ICBM for mobile launchers in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol. This provision is necessary since the notification cited triggers the right to establish perimeter and portal continuous monitoring, necessary to verify the limits on non-deployed mobile ICBMs given in paragraph 1 of Article IV. Consistent with the view that single-warhead systems represent a lesser threat, the paragraph provides an exception allowing rebasing of such single-warhead systems, but only if the Parties agree to do so within the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Therefore, a Party has a veto right over such redeployment by the other Party if it cares to exercise it.

Paragraph 4 also provides that a new type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs may cease to be considered to be a type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs if no ICBM of that type has been contained on, or flight-tested from, a mobile launcher of ICBMs. This provision means, for example, that if the United States initially declares the new Small ICBM to be an ICBM for mobile launchers of a new type in order to protect our option to base it as a mobile ICBM, and if we subsequently decide not to base it as a mobile ICBM, then the United States would have the right to cease treating the Small ICBM as a mobile ICBM for Treaty purposes, provided that no ICBM of that type has been contained on, or flight-tested from, a mobile launcher. This provision applies only to new types; thus, it does not apply to the U.S. Peacekeeper ICBM, which is considered to be an existing type of mobile ICBM.

Paragraph 5 of Article V bans deployment of ICBM launchers of a new type of ICBM, and SLBM launchers of a new type of SLBM, if such launchers are capable of launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively, of other types. It also provides that ICBM launchers of existing types of ICBMs, and SLBM launchers of existing types of SLBMs, shall be incapable, without conversion, of launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively, of other types. The effect of these two provisions is to prohibit ICBM and SLBM launchers, other than soft-site launchers, from being capable of launching more than one type of ICBM or SLBM, respectively, without conversion.

There is no standard in the Treaty for assessing a launcher's capability (or the lack thereof) to launch more than one type of ICBM or SLBM, no procedures for verifying a lack of such capability, and no requirement to develop such procedures. At a minimum, however, this means that a launcher must not contain or launch a missile of a type other than the type for which the launcher is specified. In addition, for mobile ICBM launchers, while no inspection procedures are specified in the Treaty for determining launch capability, the inspecting Party may be able to acquire information pertinent to assessing launcher capability during exhibitions and inspections. Except as provided for in Annex 2 to the Inspection Protocol, ICBM silo launchers and SLBM launchers are not subject to exhibitions or inspections under the Treaty. Of course, if a Party were to raise a concern that the other Party had deployed a dual-capable launcher, the Party owning the launcher would be obligated to attempt to resolve this concern. The Sixteenth Agreed Statement, although not specifically referring to this paragraph, stipulates the Parties' agreement that the provisions of this paragraph are met for all ICBM and SLBM launchers existing at time of signature.

Paragraph 6 of Article V prohibits converting SLBMs into ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. It also prohibits loading SLBMs on, and launching SLBMs from, mobile launchers of ICBMs. This prohibition helps to make the limits on mobile ICBMs and non-deployed missiles more effective. Note, however, that deploying SLBMs in silo launchers of ICBMs is not prohibited, nor is loading SLBMs in such launchers, or launching SLBMs from such launchers prohibited. (The re-basing of SLBMs is further addressed in the discussion of the term "new type" in the analysis of the Definitions Annex.)

Paragraph 7 of Article V prohibits the production, testing, and deployment of transporter-loaders other than transporter-loaders for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs attributed with one warhead. This means that the Parties cannot have transporter-loaders for mobile launchers of ICBMs if the launchers are rail-mobile, or if the launchers are road-mobile and its ICBMs are attributed with more than one warhead. The number of transporter-loaders for single-warhead road-mobile ICBMs is limited to no more than 30 by paragraph 5 of Article IV.

Paragraph 8 of Article V prohibits locating deployed silo launchers of ICBMs outside ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs. Deployed silos are limited to specified areas to facilitate silo accountability; such limitations are consistent with similar provisions on launchers at test ranges, training facilities, and space launch facilities. Each Party's ICBM bases for silo launchers are listed in Annex A to the Memorandum of Understanding.

Paragraph 9 of Article V bans soft-site launchers other than at test ranges and space launch facilities. Each Party's test ranges and space launch facilities are listed in the Memorandum of Understanding. Paragraph 9 also requires that existing soft-site launchers outside test ranges or space launch facilities be eliminated no later than 60 days after entry into force of the Treaty. The only such soft-site launchers belonging to either Party that are outside of test ranges or space launch facilities, however, are six launchers in Florida that are specifically exempted from destruction by the Twenty-seventh Agreed Statement.

Paragraph 10 of Article V contains prohibitions relating to flight testing and production of former and retired types of ICBMs and SLBMs. Subparagraph (a) is an undertaking not to flight-test ICBMs or SLBMs of a retired or former type other than from test launchers specified for such use or from launchers at space launch facilities. It also provides that, except for soft-site launchers, test launchers specified for such use shall not be used to flight-test ICBMs or SLBMs of a type, any one of which is deployed. This means that ICBMs and SLBMs of former and retired types may only be flight-tested from specified test launchers or from launchers at space launch facilities; it also means that such launchers are further restricted, because if even a single ICBM or SLBM of a type is deployed, no ICBM or SLBM of that type may be flight-tested from such launchers, unless the launcher is a soft-site launcher. Subparagraph (b) prohibits the production of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a retired type.

Paragraph 11 of Article V prohibits converting silos used as launch control centers into silo launchers of ICBMs. As a practical matter, this provision affects only the Soviet Union, since the U.S. has no such silo launch control facilities. An exchange of letters between Heads of Delegation on July 31, 1991 established an agreement on the implementation of this prohibition. (See the analysis of the Letters Exchanged by the Heads of Delegation.)

Paragraphs 12 and 13 of Article V set forth prohibitions that create maximum limits for reentry vehicles on ICBMs and SLBMs. The net effect of these rules is to prohibit a Party from increasing the number of reentry vehicles on an ICBM or SLBM above the number of warheads that have been attributed to such a missile. This undertaking is expressed in paragraph 13, which provides that each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it. The expression of the rule also is found in the subparagraphs of paragraph 12. Subparagraph (a) is an undertaking not to produce, flight-test, or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with more than ten reentry vehicles. This provision applies to new as well as existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs. Subparagraphs (b) and (c) prohibit flight-testing or deploying an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it. Thus, while a missile's warhead attribution may be greater than the number of reentry vehicles actually tested or deployed on a missile, a Party is not allowed to flight-test or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with more reentry vehicles than have been attributed. For an ICBM or SLBM of a retired type, subparagraph (b) also prohibits flight-testing with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the largest number of warheads that was attributed to any ICBM or SLBM of that type. Subparagraph (d) prohibits increasing the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of an existing or new type. Thus, such ICBMs or SLBMs may not, during a flight test, dispense or simulate the dispensing of a number of reentry vehicles that exceeds the number of warheads with which it is attributed. In addition, new types of ICBMs and SLBMs may not be flight-tested with an increased throw-weight and/or lighter reentry vehicles if such testing would result in an increase in warhead attribution pursuant to paragraph 4(b) of Article III. As for former types, the Treaty is silent.

Although paragraphs 12 and 13 of Article V have no legal effect before the Treaty enters into force, U.S. and Soviet negotiators confirmed in March 1990 their common understanding that the Parties would neither test nor deploy ICBMs and SLBMs with more reentry vehicles than the number recorded in the U.S. - Soviet Joint Summit Statement of December 10, 1987. Except for the Soviet SS-N-18 SLBM (attributed with seven warheads in December 1987 but only three warheads in the Memorandum of Understanding) the warhead attribution values listed in Section I of the Memorandum of Understanding correspond to those listed in the U.S. - Soviet Joint Summit Statement. For the SS-N-18, the Soviets provided assurances in a December 30, 1990, letter from Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to the Secretary of State that only front ends with three reentry vehicles exist. Thus, the Parties have undertaken a commitment not to test or deploy ICBMs or SLBMs with a number of reentry vehicles in excess of the number of warheads attributed to such missiles in the Memorandum of Understanding, pending entry into force.

Paragraph 14 of Article V is a prohibition on flight-testing from space launch facilities ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with reentry vehicles. The purpose of this constraint is to reduce the potential for a Party to circumvent data denial provisions in a way that would allow it to develop forbidden military capabilities, while allowing former and retired types of ICBMs or SLBMs to be used for commercial and scientific space launch purposes. Note that space launch facilities are not subject to inspection.

In paragraph 15 of Article V, each Party undertakes not to use ICBMs or SLBMs for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space for purposes inconsistent with existing international obligations undertaken by the Parties. Such existing international obligations include, for example, Article IV of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)4, which prohibits placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. ICBMs and SLBMs may be used for ABM tests, provided that such tests are otherwise consistent with the ABM Treaty. This provision is included for emphasis and imposes no new legal obligation on the Parties.

In paragraph 16 of Article V, each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy systems for rapid reload and not to conduct rapid reload. Rapid reload" is defined in the Definition Annex as reloading a silo launcher of ICBMs in less than 12 hours, or a mobile launcher of ICBMs in less than four hours, after a missile has been launched or removed from such a launcher. A number of the provisions of Articles IV and V complement the ban on rapid reload.

Paragraph 17 of Article V prohibits installing SLBM launchers on submarines that were not originally constructed as ballistic missile submarines. Thus, for example, SLBM launchers cannot be installed on submarines originally constructed as attack submarines.

Paragraph 18 of Article V consists of five subparagraphs that prohibit various types of relatively exotic strategic offensive arms that are not now in existence. These provisions are largely carried over from the SALT II Treaty. Subparagraph (a) provides for a ban on the production, testing and deployment of: ballistic missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers, or launchers of such missiles, for installation on waterborne vehicles, including free-floating launchers, other than submarines. Thus, for example, SLBMs may not be installed on surface ships. Subparagraph (a) makes it explicit, however, that this obligation does not require changes in current ballistic missile storage, transport, loading, or unloading practices. This allows for the current U.S. practice of transporting SLBMs by specially configured ships. Missile tenders and storage cranes are support equipment" for purposes of the Treaty.

Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 18 prohibits the production, testing and deployment of launchers of ballistic or cruise missiles for emplacement on or for tethering to the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or for emplacement in or for tethering to the subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of such missiles that move only in contact with the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or missiles for such launchers. Subparagraph (b) provides that this obligation shall apply to all areas of the ocean floor and the seabed, including the seabed zone referred to in Articles I and II of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof of February 11, 1971 (The Seabed Arms Control Treaty)5. The effect of this provision is to extend the prohibitions of the Seabed Arms Control Treaty to the entire territorial waters and internal waters of the Parties; and to extend its obligations to include production and testing in addition to deployment. The Seabed Arms Control Treaty essentially prohibits Parties from emplacing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing, or using such weapons, on the seabed and the ocean floor (or its subsoil) beyond a 12-mile coastal seabed zone" measured from the baseline of the territorial sea. The reference to Articles I and II of The Seabed Arms Control Treaty means the obligation applies to all geographic locations covered by that Treaty.

Subparagraph (c) of paragraph 18 prohibits the production, testing and deployment of systems, including missiles, for placing nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction into Earth orbit or a fraction of any Earth orbit. It may be noted, in this regard, that Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty already bans the orbiting of nuclear weapons, and that Article I of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, In Outer Space and Under Water6, already prohibits nuclear explosions in space. Also, this provision would prohibit a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), such as that tested years ago by the Soviet Union.

Subparagraph (d) of paragraph 18 prohibits the production, testing and deployment of air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs). The term air-to-surface ballistic missile" is defined in the Definition Annex as a ballistic missile with a range in excess of 600 kilometers that is installed in an aircraft or on its external mountings for the purpose of being launched from this aircraft. In the Fourth Agreed Statement the Parties agreed that the term is not intended to describe any missile that sustains flight, or any missile the payload of which sustains flight, through the use of aerodynamic lift over any portion of its flight path. This statement was agreed at U.S. insistence to protect the option to develop hyper-velocity weapons that, if launched from aircraft, might otherwise have been considered to be ASBMs, depending on their operational characteristics.

In the Thirtieth Agreed Statement, the Parties agreed that the issue of whether to modify subparagraphs 18(a) and 18(d) to permit using airplanes or waterborne vehicles other than submarines (e.g., barges) to launch ICBMs or SLBMs for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space may be addressed in the JCIC. Unless and until such an agreement is reached, such uses are banned.

Finally, subparagraph (e) of paragraph 18 prohibits the production, testing and deployment of long-range nuclear ALCMs armed with two or more nuclear weapons. (See the exchange of letters concerning ALCMs with multiple warheads, discussed below in the Section on Certain Correspondence Related to the Treaty.)

Paragraph 19 of Article V prohibits equipping various kinds of aircraft" for nuclear armaments. Aircraft" is a defined term meaning, in essence, not only airplanes," but virtually any manned machine that flies.

Subparagraph 19(a) bans nuclear-armed aircraft that have a rangeof 8000 kiometers or more and are not airplanes. Range is defined in the Definitions Annex in terms of a specific payload (7500 kiograms) and a specific method of calculation.

Subparagraph 19(b) bans giving a nuclear capability to airplanes not initially constructed as bombers but having the range and planform characteristics of heavy bombers. Thus, for example, a Party could not convert a passenger or cargo airplane to deliver nuclear weapons. Since this provision is a ban on airplane conversion and not airplane construction, a Party could construct a new heavy bomber, from the ground up, on the design of an existing passenger or cargo airplane. There would be two possible ways to deal with such a situation under the Treaty. First, a Party could consider the new heavy bomber to be the same type airplane as the passenger or cargo airplane on which its design was based. In this case, all existing passenger or cargo airplanes of that type would be considered to be heavy bombers. Alternatively, a Party could assert that modifications to the fundamental design during the construction process resulted in the heavy bomber being a new type of airplane, different from the passenger or cargo airplane on which its design was based. The Treaty has no definition for what constitutes a new type" of heavy bomber, and the Parties never discussed how to proceed in such a case. Thus, whether such an assertion would be considered to be consistent with a Party's obligations under the Treaty would depend on the nature and extent of the design modifications involved. (While it does not apply directly to the case of a heavy bomber built on the basis of a non-bomber design, the definition of a heavy bomber allows exempting maritime airplanes only in cases where such airplanes do not have designs that are essentially identical to those of a heavy bomber.)

Subparagraph 19(c) bans aircraft that are not airplanes or airplanes not initially constructed as bombers from being tested or equipped with long-range nuclear ALCMs. In contrast to the provisions of subparagraphs 19(a) and 19(b), this prohibition applies regardless of the range of the aircraft or airplane involved.

Paragraphs 20 and 21 provide the maximum long-range nuclear ALCM loading limits for each of the Parties. These limits work in conjunction with the long-range nuclear ALCM attribution rules of subparagraphs 4(e) and 4(f) of Article III to limit overall long-range nuclear ALCM loadings. For the United States of America, existing or future heavy bombers may not be equipped for more than 20 long-range nuclear ALCMs. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, existing or future heavy bombers may not be equipped for more than 16 long-range nuclear ALCMs.

In paragraph 22 of Article V each Party undertakes not to locate long-range nuclear ALCMs at air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, air bases for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, air bases for former heavy bombers, or training facilities for heavy bombers. The specific categorization of each air base for each of the Parties is listed in Annex C to the Memorandum of Understanding.

Paragraph 23 of Article V provides a rule whereby heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments will be based at separate air bases. Once again, the specific categorization of each air base for each of the Parties is listed in Annex C to the Memorandum of Understanding. This provision is intended to enhance confidence that heavy bombers that are not heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs are not being covertly deployed with such ALCMs. Note that former heavy bombers may be co-based with any of the three listed categories of heavy bombers.

Paragraph 24 of Article V prohibits certain types of conversions of heavy bombers. The Treaty establishes an effective hierarchy among relevant airplanes: those equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, those equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, those equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers and former heavy bombers. While there is an important exception in subparagraph (a), the general effect of these rules is to prevent a heavy bomber that is at one level in this hierarchy from being converted into a bomber that is at a higher" level. Note that test heavy bombers are not listed here; they can fall at any level within this hierarchy. Note also that the rules are applied bomber by bomber, and are not type rules.

In subparagraph (a), heavy bombers that have the status under the Treaty of being heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs are prohibited from being converted into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, if such heavy bombers were previously equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. Thus, "reconversion" to the status of heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs is prohibited. This means that a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs can be converted for such ALCMs if that individual bomber was not previously equipped for them. This preserves the United States' right to convert B-1 heavy bombers to carry long-range nuclear ALCMs (since none were declared to be equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in Annex G of the Memorandum of Understanding).

In subparagraph (b), heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments are prohibited from being converted into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs or into heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs.

In subparagraphs (c) and (d) of paragraph 25, training heavy bombers are prohibited from being converted into heavy bombers of another category; and former heavy bombers are prohibited from being converted into heavy bombers.

In paragraph 25 of Article V, each Party undertakes not to have underground facilities accessible to ballistic missile submarines. Such facilities, often referred to as submarine tunnels," could be used to circumvent provisions for reentry vehicle inspection. Neither Party claims to possess underground facilities accessible to ballistic missile submarines, but three such facilities were, at one time, under construction in the Soviet Union, and were the impetus behind this prohibition. To aid in the verification of the ban in paragraph 25 of Article V, the Twenty-third Agreed Statement commits the Soviet Union not to make these three facilities accessible to waterborne craft of any displacement. That Agreed Statement also makes it clear that accessible" includes submerged access. (Each Party made statements concerning such underground structures. These statements, dated July 29, 1991, are discussed in the "Declarations and Statements" section.)

Paragraph 26 of Article V contains a prohibition on locating railcars at the site of a rail garrison that has been eliminated in accordance with Section IX of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, unless such railcars have differences, observable by national technical means of verification, in length, width, or height from rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs or launch-associated railcars. The required degree of change in these dimensions is not specified.

Paragraph 27 of Article V prohibits certain activities at facilities that have been eliminated in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, and it restricts the strategic offensive arms that may be located at such eliminated facilities. Specifically, it prohibits engaging in any activities associated with strategic offensive arms at eliminated facilities, if notification of the elimination of the facility has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, unless notification of a new facility at the same location has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. Note that specific facilities that are subject to the Treaty are required to be listed in the Memorandum of Understanding, and that paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol is the provision that provides for notification of any changes to these lists.

Paragraph 27 also provides that strategic offensive arms and support equipment shall not be located at eliminated facilities, except during their movement through such facilities and during visits of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers at such facilities. (In a joint statement, the Parties agreed that support equipment" includes, but is not limited to, ICBM emplacement equipment, training models of missiles, transporter-loaders of mobile ICBMs, storage cranes, launch-associated support vehicles, and driver training vehicles.) Finally, paragraph 27 provides that missile tenders may be located at eliminated facilities only for purposes not associated with strategic offensive arms.

In paragraph 28 of Article V, each Party undertakes not to base strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the Treaty outside its national territory. For the United States, national territory" includes Guam, Puerto Rico, American Samoa and the Virgin Islands, in addition to the territory of the fifty states and the District of Columbia. The Eighth Agreed Statement amplifies and clarifies paragraph 28, making it clear that the ban does not affect the rights of the Parties under international law relating to the passage of submarines or flights of aircraft, or relating to visits of submarines (including ballistic missile submarines) to ports of third states and allowing the Parties to station temporarily, heavy bombers outside their national territory for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty. Such purposes could include military operations against a third state.

For almost thirty years, the United States has operated ballistic missile submarines from Holy Loch, Scotland. In a letter dated July 31, 1991, addressed to the Soviet Foreign Minister, Secretary of State Baker stated that, while the United States does not regard its operations in Holy Loch, Scotland as basing, it is prepared to commit that ballistic missile submarines will be withdrawn from Holy Loch within five months after entry into force of the Treaty, and that no arrangement involving ballistic missile submarines, such as that currently in Holy Loch, will be established in the future. In his response, Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh stated that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not base strategic offensive arms outside its national territory, and provided assurance that the Soviet Union did not have, and would not establish in the future, arrangements involving ballistic missile submarines, analogous to those currently being carried out at Holy Loch.

Paragraph 29 of Article V prohibits using naval vessels that were formerly declared as missile tenders, to transport, store, or load SLBMs. Paragraph 29 also provides that such naval vessels shall not be tied to a ballistic missile submarine for the purpose of supporting such a submarine if such a submarine is located within five kilometers of a submarine base. Supporting ballistic missile submarines in other locations is allowed, provided it does not involve transporting, storing, or loading SLBMs.

Paragraph 30 of Article V prohibits removing solid rocket motors with attached nozzles for the first stage of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs from production facilities for such ICBMs, unless the motors are part of an assembled first stage (for missiles maintained, stored, and transported in stages), part of an assembled missile, or part of a missile that is removed for a technical characteristics exhibition pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI. This can be compared with the counting rule for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs set forth in subparagraphs (a)-(c) of paragraph 3 of Article III. In essence, paragraph 30 means that no solid rocket motor with a nozzle attached can be removed until it has been made part of an assembled item that counts as an ICBM for mobile launchers, except that it need not have been placed yet in a canister, if appropriate, and except for a removal of a motor for purposes of an exhibition. Note that the production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers are required to be listed in the Memorandum of Understanding, and that such facilities are subject to perimeter and portal continuous monitoring pursuant toparagraph 14 of Article XI. Note finally that paragraph 30 complements the locational restrictions on solid rocket motors with nozzles for first stages of mobile ICBMs. Paragraph 10 of Article IV restricts such solid rocket motors with nozzles attached, to production facilities and locations where testing of such motors occurs. Paragraph 30 of this Article sets forth a limited number of cases where such solid rocket motors with nozzles attached can be removed from production facilities.

ARTICLE VI

Article VI sets forth restrictions on the location of mobile ICBM launchers and their associated missiles. This regime is necessary because the mobility of such launchers makes it difficult to verify the numbers of them that are deployed. Note that in many cases, there are different rules for road-mobile and rail-mobile launchers and their associated missiles, since the different kinds of launchers are deployed in different ways.

Paragraph 1 of Article VI applies to deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles. It provides that such missiles and launchers may be based only in restricted areas." This is defined in the Definitions Annex as an area within a deployment area, limited in size, in which deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles are based and in which fixed structures for housing road-mobile launchers of ICBMs may be located.

Paragraph 1 stipulates four rules for restricted areas: first, that a restricted area shall not exceed five square kilometers in size; second, that restricted areas shall not overlap one another; third, that no more than ten deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may be based or located in a restricted area; and fourth, that a restricted area shall not contain deployed ICBMs of more than one type of ICBM.

Paragraph 2 of Article VI establishes rules for the fixed structures within a restricted area. It requires that the number of fixed structures within each restricted area be limited so that such structures will not be capable of containing more road-mobile launchers of ICBMs than is specified for that restricted area (this specification is listed in the Memorandum of Understanding).

Paragraph 3 of Article VI requires each restricted area to be located within a deployment area. A deployment area" is defined in the Definitions Annex as an area, limited in size, within which routine movements and exercise dispersals of deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles are conducted. Paragraph 3 specifies that a deployment area shall not be larger than 125,000 square kilometers and shall not overlap another deployment area. It also specifies that a deployment area shall contain no more than one ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Because neither side intended to have more than one such base per area, this prohibition was the simplest way to avoid hypothetical verification questions concerning the association of a launcher with a base.

Paragraph 4 of Article VI applies to deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles. It provides that such missiles and launchers shall be based only in "rail garrisons." The term "rail garrison" is defined in the Definitions Annex as an area in which one or more parking sites for rail-mobile launcher trains are located and an associated maintenance facility may also be located. A parking site," is a location, within a rail garrison, at which deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs are based and fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs may be located. The remainder of paragraph 4, as well as paragraphs 5 - 8, specify further restrictions on rail garrisons. Paragraph 4 provides that each Party shall have no more than seven rail garrisons, and that no point on a portion of track located inside a rail garrison shall be more than 20 kilometers from any entrance/exit for that rail garrison. This distance shall be measured along the tracks. A rail garrison shall not overlap another rail garrison.

Paragraph 5 of Article VI stipulates that each rail garrison shall have no more than two rail entrances/exits, and that each such entrance/exit shall have no more than two separate sets of tracks passing through it (a total of four rails).

Paragraph 6 of Article VI limits the number of parking sites in each rail garrison to no more than the number of trains of standard configuration specified for that rail garrison. Train of standard configuration" is defined as a train consisting of a specified number of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and launch-associated railcars. Trains of standard configuration are specified in Annex F of the Memorandum of Understanding. Paragraph 6 also limits each rail garrison to no more than five parking sites.

Paragraph 7 of Article VI limits the number of fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs in each rail garrison to no more than the number of trains of standard configuration specified for that rail garrison. It also provides that each such structure shall contain no more than one train of standard configuration.

Paragraph 8 of Article VI provides that each rail garrison shall contain no more than one maintenance facility.

Paragraph 9 of Article VI provides the central rules that restrict the movements of both road- and rail-mobile launchers and their associated missiles. The general effect of this provision is that deployed mobile-launchers and their associated missiles are allowed to leave restricted areas and rail garrisons only for routine movements, relocations, or dispersals. Deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may leave deployment areas only for relocations or operational dispersals. "Routine movement" and "relocation" are both defined in the Definitions Annex. A "routine movement" is the movement of a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile for the purpose of training, maintenance, or testing that begins and ends at the same restricted area or rail garrison and does not involve movement to any other declared facility, except movement to the maintenance facility associated with that restricted area or that rail garrison. A "relocation" means the one-way movement of a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile from one declared facility to another declared facility, or from any location following the completion of a dispersal to a declared facility, or from any location during a routine movement to a declared facility other than to the maintenance facility associated with that restricted area or that rail garrison.

Paragraph 3(b) of Article VIII requires that notifications be given concerning these movements, in accordance with the Notification Protocol. Except for deployed road-mobile launchers and their associated missiles that are engaged within a deployment area in a routine movement, notification of the beginning and end of each of these movements is required. Notification of the beginning and end of routine movements of deployed rail-mobile launchers and their missiles is required in paragraphs 4 and 6 of Section II of the Notification Protocol. Notification of the beginning and end of relocations, for road- or rail-mobile launchers and their missiles, is required by paragraphs 9 and 10 of Section II of the Notification Protocol. Notifications of the beginning and end of an exercise dispersal, for road- or rail-mobile launchers and their missiles, are required by paragraphs 11 and 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol. Notification of operational dispersals must be given in accordance with the provisions of Section X of the Notification Protocol.

Paragraph 10 of Article VI places additional restrictions on relocations. It requires that relocations be completed within 25 days and limits the size of relocations. Specifically, no more than 15 percent of the total number of deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles or five such launchers and their associated missiles, whichever is greater, may be outside restricted areas at any one time for the purpose of relocation. No more than 20 percent of the total number of deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, or five such launchers and their associated missiles, whichever is greater, may be outside rail garrisons at any one time for the purpose of relocation.

Since there are no geographical limits on rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles during a routine movement, paragraph 11 of Article IV provides that no more than 50 percent of the total number of deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may be engaged in routine movements at any one time. There is no corresponding limit for road-mobile ICBM launchers, because such launchers must remain within a deployment area during a routine movement.

Paragraph 12 of Article VI sets forth a variety of rules concerning the trains that are used to transport rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles. These rules require such trains to be configured in such a way that they will be more easily identified. Specifically, paragraph 12 provides that all trains with deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles of a particular type shall be of one standard configuration. It also provides that all such trains must conform to that standard configuration except those taking part in routine movements, relocations, or dispersals, and except that portion of a train remaining within a rail garrison after the other portion of such a train has departed for the maintenance facility associated with that rail garrison, has been relocated to another facility, or has departed the rail garrison for routine movement. Except for dispersals, notification of variations from standard configuration shall be provided in accordance with paragraphs 13, 14, and 15 of Section II of the Notification Protocol. Paragraphs 13 and 15 of Section II of the Notification Protocol address the case of a variation from standard configuration for certain movements to the maintenance facility associated with the rail garrison, and paragraph 14 addresses the case of any variation from standard configuration for routine movements and relocations.

ARTICLE VII

Article VII sets forth the fundamental Treaty regime for the conversion and elimination of strategic offensive arms. The details of this regime are set forth in the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination.

Paragraph 1 of Article VII provides the basic rule that conversion and elimination of strategic offensive arms, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, and facilities shall be carried out pursuant to this Article and using procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. A "facility" is defined in the Definitions Annex as an ICBM base, submarine base, air base, rail garrison, maintenance facility, restricted area, parking site, silo launcher group, ICBM loading facility, SLBM loading facility, production facility, repair facility, storage facility, training facility, conversion or elimination facility, test range, heavy bomber flight test center, space launch facility, or static display site. Paragraph 1 also provides for the verification of conversion and elimination.

Paragraph 2 of Article VII provides the general rule that ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and support equipment shall be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty until they have been eliminated, or otherwise cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty, in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

Paragraph 3 of Article VII sets forth a companion rule to paragraph 2, providing that both ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty until they have been eliminated by rendering them inoperable, precluding their use for their original purpose. Thus, a Party eliminating such missiles can use whatever procedures it wants to eliminate them, as long as such elimination meets the standards set forth in this paragraph. The absence of specific elimination procedures is appropriate since there are no limits on the numbers of ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs or on SLBMs and thus no requirement ever to eliminate such ICBMs or SLBMs by any means.

Paragraph 4 of Article VII specifies the location where certain of the items subject to paragraph 2 shall be eliminated. An exchange of letters between Heads of Delegation on July 31, 1991, provides additional procedures with respect to the elimination of launch canisters for mobile ICBMs. (Such canisters are currently possessed only by the Soviet Union.) These procedures provide, in part, that the elimination of such launch canisters will be carried out in the open either in situ or at a conversion or elimination facility in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. In addition, the Twentieth Agreed Statement allows the United States and, if it changes its current practices, the Soviet Union to refurbish and reuse launch canisters following launch.

ARTICLE VIII

The six paragraphs of Article VIII provide the basic rules for data to be provided in the Memorandum of Understanding and for notifications to be provided pursuant to the Notification Protocol.

Paragraph 1 stipulates that the data base pertaining to the obligations under the Treaty is set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding. In the Memorandum of Understanding, data with respect to items subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty are listed according to categories of data. (See the discussion of the Joint Statement Regarding Data Updates with Respect to Categories of Data, in the Joint Statements Section of this analysis.)

Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article VIII set forth the basic Treaty regime in regard to notifications. Paragraph 2 provides the general obligation to provide notifications, and references the various documents pertaining to notifications. Paragraph 3 lists the ten categories of notification required by the Treaty. They include notifications concerning:

(a) data for updating the Memorandum of Understanding (eighteen different notifications are listed in Section I of the Notification Protocol);

(b) reports on the movement of items, both pre-notified and post-notified (seventeen different notifications are listed in Section II of the Notification Protocol);

(c) ICBM and SLBM throw-weight, tied to specific flight tests (four different notifications are listed in Section III of the Notification Protocol);

(d) plans for, the initiation of and the completion of conversion or elimination (seven different notifications are listed in Section IV of the Notification Protocol);

(e) cooperative measures to enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification (five different notifications are listed in Section V of the Notification Protocol);

(f) flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs and notifications concerning telemetric information (the two sets of notifications are combined since notifications on flight tests provide information to assist in collecting telemetry) (five different notifications are listed in Section VI of the Notification Protocol);

(g) new types and new kinds of strategic offensive arms (sixteen different notifications are listed in Section VII of the Notification Protocol, all but one relating to new types rather than new kinds of strategic offensive arms);

(h) changes in the content of information already notified, including the rescheduling of activities (general rules and two specific notifications are listed in Section VIII of the Notification Protocol);

(i) inspections and continuous monitoring activities (although there is a brief reference to such notifications in Section IX of the Notification Protocol, the twenty five specific notifications themselves are found in Section III of the Inspection Protocol, consistent with a decision by the Parties to place all material on inspections and continuous monitoring in a single document); and

(j) operational dispersals (seven different notifications are listed in Section X of the Notification Protocol).

Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of Article VIII specify certain procedures for notifications. Paragraph 4 stipulates that the Parties will use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers to provide and receive notifications, unless otherwise provided for in the Treaty. The Centers, which provide for continuous communication between the Parties, were established by the 1987 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. In some cases, such as when hard copies of documents or when photographs are needed, the Treaty specifies that notifications will be provided through diplomatic channels.

Paragraph 5 of Article VIII avoids confusion by codifying the current practice of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers with respect to specifying dates and times. It stipulates times will be expressed in Greenwich Mean Time, and that the dates that are listed will be the date at Greenwich.

Paragraph 6 of Article VIII provides for most of the data associated with the Treaty regime to be releaseable to the public. Specifically, all of the data listed in the Memorandum of Understanding signed in Moscow (that is, the data base current as of September 1, 1990), including photographs, may be released to the public by either Party. The United States has released this data through its publication of the Treaty text. The Parties agreed, however, that geographic coordinates and site diagrams shall not be released to the public unless otherwise agreed. While such information concerning U.S. facilities is normally unclassified, the Soviet Union wanted to deny public access to this information. Accordingly, such coordinates and diagrams were placed in a separate agreement associated with the Treaty, the Agreement Between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams Relating to the Treaty of July 31, 1991. By agreement between the Parties, each Party shall take steps to ensure that the site diagrams and geographic coordinates contained in this Agreement shall not be released to the public; however, this agreement does not preclude the U.S. from releasing information about its own facilities that is normally in the public domain.

In regard to data and other information provided pursuant to Article VIII (for example, updates to data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding) or received otherwise in fulfilling the obligations provided for in the Treaty, the Parties agreed to hold consultations on whether such data can be released. Paragraph 6 stipulates that none of the restrictions on releasing data are intended to affect the official use of the data to carry out activities related to the fulfillment of the obligations provided for in the Treaty.

ARTICLE IX

Article IX addresses the use of national technical means of verification to monitor Treaty compliance. "National technical means" is a term used in a variety of arms control treaties; it refers to those systems for collecting information useful in such monitoring. Examples include reconnaissance satellites, ships and aircraft that are used to monitor missile tests, and ground stations, such as the U.S. radar on Shemya Island in Alaska.

Paragraph 1 provides that, for the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law (such principles would include, for example, the right of a state not to have its airspace violated). This paragraph is closely based on similar provisions in earlier arms control agreements, such as paragraph 1 of Article XII of the INF Treaty.

Paragraph 2 of Article IX is adopted verbatim from paragraph 2 of Article XII of the ABM Treaty and is essentially identical to subparagraph 2(a) of Article XII of the INF Treaty. It prohibits each Party from interfering with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article IX. This means, for example, that a Party cannot destroy, blind, jam, or otherwise interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party that are used in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. Note that while paragraph 2 of Article IX prohibits interference with national technical means, the prohibition on interference with inspectors during inspections is in the Inspection Protocol.

Paragraph 3 of Article IX prohibits the use of concealment measures that impede verification by national technical means. This includes the obligation not to use concealment measures at test ranges that impede verification, such as measures that result in the concealment of ICBMs, SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, or the association between ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers during testing. The restriction on concealment measures at test ranges will better allow the Parties to monitor each other's testing programs, to ensure that the capabilities of tested systems are consistent with Treaty provisions, and to associate an ICBM or SLBM with its launcher. The obligation not to use concealment measures that impede verification of compliance does not apply to cover or concealment practices at ICBM bases and deployment areas, or to the use of environmental shelters for strategic offensive arms.

Paragraph 4 of Article IX provides that, to aid verification, each ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall have a unique identifier. A unique identifier is a non-repeating, alpha-numeric production serial number, or a copy of such a serial number. It will be applied by the owning Party, using its own technology. Detailed provisions concerning unique identifiers are set forth in Annex 6 to the Inspection Protocol.

ARTICLE X

Article X addresses access to telemetric information from flight texts of ICBMs and SLBMs." Telemetric information" is defined in the Definitions Annex as information that originates on board a missile during its flight test that is broadcast or recorded for subsequent recovery. Access to telemetric information provides useful information about the capability of missiles being tested that assists in verification of Treaty provisions concerning, for example, throw-weight and the number of reentry vehicles. Additional detailed provisions are contained in the Telemetry Protocol. In Article X, the Parties agree to make on-board technical measurements during each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM; to broadcast this information using unencrypted telemetry, with limited exceptions; and to exchange copies of telemetry tapes acceleration profiles, and interpretive data from all flight-tests.

Paragraph 1 of Article X provides the basic requirement that, during each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test will make on-board technical measurements and will broadcast all telemetric information obtained from such measurements. This not only means that measurements made on-board will be on the tape, if obtained, it also means that a Party cannot claim that it has flight tested a missile and not provided a telemetry tape on the grounds that it did not broadcast any telemetric information. Although each Party will decide for itself what measurements to make during a flight test, whatever information is obtained from measurements must be broadcast, with limited exceptions that are provided for in paragraph 6.

Paragraph 2 of Article X bans any practice that is intended to deny full access to the telemetric information. A variety of practices are specifically prohibited, including the use of encryption, jamming, narrow directional beaming, and encapsulation of telemetric information. Encryption (a practice that gives telemetric information a random character to prevent unauthorized access), encapsulation (a recording for subsequent recovery of information during the flight test of an ICBM or SLBM) and jamming (creating interference on broadcast frequencies) are all defined in the Definitions Annex. A joint statement, made at the final START Plenary meeting on July 29, 1991, specifies that the ban on narrow directional beaming (a practice allowing the signal to be received only at very limited locations) in subparagraph 2(c) is intended to ensure near-omnidirectional radiation of broadcast signals. Also, on July 29, 1991, the Parties made reciprocal statements, pledging as a gesture of goodwill to cease all encryption and jamming during flight-tests of ICBMs and SLBMs beginning 120 days after signature, for a period of one year or until entry into force, whichever is sooner.

Paragraph 3 of Article X prohibits broadcasting telemetric information from a reentry vehicle that pertains to the functioning of the missile boost stages or the functioning of the self-contained dispensing mechanism of the ICBM or SLBM. This is important, since, unlike booster and self-contained dispensing mechanism telemetry, reentry vehicle telemetry may be encrypted or encapsulated, within certain limits, and is exempt from the requirement to provide the interpretive information. This provision prohibits covert co-mingling of booster or self-contained dispensing mechanism data with the telemetric information that originates in and is broadcast from a reentry vehicle. This provision, coupled with the provisions of Section III of the Telemetry Protocol (which amplify the limited provisions for encryption and encapsulation of telemetric information), is intended to ensure that the provisions pertaining to booster and self-contained dispensing mechanism telemetry are not circumvented covertly.

Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article X set forth the basic provisions for the sharing of telemetric information through an exchange of telemetry tapes; the detailed provisions concerning this are set forth in the Telemetry Protocol.

Paragraph 4 requires each Party conducting a flight test to provide, in accordance with the Protocol, telemetry tapes to the other Party that contain a recording of all telemetric information that is broadcast during flight tests. Paragraph 5 requires that the Party also provide, in accordance with the Protocol, interpretive data to facilitate the analysis of the telemetric information. These data will identify the channels that contain the missile acceleration data, stage and RV separation commands and times. In addition, each Party will provide a profile of the missile's acceleration during its flight and other information concerning the format of the telemetry frame and channels without identifying the specific elements of each channel.

Paragraph 6 of Article X provides limited exceptions to the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2. Each Party has the right to encapsulate and encrypt on-board technical measurements from only the missile's front section or elements of the front section, including reentry vehicles, during no more than a total of eleven flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs each year. Amplifying provisions are found in Section III of the Telemetry Protocol. Taken together, paragraph 6 of Article X and Section III of the Telemetry Protocol provide the following restrictions on the eleven allowable instances of encryption and encapsulation:

No more than four encrypted or encapsulated flight tests may be conducted with each type of ICBM or SLBM that has ever been flight-tested with a self-contained dispensing mechanism.

Encapsulation is only allowed for measurements made during the plasma phase of flight tests, except for Minuteman II, for which encapsulation of reentry vehicle information is allowed throughout the flight test. The Minuteman II exception was necessary, because encapsulation is the only technique used to recover reentry vehicle measurements made throughout the missile's entire flight.

Encryption of information related to the front section, or its elements, including reentry vehicles, is only allowed on (a) flight tests of former and retired types of ICBMs and SLBMs and (b) no more than two flight tests per year on only one existing type of ICBM or SLBM.

Only information relating to the front section or its elements may be encrypted,and then only after that front section or its elements have separated from the final stage or self-contained dispensing mechanism, if the missile is so configured.

-- If a Party chooses to both encapsulate and encrypt in a single flight test, that test will count as two flight tests against the quotas specified in paragraph 6.

-- The Thirty-first Agreed Statement excludes from the Article X provisions on encryption and encapsulation objects launched by ICBMs or SLBMs into the upper atmosphere or space after such objects are in orbit or have achieved escape velocity.

ARTICLE XI

Article XI deals with inspections, exhibitions and continuous monitoring. This general Article establishes the right to conduct the twelve different types of on-site inspections (three of them associated with exhibitions), states the purpose for each type of inspection, and provides the authorization and rationale for continuous monitoring activities. Amplifying details are found in the Inspection Protocol and its Annexes and, for conversion or elimination inspections, in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

Paragraph 1 of Article XI establishes the basic right to conduct inspections and continuous monitoring activities and the basic obligation to conduct exhibitions.

Paragraph 2 of Article XI provides for baseline data inspections. Baseline data" refers to the data to be exchanged no later than 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, as provided for in paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. These data will consist of data current as of the date of entry into force. The inspections will help to confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified as being located at given facilities. Section VII of the Inspection Protocol sets forth detailed provisions relating to baseline data inspections, which will be conducted between 45 days and 165 days after entry into force.

Paragraph 3 of Article XI provides for data update inspections. Fifteen such inspections are allowed annually, beginning 165 days after entry into force (that is, after the period for baseline data inspections). No more than two such inspections may be conducted at any one facility in each year. ( Each year" is a defined term and is associated with the anniversary of entry into force.) Paragraph 2 of Section I of the Notification Protocol calls for an updated version of the Memorandum of Understanding to be issued every six months, while paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol provides for notifications of changes as they occur. Data update inspections will help confirm the accuracy of information contained in these notifications. Section VII of the Inspection Protocol sets forth the detailed provisions relating to data update inspections.

Paragraph 4 of Article XI provides for new facility inspections. Paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol requires each Party to notify the other of new facilities, including numbers and types of items at the facility. The new facility inspections, essentially identical to baseline data inspections, will help confirm the accuracy of the data specified in these notifications. Section VII of the Inspection Protocol sets forth the detailed provisions relating to new facility inspections.

Paragraph 5 of Article XI provides for each Party to conduct suspect-site inspections. The purpose of such inspections is to help confirm that covert assembly of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or covert assembly of first stages of such ICBMs is not occurring. Suspect-site inspections may be conducted at the facilities listed in paragraph 12 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding (that is, the Ogden, Sacramento and Magna facilities of the United States; and the Zlatoust, Bershet' and Petropavlovsk facilities of the Soviet Union). In addition, facilities at which continuous monitoring has ceased and facilities not subject to continuous monitoring which in the future produce ICBMs or SLBMs as large as or larger than ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs will be added to the list of facilities in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section VIII of the Inspection Protocol. Suspect-site inspections count against the quota of 15 data update inspections per year. They were included under this quota to allow more effective use of quotas under future conditions that are not known, and to avoid splitting the quota of 15 between one very large list of facilities and one list that is very small. Section VII of the Inspection Protocol sets forth the detailed provisions relating to suspect-site inspections.

Paragraph 6 of Article XI provides for reentry vehicle inspections to help confirm that deployed ICBMs and SLBMs contain no more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to them. Section IX of the Inspection Protocol sets forth the detailed provisions relating to reentry vehicle inspections. Ten such inspections are allowed annually, beginning 165 days after entry into force.

Paragraph 7 of Article XI provides for post-exercise dispersal inspections to help confirm that the mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that are located at the inspected ICBM base, including any that have not returned to the base after the dispersal, are properly accounted for. Section X of the Inspection Protocol sets forth the detailed provisions relating to post-exercise dispersal inspections. Two exercise dispersals may be conducted in any two-year period (see paragraph 1(h) of Article XIII of the Treaty); up to forty percent of the bases involved are subject to inspection following each such dispersal.

Paragraph 8 of Article XI provides for conversion or elimination inspections to help confirm the conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms. Section XI of the Inspection Protocol sets forth the detailed provisions relating to conversion or elimination inspections. The specific items whose conversion or elimination is subject to inspection are listed in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

Paragraph 9 of Article XI provides for close-out inspections to help confirm that the elimination of facilities has been completed. Section XII of the Inspection Protocol sets forth the detailed provisions relating to close-out inspections

Paragraph 10 of Article XI provides for formerly declared facility inspections to help confirm that facilities whose elimination has been notified in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, are not being used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty. A total of three such inspections are allowed annually. Section XIII of the Inspection Protocol sets forth the detailed provisions relating to formerly declared facility inspections.

Paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of Article XI provide both an obligation to conduct certain exhibitions and the right to conduct inspections during exhibitions conducted by the other Party. Technical characteristics exhibitions provided for in paragraph 11 and distinguishability exhibitions for heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs provided for under paragraph 12, will, for items existing at time of signature, be conducted within 240 days of signature under the provisions of the Agreement on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in Moscow on July 31, 1991. Subsequent exhibitions and inspections will be conducted under the provisions of the Treaty as new types and variants of strategic offensive arms are produced.

Paragraph 11 of Article XI provides for technical characteristics exhibitions of ICBMs, SLBMs, and mobile launchers. Each variant of each type of an ICBM or SLBM, and each version of each type of mobile launcher, must be exhibited. ( Variants" and versions" refer to different models" of ICBMs/SLBMs and mobile launchers, respectively. Both terms are defined in the Definitions Annex.) The purpose of such exhibitions is to help the inspecting Party to confirm that the technical characteristics of such items correspond to the characteristics that have been specified for them in the Memorandum of Understanding. Section XIV of the Inspection Protocol sets forth the detailed provisions relating to technical characteristics exhibitions.

Paragraph 12 of Article XI provides for distinguishability exhibitions for heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs. Section XV of the Inspection Protocol and Annex 4 to that Protocol set forth the detailed provisions concerning such exhibitions. The paragraph is organized into three subparagraphs merely as a means of presenting a complex subject. The subparagraph structure of paragraph 12 does not represent the need for separate exhibitions for the items discussed therein. In fact, for initial distinguishability exhibitions required to be conducted within 240 days after Treaty signature in accordance with the Agreement on Early Exhibitions, items from each of the subparagraphs are required to be exhibited together (see the analysis of the Related Agreements).

Paragraph 12 provides for the following exhibitions:

(a) Subparagraph (a) requires exhibitions of heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in order to help confirm that their technical characteristics correspond to those specified in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding; to demonstrate the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of each type and each variant is actually equipped; and to demonstrate that this number does not exceed a maximum of 20 for bombers of the United States, or a maximum of 16 for bombers of the Soviet Union. (These maximum limits are provided for in paragraphs 20 and 21 of Article V of the Treaty.) Under this subparagraph the U.S. B-52Gs and B-52Hs and the Soviet Tu-95MSs (Bear Hs) and Tu-160s (Blackjacks) that are equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be subject to exhibition.

(b) Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 12 requires that there will also be exhibitions for each type of heavy bomber from which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested. One of each variant of other categories of heavy bombers, including heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments and training heavy bombers, are required to be exhibited to demonstrate both that they are distinguishable from one another and that variants equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs are distinguishable from variants that are not so equipped. Within a type, airplanes of different categories must be different from one another, and within a single category, single variants must be distinguishable from one another. One former heavy bomber must also be exhibited and be distinguishable from all other airplanes of that type. (For heavy bombers, variant" only has meaning as a sub-classification when both the type and category are specified.) The Seventeenth Agreed Statement specifies that each Party shall determine for itself the distinguishing features of its heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, although, if the other Party considers such distinguishing features insufficient, it may raise the issue in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Under this subparagraph the U.S. B-52G and B-1 and the Soviet Tu-95U (Bear T) training heavy bomber, and several variants of the Tu-95 (Bear) heavy bomber will be subject to exhibition. The U.S. B-52C, B-52D, B-52E and B-52F heavy bombers (all no longer operational and awaiting elimination at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base) are specifically exempted by theTenth Agreed Statement.

One special provision associated with this subparagraph currently applies only to the U.S. B-1 heavy bomber. Normally, test heavy bombers are not subject to exhibition. If, however, there is no deployed heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs of a type from which such ALCMs have been flight-tested, a test heavy bomber from which such an ALCM has been flight-tested must be exhibited. While written in general terms, this provision applies only to the B-1, since that is the only currently deployed type of aircraft that fits this description. Thus, one of the two test B-1 heavy bombers that were once tested with long-range nuclear ALCMs must be displayed pursuant to this provision.

(c) Subparagraph (c) provides for exhibitions of long-range nuclear ALCMs in order to help confirm their technical characteristics. In the future, such exhibitions will also demonstrate the differences, notification of which has been provided in accordance withparagraph 13, 14, or 15 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, that makes long-range non-nuclear ALCMs distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. There is no requirement that these differences preclude a hypothetical capability to physically install a nuclear warhead in the long-range non-nuclear ALCM. The Soviets sought provisions precluding such capability; the United States rejected them. Thus, the Parties agreed that the verification of long-range non-nuclear ALCM distinguishability would be limited to the procedures of Section IV of Annex 4 to the Inspection Protocol. Neither Party had, at time of signature, any such long-range non-nuclear ALCMs. The Tacit Rainbow, a radar-suppression air-to-surface missile, was cancelled before it reached the point at which it would have had to be declared as a long-range non-nuclear ALCM.

Paragraph 13 of Article XI provides for baseline exhibitions, between 45 and 165 days after entry into force, of all heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, all training heavy bombers, and all former heavy bombers existing at entry into force and listed in the initial exchange of data provided under paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. Section XV of the Inspection Protocol sets forth the detailed provisions concerning such exhibitions, whose purpose is to demonstrate that such airplanes are equipped as they have been declared to be equipped. These provisions complement paragraph 13 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol which provides for inspection of each heavy bomber converted after entry into force into a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments, a training heavy bomber or a former heavy bomber.

Paragraph 13 also provides that a baseline exhibition will be conducted after a heavy bomber type is first tested with long-range nuclear ALCMs. The inspecting Party at such an exhibition will have the right to inspect 30 percent of the heavy bombers of such a type that are equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs at each air base specified for such heavy bombers, in order to demonstrate to the inspecting Party that airplanes that are not supposed to be equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs are in fact not so equipped. The language in paragraph 13 would apply to the U.S. B-2 heavy bomber, which is the only existing type of heavy bomber not subject to exhibition or inspection under any provisions of the Treaty, and to any future penetrating bombers not initially outfitted as long-range nuclear ALCM carriers. The B-2, or such a future penetrating bomber, would be subject to exhibition under this paragraph only if and when it is tested with a long-range nuclear ALCM. Note that the same event also requires a distinguishability exhibition pursuant to paragraph 12 of this Article.

Paragraph 14 of Article XI provides each Party the right to conduct continuous monitoring activities at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBM in order to help confirm the number of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs produced. The facilities subject to such monitoring are listed in paragraph 3 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding (that is, the Thiokol Strategic Operations Peacekeeper Final Assembly Facility in Promontory, Utah for the United States, and the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Votkinsk, Russian Federated Soviet Socialist Republic and the Pavlograd Machine Plant, Pavlograd, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic for the Soviet Union). Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol and Annex 5 to that Protocol set forth the detailed provisions concerning continuous monitoring activities.

ARTICLE XII

Article XII addresses cooperative measures, which are special actions that a Party will take, upon request, to assist the other Party in its verification efforts using reconnaissance satellites. Article XII provides for cooperative measures applicable to road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, and heavy bombers. Section V of the Notifications Protocol provides for the notifications related to these cooperative measures.

Paragraph 1 of Article XII contains the basic requirements to conduct a cooperative measure in response to a request. Requests for a cooperative measure must be made in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section V of the Notification Protocol.

Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 1 addresses cooperative measures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Upon appropriate request, each Party is required to display in the open the road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within restricted areas specified by the requesting Party. The number of such launchers to be displayed for each request is limited in that a request may not specify a total number of restricted areas at which are based more than ten percent of the total number of deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of the requested Party. The launchers that may be specified in such a request must be contained within one ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMS. The display will be accomplished by opening the roofs of fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs for the duration of a display, for each specified restricted area. (This provision, in effect, requires that roofs must be designed to be capable of being opened.) The road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within the restricted area will be displayed either located next to or moved halfway out of such fixed structures. The term fixed structure for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs" is defined in the Definition Annex as a unique structure, within a restricted area, that can contain road-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 1 address cooperative measures for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Upon appropriate request, each Party is required to display in the open the rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at parking sites specified by the requesting Party. The launchers will be displayed by removing the entire train from its fixed structure and locating the train elsewhere within the rail garrison. The number of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs subject to display pursuant to each request will include all the launchers located at up to eight parking sites, although no more than two parking sites may be requested within any one rail garrison in any one request. Requests concerning specific parking sites will include the designation for each parking site. Although subparagraph l(b) specifies that these site designations are listed in Annex A to the Memorandum of Understanding, they are not. The designations were removed from Annex A during the final stages of negotiations as part of the agreement to place geographic coordinates in the separate Agreement on Exchange of Coordinates and Site Diagrams, thus protecting them from public disclosure. Since the coordinates for specific sites were no longer included in Annex A, the Parties agreed to place the names of parking sites on site diagrams. Through an oversight, Article XII was not corrected to conform with this new arrangement. The United States will raise this matter in the JCIC, so that the numerical designations will be added to Annex A during the initial update of data, which, pursuant to paragraph l of Section I of the Notification Protocol, will be provided 30 days after entry into force.

Subparagraph (c) of paragraph 1 addresses cooperative measures for heavy bombers. Upon appropriate request, each Party is required to display in the open all heavy bombers and former heavy bombers located within one air base specified by the requesting Party, except those heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that are not readily movable due to maintenance or operations. The heavy bombers and former heavy bombers will be displayed by removing the entire airplane from its fixed structure, if any, and locating the airplane within the air base. Those heavy bombers and former heavy bombers at the air base specified by the requesting Party that are not readily movable due to maintenance or operations will be specified by the requested Party in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section V of the Notification Protocol. Such a notification will be provided no later than 12 hours after the request for display has been made.

Paragraph 2 of Article XII provides for procedures concerning cooperative measures and limits the number of such measures. It requires that the items displayed pursuant to paragraph 1 be displayed in open view without using concealment measures. It stipulates that each Party will have the right to make seven requests for displays each year, but that it cannot request a display at any particular ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, any particular parking site, or any particular air base more than twice each year. In paragraph 5 of Article XIV, a Party is given the right to two additional requests in the event of an operational dispersal, which do not count toward the quotas above. In any single request, a Party may ask only for a display of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, a display of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or a display of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers. A display will begin no later than 12 hours after the request is made and will continue until 18 hours have elapsed from the time that the request was made. Paragraph 2 also addresses the situation where a display cannot be conducted due to circumstances brought about by force majeure. Force majeure is generally understood to mean forces beyond one's control. In such circumstances, the requested Party will provide notification to the requesting Party in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section V of the Notification Protocol, the display will be cancelled, and the number of requests to which the requesting Party is entitled will not be reduced.

Finally, paragraph 3 of Article XII sets forth rules to prevent a cooperative measure and an inspection from being conducted simultaneously at a facility.

ARTICLE XIII

Article XIII provides special provisions to deal with exercises involving mobile ICBMs and heavy bombersspecifically, exercise dispersals" of mobile ICBMs and major strategic exercises" involving heavy bombers. In the case of exercise dispersals of mobile ICBMs, the number of such dispersals is limited by subparagraph 1(h). In the case of major strategic exercises involving strategic bombers, a Party can hold as many such exercises as it wants, but only in the one exercise notified annually, pursuant to the Agreement on Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises (see the analysis of the Related Agreements), do the provisions of Article XIII apply. In both the cases of exercise dispersals and the one notified major strategic exercise, the duration of the exercise is limited, some inspection rights are suspended during the exercise, and additional verification provisions are provided following the exercise. For exercise dispersals of mobile ICBMs these additional verification provisions are not included in Article XIII but are found in paragraph 7 of Article XI, which provides a right to conduct post-exercise dispersal inspections following each exercise dispersal.

Paragraph 1 of Article XIII deals with exercise dispersals of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles from restricted areas or rail garrisons. Such an exercise dispersal may involve either road-mobile launchers of ICBMs or rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or both road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. The paragraph provides rules for the conduct of such exercise dispersals. Exercise dispersals result in the temporary suspension of some of the Treaty's verification provisions regarding mobile ICBMs. If an exercise dispersal has been notified, the other Party may not designate an ICBM base involved in the dispersal for a data update or reentry vehicle inspection, nor request cooperative measures at such a base. In the case of road-mobile ICBMs, restrictions on movements during an exercise dispersal are similar to those imposed on the routine movements of such launchers and missiles on a day-to-day basis, i.e., there are no restrictions on the number of launchers and missiles that may be outside of their restricted areas, but all such movements are confined to the deployment area. In the case of rail-mobiles, however, an exercise dispersal suspends constraints on the number of launchers and missiles that may otherwise be outside of their rail garrisons on routine movements and relocations.

Subparagraphs 1(a) and 1(b) specify the date and time at which the exercise dispersal shall be considered to have begun and to have been completed, while subparagraph 1(c) provides for identifying the ICBM bases which will be considered to be involved in an exercise dispersal.

Subparagraphs 1(d) and 1(e) prescribe the treatment of mobile ICBMs engaged in routine movements or relocations when an exercise dispersal begins. Both routine movement" and relocation" are defined in the Definitions Annex. A routine movement is a movement of a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile for the purpose of training, maintenance, or testing that does not involve formally changing facility locations. A relocation is a one-way movement of a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile between facilities (or from any location following the completion of a dispersal to a declared facility). Mobile ICBM launchers engaged in routine movement are considered part of an exercise dispersal; mobile ICBM launchers engaged in relocation are not.

Subparagraph 1(f) supplements subparagraphs 1(d) and 1(e) for movements beginning after the start of the dispersal. It provides that all deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs departing a restricted area or rail garrison of an ICBM base involved in the dispersal shall be considered to be part of the dispersal, except for such launchers and missiles that relocate to a facility outside their associated ICBM base.

Subparagraphs 1(g) and 1(h) limit the duration and frequency of exercise dispersals. Subparagraph 1(h) also bans exercise dispersals during the period provided for baseline data inspections (i.e., from 45 days to 165 days after entry into force) and bans dispersals from a new ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs until a new facility inspection has been conducted or the period of time provided for such an inspection has expired. This ensures that the initial conditions at an ICBM base will be known to the other Party before an exercise dispersal is conducted. Finally, subparagraph (h) ensures that exercise dispersals cannot be used to circumvent the inspection regime by banning such dispersals from bases which have been designated for a data update inspection or reentry vehicle inspection until completion of such an inspection.

Subparagraph 1(i) suspends the right of the other Party to conduct data update inspections, reentry vehicle inspections, or cooperative measures at ICBM bases already involved in an exercise dispersal. As noted above, if a base has been designated for inspection prior to the notification of an exercise dispersal, the inspection will be conducted.

Subparagraph 1(j) mandates that deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs shall have returned to the normal Treaty regime before a Party can declare the end of the exercise dispersal.

Paragraph 2 of Article XIII deals with the specific major strategic exercises involving heavy bombers about which notification has been provided pursuant to the Agreement on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises. Its structure parallels that of paragraph 1. The Agreement requires notification no less than 14 days in advance of one such exercise per year. For the United States, this exercise has been the annual Global Shield exercise.

Subparagraphs 2(a) and 2(b) specify the date and time at which the exercise shall be considered to have begun and to have been completed, while subparagraph 2(c) requires the identification of the air bases that will be considered to be involved in the exercise.

Subparagraph 2(d) limits the duration and frequency of major strategic exercises involving heavy bombers about which a notification is given pursuant to the Agreement on Reciprocal Advance Notifications of Major Strategic Exercises. While a Party may have more than one exercise if it wants, it is required to give notice of only one exercise annually. Any additional exercises would not be notified or subject to the exemptions and constraints of paragraph 2. Thus, this provision limits to one the number of major strategic exercises during which there is no right of the other Party to conduct inspections, but it does not limit the overall number of such exercises.) Subparagraph 2(e) bans such a notified major strategic exercise during the period provided for baseline data inspections(i.e., from 45 days to 165 days after entry into force).

Subparagraph 2(f) bans inspections of air bases involved in the exercise. Inspections may be conducted three days after notification of the completion of a major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers has been provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

Subparagraph 2(g) allows an additional cooperative measure, outside the annual quota of seven per year, at one of the air bases involved in the exercise. The request for this cooperative measure must be made within 30 days. Note that, while there is a three-day waiting period before inspections may resume, the request for a cooperative measure may be made any time after notification of the completion of the exercise has been provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

ARTICLE XIV

Article XIV provides a mechanism for the Parties to suspend significant provisions of the Treaty when required to ensure the survivability of their strategic forces. Although such a suspension is termed an "operational dispersal," it should not be confused with the exercise dispersal" provided for in Article XIII. Operational dispersals are far broader and can involve the entire strategic forces (i.e., SLBMs and heavy bombers, as well as ICBMs) of a Party. In view of the central importance of preserving the survivability of their strategic forces, the Parties were unwilling to place any restrictions on the number, frequency, or duration of operational dispersals. In the Seventh Agreed Statement, however, the Parties specify that such operational dispersals shall only be conducted for national security purposes in time of crisis when a Party considers it necessary to act to ensure the survivability of its strategic forces. The Seventh Agreed Statement further expresses the agreement of the Parties that, in practice, operational dispersals will occur rarely.

Paragraph 1 of Article XIV establishes the right to conduct operational dispersals and specifies that there shall be no limit on the number and duration of such dispersals nor on the number or type of forces involved. When an operational dispersal begins, all strategic offensive arms of a Party are considered to be part of the dispersal. Subparagraphs 1(a) and 1(b) specify that the beginning and end of an operational dispersal will be established based on the notifications provided in accordance withparagraphs 1 and 2 of Section X of the Notification Protocol. The timing of the beginning and the end of such dispersals is thus entirely at the discretion of the dispersing Party.

Paragraph 2 of Article XIV lists the Treaty provisions that may be suspended during an operational dispersal. A Party need not suspend all of these provisions; the individual subparagraphs of paragraph 2 may be applied independently of each other. The selection of the provisions that may be suspended was based on the agreement of the Parties that the specified provisions could endanger survivability of strategic forces or provide militarily significant information to the other Party. Note that the provisions of this paragraph apply equally to each Party. The Party not conducting the dispersal has the same right to suspend provisions of the Treaty, and need not declare an operational dispersal in order to exercise this reciprocal right.

Subparagraph 2(a) allows suspension of nearly all notifications. Notification of flight tests of ballistic missiles are not suspended since, in the tension surrounding a period of crisis, such flight tests could be misinterpreted as hostile acts. In addition, if conversion or elimination is to continue, the relevant notifications must be given.

Subparagraph 2(b) allows suspension of the right to conduct inspections. Note that the right to conduct continuous monitoring may not be suspended under Article XIV.

Subparagraphs 2(c) and 2(d) allow suspension of the right to request cooperative measures and suspension of conversion and elimination processes for strategic offensive arms. Cooperative measures already in progress would not be completed and, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article XIV, would not count toward annual quotas. If conversion and eliminations are suspended, the number of converted and eliminated items must correspond to the number actually converted and eliminated as of the time of the start of the operational dispersal. This precludes a Party from claiming, after the dispersal, that it had eliminated items during a dispersal without the other Party having the opportunity to verify their elimination.

Paragraph 3 of Article XIV provides time frames for the resumption of notifications and for the resumption of inspections. It also specifies that inspections or cooperative measures in progress when a Party suspends inspections or cooperative measures during an operational dispersal shall not count under the appropriate annual quotas. Paragraph 5 of Section X of the Notification Protocol requires that, when notifications resume, a Party that suspended notifications must provide all of the information that the other Party would otherwise have received had notifications not been suspended. These provisions are intended to ensure that the Parties have the same information upon completion of an operational dispersal that they would have had if the operational dispersal had not taken place.

Paragraph 4 of Article XIV specifies the required disposition of certain strategic forces at the time an operational dispersal is completed. A dispersing Party may not declare the completion of the dispersal until these conditions have been met. As noted above, the decision as to when to declare that a dispersal is complete is entirely at the discretion of the Party conducting the dispersal.

Subparagraphs 4(a) and 4(b) ensure that mobile ICBMs will once again be in compliance with the normal Treaty regime prior to declaring the end of an operational dispersal. Subparagraph 4(c) requires heavy bombers to have returned to within national territory and to have resumed normal operations". Normal operations" are not further defined. Subparagraph 4(c) was included to provide reassurance to the Soviet Union that heavy bombers would not remain in close proximity to Soviet territory following an operational dispersal. If heavy bombers remain outside national territory for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty, diplomatic consultations must be undertaken so that appropriate assurances can be provided.

Paragraph 5 of Article XIV gives a Party not conducting the operational dispersal the right, within 30 days following the dispersal, to make no more than two requests for cooperative measures at ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs or air bases. These requests will not count in the annual quota of seven requests established in paragraph 2 of Article XII, and are not subject to the limit of two requests per base each year. These additional cooperative measures aid in ensuring that the Parties have all of the information at their disposal that they would have had if the dispersal had not occurred.

ARTICLE XV

Article XV establishes the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) and sets forth the responsibilities of that Commission in terms of promoting the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. Except for the addition of subparagraph (c), on applying the provisions of the Treaty to a new kind of strategic offensive arm, the language of Article XV is parallel to the language of Article XIII of the INF Treaty, establishing the INF Special Verification Commission. Provisions governing the operation of the Commission are found in the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

Article XV establishes the JCIC as the framework within which the Parties would resolve any question related to compliance with the Treaty and agree on any additional measures that might be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.

Subparagraph (c) of Article XV assigns the Commission the duty to resolve questions related to the application of relevant provisions of this Treaty to a new kind of strategic offensive arm, after notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol. Once such a notification has been provided, there can be no question that the new kind of strategic offensive arm is subject to the Treaty. The question of how the Treaty is to be applied, however, whether by regulating the new arm, along with the related question of how any limits will be applied, or whether to ban such a system, is to be settled within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

Neither Party may veto the deployment of the other Party's new kind of strategic offensive arm if the Parties are unable to agree within the Commission on the application of the relevant provisions of the Treaty. If, however, deployment by one Party results in disagreement about whether that Party is complying with Treaty limits, the deploying Party would be obligated to attempt to resolve the issue. There is no obligation to delay deployment pending such resolution. (See the discussion of new kinds of strategic offensive arms in the analysis of Article I of the Treaty and of the Second Agreed Statement.)

In accordance with Section IV of the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, Article XV of the Treaty and the entire Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission are applied provisionally from the date of Treaty signature. This procedure is necessary to establish a forum for agreeing upon a number of implementing details required prior to entry into force. These details include:

Agreement on procedures for tape demonstrations prior to an initial demonstration both of telemetry tapes and of the appropriate equipment for playing back the telemetric information recorded on such tapes. (Telemetry Protocol, Section I, subparagraph 4(h)). Agreement on the content of an example illustrative of interpretive data and missile acceleration profile to be provided through diplomatic channels or during the initial tape demonstration. (Telemetry Protocol, Section II, paragraph 3).

Agreement on procedures for additional confirmation of the dimensions of first stages of Soviet SLBMs. (Inspection Protocol, Annex 11, paragraph 5).

Agreement on maximum weight of equipment and supplies hand-carried on one airplane for a monitored facility. (Inspection Protocol, Section IV, paragraph 14).

Agreement on technical specifications for U.S. PPCM equipment listed in Annex 9 to the Inspection Protocol. This agreement is required prior to first in-country use. (Inspection Protocol, Section VI, paragraph 17).

Agreement on technical specifications for Soviet equipment listed in Annexes 8 and 9 to the Inspection Protocol, once the Soviets have provided names of manufacturers and models for such equipment. This agreement is required prior to first in-country use. (Inspection Protocol, Section VI, paragraph 17).

Agreement on additional procedures for the use of satellite positioning equipment and radiation detection equipment prior to first use of such equipment. (Inspection Protocol, Annex 8, Section VI, subsections E and F).

Agreement, prior to the start of monitoring and site surveys of facilities subject to continuous monitoring, on cargo inventory lead times and on procedures for repacking equipment inspected at the point of entry. (Inspection Protocol, Annex 7, paragraphs 1 and 6). Monitoring and site surveys of facilities subject to continuous monitoring may begin 30 days after entry into force.

ARTICLE XVI

Article XVI bars the Parties from assuming any international obligations or undertakings in conflict with the Treaty and commits them to consultations within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission if ambiguities arise. The phrase obligations or undertakings" covers both formal written agreements and informal arrangements between governments. The First Agreed Statement, which obligates the Parties not to transfer strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty to third states, should be read in conjunction with this Article.

The first two sentences of this Article simply restate customary international law and the responsibilities already prescribed for the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission in Article XV. They are thus redundant. The significance of the Article lies in the final sentence, which specifies that patterns of cooperation, including obligations, existing at the time of signature of the Treaty, between a Party and a third state are exempt from the obligations of Article XVI. The only such pattern of cooperation by either Party existing at the time of Treaty signature is the longstanding pattern of cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom.

The phrase "pattern of cooperation," while not defined, is broader than any specific, currently existing sales or cooperation agreement. On July 29, 1991, in the final plenary meeting of the START negotiations, the United States made a formal statement with regard to the scope of its longstanding pattern of cooperation with the United Kingdom. The United States stated that it attaches great importance to the role played by the United Kingdom's independent nuclear deterrent in helping maintain world peace, and that the United States has, for many years, helped maintain and modernize that deterrent. The United States further stated that this is what it referred to as the "existing pattern of cooperation" between the United States and the United Kingdom, which currently includes agreement by the United States to sell the United Kingdom the Trident II weapon system. The Soviet side took written note of this statement and explicitly acknowledged that the existing pattern of cooperation between the United States of America and the United Kingdom in the area of strategic offensive arms currently" consists of the provision by the United States of Trident-II SLBMs to the United Kingdom. Thus the Parties understand that "pattern of cooperation" refers to maintaining an independent deterrent and not to any specific weapon system or any specific category of strategic offensive arms. The Soviets tried to limit the pattern of U.S.-U.K. cooperation to the Trident II, then, failing that, to SLBMs only. The U.S. rejected categorically any such constructions of the U.S.-U.K. pattern of cooperation. (See the additional discussion in the analysis of the First Agreed Statement.)

The Soviet Union made a formal statement, dated July 31, 1991, that it does not have any such patterns of cooperation with other countries. (The U.S. and Soviet statements, titled Statements on Non-Circumvention," are addressed in detail in the Other Statements" section of this analysis.)

ARTICLE XVII

Article XVII consists of three paragraphs covering ratification, entry into force, duration, extension, and withdrawal.

Paragraph 1 of Article XVII formally incorporates all Treaty Annexes, Protocols, and the Memorandum of Understanding as integral parts of the Treaty. Paragraph 1 also specifies that the Treaty is subject to ratification prior to entering into force. As specified in the Telemetry Protocol and the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, however, some Treaty provisions are provisionally applied as of the date of signature. These provisions include:

Article XV, establishing the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission;

The Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission;

Subparagraph 4(a) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol, which provides for a demonstration of equipment for playing back telemetry tapes within 120 days of signature;

Paragraph 3 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol, which provides notification of a request to acquire such equipment following the demonstration; and

Paragraph 3 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, which provides for an exchange of illustrative interpretive data and acceleration profile within 120 days of signature.

Paragraph 2 of Article XVII provides a duration of 15 years for the Treaty (unless superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms), allows extension in five-year increments, and mandates a meeting between the Parties no later than fourteen years after signature to consider whether to extend the Treaty. Extension is not automatic but must be agreed between the Parties; such an extension would not constitute an amendment to the Treaty and would not be subject to ratification. Extension in other than five-year increments would require amendment to the Treaty and would be subject to ratification. The 15-year duration was a U.S. proposal accepted by the Soviet Union. It was based on the recognition that 10 years would be too short, given the length of time required to negotiate START and the seven-year period of reductions. At the same time, 20 years would be too long, given unpredictable political developments and technological changes which inevitably occur over time.

Paragraph 3 of Article XVII, identical in content to paragraph 2 of Article XV of the INF Treaty, provides each Party the right to withdraw from the Treaty on six-months notice if extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty (i.e., to strategic offensive arms) have jeopardized its supreme interests. The statement of the United States concerning the START/ABM relationship, and the statement of the Soviet Union concerning the interrelationship between the reductions in strategic offensive arms and compliance with the ABM Treaty, demonstrate that the Parties hold diverging views on whether the START withdrawal clause can be invoked on the basis of certain strategic ballistic missile defense activities. (See discussion in the "Other Statements" section below.)

ARTICLE XVIII

Article XVIII provides for amendments to the Treaty. Such amendments would be subject to ratification as specified in Article XVII. The START Treaty, like the INF Treaty, contains a provision at the end of each of the Protocols and, unlike the INF Treaty, at the end of the Memorandum of Understanding, that permits the Parties to agree on additional measures to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty." This authority is circumscribed by means of a follow-on statement that changes that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty shall be agreed upon in the JCIC, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty." Thus, this provision clarifies that, while substantive rights and obligations cannot be changed absent an amendment to the Treaty, minor matters of an administrative or technical nature relating to the detailed procedures of the Protocols and Memorandum of Understanding may be altered through agreement of the Parties.

The reason that a provision permitting such changes in the Protocols and Memorandum of Understanding is required is the likelihood, given the highly complicated verification-related procedures contained in those documents, that such procedures would have to be modified or changed to improve their viability and effectiveness, as a result of lessons learned in the course of their implementation. Such changes will thus facilitate the subsequent implementation of the Treaty regime.

Examples of measures envisioned under this provision are changes to the content of notifications, replacement of placeholder" provisions with agreed language (e.g., weight limits for equipment and supplies for monitors, see paragraph 14 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol), changes in categories of data, changes in elimination procedures, types and quantities of equipment and the method of use of such equipment, and changes in JCIC rules of procedure.

Changes to the Treaty, the Agreed Statements Annex, and the Definitions Annex are not covered by the provision concerning measures to improve the "viability and effectiveness of the Treaty." Accordingly, any changes to texts in those documents, except to make technical corrections in the text, and except in the limited number of special cases noted below, could only be made as amendments and, thus, would be subject to ratification.

In several cases, the Parties made an exception to this general rule. Recognizing that modifications to a limited number of specific provisions of the Treaty, Agreed Statements Annex, or Definitions Annex could be required in the normal course of events, the Parties included provisions explicitly authorizing such changes be made by mutual agreement. The changes so authorized include the following:

Agreeing on when a converted mobile launcher of ICBMs becomes accountable as containing a different type of ICBM (subparagraph 7(b) of Article III).

Agreeing to change the number of allowed space launch facilities, the number of launchers allowed at such facilities, or the aggregate number of silo and mobile launchers allowed at such facilities (paragraph 4 of Article IV).

Agreeing to allow rebasing a silo-based single-warhead ICBM in a mobile basing mode (paragraph 4 of Article V).

Agreeing to allow the public release of geographic coordinates of START facilities or of site diagrams for those facilities (paragraph 6 of Article VIII).

Agreeing not to treat a specific ICBM or SLBM as one maintained, stored, and transported in stages, notwithstanding the fact that a separate first stage for such a missile (or an uncanisterized ICBM) has been discovered at a prohibited location (Twenty-eighth Agreed Statement).

Agreeing to allow launches of ICBMs or SLBMs from waterborne vehicles other than submarines or from airplanes for space launch purposes (Thirtieth Agreed Statement).

Agreeing not to consider a specific type of bomber as a heavy bomber even if it fulfills the criteria in the heavy bomber definition (Definitions Annex, Heavy Bomber definition).

In each of these cases, the Parties elected to give themselves the option to make specific modifications to the Treaty provisions in the future. Electing to exercise those previously authorized options would not constitute an amendment to the Treaty.

ARTICLE XIX

Article XIX provides standard provisions from international law for registration of the Treaty pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. The decision to place geographic coordinates (which will not be released to the public) in a separate agreement, and to append site diagrams (which are also not released to the public) to that separate agreement, avoids the need to preserve any part of the Treaty as confidential. Thus the entire Treaty, including all Protocols and Annexes and the Memorandum of Understanding, can be registered with the United Nations.

FINAL PROVISION

The final paragraph of the Treaty records that the Treaty was done at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Footnotes:

1 Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed at Washington December 8, 1987, United States-U.S.S.R. S. Treaty Doc. No. 11 100th Cong., 2nd Sess.; 28 ILM 90

2 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London and Moscow July 1, 1968, entered into force March 5, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161

3 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile System, signed at Moscow May 26, 1972, entered into force October 3, 1972, United States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503

4 Treaty on the Principles Governingg the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial bodies, signed at Washington, London, and Moscow January 27, 1967, entered into fore October 10, 1967, 16 U.S.T. No. 6347.

5. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Dstruction on the Seabead and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof, signed at Washington, London and Moscow February 11, 1971, enterred into force may 18, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337

6. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and underwater, signed at Moscow August 5, 1963, entered into force October 10, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433.

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE ANNEX ON AGREED STATEMENTS STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE ANNEX

The Annex consists of thirty-eight agreed statements in which the Parties codified their understanding of various Treaty provisions. The agreed statements serve primarily to interpret existing Treaty provisions, to document the intent of the Parties to deal with certain future contingencies, or to provide specific exceptions to Treaty provisions. In addition, some provisions agreed upon late in the negotiations were codified as agreed statements, rather than being placed in the other Treaty documents. These statements are legally binding and the Annex in which they have been incorporated is an integral part of the Treaty. There is no significance to the order in which the statements appear in the Annex.

First Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement obligates the Parties not to transfer strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty to third states. The statement makes it clear, however, that patterns of cooperation, including obligations, existing at the time of signature of the Treaty, between a Party and a third state are exempt from this statement as well as from the obligations of Article XVI of the Treaty not to assume any international obligation in conflict with the provisions of the Treaty. Transfers of strategic offensive arms under existing patterns of cooperation are notified in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.


The Parties have acknowledged that the only existing pattern of cooperation with a third State involving the transfer of strategic offensive arms by either Party is the longstanding pattern of cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom. During the negotiations, the United States made clear not only that it would accept no START constraints on its pattern of cooperation with the United Kingdom, but also that START provisions did not apply to United Kingdom deterrent forces. In a formal statement handed over on December 9, 1989, the United States stressed that the United Kingdom has the legal and sovereign right to maintain an independent nuclear deterrent, and that the United States attaches great importance to this right. The formal U.S. statement noted that the United States is committed to a broad pattern of close cooperation with the United Kingdom to maintaining and modernizing that capability. This includes, with regard to strategic weapon systems, agreements by the United States to sell the United Kingdom the Trident II weapon system under the provisions of a longstanding bilateral agreement.

As the formal US statement noted, under this agreement the United States will also provide to the United Kingdom continuing support for this weapon system, including the use of US SLBM support and missile test range facilities. Storage and preparation for issue of all non-deployed Trident II missiles for the United Kingdom will be provided at King's Bay, Georgia in the United States. US negotiators emphasized that, as a sovereign nation, the United Kingdom has the right to test and deploy the Trident II missile with any warhead configuration the UK deems appropriate. This would not affect the number of accountable warheads attributed to the US Trident II missile tests under START. The United Kingdom's exercise of its sovereign right to conduct Trident II missile tests or deployment activity in no way constitutes circumvention of any provisions contained in the START Treaty. In this regard, US negotiators noted that utilization of any US SLBM test range and associated facilities (including maintenance facilities) to support United Kingdom Trident II flight test and deployment are consistent with the exercise of United Kingdom sovereignty and with US obligations under the START Treaty.

On July 11, 1990, the US Chief Negotiator clarified that any ICBM or SLBM launched from a test range, or from anywhere else on US soil, will be treated as a US missile; and that any such launch will be conducted in full conformity with all Treaty requirements, including the limits on the number of re-entry vehicles. On the other hand, as the US had indicated in the past, launches of United Kingdom missiles from United Kingdom submarines are a subject solely a matter for the United Kingdom. In addition, US support to the United Kingdom, which includes the use of radio and radar equipment within US test ranges for missile tracking support, is not regulated by the Treaty. Upon completion of the US statement, the Soviet Chief Negotiator said that the Soviet Union was satisfied with the assurances presented by the United States. (In the foregoing analysis, and in the formal statements to the Soviet Union during the negotiations, the phrase "test range" was used in a broad, general sense and was intended to include facilities that provide support for at-sea testing, such as the US Eastern Test Range in Cape Canaveral, Florida. In the START Treaty, "test range" has the narrower, defined meaning of a land area from which launches of ICBMs or SLBMs are conducted. The Eastern Test Range is not considered to be a test range within the meaning of the START Treaty.) (For additional discussion of the statements on non-circumvention, see the "Declarations and Statements" section of this analysis.)

Second Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement underscores the right to raise for consideration in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, in accordance with subparagraph (c) of Article XV of the Treaty, the question of a new arm that one Party considers might be a new kind of strategic offensive arm, whether or not the notification provided for in paragraph 16 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol has been given. This agreed statement does not alter the substantive rights or obligations of either Party and is included only for emphasis.

Third Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement excepts the Soviet SS-11 ICBMs from:

(a) the counting rule, contained in subparagraph 4(d) of Article III of the Treaty, that provides that each reentry vehicle of an ICBM or SLBM shall be considered to be one warhead; and

(b) the prohibition, contained in paragraph 13 of Article V of the Treaty, on flight-testing or deploying an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it. Notwithstanding these exemptions, the SS-11 may not be tested with more than three "multiple reentry vehicles" (commonly known as an "MRV" system, in contrast to a MIRVed system.) The SS-11 ICBM is the only existing ICBM or SLBM of either Party equipped with multiple reentry vehicles that are not independently targetable. Some SS-11 ICBMs are deployed with three such reentry vehicles. Notwithstanding this fact, the SS-11 is counted as only "one" against the warhead limits found in Article II.

Fourth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement specifies that the definition of the term "air-to-surface ballistic missile (ASBM)" is not intended to describe any missile that sustains flight, or any missile the payload of which sustains flight, through the use of aerodynamic lift over any portion of its flight path. This excludes boost glide vehicles from being considered to be ASBMs, which are banned by subparagraph 18(d) of Article VI of the Treaty. Such boost glide vehicles (also known as hyper velocity vehicles) might be considered new kinds of strategic offensive arms, depending on the parameters of the system. In a formal written statement on January 7, 1991, the United States advised Soviet negotiators that the Pegasus space launch system, which uses newly designed and manufactured three-stage missiles to boost payloads into each orbit, did not meet the definition of either a "weapons-delivery vehicle" or a "ballistic missile" and thus that Pegasus was not relevant to the START Treaty. The Soviet side accepted this statement.

Fifth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement limits the exception, contained in subparagraph 2(d) of Article V of the Treaty, to the prohibition against producing, testing, or deploying additional silo launchers of heavy ICBMs. The exception for silo launchers of heavy ICBMs that replace silo launchers of heavy ICBMs that have been eliminated in accordance with Section II of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol shall apply only in the case of silo launchers destroyed by accident or in the case of other exceptional circumstances that require relocation of the existing silo launchers. If relocation is required, the reasons and plans for the relocation shall be provided in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission prior to carrying out the relocation. The "exceptional circumstances" which might require relocation have been explained by the Soviet side as circumstances relating to the internal political situation in the Soviet Union. (See the discussion of the letter of December 6, 1990 from Defense Minister Yazov and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to Secretaries Cheney and Baker, and the letter of December 30, 1990 from Shevardnadze to Baker in the "Certain Correspondence" part of this analysis.)

Sixth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement clarifies the treatment for purposes of the Treaty of three airplanes of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as 3M or Myasishchev, known to the United States of America as Bison, which have been converted to transport oversized cargo associated with the Soviet space shuttle. Thus, without this agreed statement there could be ambiguity over how to count these three airplanes, since they are not reconnaissance airplanes, tanker airplanes, or jamming airplanes, and therefore do not meet the definition of the term "former heavy bomber." The Parties also agree that all other airplanes of the Myasishchev type will be considered to be former heavy bombers, and therefore subject to the limit in paragraph 3(a) of Article IV.

Seventh Agreed Statement.

This statement clarifies that the Parties intend to limit their exercise of the right, contained in paragraph 1 of Article XIV, to conduct operational dispersals to situations solely for national security purposes in time of crisis when a Party considers it necessary to act to ensure the survivability of its strategic forces. This statement also makes clear the intent of the Parties that, although there are no limits on the number and frequency of such operational dispersals, in practice it is expected that they will occur rarely. These understandings are necessary since the Parties have the right to suspend many Treaty provisions during operational dispersals, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article XIV.

Eighth Agreed Statement.

This statement clarifies the prohibition, contained in paragraph 28 of Article V of the Treaty, against basing strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty outside the national territory of the Party. For the United States, "national territory" includes Guam, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, and the Virgin Islands, in addition to the territory of the fifty states and the District of Columbia.

(a) Subparagraph (a) of this statement provides that such arms shall be based only within national territory at permanent bases specified in the Treaty (i.e., listed in the Memorandum of Understanding or subsequent updates) that are equipped to support the long-term operation of strategic offensive arms. This statement also makes it clear that paragraph 28 of Article V does not affect the rights of the Parties under international law relating to the passage of submarines or flights of aircraft, or relating to visits of submarines (including ballistic missile submarines) to ports of third states. This ensures that the prohibition against basing outside national territory will not hamper the movement or visits of submarines or aircraft.

(b) Subparagraph (b) of this statement makes clear the right of the Parties to station temporarily heavy bombers outside their national territory for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty. This could include conventional military operations against a third state. If, however, a Party stations such bombers outside its national territory for more than 30 continuous days, it must inform the other Party through diplomatic channels before the end of the 30th day. If a Party stations more than 30 heavy bombers outside its national territory at any one time, it must inform the other Party within 48 hours.

(c) Subparagraph (c) of this statement obligates the Parties to discuss any ambiguity and, if necessary, to provide information to resolve concerns if they arise. Such discussions could occur through diplomatic channels as well as the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Parties also do not rule out the possibility that clarifications provided in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission might include inspections or visits, including visits to locations outside national territory. However, the Treaty does not confer such an inspection right to the Parties.

Ninth Agreed Statement.

This statement clarifies the prohibition, contained in subparagraph 19(a) of Article V of the Treaty, against flight-testing with nuclear armaments an aircraft that is not an airplane, but that has a range of 8000 kilometers or more, and against equipping such an aircraft for nuclear armaments or deploying such an aircraft with nuclear armaments. Since the range of lighter-than-air aircraft, such as balloons, drifting aerostats, and dirigibles, is indeterminate, the agreed statement in effect applies the prohibition to all such lighter-than-air aircraft.

Tenth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement clarifies the treatment and inspection of certain US heavy bombers and of the Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, which is a specified conversion or elimination facility for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers.

(a) Subparagraph (a) of this statement exempts from exhibition and from the obligation to provide technical data or photographs the heavy bombers designated by the United States of America as, B-52C, B-52D, B-52E, and B-52F. These heavy bombers are in long-term storage at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base and are generally not in safe condition for inspection. They thus could not be made available for detailed exhibition pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI. The United States must locate these heavy bombers only at Davis-Monthan. None of these heavy bombers may depart Davis-Monthan before the bomber has been eliminated in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

(b) Subparagraph (b) of this statement provides for a baseline data inspection of Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, notwithstanding the fact that conversion or elimination facilities are not among the facilities specified for such inspections in paragraph 5 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol. This subparagraph also provides for data update inspections at the conversion or elimination facility at Davis-Monthan if at any time the total number of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that have been located at that base for more than seven days, and upon which the elimination process has not been initiated, exceeds five. Such an inspection shall count against the quota of 15 such inspections per year, with no more than two at any one facility, provided for in paragraph 2 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol.

(c) Subparagraph (c) of this statement modifies the procedures for baseline data inspections and data update inspections at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base. Inspectors shall have the right only to count the B-52C, B-52D, B-52E and B52-F heavy bombers, and to view them as they are found. Inspectors shall have the right to inspect other heavy bombers and former heavy bombers in accordance with the procedures provided for in Section II of Annex 4 to the Inspection Protocol, but only to the extent that the condition of such airplanes allows such procedures to be carried out. In many cases, heavy bombers at Davis-Monthan are without landing gear or hydraulic systems; thus, for example, opening of bomb bay doors is impossible.

(d) Subparagraph (d) of this statement provides for similar procedures for a Soviet heavy bomber conversion or elimination facility if, in the future, the Soviet Union has a facility that corresponds to Davis-Monthan. This provision was included in the interest of reciprocity.

Eleventh Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement makes it clear that the Conversion or Elimination Protocol intentionally omits procedures either for the elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs containing a stage equipped with a liquid-propellant main rocket engine or for the elimination of heavy bombers that have no tail sections. At the time of Treaty signature, neither Party possessed a liquid-propellant ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs. The Parties did not consider it necessary at this time to develop procedures for eliminating an airplane such as the B-2 that does not have a tail section. This agreed statement further provides that these items shall not be eliminated until procedures have been agreed to in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Nevertheless, these items may otherwise be removed from accountability under the Treaty by exercising the appropriate provisions of:

(a) Section VII of the C or E Protocol, which provides for removal from accountability of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs as a result of flight tests or static testing; or

(b) Section VIII of that Protocol, which provides for removal from accountability of Treaty-limited systems that are converted for use as ground trainers or static displays, or that are lost accidentally or disabled beyond repair.

Twelfth Agreed Statement.

This statement clarifies the treatment of the Soviet Tu-95RTs maritime reconnaissance airplane (known to the United States as Bear D), the Soviet Tu-142 antisubmarine warfare patrol airplane (known to the United States as Bear F), the Soviet Tu-142 maritime communications relay airplane (known to the United States as Bear J), and the Soviet Tu-95U training heavy bomber (known to the United States as Bear T). The definition of a heavy bomber excludes bombers tested, equipped, and configured exclusively for maritime operations, provided such bombers are not models or modifications of an accountable heavy bomber. The term "modification of an accountable heavy bomber" means having a design essentially identical to the design of an accountable heavy bomber. The Tu-95RTs (Bear D), although built on the airframe of a heavy bomber, was designed and built as a maritime patrol airplane. The Tu-142 (Bear F/J), although designated by the Soviet Union as a separate type of airplane from the Tu-95, has a design essentially identical to the design of the Tu-95 heavy bomber.

The agreed statement provides that none of these airplanes shall be considered to be former heavy bombers. At the same time, the phrase "notwithstanding the definition of the term 'former heavy bomber'" makes it clear that other airplanes having a design essentially identical to the design of the Tu-95 heavy bomber shall be considered former heavy bombers.

The treatment and exhibition of the Bear D is provided for in an exchange of letters between heads of delegation on July 31, 1991. In those letters, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics informed the Government of the United States of America that: such airplanes are not heavy bombers nor have they been equipped with air-to-surface weapons or undergone conversion; such airplanes possess a variety of external features distinguishing them from heavy bombers of the TU-95 type; and that the Soviet Union has 37 such airplanes, all of which are based at naval air bases. (See analysis of the Letters Exchanged by Heads of Delegation)

This agreed statement further provides that all Soviet Tu-95U airplanes formerly known to the United States of America as Bear E and now known as Bear T shall be considered to be training heavy bombers, and thus subject to the limit in paragraph 3(a) of Article IV.

Thirteenth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement provides that the United States of America may locate engineering models of silos at the repair facility for ICBMs at Hill Air Force Base, Utah. There are currently three such engineering models at Hill Air Force Base; they are used for engineering development and may, in some cases, contain and support more than one type of missile. Without this clarification, such silos could be considered to be silo launchers of ICBMs. This agreed statement limits the number of such models located at this facility to four.

This number was chosen to ensure that all four US ICBMsMinuteman II, Minuteman III, Peacekeeper, and the Small ICBMcould be supported simultaneously. Moreover, such models are also subject to the limitations on silo training launchers provided for in subparagraph 2(e) of Article IV of the Treaty, including counting against the numerical limitation of 60 training launchers found in that subparagraph. Also, such models shall: be specified in the Memorandum of Understanding as a separate category; not be subject to inspection; and be subject to elimination procedures in accordance with Section II of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

Fourteenth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement provides an exception to the 100 kilometer minimum distance, specified in subparagraph 11(a) of Article IV of the Treaty, between an ICBM storage facility and a deployment area. The existing ICBM storage facilities located at Khrizolitovyy and Surovatikha, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, are thus "grandfathered" and may be located no less than 20 kilometers from any deployment area, provided that the distance between such facilities and any restricted area or maintenance facility of an ICBM base for road-mobile launchers ICBMs is no less than 60 kilometers. However, such storage facilities may not be re-established after they have been eliminated in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

Fifteenth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement provides an exception to the 100 kilometer minimum distance, specified in subparagraph 11(d) of Article IV of the Treaty, between a training facility for ICBMs and a test range. The existing training facility for ICBMs at Plesetsk, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, is "grandfathered" and shall be exempt from this provision. However, no more than 12 non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs may be located at this facility and this facility may not be reestablished after its elimination in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. The special treatment of this training facility is necessary because of the proximity of the Plesetsk training facility to the Plesetsk test range.

Sixteenth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement clarifies the provisions of subparagraph 9(d) of Article III of the Treaty, which specify that, if a launcher other than a soft-site launcher has contained an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type, it shall be considered to be a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs of that type.

This agreed statement stipulates that, as of the date of signature of the Treaty, each existing ICBM launcher or SLBM launcher is capable of launching only an ICBM or SLBM of the type specified for that launcher in the Memorandum of Understanding, notwithstanding what other type of ICBM or SLBM it may have contained in the past.

Seventeenth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement clarifies the provisions for distinguishability of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers. The Parties agree that the fact that a specific airplane is "not equipped" for a particular kind of armament shall be confirmed by distinguishing features. The agreed statement was included following agreement to reject a Soviet interpretation of the phrase "not equipped" as meaning that the airplane "cannot be equipped" for particular armaments. As a result, the phrase "not equipped" implies nothing about a hypothetical "capability" to be equipped for particular armaments.

This agreed statement specifies that each Party shall determine for itself the distinguishing features of its heavy bombers and former heavy bombers. A Party's freedom to select distinguishing features is not absolute, however. In a statement for the record on July 21, 1991, made to counter Soviet claims that US distinguishing features would be inadequate, US negotiators made it clear that the United States had a responsibility to select "meaningful" distinguishing features that would allow the Soviet Union to identify and distinguish the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber. A similar responsibility applies to the Soviet Union. If the other Party considers such distinguishing features insufficient, it may raise the issue in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

Eighteenth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement explains that, because there are no heavy bombers permanently based at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, the base, which is used periodically by US heavy bombers for operations, has not been specified as an air base for heavy bombers in the Memorandum of Understanding (and is thus not subject to inspection). The Parties also agree that, if in the future the United States of America permanently bases such bombers at this base, all applicable provisions of the Treaty will apply. This agreed statement does not alter the substantive rights or obligations of either Party and is included only for emphasis.

Nineteenth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement sets out the conditions under which mobile space launchers and space launch boosters associated with such launchers could be developed. Such systems, which neither side currently possesses, could be addressed in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, and would be allowed provided that:

(a) mobile space launchers and their associated boosters have differences from ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers and from ICBMs and SLBMs, respectively, that are observable by national technical means of verification;

(b) mobile space launchers do not contain an ICBM or SLBM;

(c) the number of mobile space launchers and their associated boosters that are produced and stored do not exceed space launch requirements; and

(d) mobile space launchers and their associated boosters are not located at an ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs or an ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. While additional conditions could always be agreed in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, if the foregoing conditions are met, mobile space launchers and space launch boosters associated with such launchers would be allowed. Thus, the Treaty does not allow one Party to exercise a veto over such a deployment by the other Party. If a Party deployed mobile space launchers, and the other Party believed that the above conditions had not been met, it could, of course, raise the matter as a compliance concern.

Twentieth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement provides an exception to the requirement, specified in paragraph 4 of Article VII, that a launch canister remaining at a test range or an ICBM base after the flight test of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be eliminated only in the open, in situ, or at a conversion or elimination facility. At the time of signature, only the Soviet Union employed launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs; the existing Treaty provisions are consistent with current Soviet practice. This agreed statement preserves the US right to refurbish and reuse launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs (e.g., for the Small ICBM), in the future. This agreed statement also provides that, if the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics changes its existing practice for the elimination of such launch canisters, it will have the same right. Notification of the movement of such launch canisters to a refurbishment location shall be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers no later than five days after the completion of the movement; the content of such a notification has not been included in the Notification Protocol and would have to be agreed between the Parties at the time.

Twenty-first Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement clarifies that the requirement, specified in paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, to provide notifications for "each change in data for categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding" is intended to mandate only one notification for each event that results in changed data, regardless of the number of categories for which data must be changed. For example, converting an ICBM to be a static display would require only a single notification, although it could require changes to the following portions of the Memorandum of Understanding: Section II (Aggregate Numbers); Section IV (Additional Aggregate Numbers); Annex A (ICBMs and ICBM Launchers) aggregate section; Annex A (ICBMs and ICBM Launchers) individual base section; and Annex I (ICBM Static Displays).

Twenty-second Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement sets out the arrangements for conducting continuous monitoring activities under this Treaty concurrently with continuous monitoring activities at the same facility under the INF Treaty. The focus of this agreed statement is to retain the integrity of the continuous monitoring regime under both Treaties. Without specifying all the provisions that overlap, the Parties have provided a framework for eliminating duplication that would occur if the Parties performed the same procedures under both Treaties. Thirty days after START entry-into-force, concurrent continuous monitoring activities will take place at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Continuous monitoring is permitted under INF to help ensure that the SS-20 missile is not being produced there.

(a) Subparagraph (a) of this agreed statement requires that issues relating to this subject be agreed upon prior to entry into force of this Treaty, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission and the Special Verification Commission (for the INF Treaty). An agreement on these issues, however, shall not affect substantive rights or obligations of the Parties under either Treaty. Even if the Parties agreed to suspend certain provisions of one Treaty, the corresponding or identical rights or obligations pertaining to such provisions of the other Treaty would continue.

(b) Subparagraph (b) of this agreed statement provides the framework for reaching agreement on START-INF concurrent continuous monitoring issues. During the period when continuous monitoring at Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, USSR, is conducted concurrently under both Treaties, the Parties pledge to ensure the application of continuous monitoring procedures under both Treaties. However, the engineering site survey provided for in the START Treaty will not be conducted at the Votkinsk facility because a permanent continuous monitoring system is already in place. In cases where the continuous monitoring procedures under both Treaties are identical, the Parties agree that such procedures may be performed only once, although the results will be recorded, as appropriate, in both the continuous monitoring report (for START) and the inspection report (for INF). The Parties shall agree on a list of the specific provisions of the INF Treaty and its Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Implementation of the Verification Provisions that are to be suspended at INF continuous monitoring facilities upon entry into force of the START Treaty. Such provisions that are to be suspended include those relating to pre-inspection requirements, notifications, activities beginning upon arrival at the point of entry, and general provisions related to continuous monitoring. Agreement on such a list shall not be considered to be an amendment to the INF Treaty proper. The provisions of the INF Treaty or its implementing documents may be suspended either by making amendments to the Memorandum of Agreement or by employing the "measures to improve the viability and effectiveness" clause of the INF Protocol on Inspections.

The Parties shall also agree upon a list of the specific provisions of the START Treaty that, in connection with the suspension of the INF provisions, shall apply at such facilities from the date of entry into force of the START Treaty. Once continuous monitoring activities commence under paragraph 14 of Article XI of the Treaty, such activities performed under both Treaties shall be conducted by a team of no more than 30 monitors. Issues related to increasing the quota of monitors for maintenance of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system and replacement of monitors shall be governed by the provisions of the Inspection Protocol of the START Treaty. Equipment at Votkinsk used for continuous monitoring under the INF Treaty may be used for continuous monitoring under the START Treaty, even after termination of the INF Treaty, if the purpose of such equipment coincides under both Treaties. However, equipment the use of which is not provided for under START may only be used under INF. Equipment for use exclusively under START may be sent to and installed at Votkinsk in accordance with that Treaty. Specific issues that arise in connection with the concurrent application of continuous monitoring procedures under both Treaties may be addressed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission and the Special Verification Commission.

(c) Subparagraph (c) of this agreed statement prohibits concurrent inspection at a facility subject to both Treaties. Moreover, there must be a pause of not less than six days between an inspection conducted at such a facility under one Treaty and the commencement of an inspection conducted under another. There are no restrictions on the time between one inspection under the INF Treaty and a second inspection under the INF Treaty, or on the time between one inspection under the START Treaty and a second inspection under the START Treaty.

While the START Treaty generally has no effect on the substantive rights or obligations of the Parties under the INF Treaty, the restrictions on the timing of inspections contained in subparagraph (c) of this Agreed Statement alter the inspection provisions of paragraph 1 of Article XI of the INF Treaty. The INF Treaty places no limit on the time between sequential inspections at SS-25 bases that are former SS-20 missile operating bases (inspectable under INF as formerly declared facilities).

The Twenty-second Agreed Statement does not allow an inspection under the INF Treaty if a START inspection has been held at the facility during the preceding six days. Thus, for as long as START is in force and INF inspections are being conducted, the timing of INF inspections at these converted bases will be circumscribed. START also has an effect on INF obligations due to the fact that in START, pursuant to paragraph 5 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol, each Party has the right to change the perimeter of a monitored facility. This would allow the Soviet Union to change the perimeter of their facility at Votkinsk. That facility, however, is also a missile support facility under the INF Treaty. Paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the INF Treaty prohibits changes to the boundaries of missile support facilities. Thus, the provision in the START Treaty would alter an obligation under the INF Treaty.

Twenty-third Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement clarifies the prohibition, specified in paragraph 25 of Article V of the Treaty, against having underground facilities accessible to ballistic missile submarines by specifying that the term "accessible" in this paragraph means able to be entered on the surface of the water, while submerged, or while partially submerged. The phrase "on the surface of the water" makes it clear that storing small waterborne craft in these structures through land access is not prohibited.

This agreed statement further specifies that the USSR will not make the underground structures located in the immediate vicinity of the Ara Inlet, the Yagel'naya Submarine Base, and the Pavlovskoye Submarine Base, all of which the Soviet side has stated are used for purposes unrelated to the Treaty, accessible to any waterborne craft of any displacement whatsoever. This latter provision is designed to preclude the possibility that work to make the existing structures accessible even to small surface craft also could make the structures accessible to ballistic missile submarines. There is a fourth such facility located in the Black Sea. Since ballistic missile submarines do not operate in the Black Sea, the Parties agreed that this facility need not be mentioned in this agreed statement.

Twenty-fourth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement clarifies the meaning, for purposes of warhead attribution, of "a front section of a fundamentally new design." Subparagraph 4(b) of Article III of the Treaty specifies that, except for those with front sections of a fundamentally new design that carry more than one reentry vehicle, ICBMs and SLBMs of new types shall be attributed with a number of warheads equal to the maximum number with which they have been flight-tested, but in no event less than the nearest integer that is smaller than the result of dividing 40 percent of the accountable throw-weight of the ICBM or SLBM by the weight of the lightest reentry vehicle flight-tested on an ICBM or SLBM of that type. In the event of a new type with a front section of a fundamentally new design with more than one RV, the question of the applicability of the 40 percent rule would be determined by the JCIC. Rather than attempt to define what a front section of "fundamentally new design" is, the agreed statement specifies what it is not: it is not a front section with the essential features of any existing design as of entry into force; it is not a front section with a self-contained dispensing mechanism that dispenses reentry vehicles to different aim points sequentially; and it is not a front section on an ICBM or SLBM, the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles.

The statement also requires that the fundamentally new nature of such a design be verifiable by national technical means of verification.

In paragraph 4(b) of Article III of the Treaty and in the Twenty-fourth Agreed Statement, the words "front section" in the phrase "front section of a fundamentally new design" are used in a unique sense. Although the defined term "front section" excludes the self-contained dispensing mechanism, the Parties used "front section of a fundamentally new design" to refer to the entire payload of an ICBM or SLBM. The presence or absence of a self-contained dispensing mechanism is a significant factor in determining the existence of a front section of a fundamentally new design.

Twenty-fifth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement clarifies that an ICBM or SLBM of a type, a dimension of which differs from that of another ICBM or SLBM of the same type by more than three percent, but by less than that necessary to qualify as a new type, must be considered to be a "variant," as the term is defined in the Treaty. Furthermore, a Party may declare an ICBM or SLBM to be a variant if its dimensions differ by less than three percent from those of another ICBM or SLBM of the same type.

Twenty-sixth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement sets out the conditions for declaring a portion of the territory of an eliminated ICBM base as a space launch facility. Such a space launch facility is still subject to the provisions of subparagraph 4(b) of Article IV of the Treaty, which limit the aggregate number of silo launchers of ICBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs located at space launch facilities to no more than ten, unless otherwise agreed, and to the provisions of subparagraph 11(c) of Article IV of the Treaty, which set forth a minimum distance of 100 kilometers between space launch facilities and ICBM bases or deployment areas.

(a) Subparagraph (a) of this agreed statement requires that, first, all strategic offensive arms and support equipment be removed, and second, that all silo launchers of ICBMs or fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs be eliminated in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, except those launchers or structures located in the portion of the territory of the ICBM base that the Party intends to declare subsequently as a space launch facility. Silo launchers or fixed structures located in that portion of the territory are exempt from the provisions of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Only after the elimination inspection of the base can the space launch facility be declared. Thereafter, non-deployed ICBMs are allowed to be located at space launch facilities pursuant to subparagraph 9(a) of Article IV.

(b) Subparagraph (b) of this agreed statement mandates that all activity associated with strategic offensive arms shall cease and shall not subsequently resume at the ICBM base.

(c) Subparagraph (c) of this agreed statement requires that a close-out inspection be conducted at the ICBM base to confirm that the elimination of the base has been completed

(d) Subparagraph (d) of this agreed statement prohibits the reestablishment of such eliminated ICBM bases.

e) Subparagraph (e) of this agreed statement makes clear that nothing in the agreed statement affects the obligation of the USSR to eliminate, by actual destruction, 154 SS-18 silo launchers no later than seven years after entry into force of the Treaty. In this regard, no SS-18 silo launchers of ICBMs among the 154 launchers to be eliminated shall be retained for use at a space launch facility. The Soviet Union could convert to space launch purposes SS-18 silos from among the 154 not required to be eliminated, but only by eliminating all other SS-18 silo launchers at a specific ICBM base.

In addition, the Parties resolved a conflict between the general provisions applicable to space launch facilities (which are not inspectable) and the general provisions applicable to eliminated facilities (which are inspectable) by specifying in this agreed statement that the portion of the territory which has been declared as a space launch facility shall be exempt from inspection during a formerly declared facility inspection of the ICBM base.

Twenty-seventh Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement exempts the six existing soft-site launchers located at Cape Canaveral, Florida, from the provisions of paragraph 9 of Article V of the Treaty which prohibit location of such launchers except at test ranges and space launch facilities. These launchers are currently not being used but may be required in the future. Without this agreed statement, the United States would have been required either to declare a test range or space launch facility in Florida, encompassing these launchers, or to destroy them. This exemption continues until such time as such launchers contain or launch an ICBM or SLBM after the date of signature of the Treaty; to be in compliance with the Treaty, the United States would need to declare a test range or space launch facility encompassing these launchers before taking such a step.

Twenty-eighth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement sets out the limitations on the location of a first stage of an ICBM or SLBM that is maintained, stored, and transported as an assembled missile without a launch canister. Such a stage may be located separate from other stages of such a missile only at a production facility for such ICBMs or SLBMs or a location specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding where static testing of first stages occurs or a conversion or elimination facility for ICBMs or SLBMs, or, for ICBMs and SLBMs other than mobile ICBMs, other locations where such an ICBM or SLBM is eliminated or at an exhibition site. Moreover, such a stage may be moved between these locations only in connection with an exhibition conducted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty as well as in connection with an elimination of such ICBMs or SLBMs. The statement makes clear that, if such a stage is located separate from other stages at a location other than those specified, then all ICBMs or SLBMs of that type shall thereafter be considered, for the purposes of the Treaty, to be ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, unless otherwise agreed.

This agreed statement also sets out the limitations on an assembled missile or first stage of an ICBM that is maintained, stored, and transported as an assembled missile in its launch canister. Such a missile or stage may be located outside its launch canister only at a production facility for such ICBMs; for first stages of such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, locations specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, where solid rocket motors of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs may be tested with or without nozzles attached; for other such ICBMs not subject to the limitations contained in paragraph 10 of Article IV of the Treaty, a location, specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, where static testing of first stages occurs; a conversion or elimination facility for ICBMs, or, for ICBMs other than ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, another location where such an ICBM is eliminated; or an exhibition site.

Such a first stage may be moved between these locations only in connection with an exhibition conducted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty as well as in connection with the elimination of such ICBMs. If, however, such a missile is located outside its launch canister, or such a first stage is located separate from other stages of such a missile, at a location other than these locations, all ICBMs of that type shall thereafter be considered, for the purposes of the Treaty, to be ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, unless otherwise agreed.

Twenty-ninth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement makes it clear that the STARS booster (Strategic Target System) is not the same as the Polaris A-3 SLBM. STARS uses first and second stage boosters from "former type" Polaris A-3 missiles, but adds a third-stage motor. STARS thus has a different number of stages than Polaris A-3. The STARS booster is considered to be a booster used only for research and development purposes under the provisions of paragraph 12 of Article VII of the INF Treaty.

Paragraph 12 of Article VII of the INF Treaty allows the Parties, under specified conditions, to produce and use only existing types of booster stages for certain booster systems that might otherwise be considered to be intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles. Under the INF Treaty, there are no restrictions on telemetry encryption for such boosters. The result of this agreed statement is that STARS is not subject to any START provisions.

Thirtieth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement provides for the possibility of launching ICBMs and SLBMs for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space from waterborne vehicles other than submarines or from airplanes other than heavy bombers or former heavy bombers. Unless the Parties agree to such launches, the launches would be in violation of subparagraphs 18(a) and 18(d) of Article V of the Treaty. Provisions concerning such launches shall be agreed in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

This agreed statement does not, however, waive any rights or obligations of the Parties related to the non-proliferation of missiles and missile technology, stipulated in the Washington Summit Joint Statement of June 1, 1990. If the Parties agree to allow such launches, this agreed statement provides the legal basis for doing so without amending the Treaty. Since the Treaty itself, unlike the Protocols, has no provision permitting "changes not deemed to be amendments," without this agreed statement the Parties would lack authority to alter subparagraphs 18(a) and 18(d) of Article V of the Treaty without formally amending the Treaty.

Thirty-first Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement exempts from the provisions of Article X of the Treaty and of the Telemetry Protocol objects launched by ICBMs or SLBMs used to deliver objects into the upper atmosphere or space, after such objects either are in orbit or have achieved escape velocity. This means that full encryption and encapsulation would be permitted on such an object (for example, a communications satellite) after it reaches orbit or attains escape velocity, and that a Party launching such an object undertakes no obligation to make available any telemetry tapes for the portion of the flight of such an object after it reaches orbit or attains escape velocity. All provisions of Article X and of the Telemetry Protocol would apply to the object prior to its reaching orbit or attaining escape velocity.

Thirty-second Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement mandates agreement in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on the procedures for establishing the throw-weight accountability of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type in the event that a Party deploys an ICBM or SLBM of that type prior to its eighth flight test. Without this agreed statement the throw-weight accountability in such a situation would be ambiguous, since subparagraph 3(b) of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol provides that, under certain conditions, none of the first seven flight tests need be taken into account in determining the accountable throw-weight, while paragraph 1 of Section III of the Notification Protocol ties the notification of certain data related to determination of accountable throw-weight to the eighth flight test of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type.

The reference to paragraph 4 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol (which provides for notification that a prototype ICBM or prototype SLBM shall be considered an ICBM or SLBM of a new type) does not affect the substance of the agreed statement.

Thirty-third Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement provides special provisions for the treatment of no more than two US ballistic missile submarines that, at Treaty signature, are equipped with Poseidon SLBMs and that may be subsequently modified for use as special purpose submarines. This agreed statement allows the United States to modify two special purpose submarines that we use to support combat swimmer delivery vehicles (i.e., devices that put swimmers into the water from submarines) without either (a) the expense of eliminating the SLBM launchers, or (b) making the submarines and their home ports subject to the inspection provisions of the Treaty. Except for the removal of the SLBMs themselves, there are no specific conversion procedures specified in the Treaty for these special purpose submarines. In describing US plans for such submarines to the Soviet side, however, US negotiators specified on November 20, 1990, that these submarines would be unable to launch missiles.

(a) Subparagraph (a) of this agreed statement requires that such submarines be permanently based only at ports other than submarine bases (defined in the Treaty as bases for ballistic missile submarines) specified in the Memorandum of Understanding. Such ports shall be specified in paragraph 11 of Annex I of the Memorandum of Understanding and shall not be subject to inspection. There are no restrictions on the locations of these ports nor are there any prohibitions on special purpose submarines visiting submarine bases specified in the Memorandum of Understanding.

(b) Subparagraph (b) of this agreed statement requires that the United States of America open all the launch tubes on such a submarine, when so requested and when such a submarine is located at its home port, in order to demonstrate that they do not contain SLBMs. After receipt of such a request, such a submarine shall not leave the port until the display is completed. If both special purpose submarines are located in the same home port when a request is made, both submarines shall be displayed, and the request shall count as one request for each such submarine.

(c) Subparagraph (c) of this agreed statement gives the USSR the right to make two such requests per submarine each year. In the event the United States of America is unable to conduct such a display because of the absence of such submarine from the port, it shall provide notification and the request shall not count against the quota. While the content of the request is provided in paragraph 5 of Section V of the Notification Protocol, no specific content is provided for the notification of the inability to comply with the request due to the absence of the submarine from port.

(d) Subparagraph (d) of this agreed statement makes clear that, until they are eliminated in accordance with Section IV of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, the 16 launchers on each special purpose submarine shall continue to count as 16 launchers against the aggregate limit of 1,600 provided for in Article II of the Treaty and to count as 160 against the 6,000 and 4,900 warhead limits also provided therein. When all launchers of Poseidon SLBMs have been converted or eliminatedexcept those contained on the two special purpose submarines, test launchers, and launchers at space launch facilitiesthe Poseidon SLBM shall be considered to be a retired type of SLBM for all purposes under the Treaty, including those purposes associated with exemptions to the ban on encryption of telemetry.

Thirty-fourth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement clarifies how the criteria contained in subparagraph (f) of the definition of the term "new type" provided for in the Definitions Annex are to be applied. That subparagraph provides one of the criteria by which an ICBM or SLBM will be considered of a different type from other ICBMs or SLBMs as follows: "throw-weight, by an increase of 21 percent or more, in conjunction with a change in the length of the first stage by five percent or more." This agreed statement provides details of how these changes are to be measured.

(a) Subparagraph (a) of this agreed statement provides that the 21 percent increase in throw-weight and the five percent change in length of the first stage shall each be determined in relation to an ICBM or SLBM of the same existing type or the same previously declared new type. Thus an ICBM could not be considered a new type if it differed from one existing type of ICBM by 21 percent throw-weight and differed from a separate existing type of ICBM by a five percent change in the length of the first stage.

(b) Subparagraph (b) of this agreed statement simply refers to the requirement of paragraph 15 of Annex J of the Memorandum of Understanding as the reference on how the length of the first stage is to be specified for purposes of confirming a new type of ICBM or SLBM on the basis of a change in length of the first stage.

(c) Subparagraph (c) of this agreed statement makes it clear that there are no special provisions required by the new types definition for determining the throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM of an existing type or previously declared new type. The throw-weight involved shall be the accountable throw-weight specified in the Memorandum of Understanding.

(d) Subparagraph (d) of this agreed statement provides that the throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM of a type declared to be a new type shall be the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in flight tests of an ICBM or SLBM of that type to a range of no less than 11,000 kilometers for an ICBM, or a range of no less than 9,500 kilometers for an SLBM. These ranges were selected to be the same as the ranges specified in paragraph 3 of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol for use in determining the maximum calculated throw-weight of a new type of ICBM or SLBM. If an ICBM or SLBM of a type declared to be a new type is not capable of being flight-tested to such a range, it shall be flight-tested to a range of no less than 10,000 kilometers for an ICBM, or a range of no less than 8,500 kilometers for an SLBM.

(e) Subparagraph (e) of this agreed statement modifies subparagraph (d) and provides that should an ICBM of any type be declared to be a new type in relation to the Soviet SS-25 ICBM on the basis of an increase in throw-weight in conjunction with a change in the length of the first stage, the throw-weight of the new type of ICBM shall be the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in flight tests to a range of no less than 11,000 kilometers. This provision was included to deal with the fact that the SS-25 already has been flight-tested with its maximum demonstrated throw-weight to a range in excess of 10,000 kilometers. Thus, if a new type based on the SS-25 were not flight-tested to 11,000 kilometers, the Soviets would be able to demonstrate a significant increase in throw-weight without significant redesign of the missile, and thereby require less than a real 21% increase in throw-weight in order to be considered a new type.

Thirty-fifth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement provides for the reimbursement of certain unequal costs incurred in the provision of telemetry data tapes pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article X of the Treaty and Section I of the Telemetry Protocol. The Party that provides in any one year such tapes for a greater number of flight tests shall be reimbursed the difference in the tape-associated costs. There are no provisions for reimbursement if a Party, because of its collection procedures, must provide more tapes per flight than the other Party. Tape-associated costs are those associated with the purchase of the tapes and the copying of telemetric information onto the tapes, rather than those associated with the development of a taping system. Specific costs to be included, as well as the procedure for the reimbursement, are subject to agreement in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. This agreed statement does not address the question of the currency of reimbursement.

Thirty-sixth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement provides that the USSR may conduct only one inspection at any one time at each of the following bases: Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota; Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota; Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota; and Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri. Each of these bases, except Whiteman, is listed in the Memorandum of Understanding as both an ICBM base and an air base for heavy bombers (Whiteman is projected as a B-2 base). Thus, in theory any of these bases could simultaneously be required to host an inspection of the heavy bomber portion and the ICBM portion of the base. Limiting inspections to only one at any one time at a given base reduces the administrative and operational burden on the base. Nothing in this agreed statement prohibits simultaneous inspections at more than one of these bases.

Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement contains a number of provisions on the treatment of ICBMs or SLBMs of former or retired types as well as on the treatment of the one test launcher located at the Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, test range, that is equipped for flight-testing only the Minuteman I.

(a) Subparagraph (a) of this agreed statement provides that retired single-warhead ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not count against the limit of 250 non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in subparagraph 1(a) of Article IV of the Treaty. Retired ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of types which have ever had more than one warhead attributed to them shall count against the non-deployed limit.

(b) Subparagraph (b) of this agreed statement provides that the limitations on the number of ICBMs and SLBMs at test ranges and at space launch facilities provided for in subparagraphs 1(d) and 4(c) of Article IV of the Treaty, respectively, shall apply to ICBMs of retired types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, but not to other retired or former types of ICBMs or SLBMs.

(c) Subparagraph (c) of this agreed statement provides that the restrictions on the locations of non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs provided for in subparagraph 9(a) of Article IV of the Treaty shall not apply to ICBMs or SLBMs of former or retired types except for ICBMs of retired types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

(d) Subparagraph (d) of this agreed statement provides that retired types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not be located at ICBM bases or submarine bases.

(e) Subparagraph (e) of this agreed statement provides that data on ICBMs or SLBMs of former and retired types shall not be included in the Memorandum of Understanding except for the technical characteristics contained in Annex F for such retired (but not former) types. Retaining technical characteristics in Annex F provides a formal way to preserve the dimensions of retired types of ICBMs and SLBMs as an aid to inspectors in identifying these retired ICBMs and SLBMs, and as a baseline for new types determination.

(f) Subparagraph (f) of this agreed statement provides that retired single-warhead ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not be subject to the procedures contained in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol for elimination or removal from accountability. Retired ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of types which have ever had more than one warhead attributed to them shall continue to be subject to these procedures.

(g) Subparagraph (g) of this agreed statement provides that the provisions of Section IV of the Notification Protocol (i.e., notifications related to conversion or elimination) shall only apply to retired ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs which have ever had more than one warhead attributed to them and not to other retired or former ICBMs or SLBMs.

(h) Subparagraph (h) of this agreed statement effectively provides that launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of a former or retired type (as opposed to the ICBMs or SLBMs themselves) shall continue to be subject to all provisions of the Treaty. In particular, such launchers shall be subject to the numerical limitations on test launchers and on launchers at space launch facilities contained in subparagraphs 2(d) and 4(b) of Article IV of the Treaty, respectively.

(i) Subparagraph (i) of this agreed statement modifies subparagraph (h) and provides that the one Minuteman I test launcher located at the Vandenberg Air Force Base, California test range shall not be counted against the limits on the number of test launchers provided for in Article IV of the Treaty nor be subject to the notification requirements of Article VII of the Treaty, unless it is converted to launch other ICBMs or SLBMs.

Thirty-eighth Agreed Statement.

This agreed statement makes clear that there are no provisions in paragraph 23 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol for establishing reference cylinders in order to determine size criteria for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs containing a first stage equipped with a liquid-propellant main rocket engine. At the time of Treaty signature, neither Party possessed a liquid- propellant ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Procedures for establishing such reference cylinders shall be agreed in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission prior to the deployment of such ICBMs.

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE ANNEX ON TERMS AND THEIR DEFINITIONS STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE ANNEX

The Annex on Terms and Their Definitions (the Annex) consists of a preamble and 124 numbered paragraphs, each of which sets forth a term and its definition. All of the terms and definitions provided in the Annex are used in at least one of the other Treaty documents. The number contained in parentheses following the paragraph number is the paragraph number of the equivalent term and definition in the Russian text, because the terms are listed in alphabetical order in the English and Russian texts. The numbers of the definitions are not used elsewhere in the Treaty; definitions are referenced by the term itself.

Additional terms are defined or described in other Treaty documents, including the following terms (with the corresponding references):

"accessible" (Twenty-third Agreed Statement);

"categories of data" ( paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty)

"front section of a fundamentally new design" (paragraph 4 of Article III; Twenty-fourth Agreed Statement);

"item of inspection" (paragraph 20 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol);

"item of continuous monitoring" (paragraph 21 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol);

"large enough to contain" or "large enough to be" (paragraph 22 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol);

"launch equipment" (subparagraph 4(b) of Section V of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol);

"not equipped" (Seventeenth Agreed Statement);

" point of entry" (paragraph 1 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol);

"sequential inspection" (paragraph 33 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol);

"unique identifier" (paragraph 1 of Annex 6 to the Inspection Protocol); and,

"accountable throw-weight" and "maximum calculated throw-weight" (paragraphs 2 and 4 of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol).

For the convenience of readers, numbers have been provided below that correspond with the numbers given to the English-language order in the Definitions Annex.

1. The term "air base" means a facility at which heavy bombers or former heavy bombers are based and their operation is supported, but it does not include production facilities for heavy bombers, heavy bomber flight test centers, or training facilities for heavy bombers. "Based" is not further defined but the term is used in the Treaty in the sense of a permanent facility that supports long-term operations rather than temporary stationing. The term "air base" is routinely used in the Treaty with a further description of what category of heavy bomber is based at that air base, such as "air base for heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs" or air base for former heavy bombers." Air bases for heavy bombers and air bases for former heavy bombers are listed in Annex C to the Memorandum of Understanding, according to the category of the heavy bomber based at such air bases. Former heavy bombers are permitted to be based at air bases for heavy bombers. Only air bases at which former heavy bombers are based, and at which no heavy bombers are based, are referred to as air bases for former heavy bombers.

2. The term "aircraft" means any manned machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from interaction with the air other than the interaction of the air with the Earth's surface. This term does not include hovercraft but it does include dirigibles, wing-in-ground effect vehicles, helicopters, and gliders. Although wing-in-ground effect vehicles normally derive their support from the interaction of air pressure below the wing with the earth's surface, some machines also are capable of flight at higher altitudes outside the range of the ground effect. Since the definition of the term aircraft refers to machines that can derive support" from interaction with the air other than interaction of the air with the Earth's surface, wing-in-ground effect vehicles with such flight capability are aircraft" within the context of the Treaty. In accordance with the Ninth Agreed Statement, lighter-than-air aircraft such as balloons, drifting aerostats, and dirigibles shall not be flight-tested with, equipped for, or deployed with nuclear armaments. This term is used in paragraph 19 of Article V of the Treaty in terms of prohibiting flight testing, equipping, or deploying with nuclear armaments aircraft that are not airplanes but that have a range of 8000 km or more, and prohibiting flight testing, equipping, or deploying with long-range nuclear ALCMs aircraft that are not airplanes.

3. The term "aircrew member" means an individual who performs duties, associated with inspections or continuous monitoring activities on the territory of the inspected Party related to the operation of an inspection airplane of the inspecting Party, and who is included on the inspecting Party's list of aircrew members. The number of individuals on the list of aircrew members is not limited, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section II of the Inspection Protocol. Aircrew members are accorded privileges and immunities while in the territory of the inspected Party, as provided for in the Inspection Protocol. Flight crews of scheduled commercial flights are not "aircrew members" under the Treaty.

4. The term "air-launched cruise missile (ALCM)" means an air-to-surface cruise missile of a type, at least one missile of which has been flight-tested from an aircraft or deployed on a bomber after December 31, 1986. The date was chosen by the U.S. side so as not to capture, as an ALCM, the TOMAHAWK sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) that was flight-tested from an aircraft before December 31, 1986. This term does not specify the range of an ALCM; rather, the term long-range ALCM" specifies the range of 600 kilometers, and only such ALCMs are subject to the limitations of the Treaty. This term also does not identify whether the ALCM is nuclear or non-nuclear; there are two separate defined terms, "long-range non-nuclear ALCM" and "long-range nuclear ALCM," that provide that distinction.

5. The term "airplane" means a power-driven, heavier-than-air aircraft that derives its lift in flight chiefly from aerodynamic reactions on surfaces that remain fixed under given conditions of flight. The National Aerospace Plane would be considered to be an airplane under this definition. This term is used in paragraph 19 of Article V of the Treaty in terms of prohibiting flight-testing, equipping, and deploying nuclear armaments and long-range nuclear ALCMs on aircraft other than airplanes, and flight-testing, equipping, and deploying nuclear armaments on an airplane that was not initially constructed as a bomber but has a range of 8000 km or more or an integrated planform area over 310 square meters. It is also a central element of the definition of bomber" and, by extension, heavy bomber."

6. The term "air-to-surface ballistic missile (ASBM)" means a ballistic missile with a range in excess of 600 kilometers that is installed in an aircraft or on its external mountings for the purpose of being launched from this aircraft. This term is used with respect to the prohibition in subparagraph 18(d) of Article V of the Treaty on production, testing, or deployment of ASBMs. The Fourth Agreed Statement clarifies that such term is not intended to describe any missile that sustains flight, or any missile the payload of which sustains flight, through the use of aerodynamic lift over any portion of its flight path, (e.g., so-called boost-glide vehicles"). In a formal written statement on January 7, 1991, the United States advised Soviet negotiators that the Pegasus space launch system, which uses newly designed and manufactured three-stage missiles to boost payloads into Earth orbit, did not meet the definition of either a weapons-delivery vehicle" or a ballistic missile" and thus that Pegasus was not relevant to the START Treaty. The Soviet side accepted this statement.

7. The term "ballistic missile" means a missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. This term includes, within its definition, a defined term, weapon-delivery vehicle," which is also covered in subparagraph 9(b) of Article III of the Treaty, as follows: if a ballistic missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all ballistic missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. Not all ballistic missiles are covered by the Treaty. For example, ballistic missiles that are of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the Earth are not considered to be ballistic missiles subject to Treaty limitations, pursuant to subparagraph 9(a) of Article III of the Treaty.

8. The term "bomber" means an airplane of a type, at least one of which was initially constructed or later converted to be equipped for bombs or air-to-surface missiles. The term bomber" is used in the prohibitions contained in paragraph 19 of Article V of the Treaty on the flight-testing, with nuclear armaments and with long-range nuclear ALCMs, of an airplane that was not initially constructed as a bomber. The term is also used in the definition of the term heavy bomber" as the primary characteristic of an airplane that is considered to be a heavy bomber.

9. The term "category" is one of a series of classifications for heavy bombers, which are based on the kind of armament for which the heavy bombers are equipped or on the purpose of such heavy bombers. Such classifications consist of: heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments, test heavy bomber, and training heavy bomber. "Former heavy bomber" is not a category of heavy bomber," by this definition.

10. The term "continuous monitoring" means carrying out procedures in accordance with the Inspection Protocol that involve inspection of containers, launch canisters, and vehicles leaving a monitored facility. Such procedures may include the use of a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system. In accordance with paragraph 11 of Section III of the Inspection Protocol, notification of the date of commencement of continuous monitoring at a facility and the initial arrival of monitors to carry out continuous monitoring at that facility shall be provided no less than 30 days prior to the estimated date of arrival of the monitors at the point of entry.

11. The term "continuous monitoring activities" means activities conducted pursuant to paragraph 14 of Article XI of the Treaty, which include conducting an engineering site survey; establishing, operating, and maintaining a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system; and conducting continuous monitoring. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol, continuous monitoring activities may be conducted at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

12. The term "conversion or elimination facility" means specified facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, launch canisters of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, at which conversion, elimination, or both conversion and elimination may take place. Such facilities are used to eliminate ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs, although ICBMs other than ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs, and launch canisters also may be eliminated at such facilities. There are no provisions in the Treaty for conversion of ballistic missiles. Conversion of mobile launchers of ICBMs is permitted, provided that the sides agree on the procedures in the JCIC before such conversion takes place. In contrast, heavy bombers are subject to both conversion and elimination at conversion or elimination facilities. Conversion or elimination facilities are listed in Annexes A, B, and C to the Memorandum of Understanding.

13. The term "cruise missile" means a missile that is an unmanned, self-propelled weapon-delivery vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. This term is used in the definition of The term " air-launched cruise missile". Paragraph 9(c) of Article III of the Treaty states that, if a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all cruise missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. This definition distinguishes cruise missiles from air-to-surface ballistic missiles and remotely piloted airplanes.

14. The term "deployed heavy bomber" means any heavy bomber other than a test heavy bomber, a training heavy bomber, or a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. This term is used with respect to the 1600 strategic offensive delivery system/6000 warhead aggregate numbers in subparagraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of Article II and the aggregates of 2100/9150 and 1900/7950 in subparagraphs 2(a) and 2(b), respectively, of Article II. In accordance with paragraph 1(b) of Article III of the Treaty, each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one unit toward the 1600 maximum aggregate limit on strategic offensive delivery systems.

15. The term "deployed ICBM" means an ICBM that is contained, or is considered to be contained, in a deployed launcher of ICBMs. This term is used in the context of warhead attribution and aggregate throw-weight in Article II of the Treaty. In accordance with paragraph 2(a) of Article III of the Treaty, each deployed launcher of ICBMs shall be considered to contain one deployed ICBM. Newly constructed ICBM launchers are considered to contain deployed ICBMs as provided for in paragraph 6(d) of Article III of the Treaty.

16. The term "deployed ICBM and its associated launcher" means a deployed ICBM and the deployed launcher of ICBMs that contains, or is considered to contain, the deployed ICBM. This term is used as the "unit of account" toward the 1600 aggregate ceiling in subparagraph 1(a) of Article II, as well as the first-phase 2100 aggregate ceiling in subparagraph 2(a) of Article II and the second-phase 1900 aggregate ceiling in subparagraph 2(b) of Article II. In accordance with paragraph 1(a) of Article III of the Treaty, each deployed ICBM and its associated launcher shall be counted as one unit for the purpose of counting toward the maximum aggregate limits on strategic offensive delivery systems. In accordance with subparagraphs 2(a) and 2(b) of Article II of the Treaty, each deployed launcher of ICBMs shall be considered to contain one deployed ICBM, and a deployed ICBM removed from its launcher and not replaced on that launcher by another missile or taken from that ICBM base shall continue to be considered to be contained in that launcher.

17. The term "deployed launcher of ICBMs" means any silo launcher of ICBMs other than a silo test launcher, silo training launcher, or silo launcher located at a space launch facility, and any deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs. This term is used in paragraph paragraph 2(a) of Article III of the Treaty, which states that each deployed launcher of ICBMs shall be considered to contain one deployed ICBM.

18. The term "deployed launcher of SLBMs" means any SLBM launcher installed on a submarine that has been launched, unless otherwise provided for in the Treaty. The final phrase refers to launchers in submarines for which elimination procedures have begun, but have not been completed. Launchers on special purpose submarines, in accordance with the Thirty-third Agreed Statement, continue to count as deployed launchers of SLBMs until they are eliminated. Such launchers may not contain SLBMs. This term is used in paragraph 2(a) of Article III of the Treaty, which states that each deployed launcher of SLBMs shall be considered to contain one deployed SLBM.

19. The term "deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs" means any mobile launcher of ICBMs that contains, or is considered to contain, an ICBM, but it does not include a mobile test launcher or a mobile launcher of ICBMs at a space launch facility.

20. The term "deployed SLBM" means an SLBM that is contained, or is considered to be contained, in a deployed launcher of SLBMs. This term is used in the context of warhead attribution and aggregate throw-weight in Article II of the Treaty. In accordance with paragraph 2(a) of Article III of the Treaty, each deployed launcher of SLBMs shall be considered to contain one deployed SLBM. Newly constructed SLBM launchers are considered to contain deployed SLBMs as provided for in paragraph 6(g) of Article III of the Treaty.

21. The term "deployed SLBM and its associated launcher" means a deployed SLBM and the deployed launcher of SLBMs that contains, or is considered to contain, the deployed SLBM. This term is used as the unit of account" towards the 1600 aggregate ceiling in subparagraph 1(a) of Article II, as well as the first-phase 2100 aggregate ceiling in subparagraph 2(a) of Article II and the second-phase 1900 aggregate ceiling in subparagraph 2(b) of Article II. In accordance with paragraph 1(a) of Article III of the Treaty, each deployed SLBM and its associated launcher shall be counted as one unit for the purposes of counting towards the maximum aggregate limits on strategic offensive delivery systems. In accordance with subparagraphs 2(a) and 2(c) of Article III, each deployed launcher of SLBMs shall be considered to contain one deployed SLBM, and a deployed SLBM removed from its launcher and not replaced on that launcher by another missile shall continue to be considered to be contained in that launcher.

22. The term "deployment area" means an area, limited in size, within which routine movements and exercise dispersals of deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles are conducted. In accordance with paragraph 3 of Article VI, each restricted area shall be located within a deployment area, each deployment area shall not exceed 125,000 square kilometers in size and shall not overlap another deployment area, and each deployment area shall contain no more than one ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

23. The term "distinguishable" means different on the basis of the totality of functional differences and external differences that are observable by national technical means of verification, or, when such observations may be inconclusive in the opinion of the inspecting Party, that are visible during inspection. The term "is used in the Treaty only with respect to heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, long-range ALCMs, launch canisters, and mobile ICBM launchers. A Party is required to make certain that the items required to be distinguishable have sufficient differences so that the "totality" of their differences allows the other Party to "distinguish" between them. In all cases, there must be functional" differences that are observable by national technical means of verification or visible during inspections, since these are the differences that make one item truly different from another and that allow the other Party to conclusively distinguish between the items. In practice, such functional differences may not, in all cases, be external to the item. In such cases, the Party possessing the item must also provide an external" difference.

Although external differences may be observable by national technical means of verification, there is no requirement that the side owning the item ensure that such features are detectable by the other Party's national technical means. Further, there is no obligation inherent in this definition for the distinguishable item to be displayed to the national technical means of verification of the other Party. Such external differences must, however, in all cases be observable during inspections. More importantly, in all these cases in which the observing Party is unable to determine distinguishability by national technical means of verification, it would have the opportunity during inspections to verify the totality of functional differences and external differences that make the items distinguishable."

For heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, the Seventeenth Agreed Statement provides that the selection of distinguishing features is at the discretion of the Party owning the item. While the Treaty is silent on how distinguishing features for launch canisters and for mobile ICBM launchers will be determined, the Parties understand that such determination is also at the discretion of the owning Party. There is, however, an implicit obligation that, with respect to all items that must be distinguishable, these distinguishing features must be meaningful. Distinguishing features are demonstrated during exhibitions. If a Party is not satisfied with the distinguishing features provided, it may raise the issue within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

24. The term "each year" means during a period of 12 months commencing on the date of entry into force of the Treaty or on an anniversary of that date. The term "is used primarily in relation to quotas on inspections and cooperative measures, and is designed to facilitate initial implementation of treaty rights and obligations. This is the approach that was adopted for implementing the INF Treaty. Where the sides intend to use calendar year," the word calendar" is inserted.

25. The term "encapsulation" means, for telemetric information, recording and not broadcasting such information during the flight test of a missile, and recovering the information subsequently. This term is used in paragraph 2(d) of Article X of the Treaty, in the context of prohibiting the encapsulation of telemetric information, including the use of ejectable capsules or recoverable reentry vehicles, during each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM. The term "is also used in paragraph 6 of that Article, in terms of the right to encapsulate on-board technical measurements for a limited number of flight tests each year. Encapsulation of telemetric information is also addressed in Section I and Section III of the Telemetry Protocol.

26. The term "encryption" means, for telemetric information, the reversible transformation of such information that gives it a random character to prevent unauthorized access to such information. This term is used in subparagraph 2(a) of Article X of the Treaty, in the context of prohibiting the encryption of telemetric information. paragraph 6 of Article X and paragraph 2 of Section III of the Telemetry Protocol provide for limited exemptions to the ban on encryption.

27. The term "facility" means an ICBM base, submarine base, air base, rail garrison, maintenance facility, restricted area, parking site, silo launcher group, ICBM loading facility, SLBM loading facility, production facility, repair facility, storage facility, training facility, conversion or elimination facility, test range, heavy bomber flight test center, space launch facility, or static display site. Use of the word "specified" in the definition of a particular facility indicates that a facility is captured by the definition only if the Party declares it to be such a facility in the MOU. The rest of the definition serves merely as a guideline. If the word specified" is not used in the definition, then any facility that meets the definition is captured. For example, a facility that meets the definition of a production facility, submarine base, or ICBM base must be declared as such in the MOU. At one of these facilities, the functions described in the definition of a repair facility or a storage facility might also be performed, but it need not be declared as a storage or repair facility. At another facility -- one that does not meet the definition of production facility, submarine base, or ICBM base -- if the functions described in the definitions of repair facility and storage facility are both capable of being performed, the Party can choose to declare the facility as either a storage or repair facility. The Party could also choose not to declare it at all, in which case Treaty-limited items are not permitted to be located at such a facility. This approach was taken to avoid inadvertently capturing many facilities capable of performing storage or repair functions, but that are not used for purposes related to the START Treaty.

28. The term "facility subject to continuous monitoring" means a facility at which continuous monitoring activities are permitted but continuous monitoring has not yet commenced. Once monitoring has commenced, such facilities are known as monitored facilities.

29. The term "fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs" is the generic term for a fixed structure for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs or a fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, both of which are defined separately.

30. The term "fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs" means a unique structure at a parking site for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs that can contain a train of standard configuration with rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. In accordance with paragraph 7 of Article VI, the number of fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs in each rail garrison shall be limited to no more than the number of trains of standard configuration specified for that rail garrison, and each such structure shall contain no more than one train of standard configuration. Unlike fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers are not limited in capacity. They are permitted to contain only one train of standard configuration, but they may be capable of containing more than one. The term " train of standard configuration" is defined in paragraph 114.

31. The term "fixed structure for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs" means a unique structure, within a restricted area, that can contain road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. In accordance with paragraph 2 of Article VI, the number of such structures within each restricted area shall be limited so that those structures are not capable of containing more road-mobile launchers of ICBMs than the number of such launchers specified for that restricted area.

32. The term "flight test" means, for a missile, the launch and subsequent flight of a missile. The terms launch" and flight" are not defined and generally not used in the Treaty; flight test" is used instead. The term "flight test" includes any event that occurs during and after launch, including destruction, and does not require flight for a minimum distance or period of time. Nor does The term imply launch from a specific area, such as a test range. The reason for having this term was in part linguistic, to find a single term that could be used for either or both the launch/take-off and the flight of a missile. Cruise missiles can be tested in flight aboard aircraft in ways that do not involve launch or subsequent missile flight. Such flights, called captive carry tests," are not covered by The term " flight test from...."

33. The term "former heavy bomber" means a reconnaissance airplane, tanker airplane, or jamming airplane that is not equipped for nuclear armaments or non-nuclear air-to-surface armaments and that was initially constructed on the basis of the airframe of an existing type of heavy bomber and satisfies the requirements for conversion in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol; or that has been converted from a heavy bomber in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol after entry into force, or in such a way that it satisfies the requirements for conversion in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol prior to entry into force. In accordance with the Sixth Agreed Statement, three airplanes of the Bison type have been converted to transport oversized cargo (the Soviet space shuttle) and thus are not considered to meet this definition; however, all other Bison airplanes are former heavy bombers. In accordance with the Twelfth Agreed Statement, the 37 Bear D airplanes that the Soviet Union stated it possessed at Treaty signature and all Bear F and Bear J airplanes are not considered to be former heavy bombers. If more Bear Ds are produced, they will be former heavy bombers. As of Treaty signature, only the Soviet Union has former heavy bombers.

34. The term "former type" means, for ICBMs or SLBMs, a type of ICBM or SLBM, any one of which had been deployed prior to entry into force of the Treaty, but none of which was deployed when the Treaty entered into force and none of which are currently deployed. The category of former type" was created to allow for the use of such designated types of ballistic missiles with reentry vehicles for purposes of research and development, without their being considered to be new types or variants of existing types. The list of former types of ICBMs and SLBMs is contained in subparagraph 10(c) of Article III of the Treaty, and consists of only the U.S. Minuteman I and Polaris A-3. The Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement provides exemptions for ICBMs and SLBMs of former types with respect to specified Treaty provisions. Certain systems, such as the Soviet SS-9 and U.S. TITAN II, meet the definition of former type" but have not been included in the list of such types, since the Parties plan to use these systems for space launch only. If systems not designated as former types were ever tested with reentry vehicles, they would be considered new types of ICBMs or SLBMs.

35. The term "front section" means that portion of the payload of the final stage that contains the reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles and may, depending on design, include a reentry vehicle platform, penetration aids, and a shroud. This term is used in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol to describe the structural elements, in addition to the self-contained dispensing mechanism, that must be destroyed during elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. It is used in subparagraph 4(b) of Article III of the Treaty to identify whether the front section is of an existing design or a fundamentally new design, for the purpose of counting warheads. This term is also used in the Telemetry Protocol to limit encryption on exempted flight tests to telemetric information that pertains to the front section or its elements. Except as used in subparagraph 4(b) of Article III and in the Twenty-fourth Agreed Statement, where The term " front section of a fundamentally new design" has a somewhat different meaning, the front section does not include any self- contained dispensing mechanism that may be on the missile.

36. The term "heavy bomber" is used to define which bombers of a new type will be subject to regulation under the terms of the Treaty (existing types of heavy bombers are listed in subparagraph 10(d) of Article III of the Treaty). The definition has several elements.

The basic definition provides that a heavy bomber is a bomber that satisfies either of the following criteria: (a) its range is greater than 8000 kilometers; or (b) it is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. Should one of any of the bombers of each specific type satisfy either criterion, all of the bombers of that type would be considered to be heavy bombers. Bomber" is a defined term meaning an airplane equipped for bombs or air-to-surface missiles. Aircraft other than airplanes (for example, airships or helicopters) do not meet the definition of a bomber and thus cannot be heavy bombers. Range" is also a defined term that means unrefueled range with a 7500 kilogram ordnance load and a specific flight profile. However, the sides are allowed to agree that a specific type of bomber is not a heavy bomber even if it meets the criteria specified. Presumably, such discussions would occur within the framework of the JCIC, but the Treaty does not require that the discussion be held in the JCIC.

The third and fourth sentences of the definition are sometimes referred to as the "maritime exclusion." They provide that bombers configured exclusively for maritime operations shall not be considered heavy bombers provided that (a) they are not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, and (b) they are not models or modifications of an accountable heavy bomber. This provision allows the U.S. to deploy, for example, a follow-on to the P-3 Orion Maritime Patrol Aircraft without inadvertently capturing such an airplane under the terms of the START Treaty. The phrase modification of an accountable heavy bomber" includes derivative designs, so that, even if built from the ground up for maritime purposes, such bombers would not be subject to the maritime exclusion.

Since there could be ambiguity over whether a specific bomber did or did not meet the criteria to be considered a heavy bomber, the second paragraph of the definition provides an additional screening criterion. Any bomber with an integrated planform area of greater than 310 square meters is automatically considered a heavy bomber unless the owning side satisfies the other side that it neither is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs nor is capable of a range (as defined in the Definitions Annex) in excess of 8000 kilometers. The 310 figure was selected in order to capture new bomber types that are approximately the same size as the Backfire bomber. It is significant to note that the burden of proof is on the owning side. Integrated planform area" is not defined in the Treaty but is understood to mean the total area of an airplane projected onto a two-dimensional surface from directly overhead.

37. The term "heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments" means a non-modern heavy bomber that is equipped only for non-nuclear armaments, and that satisfies the requirements for conversion in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. At Treaty signature, no such bombers existed for either side. The term " non-modern heavy bomber" is defined in paragraph 73.

38. The term "heavy bomber flight test center" means a facility, other than a production facility for heavy bombers, at which test heavy bombers are based and their operation is supported. Such facilities are not air bases" and are not subject to inspection.

39. The term "heavy ICBM" means an ICBM of a type, any one of which has a launch weight greater than 106,000 kilograms or a throw-weight greater than 4350 kilograms. Both numbers are based on MOU values for the Soviet SS-19 ICBM.

40. The term "heavy SLBM" means an SLBM of a type, any one of which has a launch weight greater than 106,000 kilograms or a throw-weight greater than 4350 kilograms. These values were selected for consistency with the definition of "heavy ICBM."

41. The term "ICBM base" means: for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, an area in which a rail garrison and one associated maintenance facility are located (the maintenance facility may be located either within or outside the rail garrison); for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, an area in which one or more restricted areas and one associated maintenance facility are located; or, for silo launchers of ICBMs, an area in which one or more groups of silo launchers of ICBMs and one associated maintenance facility are located.

42. The term "ICBM emplacement equipment" means equipment used to install an ICBM into a silo launcher of ICBMs. In accordance with subparagraph 1(c) of Article IV, the number of sets of ICBM emplacement equipment is limited at each ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs. ICBM emplacement equipment is considered to be support equipment" under the Treaty and, as such, is listed in Annex A to the Memorandum of Understanding.

43. The term "ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs" means an ICBM of a type, any one of which has been contained on, or flight-tested from, a mobile launcher of ICBMs, or has been declared an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs. All SS-25s and SS-24s of the USSR, including those SS-24s deployed in silos, and all Peacekeeper ICBMs of the U.S., which are all currently deployed in silos, are considered to be ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Thus, all non-deployed SS-25s, SS-24s, and Peacekeepers count against the 250 non-deployed mobile missile limit. However, SS-24s and Peacekeeper ICBMs deployed in silos do not count against the 1100 limit on mobile ICBM warheads.

44. The term "ICBM launcher" means a device intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch an ICBM.

45. The term "ICBM loading facility" means a facility, outside an ICBM base and outside a test range, where ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs are loaded onto or unloaded from mobile launchers of ICBMs.

46. The term "ICBM or SLBM, the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles," describes a special classification of ICBM or SLBM established in the Throw-weight Protocol for the purposes of determining a ballistic missile's demonstrated throw-weight. Most ballistic missiles with more than one reentry vehicle use a self-contained dispensing mechanism (more commonly referred to in the United States as a post-boost vehicle) to dispense reentry vehicles. Such a self-contained dispensing mechanism conducts a series of maneuvers after separation from the final stage, and may release a reentry vehicle after each maneuver. In contrast, for ICBMs or SLBMs referred to in this definition, the maneuvering and the releasing of the reentry vehicles are done directly by the final stage.

During the negotiations, the U.S. understood that the Soviet SS-N-23 would be considered to be an SLBM the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles. Late in the negotiations, however, the Soviet side insisted that the SS-N-23 was not a missile of that type and that its throw-weight should not be calculated on such basis, but should instead be computed in the manner specified by the Throw-weight Protocol for ballistic missiles that dispense multiple reentry vehicles from a self-contained dispensing mechanism. To resolve this issue, the United States made a formal statement during the final plenary session on July 29, 1991. This statement reiterated the U.S. belief that the SS-N-23 is an SLBM the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles, but accepted the calculation of the throw-weight of the SS-N-23 on the basis declared by the Soviet Union. The U.S. side, however, reserved the right to contest the throw-weight value of any new type of ICBM or SLBM, or modification of an existing type of ICBM or SLBM, that incorporates a design similar to that of the SS-N-23, if its throw-weight value is calculated on the basis of an ICBM or SLBM that dispenses multiple reentry vehicles from a self-contained dispensing mechanism.

47. The term "in-country escort" means a group of individuals designated by the inspected Party to accompany and assist inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members throughout the in-country period, as provided for in the Inspection Protocol. In accordance with paragraph 1 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol, the in-country escort meets the inspection team, monitors and aircrew members at the point of entry, and expedites their entry and the entry of their baggage, equipment and supplies into the territory of the inspected Party. The in-country escort accompanies the inspection team and assists it in exercising its functions throughout the in-country period. The in-country escort has the right to accompany monitors and assists them in exercising their functions throughout the in-country period. The in-country escort examines equipment and supplies brought into the territory of the inspected Party, pursuant to paragraph 8 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol, to ascertain that the equipment and supplies cannot perform functions unconnected with the requirements of inspections or continuous monitoring activities. In accordance with paragraph 5 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol, inspectors and monitors, in discharging their functions, shall communicate with personnel of the inspected Party only through the in-country escort. In accordance with paragraph 12 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol, representatives of the inspected facility shall be included among the in-country escort at the inspection site.

48. The term "in-country period" means the period of time from the arrival of the inspection team, monitors, or aircrew members at the point of entry until their departure from the country through the point of entry.

49. The term "inspected Party" means the Party to the Treaty whose facilities and locations are subject to inspection or continuous monitoring pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty.

50. The term "inspecting Party" means the Party to the Treaty that conducts inspections or continuous monitoring activities.

51. The term "inspection site" means a facility or location at which inspections may be conducted in accordance with the Inspection Protocol. For inspections pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 10 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection site is designated after the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry, in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section III of the Inspection Protocol. For inspections pursuant to paragraphs 8, 9, 11, 12, or 13 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection site is specified no less than 72 hours in advance of the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry, in accordance with paragraph 5 of Section III of the Inspection Protocol. The points of entry and their associated inspection sites are listed in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding. The boundaries of the inspection site are the boundaries of the facility specified on the site diagram.

52. The term "inspection team" means the group of inspectors assigned by the inspecting Party to conduct a particular inspection. The number of inspectors on an inspection team is limited pursuant to paragraph 28 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol.

53. The term "inspector" means an individual specified by one of the Parties to conduct inspections and included on that Party's list of inspectors. In accordance with paragraph 2 of Section II of the Inspection Protocol, the number of individuals on the list of inspectors may not exceed 400 at any one time, and all inspectors shall be citizens of the inspecting Party. Procedures for proposing and rejecting inspectors, as well as provisions outlining their privileges and immunities, are contained in Section II of the Inspection Protocol.

54. The term "intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)" means a land-based ballistic missile with a range in excess of 5500 kilometers. The range of 5500 kilometers was chosen to dovetail with the INF Treaty (which bans land-based ballistic missiles of the US and the USSR with a range between 500 and 5500 kilometers) and is based on the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the continental United States and the northwestern border of the continental Soviet Union.

55. The term "jamming" means, for telemetric information broadcast from a missile, creating interference on frequencies used for broadcasting such information. Jamming during ICBM and SLBM flight tests is prohibited by paragraph 2(b) of Article X.

56. The term "launch-associated railcar" means a railcar that is directly associated with a rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs, such as a launch control car or a generator car, and that together with it provides for the preparation for launch and launch of a missile. Launchers and launch-associated rail cars are combined in a train of standard configuration. The numbers of launchers and launch-associated railcars that make up a train of standard configuration are found in Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding.

57. The term "launch canister" means a container, directly associated with an ICBM, that can be or has been used for transporting and storing an assembled ICBM, with or without its front section, and from which an ICBM can be or has been launched. In accordance with paragraph 3(d) of Article III of the Treaty, each launch canister shall be considered to contain an ICBM from the time it first leaves a facility at which an ICBM is installed in it until an ICBM has been launched from it or until an ICBM has been removed from it for elimination. The Peacekeeper missile is not considered to be a "canisterized" missile because the "liner," in which it is installed in the silo launcher, is associated with the launcher, that is, the missile is not maintained in the "liner" outside the launcher.

58. The term "launch weight" means the maximum weight of a fully loaded ICBM or SLBM at the time of first stage ignition, demonstrated during flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs of that type.

59. The term "long-range ALCM" means an ALCM with a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

60. The term "long-range non-nuclear ALCM" means a long-range ALCM that is not nuclear-armed.

61. The term "long-range nuclear ALCM" means a long-range ALCM that is nuclear-armed.

62. The term "maintenance facility" means a facility that is part of an ICBM base and at which ICBMs and ICBM launchers are maintained and their operation is supported. In accordance with paragraph 6(d) of Article III of the Treaty, a mobile launcher of ICBMs is considered to contain a deployed ICBM when it arrives at a maintenance facility. In accordance with subparagraphs 1(b) and 2(b) of Article IV of the Treaty, the number of non-deployed ICBMs and the number of non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs at the maintenance facility are limited to no more than two for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.

63. The term "missile tender" means a naval ship that is used for storing, transporting, and loading SLBMs into SLBM launchers. In accordance with subparagraph 9(a) of Article IV, non-deployed SLBMs that are located on missile tenders are considered to be located at the submarine base at which such missile tenders are specified as based, regardless of the tender's actual location. In accordance with paragraph 27 of Article V, missile tenders may be located at eliminated facilities only for purposes not associated with strategic offensive arms. In accordance with paragraph 29 of Article V, naval vessels that were formerly declared to be missile tenders may not be used to transport, store, or load SLBMs, nor may such vessels be tied to a ballistic missile submarine for the purpose of supporting such a submarine if such a submarine is located within five kilometers of a submarine base.

64. The term "mobile launcher of ICBMs" means a road-mobile launcher of ICBMs or a rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs.

65. The term "mobile training launcher" means a full-scale model of a mobile launcher of ICBMs that is not capable of launching ICBMs. Such training launchers are listed in Annex A to the MOU. In accordance with subparagraph 2(e) of Article IV of the Treaty, mobile training launchers are limited to an aggregate number, together with silo training launchers, of 60 and may contain only a training model of a missile and not a real missile. In addition, such launchers shall differ from mobile launchers of ICBMs and other road vehicles or railcars on the basis of differences that are observable by national technical means of verification. This term does not encompass mobile launchers of ICBMs that are used for training, which may be located at training facilities so long as they do not contain real missiles, and that are counted under the limits in both subparagraphs 2(a) and 2(c) of Article IV.

66. The term "monitor" means an individual specified by one of the Parties to conduct continuous monitoring activities and included on that Party's list of monitors. In accordance with paragraph 2 of Section II of the Inspection Protocol, the number of individuals on the list of monitors may not exceed 300 at any one time, and all monitors shall be citizens of the inspecting Party. Procedures for proposing and rejecting monitors, as well as provisions outlining their privileges and immunities, are contained in Section II of the Inspection Protocol.

67. The term "monitored facility" means a facility at which continuous monitoring has commenced.

68. The term "monitoring team" means the group of monitors specified by the inspecting Party to conduct continuous monitoring activities. The number of monitors on a monitoring team is limited pursuant to paragraph 28 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol.

69. The term "new type," when referring to ICBMs and SLBMs, means a type of ICBM or SLBM that is different from all other previously declared types of ICBMs or SLBMs in at least one of the following respects: a different number of stages; type of propellant of any stage (i.e., liquid or solid); a launch weight difference of at least ten percent; a length difference of the assembled missile without front section of at least ten percent; a length difference of the first stage of at least ten percent; a first stage diameter difference of at least five percent; or a throw-weight increase of at least 21 percent in conjunction with a change of at least five percent in the length of the first stage. Note that in the case of the throw-weight criterion, only an increase can be used to qualify an ICBM or SLBM as a new type; in the other cases, either an increase or a decrease in the parameters can be used to qualify a new type.

The new type definition is designed to ensure that any ICBM or SLBM that will have the status of a "new type" under the Treaty will be significantly different from any previously declared type of ICBM or SLBM, respectively. The intent is to require the Party declaring the new type to undertake significant effort, including engineering development and flight-testing, before a ballistic missile can have "new type" status. In addition, effective Treaty verification and counting depend upon ensuring that new types" will be distinct from those types of ICBMs or SLBMs that have been previously declared. ("Previously declared" is used in this analysis to refer collectively to types declared as of Treaty signature, which are referred to in the Treaty as "existing," "former," or "retired" types, and to types that have earlier been declared to be new types.")

While a new type of ICBM or SLBM must differ from all previously declared types of ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively, by at least one criterion, that criterion need not be the same for each previously declared type. Thus, for example, an ICBM could be considered a new type if it differed from previously declared ICBM Type A in the number of stages, from ICBM Type B in the type of propellant, from ICBM Type C in the diameter of the first stage, and so forth. If an ICBM or SLBM is declared to be a new type on the basis of a 21 percent increase in throw-weight accompanied by a five percent change in the length of the first stage, the Thirty-fourth Agreed Statement requires that both parameters be measured with respect to the same previously declared type.

The meaning of differ" is not further amplified within the Treaty with respect to number of stages or type of propellant. The meaning of a change in missile length is given in paragraph 13 of Annex J of the Memorandum of Understanding. The meaning of a change in first stage length (with or without an increase in throw-weight) is amplified in paragraph 15 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding; these provisions essentially define first stage length for purposes of the new types definition as the length of the solid rocket motor or the combined length of the liquid propellant tanks. Increases in throw-weight are determined in accordance with the Thirty-fourth Agreed Statement, which requires that the throw-weight of the new type of ICBM or SLBM be demonstrated to a specified range. The meaning of a change in first stage diameter is amplified in paragraph 16 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. Paragraph 10 of Section XIV of the Inspection Protocol provides that if an ICBM or SLBM is declared to be a new type on the basis of a change in launch weight, the other Party will have the opportunity to weigh or determine by some other agreed means the weight of the previously declared and new missiles; procedures for weighing or determining the weight by some other means would be worked out in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission before the beginning of deployment of the new type.

The definition is applied separately to ICBMs and SLBMs. A new type" of ICBM could be declared if it meets the above criteria with respect to all previously declared types of ICBMs but not with respect to all previously declared types of SLBMs. Similarly a new type" of SLBM could be declared if it meets the above criteria with respect to all previously declared types of SLBMs, but not with respect to all previously declared types of ICBMs.

A missile would not be of a new type", however, were a Party merely to re-base an ICBM of a previously declared type as an SLBM, or to re-base an SLBM of a previously declared type as a silo-based ICBM. (Re-basing an SLBM on a mobile launcher of ICBMs is banned by paragraph 6 of Article V of the Treaty.) This is because the Treaty's definitions indicate that once an ICBM of a type is re-based as an SLBM, or once an SLBM of a type is re-based as an ICBM, all missiles of that type would be considered to be both ICBMs and SLBMs for purposes of the Treaty limits. The Treaty defines an ICBM as a land-based ballistic missile with a range in excess of 5500 kilometers." Once a missile of a type has been based in an ICBM silo launcher, all missiles of that type would be considered to be land-based. The Treaty defines an SLBM as a ballistic missile with a range in excess of 600 kilometers of a type, any one of which has been contained in or launched from a submarine."

Therefore, if a Party were to re-base an ICBM of a previously declared type in a submarine, or re-base an SLBM of a previously declared type in a silo, such an ICBM or SLBM would simultaneously meet the definitions of both an ICBM and an SLBM. Because such re-based missiles would retain the status of being previously declared types, they would not be entitled to "new type" status. Thus, not only would Treaty provisions relating to the missile in its re-based mode apply, but Treaty provisions applying to that previously declared type of ICBM or SLBM would continue to apply, including, for example, provisions on warhead and throw-weight attribution and the prohibition on flight-testing a missile type with more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads with which it had been attributed.

70. The term "non-deployed ICBM" means an ICBM not contained, and not considered to be contained, in a deployed launcher of ICBMs. Non-deployed ICBM is a general term used to describe ICBMs in storage, ICBMs undergoing repair, ICBMs maintained as spares, ICBMs awaiting elimination at conversion or elimination facilities, ICBMs used for space launch purposes at space launch facilities, ICBMs used for testing at test ranges (with certain exceptions for mobile ICBMs), and ICBMs in transit. In accordance with subparagraph 1(a) of Article IV of the Treaty, the aggregate number of non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be limited to no more than 250, of which no more than 125 can be for rail-mobile launchers. Other limits on non-deployed ICBMs are contained insubparagraphs 1(b), 1(c), and 9(a) of Article IV.

Retired and former types of ICBMs meet the definition of non-deployed ICBMs, but retired and former types of silo-based ICBMs are exempted from most restrictions on non-deployed ICBMs by the Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement. ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of retired types remain subject to most restrictions that are applicable to non-deployed missiles, but retired mobile ICBMs that were attributed with only one warhead do not count against the 250 limit, and are exempt from the procedures of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol and the associated notifications.

71. The term "non-deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs" means a mobile test launcher, or a mobile launcher of ICBMs at a space launch facility, or a mobile launcher of ICBMs that does not contain, and that is not considered to contain, an ICBM. In accordance with subparagraph 2(a) of Article IV of the Treaty, the aggregate number of non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be limited to no more than 110, of which no more than 18 can be rail-mobile launchers. Other limits on non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs are contained in subparagraphs 2(b), 2(c), and 9(b) of Article IV.

72. The term "non-deployed SLBM" means an SLBM not contained, and not considered to be contained, in a deployed launcher of SLBMs. Geographical constraints on non-deployed SLBMs are contained in paragraph 9(a) of Article IV of the Treaty. In accordance with that paragraph, non-deployed SLBMs that are located on missile tenders and storage cranes shall be considered to be located at the submarine base at which such missile tenders and storage cranes are specified as based.

73. The term "non-modern heavy bomber" means a heavy bomber of a type, any one of which was initially based at an air base more than ten years prior to the time at which the determination of "modern" versus "non-modern" status is being made. Only non-modern heavy bombers can be converted to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. Former heavy bombers need not be non-modern. The term "non-modern heavy bomber" was created in response to stated Soviet fears that the United States might designate high technology heavy bombers (e.g., the B-2) as heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, thus exempting them from the central limits of the Treaty. There is no comparable term modern heavy bomber" because there is no need for such a term. In a formal statement on September 28, 1990, U.S. negotiators stated that, in the hypothetical case that a Party chose to deploy a modern" heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments, such heavy bombers would be treated as heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs under the Treaty.

74. The term "nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs" means, for heavy bombers, nuclear air-to-surface missiles with a range of less than 600 kilometers and nuclear bombs. This term establishes one of the two categories of deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. The other category of nuclear-armed heavy bombers is heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

75. The term "parking site" means a location, within a rail garrison, at which deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs are based and fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs may be located. In accordance with paragraph 6 of Article VI, the number of parking sites in each rail garrison shall be limited to no more than the number of trains of standard configuration specified for that rail garrison, and each rail garrison shall have no more than five parking sites.

76. The term "payload" means, for a stage, all that separates from that stage, excluding the front section shroud and the propellant burned by that stage, beginning at the time when the velocity of the final stage is equal to 1000 meters per second less than its velocity at the earlier of two events: the termination of main engine thrust of the final stage, or the first release of a reentry vehicle or penetration aid. The term "payload" was tailored for use in the determination of the throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM. It is to be distinguished from the use of the word payload" in the Fourth Agreed Statement, where the word is used in its more generic, commonly understood meaning.

77. The term "perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system" means the physical barriers, buildings, and equipment along the perimeter, at the portal, and at the other exits of a monitored facility, that may be established, operated, and maintained by the monitors for purposes of continuous monitoring of such a facility. Notification of the intention to establish such a system, to enter the territory of the other Party to establish such a system, and to maintain such a system must be provided in accordance with paragraphs 10, 13 and 15, respectively, of Section III of the Inspection Protocol.

78. The term "perimeter continuous monitoring area" means the space within which the inspecting Party has the right to establish, operate, and maintain a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system and to carry out continuous monitoring. Pursuant to paragraph 6 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol, a perimeter continuous monitoring area shall be designated by the inspected Party along the periphery of a facility, and the boundaries of such facility shall be agreed upon by the Parties, so that such boundaries are sufficient to establish a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system.

79. The term "period of inspection" means the period of time from completion of the pre-inspection procedures until the commencement of post-inspection procedures. The period of inspection is determined in accordance with paragraph 31 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol.

80. The term "procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles" means a maneuver of the self-contained dispensing mechanism or of the final stage of a missile, associated with targeting to an aim point and releasing one or more reentry vehicles, whether or not a reentry vehicle is actually released. This term is used in subparagraph 4(c) of Article III of the Treaty to determine the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM has been flight-tested, based on actual and simulated releases. A procedure for dispensing penetration aids will not be considered to be a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles, provided that the procedure for dispensing penetration aids differs from a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles.

81. The term "produce" means build, construct, or manufacture in any quantity, and includes serial production as well as one-of-a-kind manufacturing. This term is used in prohibitions contained in Article V of the Treaty as part of the expression, each Party undertakes not to produce, flight-test, or deploy" specified items. This term was chosen over the SALT II term develop" because non-production of an item is easier to verify than non-development and because of U.S.-Soviet differences over the meaning of the term in the context of the ABM Treaty. "Produce" includes production of prototypes, since it includes one-of-a kind manufacturing.

82. The term "production facility" means: for ICBMs or SLBMs, a facility at which ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in their launch canisters, are assembled, including the joining of all stages and the loading of such missiles into launch canisters; at which ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters, are assembled, including the joining of two or more stages; or at which first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages are assembled; for ballistic missile submarines, a facility at which construction of ballistic missile submarines is performed; for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a facility at which the erector-launcher mechanism of a mobile launcher of ICBMs is mounted on the self-propelled chassis, trailer chassis, railcar, or flatcar; and for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, a facility at which assembly of a complete heavy bomber airframe or complete former heavy bomber airframe is performed.

83. The term "prototype" means, for ICBMs or SLBMs, an ICBM or SLBM of a new type, none of which has been attributed with warheads or accountable throw-weight, no more than 20 of which have been flight-tested, and no launchers of which have been deployed. The reason for this term was the Parties' intent to prevent a new type of ICBM or SLBM from counting toward the Treaty's central limits until certain developmental milestones have been achieved. This gives the Parties the flexibility to alter or cancel such a missile before it becomes accountable under Article II of the Treaty. In accordance with paragraph 9(a) of Article IV, prototype ICBMs and SLBMs may not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases or at submarine bases. In accordance with subparagraph 9(b) of Article IV, mobile launchers of prototype ICBMs may not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBMs bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs. At Treaty signature, the U.S. Small ICBM was considered to be a prototype.

84. The term "rail garrison" means an area in which one or more parking sites are located and an associated maintenance facility may be located. In accordance with paragraph 4 of Article VI, deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be based only in rail garrisons, and that paragraph, along with paragraphs 5, 6, and 8 of that Article, set forth additional limitations relating to rail garrisons.

85. The term "rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs" means an erector-launcher mechanism for launching ICBMs and the railcar or flatcar on which it is mounted.

86. The term "range" means: for an ALCM, the maximum distance that can be covered by an ALCM of that type in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact; for a ballistic missile, the maximum distance measured by projecting the flight trajectory on the Earth's sphere between the launch point of a missile of that type, and the point of impact of a reentry vehicle; for an aircraft, the maximum distance that can be flown, without refueling, by an aircraft of that type when carrying an ordnance load of 7500 kilograms, with a full fuel load in the internal and external fuel tanks and a flight profile optimized to ensure minimum fuel consumption per kilometer. With respect to aircraft, the fuel remaining in the fuel tanks after landing shall be no more than five percent of the maximum capacity of the fuel tanks, and the distance covered during climb and descent shall be taken into account. Range is used to determine the cutoff between systems limited by the Treaty and systems not so limited.

87. The term "rapid reload" means reloading a silo launcher of ICBMs in less than 12 hours or a mobile launcher of ICBMs in less than four hours after a missile has been launched or removed from such a launcher. In accordance with paragraph 16 of Article V, each Party undertakes not to produce, test or deploy systems for rapid reload and not to conduct rapid reload. The Parties did not attempt comparable definitions and restrictions for SLBMs or heavy bombers, since such systems are inherently incapable, in a short period of time, of reloading and repeatedly attacking.

88. The term "reentry vehicle" means that part of the front section of a ballistic missile that can survive reentry through the dense layers of the Earth's atmosphere and that is designed for delivering a weapon to a target or for testing such a delivery. The weapon need not be nuclear in order to meet this definition. The U.S. side made a conscious decision to capture non-nuclear as well as nuclear reentry vehicles in START, to close a possible loophole (i.e., to avoid the situation in which ICBMs or SLBMs are not declared to be accountable under Treaty limits because they do not carry nuclear reentry vehicles). The effect of the Treaty provisions are that deployed ICBMs and SLBMs are always accountable toward Treaty limits, regardless of their armament.

89. The term "relocation" means the one-way movement of a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile from one declared facility to another declared facility, or from any location following the completion of a dispersal to a declared facility, or from any location during a routine movement to a declared facility other than to the maintenance facility associated with that restricted area or that rail garrison. In accordance with paragraph 9 of Article VI, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may leave restricted areas or rail garrisons only for routine movements, relocations, or dispersals, and deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may leave deployment areas only for relocations or operational dispersals. Paragraph 10 of Article VI sets forth constraints on relocations. Paragraphs 9 and 10 of Section II of the Notification Protocol contain the notifications required prior to and following each relocation.

90. The term "repair facility" means: for ICBMs or SLBMs, a specified facility, outside an ICBM base or a submarine base, for the repair or maintenance of ICBMs or SLBMs; for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a specified facility, outside an ICBM base, for the repair or maintenance of mobile launchers of ICBMs; for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, a specified facility, outside an air base, for the repair or maintenance of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers.

91. The term "residual propellant" means, when determining the maximum calculated throw-weight of an ICBM or an SLBM in accordance with the Throw-weight Protocol, the unusable propellant of a stage and the propellant of a stage designed to compensate for possible sub-optimal missile performance or missile flight conditions (e.g., weather conditions), expressed as a percentage of the total propellant mass of that stage.

92. The term "restricted area" means an area within a deployment area, in which deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles are based and in which fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs may be located. In accordance with paragraph 1 of Article VI, deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be based only in restricted areas, which are limited in size to no more than five square kilometers. That paragraph, along with paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article VI, set forth additional limitations relating to restricted areas.

93. The term "retired type" means, for ICBMs or SLBMs, a type of ICBM or SLBM, any one of which was deployed when the Treaty entered into force, but none of which is currently deployed due to the conversion or elimination of all launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of the same type of ICBM or SLBM other than test launchers and launchers at space launch facilities, or, in accordance with the Thirty-third Agreed Statement, 32 launchers on two special purpose submarines. In accordance with paragraph 10 of Article V, ICBMs and SLBMs of retired types may not be flight-tested from other than test launchers specified for such use or launchers at space launch facilities. The Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement exempts ICBMs and SLBMs of retired types from specified Treaty limitations and provides additional limitations for retired types. Paragraph 6 of Article X of the Treaty and paragraph (2)(a) of Section III of the Telemetry Protocol allow encryption of telemetry from the front section and its elements for a limited number of flight tests of retired types, subject to specified constraints.

94. The term "road-mobile launcher of ICBMs" means an erector-launcher mechanism for launching ICBMs and the self-propelled or trailer chassis on which it is mounted.

95. The term "routine movement" means the movement of a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile for the purpose of training, maintenance, or testing that begins and ends at the same restricted area or rail garrison and does not involve movement to any other declared facility except movement to the maintenance facility associated with that restricted area or that rail garrison. In accordance with paragraph 9 of Article VI, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may leave restricted areas or rail garrisons only for routine movements, relocations, or dispersals. Paragraph 11 of Article VI sets forth constraints on routine movements. Notifications concerning the beginning and ending of routine movements by deployed rail-mobile launchers are contained in paragraphs 4 and 6 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

96. The term "self-contained dispensing mechanism" means a device that separates from the final stage of a missile together with the front section and that independently targets and releases the reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles and penetration aids. The front section is attached to the self-contained dispensing mechanism. Although self-contained dispensing mechanisms are normally associated with ballistic missiles with more than one reentry vehicle, this is not required; the Soviet SS-25 ICBM, for example, has a self-contained dispensing mechanism, but only one reentry vehicle. Self-contained dispensing mechanisms are commonly referred to in the United States as post-boost vehicles.

97. The term "silo launcher of ICBMs" means a fixed launcher of ICBMs in a silo structure located in the ground.

98. The term "silo training launcher" means a full-scale silo launcher specified for training purposes. Subparagraphs 2(e) and 9(e) of Article IV establish numerical and locational constraints on silo training launchers. In accordance with the Thirteenth Agreed Statement, engineering models of silos located at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, are not considered to be silo training launchers, but are subject to the limitations on silo training launchers provided for in subparagraphs 2(e) of Article IV of the Treaty, and, if eliminated, shall be subject to procedures for silo training launchers in Section II of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Models of silos that are less than full depth, sometimes called stub" or shallow" training silos, are not considered to be silo training launchers, and are not subject to regulation under the Treaty, but such silos located in inspectable areas will be inspectable.

99. The term "silo used as a launch control center" means a silo, other than a silo launcher of ICBMs, that is located at an ICBM base and that is used to control the launch of an ICBM. In accordance with paragraph 11 of Article V, silos used as launch control centers may not be converted into silo launchers of ICBMs. Only the Soviet Union currently possesses such silos.

100. The term "SLBM launcher" means a device intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch an SLBM. The word intended" allows launchers to be considered as such prior to actually containing an SLBM, i.e., on a newly constructed ballistic missile submarine.

101. The term "SLBM loading facility" means a shore-based facility, outside a submarine base, where SLBMs are loaded onto or unloaded from ballistic missile submarines. This term is needed only to reflect Soviet practices; U.S. SLBMs are loaded at submarine bases.

102. The term "soft-site launcher" means any fixed land-based launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs other than a silo launcher. In accordance with paragraph 9 of Article V, soft-site launchers may not be located outside of test ranges and space launch facilities, except that the six existing launchers at Cape Canaveral, Florida, shall be exempt from this prohibition until they contain or launch an ICBM or SLBM after the date of signature of the Treaty, pursuant to the Twenty-seventh Agreed Statement.

103. The term "solid rocket motor" means that part of a stage that consists of the case filled with solid fuel. Paragraph 10 of Article IV sets forth the locational constraints on solid rocket motors, with or without attached nozzles, for the first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Paragraph 30 of Article V establishes restrictions on the removal from production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, of solid rocket motors with attached nozzles for the first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

104. The term "space launch facility" means a specified facility from which objects are delivered into the upper atmosphere or space using ICBMs or SLBMs. Such facilities are listed in Annex D to the Memorandum of Understanding. Provisions relating to such facilities are contained in paragraph 4 of Article IV and in the Twenty-sixth Agreed Statement.

105. The term "stage" means, for ICBMs or SLBMs, a section of a missile that is equipped with a propulsion unit and that can provide its payload with an additional velocity of more than 1000 meters per second. The velocity criterion is used to distinguish a stage from other propulsive devices, such as self-contained dispensing mechanisms.

106. The term "storage crane" means a floating crane that is used to store, transport, and load or unload SLBMs. In accordance with subparagraph 9(a) of Article IV, non-deployed SLBMs that are located on storage cranes are considered to be located at the submarine base at which such storage cranes are specified as based. The U.S. does not have such cranes; the Soviet Union does.

107. The term "storage facility" means: for ICBMs or SLBMs, a specified facility, outside an ICBM base, a submarine base, a test range, or a space launch facility, for the storage of ICBMs or SLBMs; for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a specified facility, outside an ICBM base, a test range, or a space launch facility, for the storage of mobile launchers of ICBMs; for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, a specified facility, outside an air base, for the storage of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers.

108. The term "submarine base" means a facility at which ballistic missile submarines are based and that provides shore-based support for such submarines, which may include the assembly, loading, maintenance, and storage of SLBMs, unless otherwise provided for in the Treaty. The term "does not include support for submarines that is located in adjacent waters (as opposed to shore-based support), and therefore does not include a facility such as Holy Loch. The phrase :unless otherwise provided for in the Treaty" refers to the Thirty-third Agreed Statement, which permits homeporting of two special purpose submarines at ports not treated as submarine bases.

109. The term "submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)" means a ballistic missile with a range in excess of 600 kilometers of a type, any one of which has been contained in or launched from a submarine. The range of 600 kilometers was selected to avoid limitation of tactical naval systems.

110. The term "support equipment" means vehicles and mobile or transportable equipment used to support the operation of an ICBM or SLBM. Support equipment is listed in Annexes A and B to the Memorandum of Understanding. The Parties made a joint statement at the final plenary session of the negotiations that support equipment includes, but is not limited to, ICBM emplacement equipment, launch-associated support vehicles, transporter-loaders, training models of a missile, driver training vehicles, and storage cranes. Support equipment is subject to Treaty limitations until eliminated in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Paragraph 27 of Article V prohibits support equipment from being located at eliminated facilities.

111. The term "telemetric information" means all information, regardless of content, that originates on board a missile during its flight test that is broadcast or recorded for subsequent recovery. The term "is used throughout Article X of the Treaty and the Telemetry Protocol.

112. The term "test launcher" means an ICBM launcher or an SLBM launcher located within a test range, unless otherwise provided for in the Treaty. Subparagraph 2(d) of Article IV establishes limits on the aggregate numbers of such launchers. Subparagraph 9(d) of Article IV sets forth accountability rules for deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that relocate to a test range. In accordance with subparagraph 9(c) of Article IV, rail-mobile test launchers may conduct limited movements for the purpose of testing outside a test range. Mobile test launchers are non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs" and count against the aggregate limit of 110 provided in subparagraph 2(a) of Article IV, as well as under the limits on test launchers.

113. The term "test range" means a designated land area, other than an ICBM base, from which launches of ICBMs or SLBMs are conducted. Adjacent waters, such as the waters off the coast of Cape Canaveral, Florida, are not considered part of the test range. Thus, launchers on ballistic missile submarines are never considered test launchers and launches from such submarines are not considered launches from test ranges.

114. The term "train of standard configuration" means a train consisting of a specified number of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and launch-associated railcars. The presence of other railcars and the number of such other cars in a train of standard configuration is unregulated by the Treaty.

115. The term "training facility" means: for ICBMs or SLBMs, a specified facility, outside an ICBM base or a submarine base, at which personnel are trained to use, operate, or maintain ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers; for heavy bombers, a facility where training heavy bombers are based. Although for ICBMs and SLBMs this definition is very general, note that such facilities are specified." That is, the Parties are free to designate only the facilities they choose that meet this definition.

116. The term "training heavy bomber" means a heavy bomber used for training that is not equipped for nuclear armaments or non-nuclear air-to-surface armaments, and that satisfies the requirements for conversion in accordance with the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination. These conversion requirements specify that training heavy bombers not be capable of carrying air-to-surface weapons or nuclear armaments. In accordance with subparagraph 4(g) of Article III of the Treaty, training heavy bombers are not attributed with a warhead for the purpose of counting warheads; moreover, training heavy bombers do not count toward the 1600 limit because they are not deployed" heavy bombers. Subparagraph 3(a) of Article IV establishes a limit of 75 on the aggregate number of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, former heavy bombers, and training heavy bombers. Subparagraph 9(f) of Article IV requires that training heavy bombers be based only at training facilities for heavy bombers. Provisions for training heavy bombers were added to accommodate Soviet practices; the United States has no training heavy bombers.

117. The term "training launcher" means a silo training launcher or a mobile training launcher. In accordance with subparagraph 2(e) of Article IV, the aggregate number of silo training launchers and mobile training launchers must not exceed 60. Mobile training launchers must be incapable of launching ICBMs, must differ from mobile ICBM launchers by differences observable to national technical means of verification, and may only contain training models of ICBMs. Silo training launchers may not launch ICBMs and may only contain training models of ICBMs. The Thirteenth Agreed Statement specifies that the provisions on silo training launchers in subparagraph 2(e) of Article IV also apply to the engineering models of silos at Hill Air Force Base.

118. The term "training model of a missile" means a full-scale, inert model of an ICBM or SLBM that is not capable of being launched and that differs from an ICBM or SLBM on the basis of external and functional differences that are visible during inspection. In accordance withparagraph 3(d) of Article III of the Treaty, a launch canister will not be considered to contain an ICBM if it contains a training model of a missile. In accordance with subparagraphs 2(c) and 2(e) of Article IV, non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs located at training facilities for ICBMs and training launchers may contain only training models of a missile.

119. The term "transit" means the one-way movement from one facility or location to another facility or another location of a non-deployed ICBM, other than an ICBM of a retired or former type; a non-deployed SLBM, other than an SLBM of a retired or former type; a launch canister that remains after the flight test of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs; or a non-deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs. In accordance with paragraph 12 of Article IV, the duration of each transit is limited to 30 days. Transits must be notified in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

120. The term "transporter-loader" means a vehicle that is capable of transporting an assembled ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs and from which such an ICBM can be loaded directly onto a mobile launcher of ICBMs, or onto which such an ICBM can be unloaded directly from a mobile launcher of ICBMs, outside facilities where non-deployed ICBMs may be located. Paragraph 5 of Article IV establishes numerical limitations on transporter-loaders. Paragraph 7 of Article V bans transporter-loaders for ICBMs for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, and for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs to which more than one warhead has been attributed.

121. The term "variant" means: for heavy bombers, a classification, declared by the inspected Party, of airplanes of one type and one category that are distinguishable from other airplanes of the same type and the same category; for long-range nuclear ALCMs, a classification, declared by the inspected Party, of items of the same type that are distinguishable from other items of the same type; for ICBMs and SLBMs, a classification, declared by the inspected Party, of ICBMs or SLBMs of the same type that are distinguishable from other ICBMs or SLBMs of the same type. For heavy bombers, variant" is a subclassification of a type/category combination. For example, B-52s equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs have two variants: B-52G and B-52H. B-52s equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs have several variants: B-52C, B-52D, B-52E, B-52F, and B-52G. There are no specified variants for B-52 test heavy bombers, even though such airplanes may be models of B-52Gs or B-52Hs. Declaration of variants is at the discretion of the owning Party; the United States elected not to declare such variants because (a) there was no need to do so, since test heavy bombers count toward a separate limit, rather than the central limits of the Treaty, and (b) declaring variants would have entailed exhibitions to display distinguishability.

In accordance with the Twenty-fifth Agreed Statement, an ICBM or SLBM of a type, a dimension of which differs from that of another ICBM or SLBM of the same type by more than three percent, but by less than the appropriate new types criteria, must be considered to be a variant. A Party may also declare an ICBM or SLBM to be a variant if its dimensions differ by less than three percent.

122. The term "version" means, for mobile launchers of ICBMs, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, and support equipment, a classification, declared by the inspected Party, based on external differences from other such items for a particular type of ICBM or SLBM. The term "version" is used for mobile launchers of ICBMs, fixed structures, and support equipment as The term "variant" is used for heavy bombers, long-range nuclear ALCMs, and ICBMs and SLBMs. There are three reasons why the two terms could not have been combined: "variant" refers only to items the Treaty specifies as types (e.g., ICBMs and SLBMs); The term "variant" uses the defined term "distinguishable;" and "variant" has the connotation of a base model and derivatives, while "version" has the connotation of several equally authoritative models.

123. The term "warhead" means a unit of account used for counting toward the 6000 maximum aggregate limit and relevant sublimits as applied to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers. The term "is never used to describe a physical object; instead, The term "reentry vehicle" is used, with respect to ICBMs and SLBMs, and The term "ALCM," heavy bomber armaments" or weapons" is used with respect to heavy bombers. The term "is always used in the context of a certain number of warheads attributed" to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers.

124. The term "weapon-delivery vehicle" means, for ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, a missile of a type, any one of which has been flight-tested or deployed to carry or be used as a weapon, that is, as any mechanism or device that, when directed against any target, is designed to damage or destroy it. Since the term "warhead" is used in a specialized sense in the Treaty as a unit of account, not as a physical object, it does not appear in this definition. Nevertheless, in parallel statements for the record on June 28, 1990, U.S. and Soviet negotiators confirmed that the phrase any mechanism or device" in the definition of weapon-delivery vehicle includes what are commonly referred to as warheads. This term is used only in subparagraphs 9(b) and 9(c) of Article III of the Treaty, and is based on similar provisions in the INF Treaty.

[Part 2: ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOL ON CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION OF ITEMS SUBJECT TO THE TREATY STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE PROTOCOL]