Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance

[On December 13, 2001, the United States indicated its intent to withdraw from the Treaty, and its withdrawal became effective 6 months later.]

Signed May 26, 1972

Table of Contents

Narrative

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (May 26, 1972)

Agreed Statements, Common Understandings, and Unilateral Statements Regarding the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (May 26, 1972)

Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission (December 21, 1972)

Protocol to the December 21, 1972 Memorandum of Understanding (May 30, 1973)

Standing Consultative Commission Regulations (May 30, 1973)

Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (July 3, 1974)

Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components (July 3, 1974)

Attachment: Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components (July 3, 1974)

Supplementary Protocol to the Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components of July 3, 1974 (October 28, 1976)

Attachment: Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components (October 28, 1976)

Agreed Statement Regarding Section III, Paragraph 5 of the Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components (October 28, 1976)

Agreed Statements of November 1, 1978

Statement by U.S. SCC Commissioner Buchheim

Statement by Soviet SCC Commissioner Ustinov

Common Understanding of June 6, 1985

Standing Consultative Commission Documents (September 26, 1997)

Five-Year ABM Treaty Reviews


Treaty Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on The Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

In the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems the United States and the Soviet Union agree that each may have only two ABM deployment areas,1 so restricted and so located that they cannot provide a nationwide ABM defense or become the basis for developing one. Each country thus leaves unchallenged the penetration capability of the others retaliatory missile forces.

The Treaty permits each side to have one limited ABM system to protect its capital and another to protect an ICBM launch area. The two sites defended must be at least 1,300 kilometers apart, to prevent the creation of any effective regional defense zone or the beginnings of a nationwide system.

Precise quantitative and qualitative limits are imposed on the ABM systems that may be deployed. At each site there may be no more than 100 interceptor missiles and 100 launchers. Agreement on the number and characteristics of radars to be permitted had required extensive and complex technical negotiations, and the provisions governing these important components of ABM systems are spelled out in very specific detail in the Treaty and further clarified in the "Agreed Statements" accompanying it.

Both Parties agreed to limit qualitative improvement of their ABM technology, e.g., not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers capable of launching more than one interceptor missile at a time or modify existing launchers to give them this capability, and systems for rapid reload of launchers are similarly barred. These provisions, the Agreed Statements clarify, also ban interceptor missiles with more than one independently guided warhead.

There had been some concern over the possibility that surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) intended for defense against aircraft might be improved, along with their supporting radars, to the point where they could effectively be used against ICBMs and SLBMs, and the Treaty prohibits this. While further deployment of radars intended to give early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack is not prohibited, such radars must be located along the territorial boundaries of each country and oriented outward, so that they do not contribute to an effective ABM defense of points in the interior.

Further, to decrease the pressures of technological change and its unsettling impact on the strategic balance, both sides agree to prohibit development, testing, or deployment of sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems and their components, along with mobile land-based ABM systems. Should future technology bring forth new ABM systems "based on other physical principles" than those employed in current systems, it was agreed that limiting such systems would be discussed, in accordance with the Treatys provisions for consultation and amendment.

The Treaty also provides for a U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission to promote its objectives and implementation. The commission was established during the first negotiating session of SALT II, by a Memorandum of Understanding dated December 21, 1972. Since then both the United States and the Soviet Union have raised a number of questions in the Commission relating to each sides compliance with the SALT I agreements. In each case raised by the United States, the Soviet activity in question has either ceased or additional information has allayed U.S. concern.

Article XIV of the Treaty calls for review of the Treaty five years after its entry into force, and at five-year intervals thereafter. The first such review was conducted by the Standing Consultative Commission at its special session in the fall of 1977. At this session, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that the Treaty had operated effectively during its first five years, that it had continued to serve national security interests, and that it did not need to be amended at that time.

The most recent Treaty review was completed in October 1993. Following that review, numerous sessions of the Standing Consultative Commission have been held to work out Treaty succession -- to "multilateralize" the Treaty -- as a result of the break-up of the Soviet Union and to negotiate a demarcation between ABM and non-ABM systems.

__________________

1 Subsequently reduced to one area (See section on ABM Protocol)


Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Limitation Of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

Signed at Moscow May 26, 1972
Ratification advised by U.S. Senate August 3, 1972
Ratified by U.S. President September 30, 1972
Proclaimed by U.S. President October 3, 1972
Instruments of ratification exchanged October 3, 1972
Entered into force October 3, 1972

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,

Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarma-ment, and general and complete disarmament,

Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.

2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.

Article II

1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:

(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;

(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and

(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.

2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those which are:

(a) operational;

(b) under construction;

(c) undergoing testing;

(d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or

(e) mothballed.

Article III

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:

(a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and centered on the Partys national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than three kilometers; and

(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM radars.

Article IV

The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges.

Article V

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, not to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capacity, not to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.

Article VI

To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by the Treaty, each Party undertakes:

(a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; and

(b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

Article VII

Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out.

Article VIII

ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time.

Article IX

To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty.

Article X

Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty.

Article XI

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms.

Article XII

1. For the purpose of providing assurance or compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification;

(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty;

(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;

(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty; including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.

Article XIV

1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.

Article XV

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XVI

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

DONE at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
RICHARD NIXON

President of the United States of America


FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
L. I. BREZHNEV

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU


Agreed Statements, Common Understandings, And Unilateral Statements Regarding The Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Limitation Of Anti-Ballistic Missiles

1. Agreed Statements

The document set forth below was agreed upon and initialed by the Heads of the Delegations on May 26, 1972 (letter designations added):

Agreed Statements Regarding the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

[A]

The Parties understand that, in addition to the ABM radars which may be deployed in accordance with subparagraph (a) of Article III of the Treaty, those non-phased-array ABM radars operational on the date of signature of the Treaty within the ABM system deployment area for defense of the national capital may be retained.

[B]

The Parties understand that the potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) of the smaller of the two large phased-array ABM radars referred to in subparagraph (b) of Article III of the Treaty is considered for purposes of the Treaty to be three million.

[C]

The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers.

[D]

In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.

[E]

The Parties understand that Article V of the Treaty includes obligations not to develop, test or deploy ABM interceptor missiles for the delivery by each ABM interceptor missile of more than one independently guided warhead.

[F]

The Parties agree not to deploy phased-array radars having a potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) exceeding three million, except as provided for in Articles III, IV, and VI of the Treaty, or except for the purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification.

[G]

The Parties understand that Article IX of the Treaty includes the obligation of the United States and the USSR not to provide to other States technical descriptions or blueprints specially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty.


2. Common Understandings

Common understanding of the Parties on the following matters was reached during the negotiations:

A. Location of ICBM Defenses

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 26, 1972:

Article III of the ABM Treaty provides for each side one ABM system deployment area centered on its national capital and one ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers. The two sides have registered agreement on the following statement: "The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers." In this connection, the U.S. side notes that its ABM system deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers, located west of the Mississippi River, will be centered in the Grand Forks ICBM silo launcher deployment area. (See Agreed Statement [C].)

B. ABM Test Ranges

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on April 26, 1972:

Article IV of the ABM Treaty provides that "the limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges." We believe it would be useful to assure that there is no misunderstanding as to current ABM test ranges. It is our understanding that ABM test ranges encompass the area within which ABM components are located for test purposes. The current U.S. ABM test ranges are at White Sands, New Mexico, and at Kwajalein Atoll, and the current Soviet ABM test range is near Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan. We consider that non-phased array radars of types used for range safety or instrumentation purposes may be located outside of ABM test ranges. We interpret the reference in Article IV to "additionally agreed test ranges" to mean that ABM components will not be located at any other test ranges without prior agreement between our Governments that there will be such additional ABM test ranges.

On May 5, 1972, the Soviet Delegation stated that there was a common understanding on what ABM test ranges were, that the use of the types of non-ABM radars for range safety or instrumentation was not limited under the Treaty, that the reference in Article IV to "additionally agreed" test ranges was sufficiently clear, and that national means permitted identifying current test ranges.

C. Mobile ABM Systems

On January 29, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

Article V(1) of the Joint Draft Text of the ABM Treaty includes an undertaking not to develop, test, or deploy mobile land-based ABM systems and their components. On May 5, 1971, the U.S. side indicated that, in its view, a prohibition on development of mobile ABM systems and components would rule out the deployment of ABM launchers and radars which were not permanent fixed types. At that time, we asked for the Soviet view of this interpretation. Does the Soviet side agree with the U.S. sides interpretation put forward on May 5, 1971?

On April 13, 1972, the Soviet Delegation said there is a general common understanding on this matter.

D. Standing Consultative Commission

Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 22, 1972:

The United States proposes that the sides agree that, with regard to initial implementation of the ABM Treatys Article XIII on the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and of the consultation Articles to the Interim Agreement on offensive arms and the Accidents Agreement,1 agreement establishing the SCC will be worked out early in the follow-on SALT negotiations; until that is completed, the following arrangements will prevail: when SALT is in session, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the two SALT Delegations; when SALT is not in session, ad hoc arrangements for any desired consultations under these Articles may be made through diplomatic channels.

Minister Semenov replied that, on an ad referendum basis, he could agree that the U.S. statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding.

E. Standstill

On May 6, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following statement:

In an effort to accommodate the wishes of the U.S. side, the Soviet Delegation is prepared to proceed on the basis that the two sides will in fact observe the obligations of both the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty beginning from the date of signature of these two documents.

In reply, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972:

The United States agrees in principle with the Soviet statement made on May 6 concerning observance of obligations beginning from date of signature but we would like to make clear our understanding that this means that, pending ratification and acceptance, neither side would take any action prohibited by the agreements after they had entered into force. This understanding would continue to apply in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval.

The Soviet Delegation indicated agreement with the U.S. statement.


3. Unilateral Statements

The following noteworthy unilateral statements were made during the negotiations by the United States Delegation:

A. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty

On May 9, 1972, Ambassador Smith made the following statement:

The U.S. Delegation has stressed the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces. The USSR Delegation has also indicated that the objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without the achievement of an agreement providing for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. Both sides recognize that the initial agreements would be steps toward the achievement of complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The United States does not wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we believe that the USSR does. It is because we wish to prevent such a situation that we emphasize the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achievement of more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Executive will inform the Congress, in connection with Congressional consideration of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, of this statement of the U.S. position.

B. Tested in an ABM Mode

On April 7, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

Article II of the Joint Text Draft uses the term "tested in an ABM mode," in defining ABM components, and Article VI includes certain obligations concerning such testing. We believe that the sides should have a common understanding of this phrase. First, we would note that the testing provisions of the ABM Treaty are intended to apply to testing which occurs after the date of signature of the Treaty, and not to any testing which may have occurred in the past. Next, we would amplify the remarks we have made on this subject during the previous Helsinki phase by setting forth the objectives which govern the U.S. view on the subject, namely, while prohibiting testing of non-ABM components for ABM purposes: not to prevent testing of ABM components, and not to prevent testing of non-ABM components for non-ABM purposes. To clarify our interpretation of "tested in an ABM mode," we note that we would consider a launcher, missile or radar to be "tested in an ABM mode" if, for example, any of the following events occur: (1) a launcher is used to launch an ABM interceptor missile, (2) an interceptor missile is flight tested against a target vehicle which has a flight trajectory with characteristics of a strategic ballistic missile flight trajectory, or is flight tested in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range, or is flight tested to an altitude inconsistent with interception of targets against which air defenses are deployed, (3) a radar makes measurements on a cooperative target vehicle of the kind referred to in item (2) above during the reentry portion of its trajectory or makes measurements in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range. Radars used for purposes such as range safety or instrumentation would be exempt from application of these criteria.

C. No-Transfer Article of ABM Treaty

On April 18, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

In regard to this Article [IX], I have a brief and I believe self-explanatory statement to make. The U.S. side wishes to make clear that the provisions of this Article do not set a precedent for whatever provision may be considered for a Treaty on Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms. The question of transfer of strategic offensive arms is a far more complex issue, which may require a different solution.

D. No Increase in Defense of Early Warning Radars

On July 28, 1970, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

Since Hen House radars [Soviet ballistic missile early warning radars] can detect and track ballistic missile warheads at great distances, they have a significant ABM potential. Accordingly, the United States would regard any increase in the defenses of such radars by surface-to-air missiles as inconsistent with an agreement.

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1 See Article 7 of Agreement to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed September 30, 1971.




Memorandum Of Understanding Between The Government Of The United States Of America And The Government Of The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding The Establishment Of A Standing Consultative Commission

I.

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics hereby establish a Standing Consultative Commission.

II.

The Standing Consultative Commission shall promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty between the USA and the USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, the Interim Agreement between the USA and the USSR on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of May 26, 1972, and the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the USA and the USSR of September 30, 1971, and shall exercise its competence in accordance with the provisions of Article XIII of said Treaty, Article VI of said Interim Agreement, and Article 7 of said Agreement on Measures.

III.

Each Government shall be represented on the Standing Consultative Commission by a Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner, assisted by such staff as it deems necessary.

IV.

The Standing Consultative Commission shall hold periodic sessions on dates mutually agreed by the Commissioners but no less than two times per year. Sessions shall also be convened as soon as possible, following reasonable notice, at the request of either Commissioner.

V.

The Standing Consultative Commission shall establish and approve Regulations governing procedures and other relevant matters and may amend them as it deems appropriate.

VI.

The Standing Consultative Commission will meet in Geneva. It may also meet at such other places as may be agreed.

Done in Geneva, on December 21, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

If a scroll bar appears below the following table, swipe the table to move left/right of the dashed line.

For the Government
of the
United States of America

For the Government
of the
Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics



Standing Consultative Commission

Protocol

Pursuant to the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission, dated December 21, 1972, the undersigned, having been duly appointed by their respective Governments as Commissioners of said Standing Consultative Commission, hereby establish and approve, in the form attached, Regulations governing procedures and other relevant matters of the Commission, which Regulations shall enter into force upon signature of this Protocol and remain in force until and unless amended by the undersigned or their successors.

Done in Geneva on May 30, 1973, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

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Commissioner,
United States
of America

Commissioner,
Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics



Standing Consultative Commission Regulations

1. The Standing Consultative Commission, established by the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of December 21, 1972, shall consist of a U.S. component and Soviet component, each of which shall be headed by a Commissioner.

2. The Commissioners shall alternatively preside over the meetings.

3. The Commissioners shall, when possible, inform each other in advance of the matters to be submitted for discussion, but may at a meeting submit for discussion any matter within the competence of the Commission.

4. During intervals between sessions of the Commission, each Commissioner may transmit written or oral communications to the other Commissioner concerning matters within the competence of the Commission.

5. Each component of the Commission may invite such advisers and experts as it deems necessary to participate in a meeting.

6. The Commission may establish working groups to consider and prepare specific matters.

7. The results of the discussion of questions at the meetings of the Commission may, if necessary, be entered into records which shall be in two copies, each in the English and the Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

8. The proceedings of the Standing Consultative Commission shall be conducted in private. The Standing Consultative Commission may not make its proceedings public except with the express consent of both Commissioners.

9. Each component of the Commission shall bear the expenses connected with its participation in the Commission.


Protocol To The Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Limitation Of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

At the 1974 Summit meeting, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a protocol that further restrained deployment of strategic defensive armaments. The 1972 ABM Treaty had permitted each side two ABM deployment areas, one to defend its national capital and another to defend an ICBM field. The 1974 ABM Protocol limits each side to one site only.

The Soviet Union had chosen to maintain its ABM defense of Moscow, and the United States chose to maintain defense of its ICBM emplacements near Grand Forks, North Dakota. To allow some flexibility, the protocol allows each side to reverse its original choice of an ABM site. That is, the United States may dismantle or destroy its ABM system at Grand Forks and deploy an ABM defense of Washington. The Soviet Union, similarly, can decide to shift to an ABM defense of a missile field rather than of Moscow. Each side can make such a change only once. Advance notice must be given, and this may be done only during a year in which a review of the ABM Treaty is scheduled. The Treaty prescribes reviews every five years; the first year for such a review began October 3, 1977.

Upon entry into force, the protocol became an integral part of the 1972 ABM Treaty, of which the verification and other provisions continue to apply. Thus the deployments permitted are governed by the Treaty limitations on numbers and characteristics of interceptor missiles, launchers, and supporting radars. The system the United States chose to deploy (Grand Forks) has actually been on an inactive status since 1976.


Protocol To The Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Limitation Of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

Signed at Moscow July 3, 1974
Ratification advised by U.S. Senate November 10, 1975
Ratified by U.S. President March 19, 1976
Instruments of ratification exchanged May 24, 1976
Proclaimed by U.S. President July 6, 1976
Entered into force May 24, 1976

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed on May 29, 1972,

Desiring to further the objectives of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems signed on May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

Reaffirming their conviction that the adoption of further measures for the limitation of strategic arms would contribute to strengthening international peace and security,

Proceeding from the premise that further limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems will create more favorable conditions for the completion of work on a permanent agreement on more complete measures for the limitation of strategic offensive arms,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party shall be limited at any one time to a single area of the two provided in Article III of the Treaty for deployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems or their components and accordingly shall not exercise its right to deploy an ABM system or its components in the second of the two ABM system deployment areas permitted by Article III of the Treaty, except as an exchange of one permitted area for the other in accordance with Article II of this Protocol.

2. Accordingly, except as permitted by Article II of this Protocol: the United States of America shall not deploy an ABM system or its components in the area centered on its capital, as permitted by Article III(a) of the Treaty, and the Soviet Union shall not deploy an ABM system or its components in the deployment area of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silo launchers as permitted by Article III(b) of the Treaty.

Article II

1. Each Party shall have the right to dismantle or destroy its ABM system and the components thereof in the area where they are presently deployed and to deploy an ABM system or its components in the alternative area permitted by Article III of the Treaty, provided that prior to initiation of construction, notification is given in accord with the procedure agreed to in the Standing Consultative Commission, during the year beginning October 3, 1977, and ending October 2, 1978, or during any year which commences at five year intervals thereafter, those being the years of periodic review of the Treaty, as provided in Article XIV of the Treaty. This right may be exercised only once.

2. Accordingly, in the event of such notice, the United States would have the right to dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the deployment area of ICBM silo launchers and to deploy an ABM system or its components in an area centered on its capital, as permitted by Article III(a) of the Treaty, and the Soviet Union would have the right to dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the area centered on its capital and to deploy an ABM system or its components in an area containing ICBM silo launchers, as permitted by Article III(b) of the Treaty.

3. Dismantling or destruction and deployment of ABM systems or their components and the notification thereof shall be carried out in accordance with Article VIII of the ABM Treaty and procedures agreed to in the Standing Consultative Commission.

Article III

The rights and obligations established by the Treaty remain in force and shall be complied with by the Parties except to the extent modified by this Protocol. In particular, the deployment of an ABM system or its components within the area selected shall remain limited by the levels and other requirements established by the Treaty.

Article IV

This Protocol shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. It shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification and shall thereafter be considered an integral part of the Treaty.

DONE at Moscow on July 3, 1974, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
RICHARD NIXON

President of the United States of America

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
L.I. BREZHNEV

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU


Protocol On Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling Or Destruction, And Notification Thereof, For ABM Systems And Their Components

Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the Agreed Statements regarding that Treaty, the Parties thereto have within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission agreed upon procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for ABM systems and their components limited by that Treaty, as formulated in the Attachment hereto which constitutes an integral part of this Protocol.

The Parties have also agreed on the following general guidelines:

1. The attached Procedures shall apply only to systems or their components to be replaced and dismantled or destroyed pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty;

2. Any replacement of ABM systems or their components shall be on the basis of Article VII of the Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements; dismantling or destruction of ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified by the Treaty shall be on the basis of Article VIII of the Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements;

3. Dismantling or destruction procedures for ABM systems or their components, related to implementation of the provisions of Article VII regarding replacement of those systems or their components and Article VIII of the Treaty, shall ensure that those systems or their components and facilities associated with those components, except for facilities at test ranges, would be put in a condition that precludes the possibility of their use for ABM purposes; shall ensure that reactivation of units dismantled or destroyed would be detectable by national technical means; shall be such that reactivation time of those units would not be substantially less than the time required for new construction; and shall preclude unreasonable delays in dismantling or destruction;

4. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures shall be formulated separately for above-ground and silo ABM launchers and for ABM radars;

5. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures shall ensure that adequate verification can be accomplished by national technical means in accordance with Article XII of the Treaty;

6. After dismantling or destruction in accordance with the attached Procedures, facilities remaining at ABM launch or ABM radar sites may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements; and

7. Through timely and appropriate procedures, the Parties shall notify each other of the number and type (above-ground or silo) of ABM launchers and of the number of ABM radars on which dismantling or destruction has been completed and is in process, and of the number of ABM launchers and ABM radars used for replacement.

This Protocol and the attached Procedures shall enter into force upon signature of this Protocol and remain in force for the duration of the Treaty, and may be amended by the Standing Consultative Commission as it deems appropriate.

DONE at Moscow on July 3, 1974, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

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FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

Secretary of State

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

Minister of Foreign Affairs



Procedures Governing Dismantling Or Destruction, And Notification Thereof, For ABM Systems And Their Components

I. Excess ABM Launchers at Test Ranges

1. Above-ground launchers and associated equipment shall be removed from the sites, and the entire part of the launch pad containing the launcher mount and reinforcements shall be dismantled or destroyed. Launch-pad debris may be removed and after six months the location covered with earth.

2. Silo launchers shall be made unusable by dismantling or destruction of their above-ground structures and headworks, and removal of launch rails. Silo-launcher debris may be removed and after six months the silos may be filled with earth.

3. The dismantling or destruction actions described in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be completed no later than three months after their initiation.

4. Facilities associated with dismantled or destroyed ABM launchers at test ranges may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems, and applicable Agreed Statements.

5. Notification of the completion of the activities provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be given in the Standing Consultative Commission twice annually reflecting the actual status as of the beginning of a regular session of the Commission.

II. ABM Facilities at Malmstrom

1. Metal reinforcing rods on radar buildings shall be cut off.

2. Radar buildings for which wall construction had commenced shall be left uncovered in their uncompleted state for six months, after which they may be covered with earth.

3. Launcher facilities and radar buildings for which only foundations had been completed shall be covered with earth.

4. Earth grading of the entire area shall be accomplished and construction materials removed.

5. Dismantling or destruction activities shall be initiated no later than six months after agreement on these Procedures.

6. Notification that the above activities have been completed shall be given in the Standing Consultative Commission.



Supplementary Protocol To The Protocol On Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling Or Destruction, And Notification Thereof, For ABM Systems And Their Components Of July 3, 1974

Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Agreed Statements regarding the Treaty, and the Protocol to the Treaty of July 3, 1974, the Parties thereto have, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission and in implementation of the provisions of the Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components of July 3, 1974, agreed upon procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty, as formulated in the Attachment to this Supplementary Protocol.

This Supplementary Protocol and the attached Procedures shall constitute an integral part of the Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components of July 3, 1974 and shall be considered the second attachment to that Protocol. The attached Procedures shall enter into force upon signature of this Supplementary Protocol and remain in force for the duration of the Treaty, and may be amended by the Standing Consultative Commission as it deems appropriate.

Done at Geneva on October 28, 1976, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

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COMMISSIONER,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

COMMISSIONER,
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS


Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling Or Destruction, And Notification Thereof, For ABM Systems And Their Components

I. General

1. These Procedures shall constitute an integral part of the Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components of July 3, 1974, and shall be considered the second attachment to that Protocol. The Procedures shall apply to ABM systems or their components, when they are being replaced within a deployment area on the basis of Article VII of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems of May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, as well as when a deployment area of an ABM system or its components is being exchanged on the basis of the Protocol to the Treaty of July 3, 1974.

2. Replacement of an ABM system or its components within a deployment area or exchange of a deployment area of an ABM system or its components shall be carried out so that components of an ABM system, as defined in Article II of the Treaty, in their total number and composition, shall be consistent with the provisions of Article III of the Treaty.

3. When an ABM system or its components are being replaced within a deployment area or when a deployment area of an ABM system or its components is being exchanged, for each type of component being deployed or replaced an event, verifiable by national technical means, shall be identified which indicates the initiation of its deployment or the initiation of its dismantling or destruction. After such an event, a component correspondingly shall be included in the number specified by the Treaty and Protocol thereto for such components or shall be excluded therefrom.

4. Within a deployment area of an ABM system or its components replacement of an ABM system shall be carried out by replacing its components. Dismantling or destruction of components being replaced and deployment of replacement components of an ABM system shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of Section II and III of these Procedures.

5. If a replacement component of an ABM system is deployed at the location of the ABM system component being replaced, so that dismantling or destruction of the latter is a necessary part of the construction or installation of the replacement component, the manner and extent of dismantling or destruction of the component being replaced shall be at the discretion of the Party carrying out the replacement. Removal and replacement of ABM interceptor missiles shall be carried out at the discretion of the Party carrying out such replacement, subject to compliance with the provisions of Article III of the Treaty.

6. Exchange of a deployment area of an ABM system or its components shall be carried out through coordinated activities with respect to the dismantling or destruction of the ABM system or its components in the area being exchanged and with respect to the deployment of the ABM system or its components in the replacement area pursuant to the provisions of the Protocol to the Treaty and Section IV of these Procedures.

7. Notification of the replacement of components of an ABM system, both within a deployment area and when the deployment area of an ABM system or its components is being exchanged, shall be given twice annually in the Standing Consultative Commission at the beginning of regular SCC sessions, reflecting the actual status as of the beginning of that session and covering the period since the last notification in the Commission.

In this connection, the Party carrying out the replacement shall notify the other Party of the number and type (above-ground or silo) of ABM launchers, of the number and type (large phased-array ABM radars or ABM radars with a potential less than three million) of ABM radars, and of the number of ABM radar complexes, on which dismantling or destruction has been completed and is in process, and of the number of ABM launchers, ABM radars and ABM radar complexes which have been replaced.

8. Notification of the exchange of the deployment area of an ABM system or its components shall be given in the Standing Consultative Commission pursuant to Article II of the Protocol to the Treaty. Such notification shall be given before initiation within the replacement area of any construction activities associated with the exchange of the deployment area of an ABM system or its components and shall contain the time of initiation of these activities as well as the location of the new deployment area (the direction and distance to the new area in relation to the center of the area being exchanged).

Upon completion of dismantling or destruction of the ABM system or its components in the area being exchanged, the Party which has carried out the exchange of the deployment area of the ABM system or its components shall notify the other Party of having carried out the exchange of the area, at the next regular session of the Standing Consultative Commission.

9. Each Party may on a voluntary basis add other information to the notifications if it considers such information necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed under the Treaty.

II. Procedures for ABM Launchers

1. Subject to compliance with the limitations provided for in the Treaty and the Protocol thereto, ABM launchers may be replaced by above-ground or silo ABM launchers within a deployment area as well as when the deployment area of an ABM system or its components is being exchanged.

2. With respect to replacement of ABM launchers within a deployment area of an ABM system or its components, as well as when the deployment area is being exchanged:

(a) The beginning of any construction or assembly work, other than earthwork (excavation), associated with the building of replacement ABM launchers (above-ground and silo) shall constitute initiation of deployment of these launchers, after which they shall be subject to the limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty.

(b) Removal from the launch site of all above-ground launcher elements, and in addition, for a silo launcher, dismantling or destruction and removal from the launch site of the silo door or cover and dismantling or destruction of the headworks shall constitute initiation of dismantling or destruction of ABM launchers (above-ground and silo) being replaced, after which they shall not be subject to the limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty.

(c) Prior to initiation of dismantling or destruction of ABM launchers (above-ground and silo) being replaced, all ABM interceptor missiles associated with them, as well as the warheads for these interceptor missiles, shall be removed from the launch site.

3. When carrying out dismantling or destruction of ABM launchers being replaced, the following actions shall be accomplished:

(a) Above-ground launchers and associated equipment shall be removed from the launch sites and the entire part of the launch pad containing the launcher mount and reinforcements shall be dismantled or destroyed.

(b) Above-ground structures and headworks of ABM silo launchers shall be dismantled or destroyed; dismantled or destroyed silo doors or covers, as well as equipment associated with these launchers, shall be removed from the launch sites. The silo shall be destroyed by dismantling or destroying its concrete elements to a depth of at least five meters from the upper edge of the headworks. The silo shaft shall remain open for at least six months.

4. Deployment of replacement ABM launchers within the deployment area of an ABM system or its components shall be initiated no earlier than initiation of dismantling or destruction of the ABM launchers being replaced in that area.

5. Dismantling or destruction of ABM launchers being replaced shall be completed no later than three months after initiation thereof as defined in subparagraph 2(b) of this Section of the Procedures. Debris remaining after dismantling or destruction of ABM launchers (above-ground and silo) may be removed, and after six months the former ABM launcher locations may be covered with earth.

III. Procedures for ABM Radars and ABM Radar Complexes

1. Subject to compliance with the limitations provided for in the Treaty and the Protocol thereto, ABM radars and ABM radar complexes may be replaced within a deployment area, as well as when the deployment area of an ABM system or its components is being exchanged.

ABM Radars

2. With respect to replacement of ABM radars within a deployment area of an ABM system or its components, as well as when the deployment area is being exchanged:

(a) The beginning of any construction or assembly work associated with the building of antennas (arrays), ABM radar antenna structures, or antenna pedestal supports which are not parts of ABM radar buildings shall constitute initiation of deployment of replacement ABM radars, after which they shall be subject to the limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty.

(b) Removal or destruction of antenna protective covers, dismantling or destruction of antennas (arrays) and antenna structures, as well as opening of those parts of ABM radar buildings in which antennas (arrays) had been mounted, shall constitute initiation of dismantling or destruction of ABM radars being replaced, after which they shall not be subject to the limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty.

3. When carrying out dismantling or destruction of ABM radars being replaced, the following actions shall be accomplished:

(a) ABM radar instruments and equipment shall be dismantled and removed from the radar site.

(b) Antenna protective covers shall be dismantled or destroyed.

(c) ABM radar antennas (arrays) with their structures or with antenna pedestal supports which are not parts of ABM radar buildings as well as the pads occupied by the bases and reinforcements of such supports shall be dismantled or destroyed. The dismantled elements shall be removed from the ABM radar sites.

(d) Those parts of ABM radar buildings in which antennas (arrays) had been mounted as integral parts thereof shall be opened and destroyed in such a manner that there will remain no more than half of the perimeter of the opening formed as a result of opening that part of the building where antennas (arrays) had been mounted. The buildings shall remain in such a condition for six months, after which they may be restored but not beyond that level to which destruction is required.

(e) Debris remaining after completion of dismantling or destruction of ABM radars may be removed after six months.

4. Deployment of replacement ABM radars within the deployment area of an ABM system or its components shall be initiated no earlier than the initiation of dismantling or destruction of the ABM radars being replaced in that area, and shall be carried out in such a manner that it will not cause the number of ABM radars to exceed the number specified in Article III, subparagraph (b) of the Treaty, subject to compliance with the provisions of that subparagraph and the applicable Agreed Statements concerning the potential of radars.

5. Dismantling or destruction of ABM radars being replaced, which are components of the ABM system currently deployed by each Party, shall be completed without unreasonable delays no later than one year after initiation thereof as defined in subparagraph 2(b) of this Section of the Procedures.

6. After dismantling or destruction of ABM radars has been completed in accordance with the above procedures, facilities remaining at ABM radar sites may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes which are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty.

ABM Radar Complexes

7. With respect to replacement of ABM radar complexes within a deployment area of an ABM system or its components, as well as when the deployment area is being exchanged:

(a) The initiation of deployment, as defined in subparagraph 2(a) of this Section of the Procedures, of even one ABM radar of an ABM radar complex being deployed shall constitute initiation of deployment of replacement ABM radar complexes, after which they shall be subject to the limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty.

(b) The initiation of dismantling or destruction, as defined in subparagraph 2(b) of this Section of the Procedures, of all ABM radars of each ABM radar complex being replaced shall constitute initiation of dismantling or destruction of ABM radar complexes being replaced, after which they shall not be subject to the limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty.

8. Deployment of replacement ABM radar complexes within the deployment area of an ABM system or its components shall be initiated no earlier than the initiation of dismantling or destruction of ABM radar complexes being replaced in that area, and shall be carried out in such a manner that it will not cause the number of ABM radar complexes to exceed the number specified in Article III, subparagraph (a) of the Treaty, subject to compliance with the provisions of that subparagraph concerning the size and circular shape of the area of each ABM radar complex.

9. Dismantling or destruction of ABM radar complexes being replaced shall be completed by dismantling or destruction of all ABM radars of each ABM radar complex being replaced in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Section of the Procedures no later than one year after initiation thereof as defined in subparagraph 7(b) of this Section of the Procedures.

IV. Procedures for Exchange of the Deployment Area of an ABM System or its Components

1. When the deployment area of an ABM system or its components is being exchanged, no construction activity associated with the deployment of an ABM system or its components in the replacement area shall begin until appropriate notification is given to the other Party pursuant to Article II of the Protocol to the Treaty and Section I, paragraph 8, of these Procedures.

2. When the deployment area of an ABM system or its components is being exchanged:

(a) Initiation of deployment, as defined in Section II, subparagraph 2(a) of these Procedures, of even one ABM launcher (above-ground or silo) in the replacement area shall be carried out no earlier than completion of the initiation of dismantling or destruction, as defined in Section II, subparagraph 2(b) of these Procedures, of all ABM launchers in the area being exchanged.

(b) Initiation of deployment, as defined in Section III, subparagraph 2(a) of these Procedures, of even one ABM radar, including one which is part of an ABM radar complex, in the replacement area shall be carried out no earlier than completion of the initiation of dismantling or destruction, as defined in Section III, subparagraph 2(b) of these Procedures, of all ABM radars, including those which are parts of ABM radar complexes, in the area being exchanged.

3. Prior to completion of dismantling or destruction of 50 percent of the number of ABM launchers, ABM radars or ABM radar complexes in the area being exchanged, the Party carrying out the exchange may initiate deployment of no more than 50 percent of the number of ABM launchers, ABM radars or ABM radar complexes which is specified in Article III of the Treaty for the replacement deployment area of an ABM system or its components.

4. Each Party may, at its discretion, completely dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the area being exchanged, and thereafter deploy an ABM system or its components in the other area permitted in Article III of the Treaty and the Protocol thereto, provided that, prior to initiation of construction, notification is given pursuant to Article II of the Protocol to the Treaty and Section I, paragraph 8, of these Procedures.

5. When the deployment area of an ABM system or its components centered on the national capital is being exchanged, those non-phased-array ABM radars which were operational within that area on the date of signature of the Treaty shall be dismantled or destroyed.

When carrying out dismantling or destruction of these ABM radars, the following actions shall be accomplished:

(a) Antenna protective covers shall be dismantled or destroyed.

(b) Antennas, antenna structures and ABM radar equipment shall be dismantled and removed from the radar site.

Buildings and facilities remaining after dismantling or destruction of these ABM radars may be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty.

Dismantling or destruction of these ABM radars shall be completed no later than accomplishment of the other actions provided for in these Procedures for exchange of the deployment area of an ABM system or its components.

6. Dismantling or destruction of ABM launchers, ABM radars and ABM radar complexes within the area being exchanged shall be carried out in accordance with Section II, paragraphs 3 and 5, and Section III, paragraphs 3, 5 and 9 of these Procedures.



Geneva
October 28, 1976

Standing Consultative Commission

Agreed Statement Regarding Section III, Paragraph 5 Of The Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling Or Destruction, And Notification Thereof, For ABM Systems And Their Components Attached To The Supplementary Protocol Of October 28, 1976

Agreeing that dismantling or destruction of ABM radars being replaced, which are components of the currently deployed ABM system of each Party, shall be completed without unreasonable delays no later than one year after initiation thereof as defined in Section III, subparagraph 2(b) of these Procedures, the Parties understand that if, in the future, either Party operationally deploys ABM radars of another type as a component of an ABM system, the periods of time for dismantling or destruction of such radars would be subject to agreement in the Standing Consultative Commission, but in any case would not exceed one year.



Geneva
November 1, 1978

Standing Consultative Commission

Agreed Statement

Regarding Certain Provisions of Articles II, IV, and VI of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the Utilization of Air Defense Radars at the Test Ranges Referred to in Article IV of that Treaty

In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties thereto have, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, reached mutual understanding regarding the following:

I. Test Ranges Referred to in Article IV of the Treaty

1. The test ranges referred to in Article IV of the Treaty are any test ranges at which an ABM system or at least one ABM launcher, regardless of whether or not it contains an ABM interceptor missile, or one ABM radar is located or constructed for purposes of testing.

2. Any other types of weapons or military equipment may also be located at such test ranges for testing according to their mission or for range safety purposes. Such location, testing, or use of these other types of weapons or military equipment, provided it is consistent with the provisions of the Treaty, shall not constitute a basis for considering them ABM system components.

3. The current test ranges referred to in Article IV of the Treaty are those test ranges which each Party had on the date of signature of the Treaty, that is, on May 26, 1972. Both the USA and USSR had on May 26, 1972, and have at the present time, two current test ranges: for the USA in the vicinity of White Sands, New Mexico, and on Kwajalein Atoll and for the USSR in the vicinity of Sary Shagan, Kazakhstan, and on the Kamchatka Peninsula.

4. Each Party may establish test ranges referred to in Article IV of the Treaty as "additionally agreed" and locate therein for testing ABM systems or their components as they are defined in Article II of the Treaty, provided that the establishment of such ranges is consistent with the objectives and provisions of the Treaty and, in particular, with the obligations of each Party provided for in Article I of the Treaty not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense.

5. In the event of establishment of an additional test range by either Party, the Party carrying out such action shall provide, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, notification of the location of such a test range no later than thirty days after the beginning of any construction or assembly work, other than earthwork (excavation), associated with locating or constructing at that test range an ABM launcher or antenna (array), ABM radar antenna structures, or an antenna pedestal support which is not a part of an ABM radar building. After presentation of such notification and, if necessary, clarification in the Standing Consultative Commission of any aspects of this notification which are not clear to the Party being notified, the test range being newly established will be considered an "additionally agreed test range," referred to in Article IV of the Treaty.

II. The Term "Tested in an ABM Mode" Used in the Treaty

1. The term "tested in an ABM mode," which is used in Article II of the Treaty for defining ABM system components, refers to ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, which are tested in an ABM mode separately or in conjunction with other ABM system components after the date of signature of the Treaty, that is after May 26, 1972. The term does not refer to components which were tested by the Parties in an ABM mode prior to that date.

2. Testing in an ABM mode is the testing, which, in accordance with the provisions of Articles III and IV of the Treaty regarding locations of ABM systems or their components, is carried out only at test ranges or in an ABM system deployment area, for the purpose of determining the capabilities of an ABM system or its individual components (ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars) to perform the functions of countering strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory.

3. As applied to testing of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, the term "strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory," used in the Treaty, also refers to ballistic target-missiles which, after being launched, are used for testing these ABM system components in an ABM mode, and the flight trajectories of which, over the portions of the flight trajectory involved in such testing, have the characteristics of the flight trajectory of a strategic ballistic missile or its elements.

4. The term "tested in an ABM mode" used in Article II of the Treaty refers to:

(a) an ABM interceptor missile if while guided by an ABM radar it has intercepted a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory regardless of whether such intercept was successful or not; or if an ABM interceptor missile has been launched from an ABM launcher and guided by an ABM radar. If ABM interceptor missiles are given the capability to carry out interception without the use of ABM radars as the means of guidance, application of the term "tested in an ABM mode" to ABM interceptor missiles in that event shall be subject to additional discussion and agreement in the Standing Consultative Commission;

(b) an ABM launcher if it has been used for launching an ABM interceptor missile;

(c) an ABM radar if it has tracked a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory and guided an ABM interceptor missile toward them regardless of whether the intercept was successful or not; or tracked and guided an ABM interceptor missile; or tracked a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory in conjunction with an ABM radar, which is tracking a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory and guiding an ABM interceptor missile toward them or is tracking and guiding an ABM interceptor missile.

5. The provisions of paragraph 4 of this Section shall be applied taking into account Article VI, subparagraph (a), of the Treaty concerning the obligations of the Parties not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM system components, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory. The term "tested in an ABM mode" shall not be applied to radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack, or to radars, including phased-array radars, used for the purposes of tracking objects in outer space or as national technical means of verification.

6. The term "tested in an ABM mode" shall not be applied to radars, including phased-array radars, which are constructed and used only as instrumentation equipment for testing of any types of weapons or military equipment.

7. The term "tested in an ABM mode" shall not be applied to a radar, including a phased-array radar, which is not an ABM radar or a radar referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Section, if strategic ballistic missiles or their elements passed through the field of view of the radar while it was operating in accordance with its mission, and it was not, at that time, performing functions inherent only to an ABM radar, and it was not functioning in conjunction with an ABM radar. In the event that ambiguities arise in the future regarding application of the term "tested in an ABM mode" to individual radars which track strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, the Parties, in accordance with Article XIII of the ABM Treaty, will consider such questions in the Standing Consultative Commission and resolve them on a mutually acceptable basis.

8. Deployment of radars of a type tested in an ABM mode, except as provided in Articles III and IV of the Treaty, to carry out any functions would be inconsistent with the obligation of each Party not to provide a base for an ABM defense of the territory of its country.

III. Utilization of Air Defense Radars at the Test Ranges Referred to in Article IV of the Treaty

1. Utilization of air defense radars located at or near a test range to carry out air defense functions, including providing for the safety of that range, is not limited by the provisions of the Treaty and is independent of the testing carried out at that range.

2. When air defense components and ABM system components are co-located at a test range, the Parties, in order to preclude the possibility of ambiguous situations or misunderstandings, will refrain from concurrent testing of such air defense components and ABM system components at that range.

3. In utilizing air defense radars as instrumentation equipment at test ranges the Parties will not use such radars to make measurements on strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory.



Statement By Commissioner Buchheim

November 1, 1978

Mr. Commissioner, I would like to make the following statement regarding the Agreed Statement which we have just initialed.

FIRST, in paragraph 6 of Section II of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, the Parties agreed that the term "tested in an ABM mode" shall not be applied to radars, including phased-array radars, which are constructed and used only as instrumentation equipment for testing of any types of weapons or military equipment. With respect to such radars the Parties understand that:

(a) phased-array radars which have a potential exceeding three million may be located only at the test ranges referred to in Article IV of the ABM Treaty;

(b) phased-array radars which have a potential not exceeding three million and which make measurements on strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory may be located only at the test ranges referred to in Article IV of the ABM Treaty, or at locations to which strategic ballistic missiles are launched for testing;

(c) phased-array radars which have a potential not exceeding three million and which do not make measurements on strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory may be located anywhere for instrumentation or other purposes not inconsistent with the ABM Treaty;

(d) non-phased-array radars may be located anywhere for instrumentation or other purposes not inconsistent with the ABM Treaty.

SECOND, in connection with paragraph 7 of Section II of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, the Parties understand that ABM radars, radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack, radars used for tracking objects in outer space or as national technical means of verification, as well as radars constructed and used only as instrumentation equipment for testing of any types of weapons or military equipment can, when operating in accordance with their missions, perform the function inherent to them of tracking strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory.

In addition to the aforementioned radars, both Parties have other radars, including phased-array radars, intended for various missions. When these radars are operating in accordance with their missions, strategic ballistic missiles or their elements might pass through the fields of view of these radars. The passing of strategic ballistic missiles or their elements through the fields of view of such radars will not be equated with tracking of such missiles by these radars and cannot give grounds for either Party to consider that in these cases the radars are being tested in an ABM mode.

If ambiguities arise in the future regarding application of the term "tested in an ABM mode" to individual radars which track strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, or regarding determination of whether these radars are ABM radars or radars which are not ABM radars, such questions will be subject to consultation in the Standing Consultative Commission in accordance with Article XIII of the ABM Treaty.

THIRD, the Parties, in connection with the Agreed Statement Regarding Certain Provisions of the ABM Treaty, have the common understanding that the Agreed Statement will be used by the Parties in their implementation of those provisions of the ABM Treaty, beginning on the date of initialing of the Agreed Statement by the U.S. and USSR SCC Commissioners, that is, November 1, 1978. Like the statements in connection with paragraphs II.6 and II.7 of the Agreed Statement, this common understanding constitutes a component part of the general understanding reached between the Parties with regard to certain provisions of the ABM Treaty.



Statement By Commissioner Ustinov

November 1, 1978

Mr. Commissioner, I would like to make the following statement regarding the Agreed Statement which we have just initialed.

FIRST, in paragraph 6 of Section II of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, the Parties agreed that the term "tested in an ABM mode" shall not be applied to radars, including phased-array radars, which are constructed and used only as instrumentation equipment for testing of any types of weapons or military equipment. With respect to such radars the Parties understand that:

(a) phased-array radars which have a potential exceeding three million may be located only at the test ranges referred to in Article IV of the ABM Treaty;

(b) phased-array radars which have a potential not exceeding three million and which make measurements on strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory may be located only at the test ranges referred to in Article IV of the ABM Treaty, or at locations to which strategic ballistic missiles are launched for testing;

(c) phased-array radars which have a potential not exceeding three million and which do not make measurements on strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory may be located anywhere for instrumentation or other purposes not inconsistent with the ABM Treaty;

(d) non-phased-array radars may be located anywhere for instrumentation or other purposes not inconsistent with the ABM Treaty.

SECOND, in connection with paragraph 7 of Section II of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, the Parties understand that ABM radars, radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack, radars used for tracking objects in outer space or as national technical means of verification, as well as radars constructed and used only as instrumentation equipment for testing of any types of weapons or military equipment can, when operating in accordance with their missions, perform the function inherent to them of tracking strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory.

In addition to the aforementioned radars, both Parties have other radars, including phased-array radars, intended for various missions. When these radars are operating in accordance with their missions, strategic ballistic missiles or their elements might pass through the fields of view of these radars. The passing of strategic ballistic missiles or their elements through the fields of view of such radars will not be equated with tracking of such missiles by these radars and cannot give grounds for either Party to consider that in these cases the radars are being tested in an ABM mode.

If ambiguities arise in the future regarding application of the term "tested in an ABM mode" to individual radars which track strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, or regarding determination of whether these radars are ABM radars or radars which are not ABM radars, such questions will be subject to consultation in the Standing Consultative Commission in accordance with Article XIII of the ABM Treaty.

THIRD, the Parties, in connection with the Agreed Statement Regarding Certain Provisions of the ABM Treaty, have the common understanding that the Agreed Statement will be used by the Parties in their implementation of those provisions of the ABM Treaty, beginning on the date of initialing of the Agreed Statement by the U.S. and USSR SCC Commissioners, that is, November 1, 1978. Like the statements in connection with paragraphs II.6 and II.7 of the Agreed Statement, this common understanding constitutes a component part of the general understanding reached between the Parties with regard to certain provisions of the ABM Treaty.



Geneva
June 6, 1985

Standing Consultative Commission

Common Understanding

Related To Paragraph 2 Of Section III Of The Agreed Statement Of November 1, 1978, Regarding Certain Provisions Of Articles II, IV, And VI Of The Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Limitation Of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems Of May 26, 1972, And The Utilization Of Air Defense Radars At The Test Ranges Referred To In Article IV Of That Treaty

In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties thereto, in further development of the agreement recorded in paragraph 2 of Section III of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, with a view to precluding the possibility of ambiguous situations at the test ranges referred to in Article IV of the Treaty, have, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, additionally agreed that:

each Party will refrain from launching strategic ballistic missiles to the area of such a test range or from launching ABM interceptor missiles at that test range concurrent with the operation of air defense components located at that range;

in agreeing to the foregoing the Parties recognize the possibility of circumstances -- the appearance of a hostile or unidentified aircraft -- in which, for the purpose of providing for air defense, a necessity for the operation of air defense components, located at the test range for carrying out air defense functions including providing for range safety, may arise unexpectedly during the launch of a strategic ballistic missile to the area of the test range or during the launch of an ABM interceptor missile at that range. Should such an event occur, the Party which had such a concurrent operation will, as soon as possible, but within thirty days, provide notification to the other Party describing the circumstances of the event. It will, if necessary, on a voluntary basis, also inform the other Party about the event or hold consultations with it within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, as provided for in Article XIII of the Treaty and paragraph 4 of the Regulations of the Standing Consultative Commission.

This Common Understanding constitutes a component part of the agreement reached between the Parties with regard to the provisions of paragraph 2 of Section III of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, and does not affect other provisions of that Agreed Statement or the provisions of the common understandings thereto reached by Commissioners in the Standing Consultative Commission on November 1, 1978.

The provisions of this Common Understanding will be used by the Parties in their implementation of the provisions of the Treaty and the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, beginning on the date of signature of this Common Understanding, that is, June 6, 1985.

If a scroll bar appears below the following table, swipe the table to move left/right of the dashed line.

COMMISSIONER,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

COMMISSIONER,
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS



Standing Consultative Commission Documents of September 26, 1997

September 26, 1997

Memorandum Of Understanding Relating To The Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Limitation Of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems Of May 26, 1972

The United States of America, and the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, hereinafter referred to for purposes of this Memorandum as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) Successor States,

Recognizing the importance of preserving the viability of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, with the aim of maintaining strategic stability,

Recognizing the changes in the political situation resulting from the establishment of new independent states on the territory of the former USSR,

Have, in connection with the Treaty, agreed as follows:

Article I

The United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, upon entry into force of this Memorandum, shall constitute the Parties to the Treaty.

Article II

The USSR Successor States shall assume the rights and obligations of the former USSR under the Treaty and its associated documents.

Article III

Each USSR Successor State shall implement the provisions of the Treaty with regard to its territory and with regard to its activities, wherever such activities are carried out by that State, independently or in cooperation with any other State.

Article IV

For purposes of Treaty implementation:

(a) the term "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" shall mean the USSR Successor States;

(b) the terms "national territory" and "territory of its country" when used to refer to the former USSR shall mean the combined national territories of the USSR Successor States, and the term "periphery of its national territory" when used to refer to the former USSR shall mean the periphery of the combined national territories of those States; and

(c) the term "capital" when used to refer to the capital of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Article III of the Treaty and the Protocol thereto of July 3, 1974, shall continue to mean the city of Moscow.

Article V

A USSR Successor State or USSR Successor States may continue to use any facility that is subject to the provisions of the Treaty and that is currently located on the territory of any State that is not a Party to the Treaty, with the consent of such State, and provided that the use of such facility shall remain consistent with the provisions of the Treaty.

Article VI

The USSR Successor States shall collectively be limited at any one time to a single anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system deployment area and to a total of no more than fifteen ABM launchers at ABM test ranges, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and its associated documents, including the Protocols of July 3, 1974.

Article VII

The obligations contained in Article IX of the Treaty and Agreed Statement "G" Regarding the Treaty shall not apply to transfers between or among the USSR Successor States.

Article VIII

The Standing Consultative Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, shall function in the manner provided for by the Treaty and the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of December 21, 1972, as well as by the Regulations of the Commission, which shall reflect the multilateral character of the Treaty and the equal legal status of the Parties in reaching decisions in the Commission.

Article IX

1. This Memorandum shall be subject to ratification or approval by the signatory States, in accordance with the constitutional procedures of those States.

2. The functions of the depositary of this Memorandum shall be exercised by the Government of the United States of America.

3. This Memorandum shall enter into force on the date when the Governments of all the signatory States have deposited instruments of ratification or approval of this Memorandum and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.

4. Each State that has ratified or approved this Memorandum shall also be bound by the provisions of the First Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972.

DONE at New York City on September 26, 1997, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
Madeleine Albright

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS:
I. Antonovich

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN:
K. Tokayev

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:
Y. Primakov

FOR UKRAINE:
H. Udovenko



September 26, 1997


Standing Consultative Commission

First Agreed Statement Relating To The Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Limitation Of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems Of May 26, 1972

In connection with the provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties to the Treaty have, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, reached agreement on the following:

1. Land-based, sea-based, and air-based interceptor missiles, interceptor missile launchers, and radars, other than anti-ballistic missile (ABM) interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, respectively, shall be deemed, within the meaning of paragraph (a) of Article VI of the Treaty, not to have been given capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory and not to have been tested in an ABM mode, if, in the course of testing them separately or in a system:

(a) the velocity of the interceptor missile does not exceed 3 km/sec over any part of its flight trajectory;

(b) the velocity of the ballistic target-missile does not exceed 5 km/sec over any part of its flight trajectory; and

(c) the range of the ballistic target-missile does not exceed 3,500 kilometers.

2. The Parties have additionally agreed on reciprocal implementation of the confidence-building measures set forth in the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures Related to Systems to Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles of September 26, 1997.

3. This Agreed Statement shall enter into force simultaneously with entry into force of the Memorandum of Understanding of September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972.

DONE at New York City on September 26, 1997, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
Stanley Riveles

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS:
S. Agurtsou

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN:
K. Zhanbatyrov

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:
V. Koltunov

FOR UKRAINE:
O. Rybak



Common Understandings Related To The First Agreed Statement Of September 26, 1997, Relating To The Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Limitation Of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems Of May 26, 1972

I

The term "interceptor missile," as used in the First Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, shall refer to any missile subject to the provisions of paragraph (a) of Article VI of the Treaty if such a missile:

(a) has been developed by a Party as a missile to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles; or

(b) has been declared by a Party as a missile to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles; or

(c) has been tested by a Party even once with the use of a ballistic target-missile.

With respect to subparagraphs (a), (b), or (c), such a missile shall be considered an interceptor missile in all its launches.

II

The provisions of paragraph 1 of the First Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, do not supersede or amend any provision of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, and do not alter the meaning of the term "tested in an ABM mode" as that term is used in the Treaty, including the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978.

III

The Parties have agreed that, for the purposes of the First Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, the velocity of an interceptor missile as well as the velocity of a ballistic target-missile shall be determined in an earth-centered coordinate system fixed in relation to the Earth.

IV

The Parties have agreed that, for the purposes of the First Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, the velocity of space-based interceptor missiles shall be considered to exceed 3 km/sec.

These Common Understandings shall be considered an attachment to the First Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, and shall constitute an integral part thereof.


September 26, 1997

Standing Consultative Commission

Second Agreed Statement Relating To The Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Limitation Of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems Of May 26, 1972

In connection with the provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties to the Treaty,

Expressing their commitment to strengthening strategic stability and international security,

Emphasizing the importance of further reductions in strategic offensive arms,

Recognizing the fundamental significance of the Treaty for the above objectives,

Recognizing the necessity for effective systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles,

Considering it their common task to preserve the Treaty, prevent its circumvention and enhance its viability,

Relying on the following principles that have served as a basis for reaching this agreement:

-- the Parties are committed to the Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability;

-- the Parties must have the option to establish and to deploy effective systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles, and such activity must not lead to violation or circumvention of the Treaty;

-- systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles may be deployed by each Party which will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of another Party and which will not be tested to give such systems that capability;

-- systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles will not be deployed by the Parties for use against each other; and

-- the scale of deployment -- in number and geographic scope -- of systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles by any Party will be consistent with programs for ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles confronting that Party;

Have, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, with respect to systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles with interceptor missiles whose velocity exceeds 3 km/sec over any part of their flight trajectory, hereinafter referred to as systems covered by this Agreed Statement, reached agreement on the following:

1. Each Party undertakes that, in the course of testing, separately or in a system, land-based, sea-based, and air-based interceptor missiles, interceptor missile launchers, and radars, of systems covered by this Agreed Statement, which are not anti-ballistic missile (ABM) interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, respectively:

(a) the velocity of the ballistic target-missile will not exceed 5 km/sec over any part of its flight trajectory; and

(b) the range of the ballistic target-missile will not exceed 3,500 kilometers.

2. Each Party, in order to preclude the possibility of ambiguous situations or misunderstandings related to compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy space-based interceptor missiles to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles, or space-based components based on other physical principles, whether or not part of a system, that are capable of substituting for such interceptor missiles.

3. In order to enhance confidence in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, the Parties shall implement the provisions of the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures Related to Systems to Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles of September 26, 1997, hereinafter referred to as the Confidence-Building Measures Agreement, with respect to systems covered by this Agreed Statement and not subject to the Confidence-Building Measures Agreement on the date of its entry into force. Each such system shall become subject to the provisions of the Confidence-Building Measures Agreement no later than 180 days in advance of the planned date of the first launch of an interceptor missile of that system. All information provided for in the Confidence-Building Measures Agreement shall initially be provided no later than 30 days after such a system becomes subject to the provisions of the Confidence-Building Measures Agreement.

4. In order to ensure the viability of the Treaty as technologies related to systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles evolve, and in accordance with Article XIII of the Treaty, the Parties undertake to hold consultations and discuss, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, questions or concerns that any Party may have regarding activities involving systems covered by this Agreed Statement, including questions and concerns related to the implementation of the provisions of this Agreed Statement.

5. This Agreed Statement shall enter into force simultaneously with entry into force of the Memorandum of Understanding of September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972.

DONE at New York City on September 26, 1997, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
Stanley Riveles

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS:
S. Agurtsou

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN:
K. Zhanbatyrov

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:
V. Koltunov

FOR UKRAINE:
O. Rybak



Common Understandings Related To The Second Agreed Statement Of September 26, 1997, Relating To The Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Limitation Of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems Of May 26, 1972

I

The term "interceptor missile," as used in the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, shall refer to any missile subject to the provisions of paragraph (a) of Article VI of the Treaty if such a missile:

(a) has been developed by a Party as a missile to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles; or

(b) has been declared by a Party as a missile to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles; or

(c) has been tested by a Party even once with the use of a ballistic target-missile.

With respect to subparagraphs (a), (b), or (c), such a missile shall be considered an interceptor missile in all its launches.

II

The Parties have agreed that, for the purposes of the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, the velocity of an interceptor missile as well as the velocity of a ballistic target-missile shall be determined in an earth-centered coordinate system fixed in relation to the Earth.

III

The Parties have agreed that for the purposes of the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, the velocity of space-based interceptor missiles shall be considered to exceed 3 km/sec.

IV

For systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles with interceptor missiles whose velocity exceeds 3 km/sec over any part of their flight trajectory, that become subject to the Confidence-Building Measures Agreement in accordance with paragraph 3 of the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, the Parties understand that, in connection with the provisions of paragraph 2(b) of Section IV of the Confidence-Building Measures Agreement, detailed information on such systems shall be provided in a form and scope as agreed upon by the Parties.

These Common Understandings shall be considered an attachment to the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, and shall constitute an integral part thereof.


September 26, 1997

Agreement On Confidence-Building Measures Related To Systems To Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles

The States that have signed this Agreement, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Desiring to promote reciprocal openness, greater trust between the Parties, and the preservation of strategic stability,

Declaring their intention to implement, on a reciprocal basis, confidence-building measures with respect to systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles,

Have agreed as follows:

I. General Provisions

1. Systems subject to this Agreement shall be: for the United States of America -- the Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) System and the Navy Theater-Wide Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Program, known to the other Parties by the same names; for the Russian Federation -- the S-300V system, known to the United States of America as the SA-12 system; for the Republic of Belarus -- the S-300V system, known to the United States of America as the SA-12 system; for Ukraine -- the S-300V system, known to the United States of America as the SA-12 system; and other systems as agreed upon by the Parties in the future.

2. The Parties shall conduct an initial exchange of information and notifications, as provided for in this Agreement, no later than 90 days after entry into force of this Agreement, reflecting the status as of the date of its entry into force, and update this information annually, unless otherwise agreed. Information shall be updated reflecting the status as of January 1 of each year and provided no later than April 1 of each year.

II. Notifications

1. Each Party shall provide notifications to the other Parties of test ranges and other test areas where launches of interceptor missiles of systems subject to this Agreement will take place. Notifications of test ranges and other test areas shall include the names of ranges (test areas) and their locations. Such notifications shall be provided either within 30 days after entry into force of this Agreement, or no later than 90 days in advance of the first launch of an interceptor missile of a system subject to this Agreement at each test range (test area).

2. Each Party shall provide notification to the other Parties of each launch of an interceptor missile of systems subject to this Agreement, if during that launch a ballistic target-missile is used. In this connection:

(a) an interceptor missile launch notification shall specify the name of the test range (test area) where the interceptor missile launch will take place; the type (designation) of the interceptor missile; the planned date of the interceptor missile launch; the planned launch point of the interceptor missile (geographic coordinates; for air-based systems the geographic coordinates of the projection of the planned launch point of the interceptor missile onto the Earth's surface shall be specified); the planned launch point of the ballistic target-missile (geographic coordinates);

(b) each interceptor missile launch notification shall be provided no later than 10 days in advance of the planned date of the interceptor missile launch and shall be effective for seven days beginning with the planned date of that launch; and

(c) if the launch of the interceptor missile will not occur or has not occurred within the specified 7-day period, the Party that planned to carry out the launch of the interceptor missile shall provide a notification thereof no later than 24 hours after the expiration of the 7-day period. Such a notification shall state that the interceptor missile launch has not occurred and shall either specify a new launch date, which will establish the beginning of a new 7-day period, or state that a notification of a new launch date will be made in accordance with the procedure specified in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph.

III. Demonstrations of Systems and Observations of Tests

Any Party may on a voluntary basis arrange, for any other Party or Parties, a demonstration of its systems or their components subject to this Agreement or an observation of their tests. In each specific case, the participating Parties shall agree in advance on the purpose of, and the arrangements for, such demonstrations and observations.

IV. Assurances

Each Party shall provide assurances that it will not deploy systems subject to this Agreement in numbers and locations so that these systems could pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of another Party. The measures used to provide such assurances shall include:

1. Each Party shall provide to the other Parties, in a form and scope as agreed upon by the Parties, an assessment of the programs with respect to the development, testing and deployment of ballistic missiles, other than strategic ballistic missiles, confronting that Party.

2. For each of its systems subject to this Agreement, each Party shall provide the following information:

(a) the name, type (designation), and basing mode of the system as well as of its interceptor missiles, launchers, and associated radars;

(b) the general concept of operation; the status of plans and programs; and, in addition, for systems in testing, the number of systems it plans to possess; the information shall be provided in a form and scope as agreed upon by the Parties;

(c) the class and type of basing platform:

(i) for land-based systems: the number of launchers in a battalion;

(ii) for sea-based systems: the class and type of each ship, and the number of launchers on a ship of that class capable of launching interceptor missiles of each type;

(iii) for air-based systems: the type of each aircraft, and the number of interceptor missiles each aircraft is capable of carrying;

(d) the number of interceptor missiles of a fully loaded launcher.

3. For components of each of its systems subject to this Agreement, each Party shall provide the following information:

(a) for a completely assembled interceptor missile: the number of stages, the length, the maximum diameter, the type of propellant (solid or liquid), maximum velocity demonstrated during launches, and the length and diameter of the interceptor missile launch canister;

(b) for the interceptor missile launcher: the maximum number of interceptor missiles of a fully loaded launcher; and

(c) for the radar: the frequency band (in designations adopted by the International Telecommunication Union) and potential, expressed as a value that is not exceeded by the radar's potential. The potential of a radar shall mean the product of its mean emitted power in watts and its antenna area in square meters.

V. Additional Voluntary Measures

Each Party may provide on a voluntary basis any other information or any other notifications not specified elsewhere in this Agreement. The topics, amount, and time frame for such information and notifications shall be such as each Party determines.

VI. Implementation of the Agreement

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Agreement, the Parties, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission established in accordance with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, shall consider:

(a) issues concerning implementation of the obligations assumed under this Agreement, as well as related situations which may be considered ambiguous; and

(b) amendments to the provisions of this Agreement and other possible proposals on further increasing its viability.

2. The Parties shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center channels or the equivalent government-to-government communications links for providing the notifications and for exchanging the information provided for in Sections II, IV and V of this Agreement.

VII. Confidentiality

Each Party undertakes not to release to the public the information provided pursuant to this Agreement except with the express consent of the Party that provided such information.

VIII. Entry into Force and Duration

This Agreement shall enter into force simultaneously with entry into force of the First Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and shall remain in force so long as either of those Agreed Statements remains in force.

DONE at New York City on September 26, 1997, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
Stanley Riveles

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS:
S. Agurtsou

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN:
K. Zhanbatyrov

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:
V. Koltunov

FOR UKRAINE:
O. Rybak



September 26, 1997
New York City

Standing Consultative Commission

Joint Statement On The Annual Exchange Of Information On The Status Of Plans And Programs With Respect To Systems To Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles

1. The Parties understand that in implementing the provisions of paragraph 2(b) of Section IV of the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures Related to Systems to Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles of September 26, 1997, each Party will provide information annually on the status of its plans and programs with respect to systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles that includes:

(a) whether or not that Party has plans before April 1999 to test, against a ballistic target-missile, land-based, sea-based or air-based interceptor missiles whose velocity exceeds 3 km/sec over any part of their flight trajectory;

(b) whether or not that Party has plans to develop such systems with interceptor missiles whose velocity over any part of their flight trajectory exceeds 5.5 km/sec for land-based and air-based systems or 4.5 km/sec for sea-based systems; and

(c) whether or not that Party has plans to test such systems against ballistic target-missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles or against reentry vehicles deployed or planned to be deployed on strategic ballistic missiles.

2. The Parties understand that should any Party have questions or concerns regarding activity related to any change in the statement on plans of any other Party, the Parties will, in accordance with Article XIII of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty, and Section VI of the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures Related to Systems to Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles of September 26, 1997, conduct consultations, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, to discuss such questions or concerns, as well as possible proposals for further increasing the viability of the Treaty, including possible proposals to amend the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997.

S.R. (United States of America)

S.A. (Republic of Belarus)

K.Z. (Republic of Kazakhstan

V.K. (Russian Federation)

O.R. (Ukraine)



September 26, 1997
New York City

Statement By The United States Of America On Plans With Respect To Systems To Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles

The United States of America states that, with regard to systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles, it has no plans:

(a) before April 1999 to test, against a ballistic target-missile, land-based, sea-based or air-based interceptor missiles whose velocity exceeds 3 km/sec over any part of their flight trajectory;

(b) to develop such systems with interceptor missiles whose velocity over any part of their flight trajectory exceeds 5.5 km/sec for land-based and air-based systems or 4.5 km/sec for sea-based systems; or

(c) to test such systems against ballistic target-missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles or against reentry vehicles deployed or planned to be deployed on strategic ballistic missiles.


September 26, 1997
New York City

Statement By The Republic Of Belarus On Plans With Respect To Systems To Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles

The Republic of Belarus states that, with regard to systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles, it has no plans:

(a) before April 1999 to test, against a ballistic target-missile, land-based, sea-based or air-based interceptor missiles whose velocity exceeds 3 km/sec over any part of their flight trajectory;

(b) to develop such systems with interceptor missiles whose velocity over any part of their flight trajectory exceeds 5.5 km/sec for land-based and air-based systems or 4.5 km/sec for sea-based systems; or

(c) to test such systems against ballistic target-missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles or against reentry vehicles deployed or planned to be deployed on strategic ballistic missiles.


September 26, 1997
New York City

Statement By The Republic Of Kazakhstan On Plans With Respect To Systems To Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles

The Republic of Kazakhstan states that, with regard to systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles, it has no plans:

(a) before April 1999 to test, against a ballistic target-missile, land-based, sea-based or air-based interceptor missiles whose velocity exceeds 3 km/sec over any part of their flight trajectory;

(b) to develop such systems with interceptor missiles whose velocity over any part of their flight trajectory exceeds 5.5 km/sec for land-based and air-based systems or 4.5 km/sec for sea-based systems; or

(c) to test such systems against ballistic target-missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles or against reentry vehicles deployed or planned to be deployed on strategic ballistic missiles.


September 26, 1997
New York City

Statement By The Russian Federation On Plans With Respect To Systems To Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles

The Russian Federation states that, with regard to systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles, it has no plans:

(a) before April 1999 to test, against a ballistic target-missile, land-based, sea-based or air-based interceptor missiles whose velocity exceeds 3 km/sec over any part of their flight trajectory;

(b) to develop such systems with interceptor missiles whose velocity over any part of their flight trajectory exceeds 5.5 km/sec for land-based and air-based systems or 4.5 km/sec for sea-based systems; or

(c) to test such systems against ballistic target-missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles or against reentry vehicles deployed or planned to be deployed on strategic ballistic missiles.


September 26, 1997
New York City

Statement By Ukraine On Plans With Respect To Systems To Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles

Ukraine states that, with regard to systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles, it has no plans:

(a) before April 1999 to test, against a ballistic target-missile, land-based, sea-based or air-based interceptor missiles whose velocity exceeds 3 km/sec over any part of their flight trajectory;

(b) to develop such systems with interceptor missiles whose velocity over any part of their flight trajectory exceeds 5.5 km/sec for land-based and air-based systems or 4.5 km/sec for sea-based systems; or

(c) to test such systems against ballistic target-missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles or against reentry vehicles deployed or planned to be deployed on strategic ballistic missiles.


September 26, 1997

Regulations Of The Standing Consultative Commission

In accordance with Article VIII of the Memorandum of Understanding of September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine have agreed as follows:

I

1. Each Party shall have the right to be represented on the Standing Consultative Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission.

2. Each Party shall designate a Commissioner, a Deputy Commissioner, and such members, advisors, and experts of its delegation to the Commission as it deems necessary.

3. Each Party shall have the right to participate in all activities of the Commission.

II

1. At any time, Commissioners may raise for discussion any matter that is within the competence of the Commission.

2. Commissioners may also, at any time, transmit to or request from the other Commissioners, oral or written communications.

3. Commissioners shall, when possible, inform each other in advance of matters to be raised for discussion in the Commission.

4. Commissioners shall alternately preside over the meetings of a session of the Commission, unless otherwise agreed.

5. Each Party may direct that the authorities and functions of a Commissioner may be exercised by a Deputy Commissioner or other authorized person.

6. The Commission may establish working groups to undertake such activities as it may direct, including studying and preparing specific matters.

III

1. The Commission shall be convened for sessions no less than twice a year. Such sessions proposed during the intersessional period shall be convened on a date, no later than 45 days after the date initially proposed, and with a duration agreed to by the United States of America and at least one other Party.

2. Agreement on the commencement date and duration of a forthcoming session may be reached by consensus during a session in progress.

3. During the intersessional period, any Commissioner may propose convening a session of the Commission by making a proposal or counter-proposal to the other Commissioners on the commencement date and duration of the forthcoming session at least 30 days in advance of the proposed commencement date of the session.

4. The agenda for a session of the Commission shall include all matters proposed by any Commissioner and communicated to the other Commissioners in advance of the session. Any matter raised during the session by any Commissioner may be considered in the Commission.

5. Sessions of the Commission shall be held in the city of Geneva, unless otherwise agreed.

IV

1. Any matter within the competence of the Commission may be the subject of an agreement.

2. Agreements may be recorded in any form acceptable to the Parties participating in the session.

3. The negotiation of the text of an agreement during a session of the Commission shall be done on the basis of consensus of the Parties participating in the session.

4. The United States of America shall notify, through diplomatic channels, all Parties not represented in a session of the Commission, of the final text of an agreement no later than 15 days after the final text has been negotiated in that session of the Commission.

5. A Party shall approve an agreement negotiated in the Commission by signing it in the Commission or by submitting an instrument of approval. In addition, an agreement shall be considered approved by a Party if it fails to submit a diplomatic note in accordance with subparagraph 7(b) of this Section, or if its objections are withdrawn pursuant to subparagraph 7(b) or paragraph 8 of this Section.

6. Each agreement negotiated in the Commission shall be considered adopted when all Parties have approved the agreement in accordance with paragraph 5 of this Section and shall enter into force on the date of its adoption, unless all Parties have agreed on a later date.

7. A Party that has not approved an agreement negotiated during a session of the Commission shall be bound by the agreement in one of two ways:

(a) if it submits an instrument of approval to all other Parties; or

(b) if it fails to submit a diplomatic note, specifying its objections to the agreement, to all other Parties within 30 days after receipt of a notification pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Section. Withdrawal of all of its objections by a Party shall be regarded as its approval of that agreement.

8. Any diplomatic note submitted in accordance with subparagraph 7(b) of this Section shall include the express intention of the objecting Party to address its objection in the next session of the Commission. Failure of an objecting Party to attend such session shall be considered its withdrawal of its objection unless that objection is renewed by diplomatic note to all other Parties prior to the closing of that session.

9. If the text of an agreement, negotiated in the Commission in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Section, is amended in order to resolve any Party's objection or for any other reason, the amended agreement shall constitute a new agreement subject to the provisions of paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Section.

V

1. Matters raised and discussed in the Commission, as well as the results of discussions, and any agreements reached, may be recorded in documents which shall be done in English and Russian, both texts being equally authentic, and each Party shall be provided with a complete set of such documents.

2. The Commission shall conduct its proceedings in private and may not make its proceedings public without the express consent of all Commissioners. The texts of agreements adopted by the Parties may be made public, unless otherwise agreed.

3. The official languages of the Commission shall be English and Russian.

4. Each Party shall bear the expenses connected with its participation in the Commission.

VI

1. These Regulations shall supersede the Regulations of the Standing Consultative Commission approved in accordance with the Protocol of May 30, 1973. The provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of December 21, 1972, shall apply to the extent that they are consistent with the provisions of these Regulations.

2. These Regulations shall enter into force simultaneously with entry into force of the Memorandum of Understanding of September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972. The Commission may revise, repeal, or replace these Regulations to the extent and in such manner as the Commission deems necessary.

DONE at New York City on September 26, 1997, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
Stanley Riveles

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS:
S. Agurtsou

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN:
K. Zhanbatyrov

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:
V. Koltunov

FOR UKRAINE:
O. Rybak



Five-Year ABM Treaty Reviews

Geneva
November 21, 1977

Communique Of The US-USSR Standing Consultative Commission On The Review Of The Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Limitation Of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems Of May 26, 1972

In accordance with the provisions of Article XIV of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, which entered into force on October 3, 1972, and was amended by the Protocol thereto of July 3, 1974, the Parties to the Treaty, together conducted a review of the Treaty after five years of its operation. By agreement between the Parties, the review was conducted from November 4 to November 21, 1977, in a special session of the Standing Consultative Commission which was convened for that purpose.

The Parties agree that the Treaty is operating effectively, thus demonstrating the mutual commitment of the USA and the USSR to the goal of limiting nuclear arms and to the principle of equal security, serves the security interests of both Parties, decreases the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, facilitates progress in the further limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms, and requires no amendment at this time.

The Parties note, in connection with the conduct of the review, that during the aforementioned period of operation of the Treaty consultations and discussions have been held in the Standing Consultative Commission on matters pertaining to promoting the implementation of the objectives and provisions of the Treaty. These consultations and discussions have been productive and useful in clarifying the mutual understanding of the Parties concerning certain provisions of the Treaty, in working out appropriate procedures for implementation of its provisions, and in resolving a number of questions related to complete and precise implementation of the provisions of the Treaty.

Mindful of their obligation to conduct together a review of the Treaty at five-year intervals, the Parties will continue the process of consultation concerning the implementation, as well as the enhancement of the viability and effectiveness, of the provisions of the Treaty.

The Parties reaffirm their mutual commitment to the objectives and provisions of the Treaty and their resolve to maintain and further increase the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.


Geneva
December 15, 1982

Communique Of The US-USSR Standing Consultative Commission On The Second Review Of The Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Limitation Of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

Pursuant to the provisions of Article XIV of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, which entered into force on October 3, 1972, and was amended by the Protocol thereto of July 3, 1974, the Parties together conducted a review of the Treaty after its second five-year period of operation. By agreement between the Parties, the review was conducted from November 9, 1982, to December 15, 1982, in a session of the Standing Consultative Commission specially convened for that purpose.

During the course of the review, the Parties carefully examined the Preamble and Articles of the Treaty and Protocol and evaluated their implementation in the period covered by the review.

The United States and the Soviet Union each reaffirmed its commitment to the aims and objectives of the Treaty, and to the process of consultation within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission to promote the implementation of the objectives and provisions of the Treaty and the Protocol thereto of July 3, 1974.


Geneva, Switzerland
August 31, 1988

United States Unilateral Statement Following ABM Treaty Review

The United States and the Soviet Union conducted the third Review of the ABM Treaty as required at five-year intervals by the provisions of that Treaty. The Review was conducted from August 24, 1988 to August 31, 1988. The U.S. Delegation was led by William F. Burns, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

During the Review, the United States emphasized the importance of Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty, which are a threat to the viability of the Treaty. Throughout the Review Conference, the Soviet Union gave no indication that it was prepared to correct the violations without linking their agreement to do so to unacceptable demands.

Specifically, the United States discussed with the Soviets its serious concern that the Soviet Union's deployment of a large phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk constitutes a significant violation of a central element of the ABM Treaty. Such radars take years to build and are a key to providing a nation-wide defense -- which is prohibited by the Treaty. The Treaty's restrictions on the location, orientation, and functions of such radars are, thus, essential provisions of the Treaty. Hence, the Krasnoyarsk violation is very serious, particularly when it is recognized that the radar constitutes one of a network of such radars that have the inherent potential for attack assessment in support of ballistic missile defense.

In order for the Soviet Union to correct this violation, the Krasnoyarsk radar must be dismantled. The United States has been urging the Soviet Union for more than five years, both in the Standing Consultative Commission established by the Treaty and in other diplomatic channels, to correct this clear violation by dismantling the radar. During the Review, the U.S. outlined the specific Soviet actions necessary to correct this violation in a verifiable manner. The United States has also made clear that the continuing existence of the Krasnoyarsk radar makes it impossible to conclude any future arms agreements in the START or Defense and Space areas. The United States has observed a slowdown in construction, but this slowdown, or even a full construction freeze, would not be sufficient either to correct the Treaty violation or to meet U.S. concerns about the significant impact of the violation.

The United States cannot continue indefinitely to tolerate this clear and serious Treaty violation. The violation must be corrected. Until the Krasnoyarsk radar is dismantled, it will continue to raise the issue of material breach and proportionate responses. Nothing that occurred during the Review Conference or its completion should be interpreted as derogating in any way from rights the U.S. has under international law with regard to any Soviet violation of the Treaty. Since the Soviet Union was not prepared to satisfy U.S. concerns with respect to the Krasnoyarsk radar violation at the Review Conference, the United States will have to consider declaring this continuing violation a material breach of the Treaty. In this connection, the United States reserves all its rights, consistent with international law, to take appropriate and proportionate responses in the future.

During the ABM Treaty Review, the United States also discussed the violation of the ABM Treaty involving the illegally deployed radars at Gomel. The U.S. also reserves its rights to respond to this violation in an appropriate and proportionate manner. The United States also discussed with the Soviet Union a number of ABM-related compliance concerns, the totality of which suggests that the Soviet Union may be preparing a prohibited ABM territorial defense. This is a particularly serious concern. As the President has noted, such a development "would have profound implications for the vital East-West balance. A unilateral Soviet territorial ABM capability acquired in violation of the ABM Treaty could erode our deterrent and leave doubts about its capability."

The U.S. continues to have deep, continuing concerns about the implications of the pattern of Soviet non-compliance with the ABM Treaty. As President Reagan observed in December 1987:

No violations of a treaty can be considered to be a minor matter, nor can there be confidence in agreements if a country can pick and choose which provisions of an agreement it will comply with . . . . correcting their violations will be a true test of Soviet willingness to enter a more constructive relationship and broaden the basis for cooperation between our two countries on security matters.

The U.S. will not accept Soviet violations or a double standard of Treaty compliance, and reserve the right to take appropriate and proportionate responses in the future.


September 1, 1988

Soviet Statement in Connection with the Third Review of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty Between the USSR and the United States on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, talks were held in Geneva August 24-31, 1988 between representatives of the USSR and the United States to review the Treaty after another five years of its operation.

The Soviet side proceeded on the basis that the review should lead to the strengthening of the ABM Treaty, which is of key significance for ensuring further progress in the disarmament sphere and strengthening strategic stability and international security. The preservation and strengthening of this Treaty is the common concern of its participants -- the USSR and the United States.

The USSR delegation conducted all the discussions in a non-confrontational spirit, with the aim of seeking mutually acceptable decisions both as regards the political reaffirmation of the sides' commitment to the objectives and tasks of the Treaty, and as regards the quest for concrete technical decisions that could lead to the removal of mutual concerns in unclear situations that have arisen in the exchange of opinions between the sides.

The Soviet delegation sought to ensure that the reaffirmation of commitment to the Treaty and the agreed outlines concerning ways of eliminating the two sides' concerns would be reflected in a joint statement or communique, that would be published as a result of the review of the Treaty's operation. Unfortunately, this proved impossible because of the American side's reluctance to give practical consideration to the Soviet side's concerns and its desire to reduce the entire review of the operation of the ABM Treaty to the acceptance by the Soviet side of the American demand for the dismantling of the Kranoyarsk radar station, which does not yet exist.

On the basis of the results of the discussion, the American side published a unilateral statement which gives an unobjective assessment of the existing situation.

The present statement by the USSR delegation sets forth the facts that give a true picture of the situation as regards compliance with the ABM Treaty and the nature of the discussions that took place.

On the question of the radar station under construction in the Krasnoyarsk region, the Soviet side once again confirmed that this station is intended for the tracking of space objects and does not come under the ABM Treaty restrictions. Despite this, the United States continues to attribute missile attack warning functions to it. These American claims are based not on facts, but on assumptions, and subjective evaluations.

In order to show goodwill, and in an attempt to remove the concern that had arisen on the part of the United States, we expressed readiness to dismantle the equipment of this station in a way that would be verifiable and would cause the United States no doubts, if an accord were reached on compliance with the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972.

The American side also expressed concern in connection with the relocation of individual components of radar stations known in the United States as "Pawn Shop" and "Flat Twin" from the Sary Shagan testing range to the Gomel region, which the American side regards, without foundation, as the start of the deployment of ABM radar stations.

On the basis of the facts we cited and a visit by US official representatives to the Gomel region, the American side saw for itself that in fact the individual components of the "Flat Twin" radar station and the "Pawn Shop" van are being used in the region in question in order to set up measurement testing grounds for the testing and tuning of mirror antennas that are used widely in the country's national economy. These operations are in no way contrary to the ABM Treaty.

At the same time, we stated that in the context of removing the two sides' concerns over questions of compliance with the ABM Treaty, the Soviet side would be prepared for a radical solution to the question of the remaining individual components of the "Flat Twin" radar station and the "Pawn Shop" van to which the American side refers.

The American side once again raised the question that the Soviet Union could be preparing an ABM defense system for its territory. Here, the assertions cited earlier were enumerated, assertions to which the Soviet side had supplied the necessary replies. Neither any one of the questions raised individually nor all of them together provide grounds for the expression of such concern by the United States.

The Soviet side also submitted a number of constructive proposals which, in the event of their implementation, would promote the resolution of other questions raised on both sides, namely:

-- To draw up an accord to the effect that the sides would inform each other beforehand about plans for the construction of large phased-array radar stations and indicate their purpose.

-- To agree on features making it possible to distinguish ABM radar stations from other radar stations.

-- To draw up procedures for the dismantling or destruction of ABM radar stations on testing ranges.

-- To permit Soviet representatives to visit the American radar station in Greenland and the construction of a launch site for "balloon rockets" on Shemya Island, to enable the Soviet Union to study on the basis of factual material US actions which, according to the information available, it assesses either as a violation of the Treaty (the Greenland radar station) or as a situation causing concern (the Shemya Island construction site).

Unfortunately, our proposals did not meet with a positive response from the American side. Contrary to the true state of affairs, it continues to issue unfounded denials or to claim that it does not see that serious Soviet concerns exist with regard to US compliance with Treaty commitments. The American side did not respond to some of our proposals, and its answers on the other questions cannot be deemed satisfactory.

Nor did the American side show willingness to take any steps to rectify the violations of the ABM Treaty which it has committed.

Since 1975, the Soviet side has been expressing concern over the US deployment of large phased-array radar stations of the "Pave Paws" type on US territory and elsewhere. The essence of our concern is that these large radar stations have parameters sufficient to carry out the tasks of ABM radar stations. In conjunction with the radar station at the Grand Forks base, these stations could provide a radar base for an ABM defense of US territory, which is incompatible with the provisions of Article 1 of the ABM Treaty prohibiting the creation of a base for ABM defense of the country's territory.

Particular concern is caused on the Soviet side by the US violation of the ABM Treaty in the deployment of a new "Pave Paws" large phased-array radar station in Greenland after the Treaty came into force, and the construction of a similar radar station in Britain. Under the ABM Treaty, the deployment of large phased-array radar stations having a potential exceeding 3 million watts is strictly regulated, taking into account the purpose of such radar stations. Missile attack warning radar stations with the above characteristics are permitted to be deployed only on the periphery of the national territory, oriented outward.

The American large phased-array radar station at Thule (Greenland) has a potential considerably in excess of 3 million watts. The Thule region does not constitute a position on the perimeter of US national territory. The American side itself has indicated that the radar station at Thule is intended for missile attack warning. Consequently, the deployment of a large phased-array radar station in the Thule region is a violation of the ABM Treaty.

The construction that has begun of a similar radar station at Fylingdales (Britain) is a similar violation.

The Soviet side also expressed other concerns with regard to US compliance with the provision of the ABM Treaty.

Seeking to find solutions to the specific issues that have arisen, the Soviet side demonstrated in practice its readiness to eliminate the two sides' concerns. Naturally, the quest for solutions should take place on a reciprocal basis and should not distract attention from the most important thing -- the sides' reaffirmation of their commitment to the objectives and provisions of the ABM Treaty.

Through no fault of ours, it proved impossible to achieve positive solutions to the questions examined at the talks. However, the Soviet side believes that joint efforts with the aim of seeking fundamental solutions could be continued, and we will work toward this. In particular a mechanism established by the Treaty exists for the examination of concerns expressed by the sides -- the Standing Consultative Commission. The next session of the Soviet-American Standing Consultative Commission in Geneva in the fall of this year should be used specifically for this work, including work in accordance with instructions that could be given to the Standing Consultative Commission as a result of the forthcoming meeting between the USSR Foreign Minister and the US Secretary of State.



October 1, 1993

Joint Communique: Fourth Review Of The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty

The Fourth Review of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems was conducted in Geneva, Switzerland, from September 27 to October 1, 1993. The delegations that were present at the Review, representing the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States of America, exchanged views on the operation of the Treaty, on rights and obligations under the Treaty, and on the question of state succession. Commitment to the ABM Treaty was reaffirmed and it was agreed that maintaining the viability of the Treaty in view of political and technological changes remains important. The delegations at the Review advocated continued efforts to strengthen the ABM Treaty.

[This is a mobile copy of Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty)]